Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) will have a great influence on how future wars will be fought by the United States and its allies. The ability to quickly muster a maritime force for missions in the littorals will be key to continuing the global war on terrorism. We have to get the right forces to the right place at the right time—and in Iraq, we had to control the shallow water areas.
A few U.S. Navy Cyclone (PC-1)-class 170-foot coastal patrol craft and U.S. Coast Guard Island (WPB-1301)-class 110-foot patrol craft were included in the OIF force package. Their planning and execution requirements were simple when compared to that of battle groups and multi-division land forces, but their littoral operations nonetheless played a critical role. Although the Coast Guard craft did the same important work, this feature focuses on the Navy vessels involved: the Chinook (PC-9) and the Firebolt (PC-10).
There is a considerable difference in views between the two services. The Coast Guard embraces the mission of small ships; they are integrated completely into its many maritime roles. The Navy sees small ships as secondary to its large ships—rightly so, given its worldwide responsibilities. As demonstrated in OIF, however, small warships are essential to the Navy, and they provide a substantial return on the time and money invested to get them to the fight.
Patrol Craft in OIF
The PCs sailed from Norfolk in mid-January, crossed the Atlantic Ocean in the worst weather of the year, and arrived in the Arabian Gulf four weeks later. Under operational control of Task Force (TF) 55, they were sent immediately to the northernmost reaches of the Gulf to conduct security patrols and maritime interception operations (MIO) as the coalition made final preparations for battle. These ships are ideal for these missions because of their eight-foot draft, exceptional speed, and maneuverability. Because they can operate where the ships of the line cannot, they could provide force protection for the minesweepers that worked their way up the approach lanes of the Khawr Abd Allah waterway in preparation for the land forces and supporting naval combatants. The mine-clearing effort allowed humanitarian aid ships to transit to Umm Qasr and provide basic necessities and supplies to the Iraqi people.
In addition, the patrol craft embarked Coast Guard law enforcement and Navy explosive ordnance disposal detachments. The prewar MIO mission centered on choke-point control by verifying that vessels leaving the Khawr Abd Allah waterway to escape the war were not military, paramilitary, or terrorist. Working together with other coalition assets, the Firebolt and Chinook tracked and captured two tugs and a barge carrying 30 Iraqi naval personnel with more than 80 concealed mines they intended to lay in the northern Arabian Gulf.
The Chinook later put another feather to her cap when she uncovered a suicide boat and arms cache hidden on the coastline. These opportunities might have been missed if PCs were not operating in the shallow reaches of the Gulf, where larger ships cannot go and small boats cannot stay for long periods of time because of crew fatigue, short endurance, and limited self-defense capabilities.
The Navy PCs spent 80% of their time on patrol during the build-up and execution phases of the war. They only left station to fuel from a forward operating base or one of the larger ships in the vicinity. Every seven to ten days the PCs gave well-deserved rests to their 30-man crews and embarked riders. They maintained superb mission readiness because the craft are designed specifically for operations in shallow water, and they have significant redundancies in engineering, electronics, and weapon systems. (The Navy's PCs have more redundancies in these systems than the Coast Guard's Island-class patrol craft, which were designed for short-duration noncombat operations in the United States and its territories.)
After the commencement of hostilities on 19 March, the PCs continued to provide force protection for coalition minesweepers and various logistics craft as they moved up the Khawr Abd Allah waterway to provide logistic support for the land forces. Within the week, the PCs were more than 40 miles inside Iraq to ensure the waterway remained in the hands of friendly forces. This permitted the first humanitarian aid ship, HMS Sir Galahad, to moor in the port. Escort duties were accomplished by the mine hunter HMS Brocklesby, armed coalition helicopters, Kuwaiti missile patrol boats, and the Firebolt. Through patrol and escort, the PCs continue to defend against paramilitary and terrorist threats in that area.
Following the end of major combat operations, the missions of TF-55 shifted to closing the seaborne escape route for the regime leadership and terrorists, containing the movement of war goods (including weapons of mass destruction), and securing vital oil and gas platforms. Again, the PCs proved to be mission enablers. The ability to conduct unrestricted patrols of the coastline, board vessels in any location, and monitor events on shore and near oil platforms helped the TF-55 commander meet his objectives. The mission will continue for the foreseeable future as the coalition prepares Iraqi naval units to assume protection of their own borders and waterways.
What Else Can PCs Do?
There are 13 patrol craft in the Cyclone class; 9 are homeported in Norfolk, Virginia, and 4 in San Diego, California. Between 11 September 2001 and commencement of preparations for OIF, the PCs had not deployed outside the continental United States because they are the Navy's only routine underway contribution to homeland security. They augmented the Coast Guard with tens of thousands of patrol hours to defend against terrorist attacks. Thus, the Navy's PCs provide unique capabilities needed at home as well as abroad.
The PCs have much to offer the Navy in peace and war:
- With their capacity for embarked riders, they are ideal candidates for testing future naval warfare concepts. The Fleets are assessing formation of dedicated Navy boarding teams to deal with terrorists—the specially designed PCs are a natural home for these new warriors. And they could serve numerous purposes in development and validation of the littoral combat ship (LCS).
- They could combine with expeditionary strike groups to perform choke-point control tasks, render force protection close to the beach, and insert reconnaissance and special operating forces. They also could function as refueling and command-and-control platforms for the smaller naval special warfare craft, which have limited endurance and capabilities.
- During peacetime, they are useful when integrated with allied navies that operate small combatants as a matter of course. Because larger ships can be frustrating and overwhelming to small nations, PCs work well with smaller navies and contribute much to coalition-building exercises. They have access to small ports and can gain professionally from foreign insights into small-ship tactics and procedures.
Home Port Options
The Navy should consider homeporting the PCs and their maintenance support teams overseas. This would accord with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vernon dark's desire to leverage flexibility and maximize time on station as a means of meeting new tasks. Homeporting the ship and the crews overseas is preferable to crew-swap arrangements that could prompt maintenance, material readiness, and training problems. Negative lessons learned from crew swaps were documented thoroughly by the rotational crews on Navy mine-countermeasures ships ported in Bahrain.
Possible PC home ports include Bahrain; Rota, Spain; Gaeta, Italy; and Sasebo, Japan. These geographic areas could support the small warships and eliminate the need for winter transits during times of operational necessity, such as occurred in the months before OIF. The PCs' transit of the Atlantic during the winter storm season caused equipment casualties. Moreover, the smaller Island-class craft were transported by sea at no small expense.
Forward-deployed mine-countermeasures ships in Bahrain and Japan are based overseas for the same reasons. The operational performance of the Fifth Fleet mine force during the war with Iraq underscored the importance of having ready assets in the theater before hostilities begin. They can be ready for combat commitments faster and quickly integrate with U.S. naval forces when they arrive. The skills required of PC crews are such they can be trained in far less time than that required of larger ships. And training is easier because of the seniority of the enlisted sailors, their eagerness to learn, and the positive feeling that comes from the close-knit "band of brothers" atmosphere in small ships.
Conclusions
The future of the Navy's PCs has been in doubt for years. Commissioned between 1993 and 2000, they have been under the budgetary gun because of perceived lack of missions and inadequate funding. But past demands for vessels to control littoral waters—gunboats, sub chasers, patrol-torpedo boats, Vietnam-era patrol boats, and the fast hydrofoils of the 1980s—are much more than nostalgic ran tings. Technology has not reversed the Navy's need for small warships. In fact, technology can be harnessed to make these platforms more potent and cost-effective.
It appears that Operation Iraqi Freedom has ensured the patrol craft a mission niche—at least until the LCS comes into routine service. Thereafter, owing to the many capabilities being incorporated in its design, the ability of the LCS to conduct operations inside the 30-foot curve remains to be seen. In any case, there is no short- or long-term replacement for the PCs. Most U.S. and coalition warships have sailed home from Iraq—the patrol craft remain behind to continue accomplishing their essential missions.
Lieutenant Butler recently completed an assignment as commanding officer of the Firebolt (PC-10) in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He currently commands the Shamal (PC-13).