In the October War 30 year ago, Israel was fighting “the war before,” while Egypt was fighting a combined-arms “war-after-next.” Egyptian forces breached the Bar-Lev Line once thought an impenetrable 110-mile barrier along the Suez Canal.
When the U.S. Marine Corps published its doctrinal publication on tactics in 1997, it cemented the long-standing theory of combined arms. Modern warfare has evolved to the point that a force's survival—much less its success—hinges on its ability to coordinate the different effects of each of its arms. For the Marine Corps, "combined arms tactics is standard practice and second nature." As proof, the publication cites the Marine air-ground task force, a doctrinal combined-arms organization within the Corps; and to reinforce the wisdom of employing forces in concert, it quotes a metaphoric remark by General George S. Patton:
If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get harmony in music each instrument must support the others. To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins.
The significant point here is that Tactics does not provide a road map for further study and offers no examples of modern combined-arms tactics in battle. One example, however, taught as part of the curriculum at Amphibious Warfare School, is the October War of 1973 (also called the Yom Kippur War or Ramadan War). The Egyptian attack across the Suez Canal was a three-day virtuoso performance in combined arms. It took years for the Arabs to plan and taught the Israelis, who eventually recovered in time to reverse the tide, a costly lesson.
Strategic Setting
Israel's dramatic victory in the 1967 Six Day War brought with it the fruits of victory and the seeds of future conflict. The humiliated Arabs refused to accept the outcome. "We in Egypt can wait until we complete our military preparations, then we can take the only kind of action Israel understands, which is to liberate our land by force," Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir said at the August 1967 Arab summit conference in Khartoum. The conference, with representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait, ended with a unanimous resolution: "No negotiations, no peace, no recognition of Israel." Egypt and the other Arab nations in the region resolved to rebuild their shattered forces for a future strike.
Israel, then in possession of the Sinai, a vast desert peninsula jutting into the Red Sea, had formulated a plan to defend against future incursions from the west. For the first time, the Israelis had a defensible frontier. The Suez Canal offered a natural water obstacle. Israel spent more than $40 million reinforcing its defenses on the canal, constructing a series of fortifications along the east bank. Completed in March 1969, the Bar-Lev Line took its name from Chaim Bar-Lev, who served as the Israeli Defense Force Chief of Staff from 1968-71.
By 6 October 1973, the Bar-Lev resembled a cross between a fortified defensive barrier and a string of observation posts. Overlooking the approaches to the Sinai was a series of fortresses along the 110 miles of the artificial waterway. The forts—about 18 in all—were seven to eight miles apart. Roughly 450 Israeli reservists manned the line. Behind the forts was a division with three armored and two infantry brigades (about 260 tanks and 70 artillery pieces). Israel estimated it would take at least a day for an invader to bridge the canal and breach the sand embankments on the east bank—time enough for the Israeli Defense Force to mobilize its forces.
Israel neither anticipated the October attack nor had developed a balanced combined arms team to counter it. Tel Aviv perceived a greater threat from Arab terrorism than conventional attack. The Israeli Defense Force, moreover, had put all its eggs in two baskets: It devoted more than 75% of its budget to the air force and armor branches alone. It had neglected its artillery and infantry branches, moving most of its mechanized and regular infantry units to the reserve. Clinging to the belief that only a tank could defeat another tank, Israel refused an offer from the United States to supply the new TOW antitank missile system.
The vaunted performance of their air force during the 1967 war had bred in the Israelis a false sense of security, a belief their fighter-bombers could make short work of any invader. So decimated were the Egyptian forces that the Israelis calculated it would be at least eight years before Egypt could muster enough pilots to pose a threat.
In planning their attack, the Egyptians identified four major areas of concern: the Suez Canal (crossing it would be a major feat in itself); the fortified Bar-Lev Line; the successive armored troop concentrations echeloned back from the canal to the middle of the desert; and the Israeli Air Force (superior in skill, numbers, and weaponry). To overcome these obstacles, the Egyptians knew they would have to limit their advance, coordinate their actions, and act swiftly.
The Egyptians discerned a number of key Israeli weaknesses: their reliance on wartime mobilization; their long lines of communication (the expanse of the Sinai was, in this regard, a disadvantage); their long frontage along the Suez; and most of all, their arrogance. "Our military superiority is the dual outcome of Arab weakness and our strength," Defense Minister Moshe Dayan told the officers of the Israeli Army Staff College during a lecture on 9 August 1973. "Their weakness stems from factors that will not change soon . . . low level of their soldiers' education, technology and integrity . . . disunion among the Arabs . . . and the decisive weight of extreme nationalism."
Hence, the Egyptians aimed from the outset at a limited offensive to gain a foothold in the Sinai, a transition to the defense, then a negotiated settlement.
The Egyptians Attack
The Egyptian Second and Third Armies, each reinforced with an armored brigade, crossed the 500-foot-wide waterway just after 1400 on Saturday, 6 October 1973. They then penetrated the string of Israeli forts along the BarLev and by 9 October established an eight-mile foothold in the wind-swept desert Sinai. This five-division, shore-to-shore attack made complimentary and supplemental use of armor, artillery, aviation, infantry, anti-armor and antiair rockets, and combat engineers.
When commanders make complimentary use of combined arms, they offset the shortcomings of one arm by using another that compensates for the other's weakness (e.g., using armor in concert with infantry). The whole is greater than the individual parts. Commanders making supplementary use of combined arms increase the effects of one weapon system by adding the effects of another with similar characteristics (e.g., integrating mortar and artillery fires and close air support). The parts are strong by themselves, but stronger when used together.
The Egyptians initially made supplemental use of combined arms. Commencing at 1405 with a 240-plane air strike, they used about 1,000 artillery pieces, 2,000 tanks, and 2,000 antitank guns and antitank missile launchers to mass fires on the east bank of the canal. The air strikes lasted for about 20 minutes; the artillery barrage continued for another 30 minutes. In the first minute alone, more than 10,000 artillery shells fell on the Israeli positions. "It was a frightening scene," said Yossi Harel, an Israeli sergeant on the receiving end. "It began to rain shells of every type."
Under this umbrella of steel, at 1420 the first Egyptian assault wave crossed the canal. Here was the integration of fires with maneuver. Some 1,000 collapsible rubber assault boats ferried about 8,000 Egyptian commandos, infantrymen, artillery observers, and antitank missile units (armed with Sagger, Snapper, and RPG-7 antitank weapons). Subsequent waves (12 in all) landed successively at 15-minute intervals."
Egyptian engineers crossing with the initial waves immediately began constructing bridges and blasting 23-footwide paths through the sand ramparts blocking the way to the Sinai. This was no small feat. Each sand barrier rose about 70 feet at an angle of 45[degrees] to 65[degrees] from the water's edge. Each lane required the removal of almost 2,000 cubic yards of sand. Moshe Dayan bragged before the war: "It would take the American and Soviet engineer corps, together, to break through the Bar-Lev line." Using high-pressure water guns, it took the Egyptian Corps of Engineers only five hours to prove the Israeli defense minister wrong. By 0800 on 7 October, the Egyptian engineers (15,000 strong, organized into 35 battalions) had cleared more than 80 lanes and constructed 10 heavy bridges (2 for each division). By doing so, they had enabled 80,000 troops, 500 tanks, and 11,000 vehicles to cross the waterway. This was an example of the Egyptians making complimentary use of combined arms.
Perhaps the greatest—and most unexpected—departure from the previous war was the battle for the air. The Egyptians managed to gain air superiority over the Suez during the assault phase from the ground. Their air defense system made complimentary use of combined arms, joining together different effects to pose a greater threat to the Israelis.
The Egyptians covered their penetration of the Bar-Lev with an integrated air defense shield, supplementing fixed SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles on the west bank with mobile track-mounted SA-6 missiles and ZSU-23-4 self-propelled guns. The latter two weapons, used in concert by the Egyptians, proved most effective of all. "One third of their Phantoms and everything they boasted of came down because of the ground-to-air missiles," Egyptian President Anwar Sadat said afterward. "Ground-to-air missiles deprived Israel of its supremacy."
The Egyptians had more than 40 SA-6 batteries and 800 ZSU-23-4 air defense artillery pieces supporting their attack. Each SA-6 battery came with four launchers and three missiles and could reach out to about 20 miles. The ZSU-23-4 could fire more than 4,000 rounds a minute from its radar-controlled quad 23-mm cannon. The Egyptians used the surface-to-air missiles to make Israeli pilots fly closer to the ground and into the range fan of the air defense artillery. So effective was the Egyptian air defense team that Tel Aviv ordered its pilots not to fly within ten miles of the canal.
The Israelis Defend and Counterattack
In 1974, General Chaim Herzog, Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence, said: "We assumed after the 1967 War that all you need is a tank and an airplane and you can do everything with them. But you cannot." Doctrinally, Israel's response to the Egyptian attack was a combined arms failure. During the night of 6 October and throughout the next day, the Israelis launched at least ten concentrated company- and battalion-size armored counterattacks. The Egyptians repelled all of them. Attacking with virtually pure tank units, the Israelis had forgotten the necessity to combine columns of infantry and artillery with their tanks: the infantry, to hunt down enemy antitank weapons; and the artillery, to neutralize them so the tanks could maneuver more freely.
The Israelis changed their tactics on 8 October, rushing the Egyptian positions at maximum speed to lessen the duration of their exposure to artillery fire. This was a tactic that had achieved success against the Arabs in 1967. This time, however, these unsupported armored thrusts wilted in the face of Egyptian rocket and antitank gunfire. In one day alone, Egyptian antitank units destroyed 180 Israeli tanks. By the end of the first phase of the attack, Egypt had defeated 23 large-scale (battalion-sized or greater) Israeli armored attacks.
Representative of these tank-antitank clashes was an engagement on Tuesday, 9 October. Elements of the Egyptian 2d Infantry Division unleashed a hail of antitank missiles against the 19OB Battalion, destroying the Israeli armored unit and capturing its commander. A senior Israeli commander recounted the fate of that unit:
About 1,500 meters from the canal, they suddenly found themselves almost on top of enemy trenches from which infantry opened fire on them with machine guns and antitank RPGs. At the same time, scores of enemy tanks opened fire from the ramparts and barriers on both sides of the canal, and Sagger missiles were also directed at them. Tanks were hit one after another and crewmen could be seen jumping out of the burning vehicles.
Had the Israelis been able to cover their armored advances with suppressing fire—had they made supplementary use of combined arms—they would have been able to close with the Egyptians without exposing themselves to defeat in detail in the process. The Egyptians succeeded where the Israelis failed by using their artillery to engage Israeli armor forward and antitank weapons to engage within direct line of sight.
The Israeli Air Force failed to suppress the Egyptians' air defenses. In effect, Israeli pilots attempted to fly close air support without first gaining air superiority—a violation of their own doctrine, and a combined arms failure. "We played the game by our rules and suddenly we didn't know the new rules or how to play," said an Israeli pilot.
Until 1970 we had total air superiority. We were good at air-to-air missions and could attack any point in the Middle East without any chance to be interrupted. But then came the SAMs, the SA-2, improved SA-2, the SA-3, and then in 1973 the SA-6.
Lessons Learned
What can be taken away from studying the October War of 1973? After their 1967 thrashing, the Egyptians learned they could not match Israel plane-for-plane or tank-for-tank. Still, Egypt was determined to recover its losses in the Sinai and regain its honor. Immediately following the 1967 War, the Egyptians began analyzing their own strengths and Israel's weaknesses and began formulating an attack plan that made maximum use of all their assets. Lesson learned: When one is weak, one must make maximum use of all the available tools at one's disposal.
Israel, on the other hand, preferred to remember its great victory in 1967 rather than study and understand it. Tanks and fighter-bombers had won the last war; tanks and fighter-bombers would win the next one. The Israelis learned this time around, though, and renewed their interest in mortars, artillery, and infantry after 1973. Lesson learned: When one is strong, one must avoid becoming over-reliant on one arm or weapon system. When unsupported, few arms or weapons can stand independent against the phalanx of a competent and determined foe using combined arms tactics.
Captain Kopets is a combat engineer at Headquarters Marine Corps, Quantico, Virginia.