Littoral warfare is a relatively new term, coined to denote the move from blue-water, usually major, naval operations, to those taking place in coastal regions. That sounds straightforward, until you ask what it means to doctrine, requirements, or state of mind and hear the vast array of answers, many based on experiences with adversaries precluded by either ability or will to put up a well-planned and -executed littoral fight. Some smaller navies always have operated in the littoral, and their experience could prove valuable to navies now entering these murky waters.
The Israel Navy, by its nature a littoral navy, has two prime, and very different, historical precedents. The first was the sinking of the destroyer Eilat by Egyptian missile boats off Port Said in 1967. Although remembered as the awakening to the effectiveness of antiship missiles, it also is an excellent example of complacency and overconfidence in entering a dangerous littoral environment. Repeated patrols allowed the Egyptian Navy to gather intelligence and prepare a simple attack, making good use of shorebased sensors and the crowded port entry to surprise the destroyer. Just six years later, Israeli Saar boats carried out successive battles with the Syrian and Egyptian navies, effectively putting them out of the war with two littoral attacks. The resulting naval supremacy allowed repeated bombardment of their shores and a blockade of their ports by Israeli naval forces.
The lessons learned in those first missile battles still are relevant today and—combined with the evolution in tactics and technology since—form the basis of Israeli perceptions of the littoral:
- Effective defense is vital to operational flexibility. In our case, although the Osa and Komar boats carried 25-nautical-mile-range Styx missiles, compared with the Saar boats' 12-nautical-mile Gabriel 1 missiles, none of the 50 Styx hit Israeli ships, mostly because of effective countermeasures and faulty targeting.
- Weapon, sensor, and command-and-control effectiveness near land are critical. Most of the Syrian and Egyptian missile boats were quite close to shore. Some were sunk by missiles and others were run aground and destroyed by gunfire, demonstrating littoral skirmishing at its best.
- Understanding the ever-changing interactions between land-based resources, ships, and aircraft and employing tactics that take advantage of the opponents' weaknesses while avoiding their strengths are of utmost importance.
The Israel Navy defines the littoral as "the area of sea adjacent to an enemy coast, protected by detection and weapon systems based on land, ships, and aircraft within the area." The major difference between this definition and most others is that it looks at what our opponent can do to us at sea, not at how we strike him ashore. This recognizes the inherent disadvantage of a naval force attacking a defended coast, and mandates overcoming these disadvantages to mount an effective offensive.
The littoral is not a fixed geographic area, but rather an increase in threat level as you near the shore and become more affected by elements operating under its wing. As you close the coastline, the chance of detection by a patrolling aircraft or submarine grows, but when they have to return to base or snorkel, you might be in the clear again for a while. You might be picked up by a large array of passive and active sensors, distributed at multiple locations and designed to evade and withstand attack, possibly feeding into a comprehensive command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C41) network. The nearer you come, the more diverse the enemy's weapons become and the better his targeting. The air threat, fed from multiple airfields, may be limited by pilot competence over the sea, but as you near land, it grows in probability of attack, in severity, and in duration. Small boats clearly are more threatening near shore, but even larger, missile-armed patrol boats often are more effective in the coastal region and unlikely to operate independently for long hundreds of miles from home. The chance that all these elements will be coordinated into an effective, full-scale defense is dependent on range, command-and-control capabilities, training, and policy. Maintaining such coordination over time and distance requires great proficiency and a fair bit of luck, but occasionally the littoral defender can reach out much farther and stronger than expected, catching the attacking force off guard.
Building, maintaining, and understanding the tactical picture, always a complex task, is exacerbated by the increase in seemingly random pieces of data acquired by radar, signals intelligence, and acoustic and electro-optic sensors as one gets closer to shore. Some of this is because of increased traffic, some because of reduced sensor performance near land, and some because of intentional interference. While not quite symmetrical, and generally considered beneficial to the defender, this data overflow influences both sides and can be used to the advantage of the attacker.
The key to succeeding in the littoral lies in employing a balanced, fully capable naval force based on mobility, information superiority, focused offense, and comprehensive defenses. All are essential to achieve the freedom needed to execute the main objective, be it amphibious assault, blockade, land attack, or peace support. If any one of these elements is lacking, a determined coastal defender can inflict enough damage to pressure both military and political leaders to stop the assault.
In the past few years, there has been growing recognition of the role of a "small" warship designed specifically for littoral warfare. Equipped with a fully capable, multipurpose combat suite, and operating in conjunction with other types of naval platforms, a small ship can be an excellent littoral combatant. It can blend into the crowded arena with relative ease, and larger numbers enable coverage of wide areas and flexible reaction to changing scenarios.
Small ship survivability has two aspects: the chance of being targeted or hit is reduced, and if the ship is hit, the loss of life and assets is lessened. On the other hand, the chance of rescuing the ship and repairing it is very poor, possibly giving the enemy a propaganda victory, for sinking a warship of any kind airs well on television.
The Israeli Saar V corvette has shown that a relatively small ship, heavily armed and equipped with sophisticated combat systems, can carry out many of the tasks once assigned only to larger warships, and at greatly reduced cost and manning. The Saar V displaces nearly 1,300 tons, yet as a result of extensive signature reduction, looks and sounds much smaller, offering an initial advantage in the crowded littoral. Her sophisticated C41 systems, combined with radars, sonar, electronic surveillance measures, and the onboard helicopter, afford information superiority. Layered defense systems, including hardkill missiles, electronic countermeasures, multiple chaff launchers, and acoustic countermeasures, provide the unusually high degree of survivability deemed necessary in the littoral. Good maneuverability combined with electro-optical controlled gunnery offer defense (or attack) capabilities against small boats.
The key factor in keeping such a capable ship small is reducing crew size. The crew of the Saar V numbers slightly fewer than 70, of which 45 are conscripts and the remainder are officers and petty officers. Manning levels were set by combining several factors:
- The ship operates at full capability only at general quarters, limiting the duration of full combat readiness. Routine operations are run under a two-watch system, with partial manning of the combat information center (CIC) and other key positions aided by a high degree of automation. Saar V crew size grew to enable helo operations during cruising watches, but evolutions such as underway replenishment or boarding, as well as high-intensity CIC work, require general quarters. Running under a three-watch roster is possible only during uneventful periods, such as transits.
- Most periodic maintenance is carried out by the crew in port, with only limited work done at sea. Even so, some of the manning reductions hoped for as a result of increased engine-room automation were not realized, and the number of sailors needed for maintaining, greasing, painting, and cleaning increased specific manning requirements.
- On-the-job crew training and the need to gain experience at sea increased manning requirements for certain positions beyond the normal, task-generated, demand.
Sa'ar 5 manning, then, is an evolution of fast patrol boat manning, with slight increases for added systems and to enable greater flexibility. It is not a reduction of large warship manning practices. It calls for routine watch flexibility, crew multitasking, and operating procedures based on lean manning. The technicians also are the operators of their respective systems, reducing the number of crew members without dedicated combat duty at general quarters. There are no dedicated damagecontrol teams waiting for action. Because the chance of carrying on the fight after taking a hit on a small ship is slim, damage control parties come at the expense of general quarters manning, leaving only critical positions adequately manned.
The main price paid for a lightly manned ship is limited sustainability and operating tempo. To deploy such ships for any length of time, adequate facilities must be provided for crew maintenance, rest, supply, and maintenance support. These facilities, whether provided by a forward base or a mother ship, probably will need to host every ship for 20-30% of the time on a two-to-four-week rotation schedule.
The Israel Navy has initiated a feasibility study for the next generation of Saar V corvettes. The ship will be an enlarged version of the current Saar V, building on the experience and lessons learned operating a modern corvette in the littoral. It will be a true multipurpose warship, with advanced antiair, antisurface, antisubmarine warfare, and land-attack capabilities. This combination of capabilities is deemed crucial if we are to achieve supremacy in the evolving littoral, with its increased threat of integrated air, surface, and subsurface forces operating at ever growing distances from shore. The major design change will be to allow for the installation of an antiair-- warfare system, which will include medium-/long-range missiles and a multifunction radar, the choice of which has not yet been disclosed. Other changes include an increased surface-to-surface missile load, improved sonar, and a larger helicopter. The ship will follow the design philosophy of the current Saar Va fully integrated, highly capable combat system, low signatures, and lean manning. Fitting all this in a ship of about 2,000 tons seems to be within the realm of current technology, and should lead to the world's first fully capable littoral corvette.
The littoral is a large, complex, dangerous, ever-changing region. Operating there effectively requires the right ship—small, flexible, and armed with modern combat systems capable of meeting the full range of threats and opportunities. Such a ship provides the multitude of tactical possibilities needed to gain and maintain access and freedom of operations in the littoral. For the Israel Navy, the next generation Saar V corvette, building on decades of littoral experience, will be the core of future littoral supremacy.
Before his retirement in January 2003, Captain Doron served three years as head of the Operational Requirements Department. He previously has commanded the Sa’ar V squadron the INS Eliat, the first Sa’ar V; and a Sa’ar 4.5, Sa’ar 4, and Sa’ar 3. He also served as head of the weapons and platforms branch and of the surface weapons section, both in the Operational Requirements Department.