It is the wave of the future. The mating of submarines and surface combatants to traditional amphibious ready groups will result in a new creation, capable of defending itself, landing forces on the beach, and striking targets inland and above and below the sea. The addition of the as-yet-unbuilt LHA replacement, with its Ospreys and Joint Strike Fighters, will make this new concept even more effective.
The Navy's bold vision for the future as expressed by the Chief of Naval Operations in "Sea Power 21" establishes a standard for a more innovative, joint, and flexible Navy in the future. The decisive warfighting capabilities of the Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing concepts are being defined, but the merits of one significant instrument within these concepts, the expeditionary strike group (ESG), have been described only briefly. More than just an augmentation of an amphibious ready group (ARG), the ESG will be an integrated expeditionary warfare force "with dedicated strike-capable surface warships and submarines."1 With new ships planned or under construction, and employment planning and doctrine only in preliminary stages, the ESG could emerge as "Sea Power 21's" most revolutionary vision.
"Sea Power 21" and Expeditionary Warfare
The expeditionary strike group will "[distribute] the firepower of the fleet more widely to provide enhanced presence, greater operational flexibility, and [reduced] response time should there be simultaneous conflicts or contingencies."2 ESGs also "will prosecute Sea Strike missions in lesser-threat environments."3 These advantages will build on current expeditionary forces, complemented by surface and subsurface combatants.
There will continue to be situations requiring a flexible naval presence in a low- to medium-threat environment, in which commanders request a Marine-expeditionary-unit-sized or smaller force. Higher-threat situations will require a force that can be reconfigured rapidly for a more focused mission—a force that has the command-and-control capabilities to plan and execute, and that has the requisite firepower for self-defense as well as power projection. The ESG and a potential subsidiary force, the special-purpose ESG, will provide that needed capability if properly trained and equipped.
The Navy-Marine Corps team brings significant warfighting capabilities to the expeditionary strike group. The "big deck" amphibious assault ship classes, LHAs and LHDs, that will be the centerpieces of the ESG are flagship-configured and have the requisite command-and-control spaces with significant connectivity bandwidth and capabilities. With excellent radar sensors, link interoperability, embarked intelligence and cryptologic assests, and the cooperative engagement capability, these ships will have the potential to participate in a ForceNet-type "networked and distributed combat force." These ships also routinely carry helicopters and tactical strike aircraft. With an accompanying landing ship dock (LSD) and amphibious transport dock (LPD), the group will be able to land and support a Marine expeditionary unit or execute a crisis-action scenario anytime, anywhere.
The reinforced expeditionary unit also will be an ESG force multiplier. With a reinforced mechanized/heliborne ground combat element, transport and attack aircraft, and service support group, the landing force will perform a number of missions. Expeditionary unit reconnaissance elements, engineers, topographic model builders, intelligence experts, forward air controllers, and other professionals all will add to this potential. Combined with embarked special forces, explosive ordnance detachments, and naval support elements, landing forces will be integrated and focused for projecting power ashore.
The proposed new elements in the ESG will complement possible shortfalls in traditional expeditionary forces. A submarine will bolster surveillance, undersea warfare, surface warfare, and special warfare. Surface combatants also will aid in undersea, strike, and surface warfare, but their greatest contribution will be in air defense and managing the air battle space. The net effect will be greater than the sum of the parts, such as through cross-decking part of the ESG's tactical air-to-ground control squadron detachment from the ARG flagship to a cruiser, a concept already tested in the 1990s.
A typical scenario might involve a noncombatant evacuation operation where the opposition threatens the land, air, and surface regions and has the capability to threaten the evacuation. While the Marine expeditionary unit embarked in the three-ship ARG initiates its crisis-action planning, the ESG commander would determine how best to employ cruiser and submarine assets in the operations area. Strike targeting, antiship missiles, and air defense all will add to the ESG's "scalable, interoperable, combined arms Marine Air Ground Task Force."4 The responsiveness of more than 2,000 Marines combined with Sea Strike and Sea Shield warfighting capabilities within the ESG will provide a new level of flexibility to U.S. forces to conduct this kind of operation successfully—when traditional assets might be miles and days away.
In the future, there promises to be more support for these concepts. New ship platforms will expand the ESG's vital role. The LHA replacement (LHA[R]) and the new entries of the Wasp (LHD-1) class will employ the MV-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. As currently envisioned, the LHA(R) will have the capability to conduct simultaneous well-deck and flight-deck operations, as well as concurrent fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and tilt-rotor operations.5 Already under construction, the San Antonio (LPD-17) and the 11 other ships of her class will exemplify much of the desired ForceNet potential. With extra- and super-high-frequency communication systems and Challenge Athena, a shipboard wide-area network, the San Antonio class will be the first expeditionary warship fully equipped for the information age. With her embarked MV-22s and advanced amphibious assault vehicles, she will provide a true over-the-horizon mission ability when the first ship joins the fleet in 2006.
Enhancing the ESG Concept through Sea Basing
The attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) highlighted the vulnerabilities resulting from reliance on shore-based logistics facilities. The Sea Basing concept of managing logistics assets will give local and theater commanders much greater flexibility and independence when planning for missions. In the case of the expeditionary strike group, Sea Basing facilities will include the ability to transfer vehicles or ammunition from amphibious ships to Marine prepositioned cargo transports or roll-on/roll-off logistics support ships and back again as the situation requires. This capability will be particularly useful to ESG and expeditionary unit commanders, who in years past have had to tailor their loadouts in the United States prior to deployment. In one scenario, an ARG might offload its tanks and replace them with more advanced amphibious assault vehicles or light armored vehicles, trading combat power for greater maneuverability as the mission requires.
In addition to providing afloat commanders greater independence and on-station time, Sea Basing will provide the ability to reconfigure ESGs to execute specific missions. For example, Sea Basing will allow ESG commanders to respond to emergent requirements with available assets, while continuing primary missions. Sea Basing will ensure ESGs or any specially formed subforce will have both the requisite logistics support and firepower to ensure mission success.
Special-Purpose Expeditionary Strike Groups
There might be situations in which ESG commanders will be required to split forces to respond to multiple missions. In these cases, a more focused, mission-specific portion could be formed as a separate or special-purpose ESG. New ship construction and planning envisioned in "Sea Power 21" will provide commanders with the necessary flexibility.
Visionaries have advocated the construction of the littoral combat ship (LCS), a small, fast, survivable, and focused mission ship. The ship's superstructure would be modularized and removable to permit reconfiguration to meet prescribed missions. For instance, several LCSs might be configured to support special forces operations by adding the ability to launch and recover rigid-hull inflatable boats, spaces for diving lockers and SEAL storage, a mission planning space, special communications spaces, and helicopter facilities. Other LCSs in the same operation might be configured for air, surface, or undersea defense with systems augmenting their normal capabilities.
An ESG commander might detach his LPD-17-class ship to serve as a special purpose ESG flagship. While not "flagship-configured," the designed mission capabilities of the LPD-17 provide the means to sustain independent and continuous operations in the challenging environment of littoral crises and conflicts. Operational concepts, such as the Navy's "Forward . . . from the Sea," the Marine Corps' "Operational Maneuver from the Sea," and its tactical implementation plan, "Ship to Objective Maneuver," molded the ESG concept and defined the operational capabilities of the LPD-17. The LPD-17 has many essential attributes, such as enhanced survivability for operations in the littoral and medical, refueling, and supply facilities, that will help sustain LCSs for extended periods.
Overall, the design of the LPD-17's command-and-control architecture represents a revolutionary advance in shipboard communications capabilities. Ultra-, super-, and extra-high frequency satellite communications will provide immediate and reliable access to pull information from local, joint, theater, and national assets as well as the ability to push information back. The ship's video teleconference facility will lessen or eliminate the need to cross-deck personnel for mission planning. The single, seamless command-and-control structure will support the decision-making process by allowing war fighters the effective interoperability and connectivity needed to plan, coordinate, and execute operations.
Through the Sea Basing concept, the LPD-17 and the LCS could be reconfigured at sea for their specific missions. Sea Basing platforms with cranes could replace LCS modules or offer alternative equipment and off-load space to enable changes in landing force loadouts. Moreover, a special-purpose ESG returning from a mission, such as an evacuation operation, could be reconfigured quickly and poised to support another expeditionary mission. A potential range of special-purpose missions using an LPD-17 working in concert with an LCS group could include, but would not be limited to: operations by a unit smaller than a Marine expeditionary unit (e.g., evacuation, tactical recovery of aircraft and pilot); sea control (in a low-threat environment); sanctions monitoring/enforcement using embarked special warfare personnel and law enforcement detachments; surveillance and reconnaissance; harbor/port security; and humanitarian/disaster relief.
A special-purpose ESG might be very effective in sea-control or maritime-interdiction operations. Marines already practice heliborne search-and-seizure operations, and unmanned aerial vehicles or helicopters from an LPD-17 could augment the surface surveillance and weaponry from an LCS. With the range and firepower of littoral combat ships in company, the capacity for sea control will be exceptional. Collectively, the LPD-17 will make the LCS's role even more potent. The use of the LPD-17 class in this role has the potential to provide new options to force commanders, and thus warrants consideration during battle force experimentation.
Lessons Learned or Relearned?
As with any new operational concept, the expeditionary strike group raises some concerns. Development and refinement of a new strike group require an open-minded approach by those in charge of experimentation. On the other hand, traditional doctrine and command relationships, such as those between commanders of amphibious task forces and commanders of landing forces, should not be dismissed immediately.
Who will be in charge of an ESG—a flag officer or senior captain? Will it be the ARG commander, surface combatant commander, or landing force commander? These questions pose potential challenges to the ESG concept, but they are not new. Planning and exercises were conducted in the 1990s in which Commander, Amphibious Group Two, placed Commander, Amphibious Group Four, in a command situation with an expeditionary unit/amphibious ready group with surface and undersea combatants in a supporting role. Some of the challenges encountered then remain of concern today.6
- If an amphibious group or squadron commander is placed in charge of an ESG, staff manning becomes a problem. These "amphibious" staffs currently do not have the expertise in strike or submarine warfare, and their intelligence often is shore focused, thus requiring augmentation. Current planning for ESG deployments in 2003 on one coast already includes augmentation in these warfare areas. Another alternative might be to create permanent "expeditionary strike squadrons" with assigned augmenters who have the expertise in expeditionary, strike, surface, information, submarine, and special operations warfare.
- Exercises in the 1990s encountered concern with surface combatants operating under tactical control of amphibious commanders. However, if a "super captain" with a cruiser-destroyer background is assigned as ESG commander over the amphibious unit commanders, then traditional amphibious command relationships will be affected. Expeditionary unit commanders expect to be coequal with amphibious task force commanders and might presume the latter are the senior Navy commanders. Also, if the ESG has a separate staff, it could choose to subsume the amphibious ready group/expeditionary unit staff. In either case, we will need to decide which staff plans crisis-action/rapid-response missions with the landing force commander and which has final approval authority.
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Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2002, p. 38. back to article2. Adm. Vern Clark as cited by Gordon Peterson, "A Clear, Concise, and Powerful Navy Vision," Sea Power, October 2002, p. 54. back to article
3. Clark, "Sea Power 21," p. 38. back to article
4. Gordon England, Adm. Vern Clark, USN, and Gen. James L. Jones, USMC, "Naval Power 21 . . . A Naval Vision," October 2002, p. 4. back to article
5. Byron Hurst and Scott Truver, "An Eclectic Overview of U.S. Navy Programs," Sea Power, October 2002, p. 51. back to article
6. Challenges listed are based on the authors' observations and perceptions while participating in amphibious and joint task force exercises in 1993-1994 while serving in Amphibious Group Two and Amphibious Squadron Six. back to article