In March 2002, the results of a study that transformed Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation were briefed to successive levels of leadership in the Department of the Navy and Department of Defense (DoD). The study was the culmination of an effort started internally by the Navy and the Marine Corps that transitioned to an independent study team and concluded in a flurry of briefings in early 2002. The results have been set forth in a memorandum of understanding between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps that commits their services to "begin the process of achieving the integration of naval tactical aviation."
The study was motivated by a Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) tasking that directed the Navy Department to "conduct a comprehensive review to assess the feasibility of integrating all Naval Aviation force structure. Naval Aviation structure must continue to provide flexible, responsive, interoperable and expeditionary forces that support Combatant Commanders and joint forces. The integration of aviation capabilities should seek both effectiveness and efficiencies."
Greater integration of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation assets has been the subject of informal discussions for some time. The naval services began to consider this issue seriously in the summer of 2001, prior to issuance of the 2002 DPG. Facing a bow wave of projected funding requirements for naval aviation in 2007 and beyond, both services sought ways to reduce the requirements.
They organized the "Vector Study" and began to examine increased integration of tactical aviation assets. Their efforts were complicated first by the need to understand the nuances of each service's positions; then they were truncated by the events of 11 September 2001, which redirected the focus of the DoD and destroyed the Pentagon work spaces of the Navy members on the study. Realizing the value of an objective assessment—and accelerated by the DPG tasking—the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Warfare Requirements-N7) and Headquarters, Marine Corps (Deputy Commandant for Aviation), retained an independent study group with wide expertise in all aspects of naval aviation to undertake an examination of the tasking.
Navy and Marine Corps aviation forces have enjoyed significant levels of integration since their inception prior to World War I. During World War II, the services frequently supported each other's missions. Today, integration includes acquisition of aircraft, undergraduate and selected fleet replacement squadron training for aircrews, and technical training of aviation maintenance personnel. Since 1993, four Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons have been integrated into Navy carrier air wings (CVWs). Thus, at the study's outset, the sponsors agreed with the study team that the initial focus should be on tactical aviation because the greatest opportunities lay in that area.
Study Process
Major decisions were made to successively put bounds on the limits of the recommended solution. Acceptance of key decision points was confirmed in briefings to the service chiefs. The first decision point was validation of the requirement for two naval versions of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): a short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) version for operation from amphibious ships and expeditionary sites, and a carrier (CV) version for operation from aircraft carriers and possibly in-theater bases. This issue was critical because of the Corps' desire to transition to an all-STOVL force and the Navy's desire that any JSF operating from a carrier have CV-JSF capabilities.
The second decision point required consensus on what might be affordable financially. The magnitude of projected tactical aviation recapitalization significantly exceeded historical and current budgetary levels. The target level of funding was agreed to be approximately $3.2 billion for tactical aircraft procurement (in fiscal year 2002 dollars) over the period 2005-2020. This did not include the EA-613 replacement—analysis of alternatives for that aircraft was still ongoing.
After agreement on these central issues was reached, possible solutions were evaluated. The study team devised new operational concepts, built alternatives, tested for budgetary feasibility, and evaluated warfighting effectiveness.
As in any in-depth examination, certain assumptions were essential to the process. In this study, they included:
- Future force structures would include 12 carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and 12 amphibious ready groups (ARGs). The 12 CVBGs were supported by 11 CVWs, 10 active and one reserve.
- The capacity of aviation-capable ships would be that of today's forces.
- The unit deployment profile (UDP) requirement for support to a Western Pacific conflict continued.
- Tactical aviation units had a minimum of ten aircraft per unit.
Study Results
The team examined four discrete aspects of a solution: disestablishing units; reducing numbers of aircraft in units; reducing numbers of aircraft in non-deploying status (overhead); and increasing levels of integration by both services. The final recommendation used a combination of these methods to arrive at a total naval strike fighter force structure of 1,140 (460 F/A-18 E/Fs and 680 JSFs), a reduction of 497 (30%) from the program of record. This was achieved by:
- Projecting maximum power forward
- Integrating ten Marine squadrons into CVWs
- Using non-deployed Navy and Marine assets to execute Marine close air support (CAS) requirements in the event of an extended ground campaign
- Integrating three Navy squadrons into the Marine Corps UDP
- Disestablishing three active Navy squadrons, one Navy reserve squadron, and one Marine reserve squadron
- Reducing the number of aircraft in fleet F- I8F and JSF squadrons
- Reducing overhead aircraft (those not assigned to combat units) from 801 to 508
Reduction of future overhead aircraft was achieved by implementing such actions as:
- Improvements in business practices for managing maintenance pipeline aircraft
- Efficiencies in test and evaluation, primarily because of commonality among the three JSF variants
- Efficiencies in aircrew training owing to commonality, investments in advanced simulation techniques, greater sortie-generation capabilities of the newer aircraft, and ability of both the F/A-18 E/F and JSF to meet more training objectives in a single event because of greatly increased endurance
- Reassessment of the percentage of aircraft procured for attrition, to include matching predicted rates with historical attrition rates and allowance for the capability of JSF to surge forward to any location with minimal support from tankers
Operational Concept
A primary principle that guided the final recommendation was maximization of sustainable combat power forward. The underlying concept of operations of the recommended force has at its core the notion that naval tactical aviation should be capable of executing any of the missions of either service, and that the sum of the two services' tactical aircraft units form a pool of interchangeable assets. Their aircraft differ only in the characteristics that enable them to operate from their bases: carriers, amphibious ships, and expeditionary air bases. The final mix of STOVL-JSF and CV-JSF aircraft can be determined as the aircraft matures and the ultimate capabilities of each variant are known.
Another driving principle of this concept is the idea that integration of Marine squadrons into traditional Navy missions and Navy squadrons into traditional Marine missions will create a far more formidable and flexible force. Each service's culture and devotion to mission can be shared with the other to build a more potent force. Commonality of the JSF also offers an opportunity for aviators to build tactics and doctrine across both versions that are applicable to a wider variety of missions. In addition, commonality should ease the transition from one version to the other, thereby increasing career flexibility for both services.
Assessing Recommendations
The capability of this force structure was measured by three metrics: aim points serviced during the onset and build-up phases of a campaign, CAS orbits supported during the mature phase of the campaign, and percentage of units deployed. The study recommendations' effectiveness was measured relative to today's force and the original program of record. Because of the increasing capability of future systems, both the program of record in future years (2010-2020) and the recommended force structure show significant increases in effectiveness over today's forces. While the proposed force structure slightly reduces the number of aircraft in certain squadrons, it retains enough aircraft to fully populate the flight decks of aviation-capable ships. Improved reliability of future aircraft is key to this aspect of the recommendation—it preserves the daily sortie-generation capability of the current sea-based force while increasing the level of effectiveness.
Higher sortie rates coupled with increased effectiveness per sortie achieve a similarly improved level of effectiveness in support to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). In a high-intensity campaign, however, fewer aircraft are available in the most stressing case (eight CVBGs and eight ARGs deployed). This results in a less than 10% decrease in the number of supported CAS orbits. Nonetheless, this level exceeds the capability of today's forces by a wide margin and it represents a larger capability than that seen in Operation Desert Storm. During presence operations, the tempo of operations—measured by percentage of units deployed—remains at or below 33% in both services.
The most significant change occurs in budgetary requirements. The force requires much less budgetary authority, yielding a cost avoidance of approximately $30 billion (in fiscal year 2002 dollars) across 2005-2020. Adoption of this constrained force structure, however, mandates other actions. Lower total inventory and lower overhead greatly reduce the tolerance for underfunding readiness. The naval services are reviewing the associated details that must be considered in advance implementation: manpower, maintenance and modernization accounts, training, and doctrinal guidance.
Conclusions
The integration study began in early December 2001 and concluded in March 2002. The study team believed strongly that these recommendations represented a transformational view of the future of naval aviation: interchangeable tactical aviation assets that support both services' requirements.
In view of the fiscal environment they are likely to face, the Navy and Marine Corps aviation components each run the risk of losing warfighting effectiveness without this integration. Study recommendations are being assessed carefully by the services and memoranda have been signed to begin implementation. While the exact structure and composition of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation will evolve over a number of years and budget cycles, there is no doubt that the naval services have embarked on a course that will sustain their potency and increase their value to the U.S. armed forces.
Commander Bouchoux, a former naval aviator, works for Whitney, Bradley, and Brown, Incorporated, in Vienna, Virginia.