Israel is almost totally dependent on its sea lanes for its national economy, and safeguarding these against hostile attack is of vital strategic interest. Given the nation’s geographical environment and past experience, there are three directions from which such a siege from the sea is possible:
- The Suez Canal, which has been closed by the Egyptians to Israeli shipping because of political tension with Egypt
- The Strait of Tiran, also under Egyptian control
- Shipping lanes in the Mediterranean and Red Sea
Many of these sea lanes also are close to hostile nations, such as Libya, Syria, and the Maghreb, which could, under political tensions, harass unprotected ships sailing at high sea but within range of naval surface, submerged, or airborne elements. An even more dangerous threat exists in the Red Sea routes connecting Israeli ports with the Far East. Here, Israeli cargo ships have to cross a virtual gauntlet between Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Somalia, with a strategic bottleneck at the Bab-al-Mandab Strait.
Combined with the regional proliferation of long-range delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, these threats have forced the Israeli defense community to search for new deterrence concepts. One of the first to propose a future role for the navy to act as Israel’s strategic long arm was retired Major General Israel Tal, Special Assistant to the Defence Minister. In his 1996 book National Security—The Few against the Many, he stressed the need to adopt new perspectives: “The concept of strategic depth generally relates to geographic breadth of land, although the sea may also constitute strategic depth, given the existence of a combat fleet that exploits its breadth, on and under the surface…The purpose of the navy must be altered from that of an auxiliary arm to an arm of strategic deterrence.” These words, by a former ground commander, might signal a drastic change of mind in the national defense doctrine, which has long been neglected by the top military leadership.
A few years later, Dr. Yuval Steinitz, a philosophy professor and chairman of the Knesset Subcommittee on Strategic Posture and Force Structure, took up General Tal’s challenge and has become the main advocate of Tal’s doctrinal vision, which is rapidly gaining ground in spite of vehement opposition from ground and air commanders, concerned over the loss of their budgetary priorities.
At the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya conference on Israel’s national strength and security in December 2001, Steinitz pointed out the advantages of a new naval structure obtaining a strategic role in bolstering Israel’’s deterrence posture. A few months later, in an article published in the Israeli defense journal Maarachot, Dr. Steinitz argued, “The latest developments within the Arab nations [proliferation of ballistic missiles] have made possible for Arab decision makers to bypass [Israel Defense Forces] air superiority and, for the first time, threaten Israeli rear population centers and vital strategic installations, without using vulnerable manned weapons systems.” Therefore, in Dr. Steinitz’s words, “the dominant role of the air force can no longer be regarded as Israel’s exclusive deterrence weapon, as it depends on land bases for the operational infrastructure, which can become vulnerable to missile…attack.”
Naval platforms, whether surface or submerged. Steinitz argues, are almost perfect combat elements for modern strategic deterrence. Although they need land bases for initial supplies, they can remain at sea for extended periods, supplied by seaborne logistical assets. Naval combatants, because of their relatively small dimensions and high mobility, are far less vulnerable to attack than static land targets. Submarines especially are difficult to locate when moving submerged. From a technostrategic viewpoint, Dr. Steinitz emphasizes the unique naval strategy maintained by Israel: “relatively small sized, combat platforms, which carry highly sophisticated armory, like cruise missiles, long-range high-precision weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and perhaps also unmanned aerial combat vehicles.”
The air force remains a vital element in Israel’s deterrence strategic posture, but, Dr. Steinitz admits, “it can no longer maintain its national priority monopoly, without a modern navy adding strategic depth to Israel’s deterrence under the new regional threat conditions.”
The Israeli defense industrial base has helped develop an impressive range of indigenous naval weapons and technologies, which gives the Israel Navy combat capabilities quite disproportionate ro irs small size. This technological know-how continues to be the most important factor in rendering the navy its new strategic role in the national deterrence posture.
Colonel Eshel, a defense analyst specializing in Middle East defense affairs, was one of the 1948 founders of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Armor Corps and served in various command, staff, and training assignments. His last appointment was as lecturer on tactics at the IDF Interarms Command & Staff College. After retirement, he served for 14 years as editor-in-chief of Defense Update International.