Armed Forces Joint Warfighting Essay Contest, 3rd Prize Winner
The services do not need to "transform" to become better joint war fighters. They must work together more closely on the sound fundamental skills that proved so effective in Iraq (such as combined arms operations) and learn from each other’s strengths to overcome individual service weaknesses.
Joint warfighting is not a new concept. Although formal joint doctrine and task organization are derived from the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of the 1980s, joint operations are found throughout U.S. military history. During the Civil War, for example, the Union Army and Navy reduced Confederate strongholds in the Tennessee/Kentucky/Mississippi theater with a carefully orchestrated land-and-water campaign. In the last century, the Guadalcanal, Okinawa, and Inchon campaigns were masterpieces of joint warfare. Joint operations are part of our past, as well as our future.
Despite this history, however, many observers believe that a revolution in joint operations is imminent, if not already under way. The end of the Cold War, the proliferation of ethnic and clan conflict, and the resurgence of terrorism have led many to conclude that this period is revolutionary and that the U.S. military must abandon "Cold War" or "legacy" doctrine and systems or risk obsolescence. This view has had particular influence with respect to acquisition, as each service fights for the dollars and platforms that supposedly will make it relevant to the 21 st-century battlefield.
As is so often the case, the more things change, the more they stay the same. Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted the devastating potential of precision firepower and information technology. To an even greater extent, these conflicts have made it clear that the foundation of successful warfighting has changed less than the pundits would have had us believe.
Combat in the global war on terror shows that our basic doctrine and technology are sound. Instead of rejecting this strong foundation as insufficiently revolutionary, the U.S. armed forces should focus on maintaining competency in fundamental warfighting skills. At the same time, they should combine in a joint effort to learn from each other's strengths and improve each other's weaknesses. This approach will maximize the effectiveness of the future joint warfighting team.
Transformation: The Wrong Direction
All too often, transformation is driven by the desire to win the race for dollars in defense budgets. After lobbying for the latest, most expensive weapon systems, the services pursue revolutionary doctrine to exploit the amazing capabilities of technology. This is a flawed approach that not only ignores fundamental lessons from the past but contributes to a culture of competitiveness and service parochialism that is antithetical to the joint concept.
Interservice rivalry is driving a race to revolutionize between the ground combat services. For example, the Marine Corps felt slighted when the Army dominated the invasion of Panama in 1989; likewise, the ability of Marine Corps expeditionary units to respond rapidly to the brush fires of the 1990s terrified Army leaders and pushed them to desire a similar capability. This rivalry is reflected in Army and Marine Corps transformation. The Army wants to be light and rapidly deployable, just like the Marine Corps is now. On the other hand, the Marine Corps wants to be able to project power far inland.
Accordingly, the Army has committed to transition from a supposedly out-moded "legacy force" (tanks and mechanized infantry) to an "objective force" based on a sketchy concept called the Future Combat System (FCS). It expects to field the FCS in 2008, although nobody knows exactly what FCS will be. The objective force as a whole rests on similarly shaky assumptions—for example, that hydrogen-based fuel cells will supplant the need for petroleum products, and that U.S. forces consistently will possess perfect real-time battlefield awareness.
Equipped with the ethereal Future Combat System, the Army plans to break down its systems into their component parts, locating sensors and weapons on different platforms, then linking them through a command-and-control network. It also expects to be able to deploy the objective force directly from its bases to anywhere in the world, a concept known as strategic maneuver to the objective.
The Marine Corps similarly has tied its future to a piece of technology—the V-22 Osprey. The Osprey possesses the theoretical capability to vastly outclass helicopters as a means of delivering Marines to the battlefield. In reality, however, it has been plagued by mishap after mishap and cost two dozen Marines their lives. Its speed and range are impressive, but it must still slow and land to insert or extract troops, making it even more vulnerable than a helicopter because of its mechanical complexity and inability to effectively autorotate.
Emerging Marine Corps doctrine of ship-to-objective maneuver cheerfully assumes that the Osprey will be fielded as planned and will perform at the level promised by a generation of Marines—despite the aircraft's dramatic and often lethal shortcomings. This doctrine sees a Marine Corps which no longer requires a logistical build-up on shore and is free to maneuver hundreds of miles inland, directly from the deck of amphibious assault ships.
The problem with these visions is that they ignore lessons learned in the past. The proposed Army objective force will rely on sophisticated communications and intelligence networks. In doing so, however, it ignores friction, the most profound of Carl von Clausewitz's lessons. At some point, these networks will fail. When they do, forces must be able to continue to fight.
The Army has tried before to separate its firepower systems from those that detect and maneuver against the enemy—the disastrous tank destroyer experiment. The modern main battle tank is a response to the failure of vehicles that do not integrate mobility, protection, and firepower into a cohesive unit. Tanks were effective in both Iraq wars, even in urban areas, where they provided on-the-spot firepower and unmatched protection. Ironically, these "legacy" weapons possessed an essential combination of attributes that more advanced "objective" ones lack.
Likewise, the Army and Marine Corps doctrines of strategic maneuver direct from base or ship to the objective are not so much of a revolution as they are an attempt to revive a flawed concept. World War II airborne assaults accomplished much the same purpose, dropping a force directly into the heart of contested territory. This reach, however, came at a price. The airborne force that landed was lightly armed and stranded at the end of a tenuous logistics bridge; witness, for example, the fate of the British airborne force at Arnhem in September 1944. The new revolutions in doctrine propose to go even farther, projecting forces hundreds or even thousands of miles away from logistics bases and reinforcements. The Army and Marine Corps believe that fuel cells and Ospreys can overcome the challenges that the World War II airborne could not. There is great potential for disaster, however, if they have judged wrongly.
No such gamble is necessary, however, because each of these services has a place in the joint warfighting effort. The Army is the world's premier land-combat force; its major shortcoming is the massive effort required to deploy and sustain it. The Marine Corps, in contrast, is a 911 force without equal; however, it lacks the heavy force structure and overhead to manage a ground war alone. Instead of trying to abandon their core competencies to outdo each other, the services must realize that they complement each other perfectly. In preparing for the future, they must embrace the skills and principles that have taken them this tar, while continuing to learn from each other.
Fundamentals Still Win Wars
Combat in Afghanistan and Iraq shows that the nature of war has not changed radically. Fundamentals that led to success in past wars still work, even though shortfalls remain in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. Embracing these lessons is a key to future victories.
Fighting in America's first 21st-century wars has been painfully familiar. Air superiority, psychological operations, and technological overmatch could not prevent a series of close-range firefights in the mountains of Afghanistan, or brutal tank-infantry clashes in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. Under the right conditions, ground fire proved capable of neutralizing the most sophisticated U.S. helicopters. Simple but plentiful enemy weapon systems abounded—AK-47 rifles, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades. In mountainous and urban terrain, soldiers and Marines quickly found themselves isolated.
U.S. forces triumphed not because of transformed technology and doctrine, but because of the fundamentals:
- Mass. When U.S. leaders committed a force of sufficient numbers and firepower to overwhelm the enemy, they got outstanding results. The success of U.S. Army General Tommy Franks's plan for a multidivision heavy force in Iraq speaks volumes for mass. When we relied on a few Afghan fighters to carry the load, we were less successful, and the enemy got away.
- Combined arms. The battle of Aachen in 1944 proved that the team of tanks, infantry, engineers, and artillery is the most effective way to win in urban combat. In Iraq, Army and Marine Corps infantry, tanks, and light armored vehicles fought with devastating effectiveness and complemented each other's capabilities. Firepower from the U.S. Air Force and Navy air, as well as Army and Marine Corps artillery, was readily available and made the maneuver forces' fight substantially easier.
- Security. U.S. forces are spread over the globe, projecting hundreds of thousands of troops into foreign and hostile environments. Despite determined terrorist efforts in Kuwait, and ambush and rocket attacks in Afghanistan, their losses outside of actual combat were negligible. In contrast with the experiences of the Vietnam War, or the tragedy of the USS Cole (DDG-67), this represents an incredible triumph.
- Training. Like great sports teams, great armed forces excel at the fundamentals. Ground forces win with marksmanship, physical fitness, and crew and battle drills. Air and naval forces similarly rely on training, experience, and repetition. U.S. forces in the war on terror have demonstrated an outstanding ability to execute fundamental tasks. The close-quarter fighting that took place on the battlefields of the past two years would be familiar to generations of infantrymen; as in the past, techniques for clearing rooms, bunkers, and caves could only be perfected by drilling until the tactics became second nature.
None of these lessons is new, revolutionary, or even surprising. The joint warfighting team does not need to reinvent doctrine to win in the future. It only needs to continue to refine it.
Refinement, Not Transformation
We must improve the use of joint close-air support. Too often, the tremendous firepower of modern aircraft is wasted because of poor cooperation between observers, air controllers, and strike aircraft. Processing joint close-air support requests according to existing standards is a good start. The services should also stress these procedures at lower levels, maximizing the effectiveness of air power against targets of opportunity.
We also must become more strategically mobile. Diplomatic differences with Turkey prior to Iraqi Freedom highlight a challenge for U.S. forces. Despite our aspirations to operational independence, we depend on lodgment areas and airspace to bring our forces to bear. This is no reason, however, to reflexively eliminate current weapons and force structures that are highly effective. The services already possess a wealth of knowledge and experience related to getting to the fight. By encouraging open joint dialogue, the services can vastly increase the quality of the joint warfighting team.
The maritime prepositioning force proved tremendously successful in Iraq. The Army should seize upon and employ the concept, and the Marine Corps must share its knowledge and experience. The Air Force is operating expeditionary units from forward air bases in hostile terrain and environments; the Marines have much to teach here, as well. Finally, naval aviation was able to extend its reach over Afghanistan by relying on Air Force tankers and command-and-control aircraft. This team can work in the next war, and should prepare to do so.
There are lessons for forces in post-war Iraq, too. The Army has long been training Marines in armor, artillery, and other occupational specialties, but it also has valuable operational lessons to offer. Marines should make good use of the Army's extensive peacekeeping experience, ability to manage huge logistics networks, and much more developed civil affairs and psychological operations programs. This is not an exhaustive list of things that the services can teach each other, but it is a start.
Conclusion
The calls for transformation and revolution in military affairs are premature. Today's armed services already possess sound doctrine and technology, as well as their own unique strengths. By working together, they can continue to improve these strengths, while overcoming their weaknesses. In doing so, all will continue to maintain the fighting edge needed to win in the 21st century.
Captain Hayes commands B Battery, 1st Battalion, 246th Field Artillery. He has served in both tank and field artillery units and has participated in Operation Intrinsic Action in Kuwait and Operation Noble Eagle.