The USS Nimitz (CVN-68) Strike Group (SG) is operating in the Gulf of Orange. The threat warning condition is white and weapon status is hold; tensions are escalating. Political talks over threatened closure of the international straits have broken down. The sea combat commander (SCC) sits in his module on the Nimitz. His staff tactical watch officer reports that the USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) has two-guided missile patrol boats closing at high speed. The watch officer sees on his surface display that the contacts are five miles from the Fitzgerald, which is 25 miles from the Nimitz. When the SCC recommends that surface warning yellow and weapons tight be set, the SG commander glances at the knowledge wall in the Nimitz’s tactical flag command center and concurs.
The SCC directs his watch officer to inform the air defense commander on the USS Princeton (CG-59) of the approaching patrol boats. He directs the Fitzgerald to cover them with guns and Standard missiles, and watches his displays as the patrol boat symbols change to “covered.” On board the Fitzgerald, the captain and tactical action officer discuss hostile intent indications because the vessels continue to close on the Nimitz and are well within weapon-release range of the Fitzgerald.
Simultaneously, the SCC hears the air defense commander report an air contact to the SG commander and order a section of F/A-18E/Fs into attack position behind two inbound Orange aircraft. The SCC notes that the patrol boats are 20 miles from the Nimitz, with the Fitzgerald maintaining position between them and the carrier. The light airborne multipurpose system helicopter from the USS Chosin (CG-65) begins to track numerous small boats armed with rocket-propelled grenades approaching from an oil rig in international waters. The SCC discusses his intentions with the SG commander, but just before he responds, the radio crackles “stop the problem, stop the clock.”
Although the foregoing scenario has been played countless times in training at sea, it is unique that this training occurred on board the Nimitz Strike Group ships while pierside at the Naval Air Station North Island and Naval Station San Diego, California, and Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The new approach is integrated training of an entire SG's warfighting team using high-quality, scalable, multidimensional warfare simulation. Teams on board each ship fought from their own consoles in their combat information centers, talked on radio circuits patched through their own communications centers, and—with the exception of arming weapons—employed their combat systems as they would in actual combat situations.
Battle Force Tactical Training (BFTT)
The BFTT system is the Navy's first organic battle-group-wide simulation capability: an embedded training capability installed already in many aircraft carriers, large-deck amphibious ships, cruisers, and destroyers. It provides realistic tactical stimulation to radars, sonars, electronic warfare systems, the Tomahawk missile system, and the Navy's new cooperative engagement capability by using new training devices—or current ones, such as the Aegis Combat Training System and AN/SQQ-89 onboard trainer. The BFTT drives a wide-area network that stimulates sensors to react as if an actual contact has been made so that a ship's displays, links, command-and-decision system, and weapon-control systems respond as they would in an underway exercise with extensive opposing forces.
From the perspective of communicators, link operators, and tactical decision makers, there is little difference between being under way and in port during a BFTT exercise. The advantages of such high-quality simulation for Navy-wide strike group training are substantial. Using BFTT's wide-area network capability, ships can train together even if widely dispersed geographically. Naval bases at Norfolk, Little Creek, and Portsmouth, Virginia; Mayport, Florida; San Diego; Everett and Bremerton, Washington; and Pearl Harbor are configured with the system's wide-area networks. Seventy ships currently are BFTT-capable and another 80 shipboard installations have been funded.
This tactical training system is able to train watch slanders at every level in the SG. New scenarios can be developed to meet desired objectives; existing scenarios can be tailored to emphasize areas desired by the SG commander and subordinate commanding officers (COs). The system is becoming a mainstay of ships' interdeployment training cycles (IDTCs). In battle group inport exercises (BGIEs), the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets intend to employ the scalability feature of BFTT to train shipboard watch teams from unit level to complex, multidimensional SG operations.
Training Cycle
Strike group training can be compared to a professional football team's training regimen. The first step is training camp, where the team works to get back in shape and practices individual skills. For SGs, training camp is the BGIE-U (unit level) that occurs during the basic phase of the IDTC and is tailored to the needs of each ship's crew. By drawing on the results of internal and outside assessments, such as the command assessment of readiness and training, COs have significant input to the structure of these exercises. Events are conducted autonomously and focus on the conduct of multidimensional warfare in a single ship.
The next step is when the offensive, defensive, and special teams come together to practice their skills in scrimmages. For SGs, this training takes place during BGIE-WC (warfare commander) in the intermediate phase of the IDTC. It focuses on goals established by the group's sea combat, air defense, information warfare, and strike warfare commanders. Just as coaches' whistles blow frequently in scrimmages to permit actions to be reviewed, training team leaders halt battle problems during BGIE-WC events to underscore tactical lessons for the watch teams.
The closest a football team can get to a real game before the regular season starts is in exhibition games, where coaches practice decision making and learn their teams' strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, BGIE-GC (group commander) training is conducted for the entire SG later in the intermediate phase to meet the commander's training objectives in support of the group's first foray into high-tempo, multidimensional warfare. At this point, the basics should be in place to enable the group to commence the composite unit training exercise (COMPTUEX). If the fleet or SG commander so desires, a BGIE-A (advanced) can be conducted during the advanced phase of the IDTC and tailored to a specific warfighting area. As the football team is ready for the regular season after its final training, so the SG is ready for deployment after these exercises.
The BFTT supports post-exercise debriefs by automatically collecting and storing individual and team performance data. During debriefs, warfighting teams interactively review what happened throughout the scenario. Strike group watch teams replay the scenario, see three-dimensional reconstruction of significant events, and reconstruct operators' actions. Debriefings can be conducted at all levels.
By combining scalable scenario complexity with a comprehensive debriefing capability, realistic training captures maritime warfare basics and tactical applications in multiple warfare disciplines. The system enables SGs to use precious underway days more effectively and allows them to start COMPTUEX at higher levels of readiness. The BFTT offers many advantages:
- Numbered fleet commanders have another tool to reach acceptable levels of mission readiness when they face shortened IDTCs.
- Ships' crews and battle staffs gain more from current combat systems because they understand how to use them more effectively.
- Mission readiness and quality of life are improved when sailors receive real tactical training, yet can go on liberty at the end of the work day.
- All-important training on the rules of engagement is conducted.
- Because BFTT scenarios can be tailored easily and shared by all SG units, lessons learned from a returning SG can be incorporated quickly in scenarios for forces Hearing deployment.
- Other services receive a detailed representation of current Navy capabilities in joint and coalition operations.
While BFTT is a great improvement over the Navy's in-port shipboard training at the group level just a few years ago, even its proponents recognize there are significant challenges ahead in making the system the warfare simulation system envisioned by designers and desired by Navy leaders. Improvements currently under study include increasing the number of aircraft simulated for control by SG units, developing an interface so air controllers to "fly" the simulated aircraft in support of the scenario, and improved simulation that gives coherent displays of submarine contacts to all SG ships.
Whenever the Navy introduces new organic training systems—especially those that integrate various existing systems—initial set up and operation is cumbersome and painful. The handwriting, however, is on the wall for all to see: high-quality, integrated, multidiscipline simulation is essential to ensuring battle staffs and ships' forces effectively operate increasingly complex and demanding shipboard systems.
Conclusions
Battle Force Tactical Training is not a panacea, but it is a powerful tool. Leaders at all levels in the fleet should support it energetically, provide unvarnished feedback on system performance to spur improvements, and recommend new ways to expand its capabilities. The payoffs will be higher mission readiness and fiscal efficiency for the fleet, and improved quality of life for sailors—all huge gains for the Navy.
Rear Admiral Edwards, former commander of the Nimitz (CVN-68) Battle Group, is deputy director of the Surface Warfare Division (N76B) on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. Captain Martoglio is the commander of Destroyer Squadron 23 and sea combat commander of the Nimitz Strike Group. Commander Neagley is commanding officer of the Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and the Nimitz Strike Group’s executive agent for Battle Force Tactical Training.