Comment and Discussion

"Chiefs Are Professionals"

(See D. Hinson, p. 60, September 2003 Proceedings)

Chief Jim Murphy, U.S. Navy—The title of Master Chief Hinson's article is absolutely correct, and I support his arguments. What is missing from his commentary is an examination of why chiefs are not reading Proceedings. My educated guess is that most chiefs have never heard of it.

Until I happened to find mention of the Enlisted Essay Contest a couple years ago, I had no idea this forum existed. Not until I received my first copy of Proceedings did I recognize the magazine as one I had seen passed through a wardroom chop chain several years before. When word of my Proceedings essays spread in my own, nearly 500-strong chief's mess, the common reaction was something like, "What is Proceedings?" (You also can substitute Naval Institute in this question.) When the names did strike a familiar tone, the responses referenced an officers' magazine/association. My brother and sister chiefs have the same impression I had; that the Naval Institute is a professional organization for naval officers. This leads to another incorrect perception: that Proceedings holds no items of interest to chief petty officers. Despite the fact that every chief received a copy of the Naval Institute Press's Bluejacket's Manual in bootcamp, these misperceptions should be no surprise. The Naval Institute did not have enlisted representation on the Board of Directors for its first 126 years, and has only had such for less than five full years.

Since becoming a Naval Institute member, I've tried to help spread the word. In a November 2002 "Comment and Discussion" submission, I stated that it was "time for the Naval Institute to undertake an enlisted-oriented membership drive." While my expressed motivation was to encourage enlisted participation in the forum and thereby change the views of enlisted sailors (specifically chiefs), it also would have the results Master Chief Hinson desires.

Several issues of this fine magazine have included advertisements stating that newly commissioned officers are eligible for three free issues of Proceedings. Why has this initiative not been extended to newly frocked chief petty officers? There are obvious budgetary concerns, but how about just one free issue as a gift upon frocking? Similar initiatives should be undertaken to attract enlisted Marines and Coast Guardsmen. I suspect the interest generated by such an initiative would later pay for itself through increased membership.

A concerted enlisted membership drive will require active leadership, and I encourage Master Chief Hinson to assist in his position as the enlisted representative on the Naval Institute Board of Directors. Until adoption of this proposal by the Board, we need to do a better job of advertising. Discussing this issue in the very magazine chiefs are not reading will not sufficiently spread the word. We need to identify and exploit other means of communication.

This issue cannot be discussed without congratulating the Naval Institute and Booz Allen Hamilton for adding a one-year Naval Institute membership as a prize in the Enlisted Essay Contest. Congratulations also to the Naval Institute Press for its planned publication next year of a chief petty officer manual. These are steps in the right direction.

While it's true (and sad) that most chiefs are not taking part in this open forum, we need to get to the cause of the problem. We need to change the idea that this is an officer-only forum.

"It Is Time to Transform the Naval Reserve"

(See S. Cvrk, R. Robey, pp. 52-55, August 2003; J. Totushek, pp. 18-22, September 2003 Proceedings)

Captain Paul A. Payne, U.S. Naval Reserve—Bravo Zulu to Captains Cvrk and Robey. They have honestly and accurately articulated what has been a major topic of conversation in every unit I have been assigned to for the past ten years. I hope that their article moves this issue to the front burner and that our Navy leaders act on their recommendations.

Rear Admiral Stephen T. Keith, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—The Naval Reserve is more capable today because of the efforts and professionalism of all naval reservists—selected reservists, recalled reservists, and full-time support personnel. It is unfortunate that such a myopic, biased, and inaccurate article would appear in this superior magazine.

I take particular exception to the inference that the Naval Reserve P-3 squadrons were not able to augment the active force because their training was not in sync with the fleet's needs. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Naval Reserve P-3 squadrons are trained to fleet standards and were ready to go for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. They were requested in theater, but for undisclosed reasons the Navy chose not to mobilize them. Perhaps there was concern that these professionals would outperform their fleet counterparts as did their peers in VFA-201 on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) in Air Wing Eight.

As for transformation, it has been under way for nearly three years under the dynamic leadership of Vice Admiral John B. Totushek—even before transformation become the latest buzzword. He has involved the fleet, selected reservists, and full-time reservists, providing a good deal of education to the uninformed along the way. Obviously, Captains Cyrk and Robey missed the transformational experience.

Captain Wayne Henry, U.S. Naval Reserve—I agree it is past time to transform the Naval Reserve. Captains Cvrk and Robey are correct in all myths, except number five, which should address a much broader subject than "career paths." It is not a myth that an effective and cost-efficient reserve must be located in some reasonable proximity to hometowns if one buys the concept of citizen-sailor (and I certainly do). Nothing in the article addressed the important goal that the military should be reflective of our society. Therefore, I contend that all their actions can be accomplished quickly with the following one action: The Naval Reserve shall be managed by active-duty Navy, and all officer billets directly involved in management of reservists shall be designated as career enhancing.

Commander James M. Nugent, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Captains Cvrk and Robey address a broad range of issues that have existed for some time in the Naval Reserve, but they miss the one that most bears on the total rationalization for having a reserve: training.

Captains Cvrk and Robey suggest that reservists should be sent exclusively to active-duty commands for training and mission support, which would be great but impractical. All reservists who are routinely inaccessible to active Navy sites fall under what's often called the Prairie Navy. Shipping a reservist from the Prairie Navy to an active Navy site costs $500 on average. Considering roughly 50,000 reservists fall into the Prairie Navy (two-thirds of the Naval Reserve), it's hard to see money for this being available for that many people on a regular basis. That said, if we closed reserve centers and readiness commands, created an online interface that would facilitate management of reservists, and transfer everything to the active component, some of the money needed might be found, though hardly enough to cover 50,000 reservists.

Training in the Prairie Navy is woeful at best. It's often assumed that the reserve is sustaining the active-duty skills of sailors who are now reservists. This might have been true in days past, but it's not the case today. This is because of a paucity of training assets and opportunities available at Prairie Navy sites. Training within these reserve centers consists of some computers dedicated to training (which are rarely used for this purpose), mostly connected to the Internet though not likely properly networked or managed because there's rarely the manpower nor any force-wide plan for this (though this is presently changing by default with the implementation of the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet), some computer-based training materials, videotapes, VCRs, TVs, and Navy correspondence courses. There is a small budget to send people either to their gaining commands or to schools, though reservists rarely go to any school that is rate or billet specific. This is inadequate for sustaining skills, and in no way supports growing new ones. There are no distance learning opportunities likely to be available anytime in the near future that would address the massive training requirement that exists, which leaves tens of thousands of reservists showing up for drill weekends where general military training, rate training (specifically from reference books, not hands on), or other general training is the rule of the weekend's training opportunities.

One way to fix this problem is to reduce the reserve community. Large numbers of reserve billets should be cut because the people in them simply cannot be trained and they can only be used, if at all, by the Navy for the most rudimentary of functions, as the last two recalls (9/11 and Iraqi Freedom) more than bear out. Cutting the size of the reserve would free the needed resources to provide what's remaining to do what Navy requires of them. The reservists retained would drill at their active sites on a regular basis regardless of where they lived in the country; they would get the extra money required to sustain necessary skills through schools or special online or local courses; and they could be a vital and flexible part of the Navy system in a way that the present reserve is not. Such cuts are not politically attractive, resulting in an organization that's more vestigial than productive.

Captains Cvrk and Robey believe that passing the Naval Reserve off to the active Navy is the panacea to all reserve problems, real or perceived. The fact is that the active Navy has long viewed the reserve as a burden and an afterthought; the Naval Reserve has had to fight for its existence from day one. The Naval Reserve is well aware that it answers to the demands and requirements of the Navy, as well as that it will always have the political support to sustain some vestige of its existence. If a large part of the reserve does not reflect Navy needs, or is not accommodating Navy requirements, it's because the Navy has allowed this to happen and more often than not doesn't care. If the Naval Reserve is to provide the support to Navy requirements that most would like to see, the current reserve system needs more change than it has seen to date in how it's constructed, operated, and trained. Similarly, the Navy must change how it views the reserve's importance in contributing to its mission, specifically recognizing that it isn't going to go away, and determining the optimal ways of putting it to use, instead of rubber stamping a non-productive status quo and then complaining about it.

"Expeditionary Strike Group: Put a Marine in Charge"

(See C. Stopyra, pp. 57-59, July 2003 Proceedings)

Admiral Walt Doran, U.S. Navy, Commander, Pacific Fleet, and Lieutenant General Chip Gregson, U.S. Marine Corps, Commanding General, Flee! Marine Forces, Pacific—Lieutenant Commander Stopyra's article makes the case for a Marine general officer to command an expeditionary strike group (ESG). The article finishes with a bold statement that there "most likely will be subsequent deployments [after the initial East and West Coast experiments] before a decision is made to employ a Marine general to command one of these strike groups." The article does not address initiatives already in progress in the Pacific, where a Marine Corps general has already commanded an ESG during a fleet exercise and a general officer (select) has been assigned to command the ESG deploying from the West Coast in the summer of 2004.

The expeditionary strike group concept became a reality with the deployment of the USS Peleliu ESG (ESG-1) in August 2003 from San Diego. This significant and flexible combat capability is long overdue in the Western Pacific where the war on terror continues, overlaid on the uncertainty of the situation in Korea and the always volatile China-Taiwan dispute. To adequately address the myriad of challenges across the region, we need to distribute our combat power, and we need to do it now. The expeditionary strike group addresses this need.

Even prior to the deployment of ESG-1, the USS Essex Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, and the ships from our forward-deployed naval forces based in Japan, tested ESG concepts during exercise Tandem Thrust 2003 held in the Northern Marianas earlier this year. Essential to this exercise was the transfer of command of the Essex ESG midway through the operations to a Marine general officer. Much was learned, and the Essex ARG is being reorganized into an ESG which will be commanded by either Commander, Amphibious Task Force 76 (a Navy flag officer), or Commanding General, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (a Marine general), depending on the mission. We expect to certify this capability within the month.

As ESG-1 heads out on its maiden deployment, preparations are already under way for ESG-3, which will apply lessons learned from Tandem Thrust and additional lessons as they continue to be learned from ESG-1. The Marine Corps already has named the general officer (select) who will command ESG-3 and we expect it to deploy in the summer of 2004.

The scope of the Pacific Fleet's experiment into the important capabilities of an expeditionary strike group will therefore entail a forward-deployed ESG (USS Essex) with the flexibility to be commanded by either a flag or general officer, along with two West Coast deployers led by an admiral and general respectively.

The advantages of this diverse line-up are numerous and extensive, and will allow us to quickly assimilate lessons learned for the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps as the Navy and Marine Corps team decides how to optimize this transformational capability. The combat power of an expeditionary strike group fills a need in the Pacific and will better position us for success as the global war on terrorism continues.

"Using Anonymity Is Dysfunctional"

(See J. Van Tol, p. 48, April 2003; Anonymous, R. Beauchamp, C. Bush, M. Boettcher, pp. 16-22; J. Huber, pp. 22-26, July 2003; S. Tangredi, pp. 22-28, August 2003 Proceedings)

"Publisher's Page: Anonymity"

(See T. Marfiak, p. 8, February 2003; G. Schultz, W. Morgan, W. Holland, pp. 14-16, March 2003; V. Addison, M. Collins, D, Richardson, pp. 10-14, April 2003; R. Dunn, J. Mazzafro, P. Hall, pp. 18-20, May 2003; Anonymous, R. Beauchamp, C. Bush, M. Boettcher, pp. 16-22, June 2003; J. Huber, pp. 22-26, July 2003; S. Tangredi, pp. 22-28, August 2003 Proceedings)

"You Can't Handle the Truth!"

(See E. Wooldridge, pp. 66-70, April 2000; D. Porter, p. 18, May 2000; L. Bull, p. 28, June 2000; T. Smythe, p. 18, July 2000; R. Yvenge, pp. 26-28, October 2000 Proceedings)

Captain Ev Shipe, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Let me see if I have this right. In the debate about whether Proceedings should publish anonymous contributions, the editor of Proceedings published an anonymous contribution on the merits of publishing anonymous contributions in Proceedings.

The letter from Anonymous Serving Naval Officer gives pretty good ammunition for not allowing such contributions. Why? Because even though I agreed with much of what he said, the letter denied me the opportunity to go through my back issues and read, or reread, his previous contributions so I could make up my own mind about whether he was someone with whom I generally agreed, or was a just a commie-pinko-facist-weirdo who was uncharacteristically right for a change. Because of his anonymity I'll never know. On the other hand, without that anonymity, Proceedings readers would have been denied the insights his letter contributed to the debate.

Several participants in the debate have raised concerns that retribution or outright punishment for differing opinions is anathema and "should not happen," and have opined that anonymity therefore is neither necessary nor appropriate. Others oppose anonymity as an invitation to screed, scurrilous attack, and open dissention in the ranks.

Several proponents of anonymity cite the adverse effects that publication in Proceedings has had on careers (whether the impact is perceived or actual is impossible to tell.)

While I agree that no right-thinking naval officer should punish a subordinate for his or her ideas, we would all be naive to think it does not happen. For those of you who doubt that it does, reread Tyler Wooldridge's article "You Can't Handle the Truth!," particularly the paragraph discussing Pete Deutermann's experiences resulting from a contribution to this very "Comment and Discussion" forum, and those about the huge flap over Lawrence Di Rita's highly amusing, tongue-in-cheek "Reflections on a Naval Career" (August 1995, p. 8) Damn it, such things just "should not happen" in my Navy—but they do.

But punishment aside, are seniors not entitled to include the writings and opinions of their juniors when considering their potential for future performance in the Navy? Or should skippers only take into consideration those writings they agree with, and ignore those they don't, when evaluating the whole person at fitrep time? It's not a matter of political correctness or intellectual oppression, but a natural part of everyone's make-up that everything you know about someone contributes to your opinion of that person. And what more valuable input than carefully considered writings?

When authors contribute to Proceedings, they are saying to the readership, "This is what I think." The fact that authors are willing to sign their contributions certainly adds weight and credibility to their arguments. Should authors prefer anonymity, for whatever reason, they must accept the reduction in weight and credibility.

When Rear Admiral Tom Marfiak first raised this issue, I though he framed his proposal carefully and well. We members of the Naval Institute must rely on the sound judgment of our editor and editorial board (that same sound judgment they demonstrate in the preparation of each issue of Proceedings) to evaluate every contribution on the basis of a multitude of factors. Not every submission gets published. Those that do generally deserve publication. If an article is worth publishing, even though the author—known to the board—has requested anonymity, the Naval Institute should be free to publish it.

If they get it wrong too many times, or if anonymity becomes commonplace, the informed membership of the Naval Institute, and other Proceedings readers, will let them know loud and clear. In the marketplace of free ideas, I think that's a fair and reasonable editorial policy.

"Learning from Victory"

(See M. Vego, pp. 32-37, August 2003 Proceedings)

Paul J. Madden—As Operation Iraqi Freedom was playing out, I was worried that Iraq might be as wily as the Vietnamese Communists. Iraq had the men, equipment, and the access to television news needed to make the war much longer and more costly to us than it was.

A wilier enemy would have cheered the 3rd Infantry Division (ID) and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) moving toward Baghdad (something we were half expecting), then cut off our more extended supply lines. A wilier enemy would have concentrated on the vulnerable fuel trucks (easy game from a distance).

A wilier enemy would have used the predictable March sandstorms to attack the MEF with most of the Republican Guards, while delaying the 3rd ID. The 3rd ID was not in a position for mutual support. With the MEF bloodied and the supply lines interrupted, the 3rd ID would not have pressed on to Baghdad alone. The 3rd ID would have had to stage an active defense until the 4th ID (and more) could join it. Meanwhile, the Bush administration would have had to circle the wagons (a Vietnamese-like end objective).

Either we had good intelligence into the Iraqi military's mind-set, or we were lucky. Given that our other intelligence regarding Iraq has not been correct, we probably were just lucky. The main lesson I hope we learn from this victory is to anticipate a wily enemy rather than trusting luck.

"U.S. Navy Organizational Chart"

(See p. 171, May 2003 Proceedings)

Editor's Note: The organizational chart for the U.S. Navy omitted the Chief of Navy Chaplains (NO97), a position filled at the time by Rear Admiral Barry C. Black (above left). Admiral Black retired in August 2003 to become the Chaplain of the U.S. Senate. Rear Admiral Louis V. Iasiello (above right) serves as Chief of Navy Chaplains.

"Why I Am Failing My Junior Officers"

(See K. O'Neal, pp. 40-42, July 2003; N. Van Schaik, p. 12, August 2003; C. Swallow, J. McReynolds, pp. 16-18, September 2003 Proceedings)

Lieutenant (junior grade) Ryan Scott Aleson, U.S. Navy—I share Lieutenant O'NeaPs many concerns about the new division officer pipeline. I am worried that ships are now being given an increased burden to train newly accessed officers while compressing the time required to complete the interdeployment training cycle (IDTC). I also am concerned about the problems that could arise if division officers report on board ships with a lower baseline of knowledge. These are policies that have been agonized over by our senior leadership and I know they do not make these decisions lightly. My job as a surface warfare officer is to voice my concerns up the chain of command then implement the necessary changes to support the policy. I disagree, however, with Lieutenant O'Neals proposal that the overmanning of division officers is a completely negative resultant of the Surface Warfare Officers School's new policy.

While I learned many valuable lessons from my commanding officer, executive officer, and department head, it was the fleet lieutenants junior grade who taught me the most important lessons during my first tour. They had just walked the challenging gauntlet of earning their Surface Warfare Officer pin, and were at the top of their games. We, the new division officers, looked to them for guidance, encouragement, and inspiration as we found ourselves fighting our way through the same gauntlet. When I reached the end of my tour, I expected to have the same opportunity to pass on all I had learned, but because of a shortage of new division officers I was too busy doing my job up until my transfer date to fully pass on what I had learned.

If overmanning is to be viewed as a problem, I wish more problems we faced would bring as many potential benefits. Here are some ideas to help deal with these "problems":

• Cross-decking, schools, and other special temporary additional duty training opportunities can help alleviate some of the rack shortage issues. For example, if training officers had an opportunity to spend a week or two with the destroyer squadron training officer, they could have a better perspective of expectations and requirements from ships during an IDTC.
• Use larger watch sections as a practical classroom. For example, when 1 stood officer of the deck watch with four junior officers, I would send one or two junior officer on training scavenger hunts to the combat information center or combat service support, and make the other two JOs officer of the deck under instruction (who I would train) and conning officer.
• The super JOs can be moved to the positions of assistant department heads where they are groomed for even higher levels of responsibility and put in positions where they can mold the new JOs and provide the mentorship they need. It is the burden of responsibility that matures a surface warfare officer, so give greater responsibility to the less mature and have the mature provide oversight and guidance. Both will continue to learn in this situation.
• Finally, we need to provide feedback up the chain of command recommending how many officers we need to fill all meaningful billets. That way, once this surge of division officers is done, we can help avoid the opposite problem of too few division officers. My proposal for the frigate is: commanding officer, executive officer, three department heads, four established second-tour jobs, ten potential division-officer billets, and three or four super JO billets for a total of 22-23 junior officers.

"There Are Other Lessons from Iraqi Freedom"

(See M. Vandroff, p. 71, August 2003 Proceedings)

Commander Peter A. Williams, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Commander Vandroff's assessment of biased media coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom has validity. The point he never touched on was the fact that there was too much media coverage involving on-the-scene decisions by operational commanders that had significant influence on how the average reader (and the enemy) believed the conflict was progressing. The fog of war obliterated the overall situation for many of embedded journalists. A significant amount of media coverage tended to give aid and comfort to the enemy as well as daily tactical intelligence. No other war ever fought by our nation has had so much publicity regarding not only the movement of our forces but our enemy's assessment (propaganda) of the situation.

"Mush Morton and the Buyo Maru Massacre"

(See J. Holwitt, pp. 80-81, July 2003; G. Solis, D. Johnston, pp. 23-25, September 2003 Proceedings)

Commander Frank M. Sperry, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—On 6 April 1942,1 was a member of the crew of the MV Dagfred when she was sunk in the Bay of Bengal by two Japanese cruisers. The cruiser's commander signaled "Abandon Ship!" and gave us five minutes before opening fire.

After volleys from the two heavy cruisers, the Dagfred rolled over and slid beneath the surface and the cruisers retired to seek other vessels. As they departed, their open cockpit scout plane flew low over our lifeboats. The gunner sprayed us with bullets from his machine gun in the rear cockpit, killing two and wounding several more.

In June 1942, I was a member of the MV Seawitch delivering Australian troops to Port Moresby in New Guinea, where we held the Japanese Army and marked the furthest advance south by Japanese invaders.

Who was right? The cruiser's commander who gave me the opportunity to man the lifeboat, or the gunner who shot at me and tried to prevent me from manning another ship to face him again?

"UAVs & UCAVs: Unmanned and Unafraid"

(See N. Polmar, J. Hancock, R. Lynch, pp. 41-47, September 2003 Proceedings)

Rear Admiral Thomas Cassidy, U.S. Navy (Retired), President and Chief Executive Officer, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems—The weight number tied to Predator B (2,800 pounds) actually is closer to the weight of Predator. Predator B is a 10,000-pound propjet airplane that can remain airborne for more than 30 hours, fly to 50,000 feet, and carry a payload of 3,800 pounds, including 3,000 pounds of weapons on wing stations.

A photograph of Predator, the first operational UAV to make a significant contribution as a reconnaissance aircraft in combat, did not make the lineup. Predators first deployed to combat in 1994, and they have been engaged in combat operations nearly continuously ever since, making a dramatic contribution to the war on terror. They have flown more than 70,000 flight hours. Numerous Predators continue to remain airborne over Afghanistan and Iraq on a daily basis, providing a continuous level of awareness, persistence, and firepower to battlefield commanders and the national command authority. This is real mission performance, day in and day out.

There is a tremendous future for reliable, operationally capable unmanned aircraft systems that can fly real aircraft missions. Very few of the UAVs that are displayed on marketing posters ever reach this level of usefulness. The Navy track record for fielding UAVs is anything but impressive. Wishing for pie in the sky beyond the limits of what technology can realistically provide is not the road to success in the airplane business. Overloading requirements also has contributed to the numerous failures in the industry.

Another aspect of this problem that should be appreciated is how UAVs are integrated into airspace occupied by manned aircraft. If it flies, it must be treated as an airplane from the acquisition process to employment in combat. If it can fly missions normally flown by manned aircraft, it must have a pilot in the loop to ether fly it manually, program it for autonomous flight, or even command heading, altitude, and airspeed with a ball tab. The pilot is essential for flight in national airspace and to communicate with other aircraft in an area occupied by manned aircraft. If it is in the model airplane class, controlled by an operator, it should be kept out of airspace occupied by aircraft with pilots and crews on board.

Predators have paved the way for the use of UAVs in an integrated air-warfare environment. New tactics and procedures are evolving on a daily basis. As the U.S. Navy moves forward, it should stay focused on remaining within the bounds of proven technology as these systems begin to operate with manned aircraft.

"E-Mail Is a Two-Edged Sword"

(See R. Girrier, pp. 90-91, July 2003 Proceedings)

Colonel Charles Laedlein, U.S. Air Force (Retired)—Commander Girrier makes some valid points that are worth remembering by anyone using this new means of communication. His analogy to a sword is most apt, as those who ignore his email advice are likely to find themselves severely cut if they are not careful. As a lawyer, I would suggest consideration of some additional points when using e-mail for communication.

First, recognize that e-mail is in fact a new communications animal. It is neither formal (snail) mail nor, despite its immense popularity, is it a telephone conversation, although it bears similarities to both. In particular, as Commander Girrier notes "e-mail is anything but private." As demonstrated by recent sensational criminal and civil cases, attorneys and judges increasingly are becoming interested in e -mail. Unlike telephone conversations, email may be subjected to discovery in a legal proceeding and may be introduced as evidence in an administrative or judicial forum. In such instances random musings or inappropriate, inarticulate statements may come back to haunt the sender. While many people think of e-mail as a form of confidential conversation like a telephone call, it definitely is more than that. Regardless of the time crunch involved, e-mail should always be reviewed before hitting the "send" button—preferably from the vantage point of a reasonable time from original composition.

Second, pay attention to the mechanics of e-mail. Watch who you include as addressees; do not send your e-mail anyone who does not have a definite need to know. This discipline will avoid the curse of contributing to friendly spam as well as restrict the opportunity for your e-mail traveling further afield than it needs to. Be especially careful when using the "reply all" button or any global address list. With respect to use of address lists, be aware that there may be two people who go by the name of Joe Bagodonuts. Make sure you send your message to the right one. This is a critical element of your predispatch review. Also, don't rely exclusively on spell check to catch errors. Although it fine as an initial tool for catching errors committed by folks like me, it is not foolproof nor a substitute for good proof-reading. You are composing an electronic written document, and it demands the same attention as any letter or memo you write. Always review what you write.

Third, be aware of security concerns. While we in the military appear to exercise good telephone discipline, there are too many cases in which e-mail broadcasts sensitive, and sometimes classified, information. Think about the information you are discussing through e-mail. Does it contain sensitive operational information? What about sensitive precontract data? If you must discuss information that needs to be protected, let your readers know by placing warnings at the beginning and end of your message. In addition, be extremely cautious concerning addresses.

Fourth, the administrative rules concerning e-mail are still evolving. Recognize that e-mails are a form of records, and you should follow sound administrative practices with respect to their retention. This means you should consider a process for both filing and retaining emails, as well as a process for moving older e-mails to a proper storage/archive site.

While there are other issues involving e-mails such as expectation of privacy and monitoring, as well as search and seizure, the above points should be added to the individual user's administrative list of dos and don'ts.

"Lest We Forget: James Elliot Williams"

(See T. Cutler, p. 110, September 2003 Proceedings)

Editor's Note: Boatswain's Mate First Class James Elliot Williams, awarded the Medal of the Honor for his actions on the My Tho Riverin Vietnam in 1966, was incorrectly identified as John Elliot Williams. The guided-missile destroyer James E. Williams was christened on 28 June 2003.

"Books of Interest: Waves of Hate"

(See D. Seamon, p. 114, October 2002 Proceedings)

John Berger—The Naval Institute Press has an enviable reputation for the quality of its publications. I was therefore extremely disappointed to find that Waves of Hate (2002) falls far short of the usual standards of scholarship and objective historical inquiry.

I expected an objective account of the naval atrocities of World War II. I found a highly subjective work that largely recycles previously published material. Author Tony Bridgland consistently hold Axis personnel—primarily Germans—to far higher standards than the Allies.

Bridgland does not explain how the commanders of the submarines that sank the City of Benares and the Laconia could have known that the blacked-out ships were carrying civilians rather than military personnel. In the case of the Laconia, the German commander risked his ship to aid the survivors—and was attacked by Allied aircraft for doing so.

Bridgland shows little interest in English war crimes or atrocities against Germans—for instance, leaving as many as 1,000 Bismarck survivors to die in the open ocean. He mentions an instance in which German survivors were deliberately killed in the Aegean but seems untroubled that no one was prosecuted for doing so.

Although reviewer Richard Seamon claims that Bridgland "seems to go out of his way to condemn atrocities by U.S. sailors and Marines in the Pacific"—atrocities that Seamon claims were for the most part "honest mistakes"—Bridgland seems largely unconcerned about U.S. war crimes as well.

He establishes that a U.S. submarine commander had the ship's guns turned on helpless men in the water, but stops well short of suggesting that Americans should have been held to the same standards of international law that resulted in the postwar executions of German submarine personnel for doing the same.

Bridgland establishes that Allied air and surface units spent over 24 hours killing Japanese survivors in the water after the Battle of the Bismarck Sea—again, hardly an "honest mistake"—but doesn't mention that Japanese personnel would have been charged as war criminals for doing the same thing.

There is another problem with the book, however, and that is Bridgland's use of the racist pejorative "Japs" throughout. The use of "Japs" is nonnegotiable when quoting from archival sources, but there is no excuse for using it in a newly written nonfiction book. Seamon's failure to find this racist usage worth mentioning is appalling as well.

"JSF Sets the Standard for Aircraft Acquisition"

(See J. Miller, pp. 38-42, June 2003 Proceedings)

Captain A. H. Wagner, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—It is stated that Admiral Miller is "a student of military aircraft acquisition, and was intimately involved in this process during much of the Vietnam War." I am sure that he is justifiably proud of the way the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) has wended its way through the morass of the tortuous Department of Defense acquisition process relatively unscathed. But to state that it "has taken more than 80 years for the aircraft acquisition process to reach this degree of maturity, but the JSF is an example of what can be accomplished" is blatantly wrong. The proper statement might have been that "recent years have shown that the aircraft acquisition process has been broken for so many years that no one seemed to be able to fix it. But with the JSF, maybe we have turned the corner." To consider as a cause of optimism a program in which concept and development took seven years is a sad testimony to the depths that our processes have sunk.

I, too, have been involved in the process on the government side, as a company program manager for many challenging programs, and as a proposal manager for the past ten years. Some recent examples of aircraft acquisition and operational introduction include:

• C-17: 13 years from contract award to operational deployment (first flight in September 1991, operational in 1995)
• F-22: Design competition in 1986, 54month demonstration/evaluation completed in 1990, and first flight in 1997. Future still in doubt in 2003

I believe that the process is far from mature. Perhaps the proper adjective might be aged and decrepit. Consider that the P-51 took 117 days from contract award to first flight. (Granted, it was wartime, and speed was of the essence)

During the halcyon days of the early postwar years, we went from reciprocating engines to the turbo jets, and introduced a phenomenal number of aircraft. To mention just a few:

• FH-1: First flight in 1943, operational in 1945
• F-102: First flight in 1953, operational in 1956
• F-104: First flight in 1954, operational in 1959
• F-105: First flight in 1955, operational in 1959
• F-106: First flight in 1956, operational in 1959
• B-47: First flight in 1947, operational in 1952 (after complete re-engining)
• B-52: First flight in 1954, operational in 1955
• B-58: First flight in 1956, operational in 1960
• A4D: First flight in 1954, operational in 1956
• F4D: First flight in 1954, operational in 1956
• F4: First flight in 1958, operational in 1961

We knew how to acquire and get an asset to the operator quickly, and we could do it for many weapon systems at the same time. Many of these birds could be categorized as breakthrough technology. One could argue that they were of a different age, simpler in design, plagued with early problems that should have been tested out, or focused only on one mission. But the point is that the cycle was managed down to a short period and the aircraft went to the field.

The lightweight fighter (LWF) competition of the mid-1970s is of interest. A performance-based RFP (instead of a detailed specification) dictated the configuration, and the F-16 and F-17 looked very much alike. Both aircraft were very successful as the F-16 and F-18. The contract was let in 1975; first flights in December 1976; and they were operational in January 1979. Both are still in production.

I believe that there are several reasons for the recent malaise. The requirements people want the vehicle to be all things to all people. Management (customer and contractor) is unable to freeze the configuration. We want to test out every potential problem. Finally, career fear has crept in to every facet of the process.

I hope Admiral Miller is right to the extent that we are about to turn the acquisition corner and get military aircraft into the hands of the operators and replace the 50-year-old vehicles they are now saddled with. But we once knew how to procure aircraft, and it was not as far back as 80 years ago.