"Expand Education for Sailors"
(See J. Murphy, pp. 57-59, February 2003 Proceedings)
Command Master Chief (Surface Warfare) Mark Butler, U.S. Navy—Congratulations to Chief Murphy! He has accurately addressed the lack of professional military education (PME) in the Navy. Outside of the training and degrees available through the cryptology community, there exists a near vacuum of required PME. The advent of Task Force EXCEL (Excellence through our Commitment to Education and Learning), while certainly admirable, has yet to show any signs of developing anything more significant in the PME arena beyond that already included in required training associated with advancement from petty officer indoctrination to the Senior Enlisted Academy.
Unfortunately, Chief Murphy ties rating knowledge to PME and therefore does not go far enough in addressing the need for real PME in the enlisted ranks. If Naval War College and Staff College education is of value to the naval officer, then there should be some equivalent for enlisted who have obtained the prerequisite degree level. Making nonresident (correspondence and weekend seminar) programs available to senior enlisted on a competitive basis is one way of addressing this issue.
The benefits of opening this opportunity are many. In addition to having a more educated senior enlisted force, the commander would have an added resource on staff. If a command master chief, or any senior enlisted in a command, had that educational background, the commanding officer could use that expertise to enhance junior officer training. With an added depth of knowledge, a command could have a seminar program designed to enhance overall enlisted knowledge on the impact of events on the defense posture of the United States. This enlisted seminar may not lead to a degree but could be a vital part of a sailor's professional development. It also could be incorporated into some type of undergraduate degree if the lead facilitator had the proper educational credentials.
Enlisted PME and rating knowledge—and the degrees that go with them—are interrelated paths that can only enhance the value of the enlisted force. We can stay the current path, or we can change course for a brighter future.
"All Ahead Flank for LCS"
(See H. Mustin, D. Katz, pp. 30-33, February 2003 Proceedings)
Captain David H. Lewis, U.S. Navy—I take issue with the authors' point that the Navy should choose to build the littoral combat ship (LCS) as a tool to revamp the Navy's shipbuilding process. We do not need to build a new class of ships just to reform a shipbuilding process that is formally defined in a few congressional statutes and in several regulations imposed by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. LCS should be built only if it meets the Navy's and the nation's operational warfighting requirements. The shipbuilding process can be reformed on its own.
The first important point that Vice Admirals Mustin and Katz missed is that industry did the bulk of the "inventing" for all of the systems installed on our existing ships. If industry can do a better job "inventing" LCS, the question must be asked: What is different between an industry that takes ten years to develop and field a new Aegis system for the Ticonderoga (CG-47), and the assertion that the same industry can develop and field a new set of LCS systems 30 months from today? Either the defense industry has been keeping a secret room full of wonderful new processes that they have withheld from use, or more likely, the difference lies within the Navy itself.
In the current shipbuilding model, the Navy reserves the right to make decisions about what installed ship systems will do, what specific operational performance requirements they will meet, what type of maintenance and crew requirements they must have, how they must be tested, what technical standards will be used in their design and construction, and a myriad of other details. The process of defining requirements takes time. Everyone, it seems, has a different opinion, and it takes a while to work out an agreeable ship-performance requirement that can withstand internal, not to mention external, review. Abdicating that entire process to industry is certainly one option, but it is not one that the Navy has been willing to entertain so far.
The authors are correct when they state that the Navy has problems with new starts in shipbuilding. The arsenal ship was cancelled when the Navy stopped supporting the requirement. DD-21 became DDX when the Navy decided to change the requirement. Seawolf (SSN-21) became Virginia (SSN-774) when the Department of Defense decided to change the Navy's requirements. In order to build a new ship class, the Navy must be able to define and defend a clear need. The mechanics of designing and building a ship have very little to do with that problem. Industry can build almost anything any naval officer can imagine, rational or not, and, if the Navy is not particular about details, industry can do it pretty quickly as well. Guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) are built in 36 months today, once the requirements are set and the design is complete, so a 30-month build time for the LCS is not unrealistic. The rub lies in getting the key set of naval officers to agree on one idea long enough to design and build a ship. If the authors are advocating speeding up the mechanical aspects of the shipbuilding process in order to trump an ineffective, dysfunctional operational requirements decision-making process, I think they propose fixing the wrong problem.
The second key point that the authors missed concerns spiral development. What is described as "spiral development" is actually "evolutionary acquisition." They are correct in stating that it is not new. The "obsolete" computers on the Ticonderoga were there by the Navy's choice, as a first step in an evolutionary acquisition plan. The Mk-26 launchers on Ticonderoga also were "obsolete"; the hull also was an existing design, as were the first Standard missiles deployed on the ship. In fact, virtually all of the Ticonderoga's systems, except for the SPY1A radar and the computer programs, were already in service elsewhere as proven performers. Those elements have since been upgraded using exactly the process that the authors describe. "Build a little, test a little, learn a lot" was one of Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer's guiding concepts for Aegis development. Even today, 20 years after the Ticonderoga was commissioned, every fifth or sixth Aegis ship gets some sort of major system upgrade to keep pace with current technology. The price for any given DDG ends up being about the same, but capability consistently increases from ship to ship. The DDG-51 class, for example, is now using its second SPY-113 radar design, sixth Aegis baseline, fourth vertical launch system upgrade, fourth sonar upgrade, third machinery control system design, and fourth electrical distribution system, just to name a few. If the authors are looking for a shipbuilding process that elicits good, long-term operational requirements decisions from Navy leaders and then ensures that they fully implemented, they should just tour the Mustin (DDG-89), which will be commissioned in July, to see evolutionary acquisition in production.
The Navy has the shipbuilding process it has today because that is what the Navy wanted. The Navy sought ships that did what they promised to do, with installed systems that the Navy liked, and often specifically chose, and the Navy required that industry be able to prove the ships worked as intended, upfront. If we no longer want those things, and will just accept a notional ship configuration based on a "snap decision," we do not need to start a whole new ship class to force a change. There are a few statutory requirements concerning performance and organization that must be met, but, other than that, it's all under Navy and Department of Defense control. We can redefine any aspect of the shipbuilding process at any time, on any class of ship. Reforming shipbuilding outside of LCS might cost something, but if we are willing to pay, then we do not need to wait for LCS to do it.
"Publisher's Page: Anonymity"
(See T. Marfiak, p. 8, February 2003 Proceedings)
Colonel Gerhard Schulz, U.S. Army (Retired)—I support the adoption of a policy of publishing anonymous contributions in Proceedings, with the authors known to the Naval Institute only. I believe it will lead to even more interesting articles. I admire your independence and willingness to tackle difficult issues directly.
Lieutenant William J. Morgan, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—I disagree thoroughly with a policy of anonymity. While I am sure the intent is the best interest of the author, the First Amendment should provide protection to anyone who may author a controversial article. Any subject that is worth publishing should be forthright and clear, with no hidden aspects. If senior naval officers or civilian officials are so narrow-minded that they would persecute a junior for expressing an opinion on a naval subject, then we have some serious problems in our democracy.
Authors should be able to write whatever they desire so long as it does not jeopardize our national security and have their by-line appear on the article. Any deviation from this approach raises the specter of censorship, or, at some future time under a different administration, runs the risk of less scrupulous editors taking pot shots at senior naval personnel under the veil of secrecy.
I would think that any person who has a viable issue to write about would have the intestinal fortitude to stand by his or her position without hiding behind a cloak of anonymity.
Rear Admiral W J. Holland Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Publishing anonymous articles is a terrible idea. Such a policy cheapens the courage of convictions of authors who identify themselves. Anonymity also sanctions screed. Anonymous articles are less likely to produce essays of more originality and value than signed ones.
Anonymity would damage the magazine's reputation beyond measure. No reputable periodical of my acquaintance publishes essays from unidentified sources. No historian or analyst could ever use such as a reference, and in my experience, any opinion or idea for which the author is not willing to stand will be discarded. The Navy's unique reputation for encouraging responsible dissent in the ranks would be severely compromised.
Civilian policymakers would be deprived of sources of information that they do not and cannot get through official channels. The unidentified authors would be invisible to them.
Finally, I find it hard to believe that there really is a threat of retaliation for well-expressed ideas. I have been the author of several essays that went against the grain, and in several instances I was the subject of questions or comments from those whose ox I gored. But I never was discouraged, reprimanded, or insulted for such opinions, especially by those in my chain of command. If there truly is a threat to those who question company policy, all the more important to maintain the custom of identity in order to reward those who are "thinkers" as well as doers and build a reputation for a new idea.
"Pacific Faces Crisis in Intel Analysis"
(See M. Studeman, pp. 64-67, January 2003; K. Dunbar, pp. 14-16, February 2003 Proceedings)
Captain Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director, Intelligence, Plan, and Policy, U.S. Pacific Command—Lieutenant Commander Studeman's recommendations for strong leadership in all joint intelligence centers is both timely and well stated. Strong leadership reinforces any organization's capabilities and improves its mission accomplishment.
Unfortunately, the author's own source shows that his argument is based on an erroneous assumption. He argues that it was Rear Admiral Edwin Layton's intimate knowledge of the Japanese that enabled him to predict the Japanese fleet's position in relation to Midway, then predicates much of his remaining arguments on that erroneous assumption. Layton says otherwise.
On page 429 of his book And I Was There (William Morrow, 1985), Layton ascribes his success to his plotting the Japanese position of intended movement based on station Hypo's signals intercepts that provided their sailing dates and arrival times. So it wasn't Layton's expertise on Japanese naval operations that ensured his success, but his application of basic navigational plotting skills familiar to any first class midshipman. The differences in time, bearing, and distance most likely represent the difference between Layton's rhumb line plot and the great circle route most navigators would use for that distance in order to save time and fuel.
Beyond that, Commander Studeman's concerns about the Navy's loss of support are not unique to the Navy and reflect little understanding of what the 1990s reductions and consolidation of military intelligence assets were intended to achieve. Deep analysis of service-specific concerns fell to the services, and the joint structure was directed at analyzing current events and developments affecting the theater as a whole. In-depth regional databases on each country's military services is beyond the capacity of any joint intelligence center, especially given the present priorities for production and monitoring those centers face today. Also, the Navy's mission has changed from one focused on naval operations against a single potential ocean-going opponent with occasional limited contingency strikes against a minor Third-World pariah state, to full integration into the theater-strike plans for sustained air combat operations over land as part of a joint war campaign. The joint intelligence structure has had to reshape itself to support that mission.
The author notes that the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) intelligence support remains as it always was, outstanding. That is because the ASW mission has not changed and remains the only purely naval mission left. More important, because of its operational-strategic nature and importance, its focus continues relatively unchanged since the Cold War. The same cannot be said for the Navy's other mission areas, where the absence of a major ocean-going opponent, the growing diversity of maritime security concerns, and the changing nature of naval operations have spread the community's focus. Missions such as countering piracy and global sanctions enforcement were either all but ignored or non-existent, respectively, during the Cold War when Navy operational intelligence reached its peak. Today's fleet intelligence officer has to be cognizant of the key elements of all those areas. Focusing on a single mission does a disservice to the fleet.
This does not mean the community should ignore growing naval powers and fail to develop officers with focused knowledge on any particular country. The failure to do so in the 1960s led to strategic surprise in 1970 when the global exercise Okean 70 gave the U.S. Navy a wake-up call on the Soviet Union's growing naval capabilities. Nonetheless, the concentrated study of any particular navy, its equipment, tactics, and operations is a service responsibility and given the lack of national focus on most of the Pacific region's navies over the last ten years, the three-year study to which he alludes is a good start. Hopefully, more will be done in the future.
Good leadership can do much to compensate for a lack of resources and national policy support, and the fact remains that many theater headquarters place too much emphasis on the morning brief. That emphasis has come at the expense of basic record keeping and analytical databases. The best and brightest are sucked into the preparation, production, and follow-on taskings that goes into and follows from the headquarters morning brief. All theater intelligence centers should reduce their resource commitment to that cycle, but neither the theater intelligence centers nor the fleet intelligence officer can escape the realities of their theater support mission. The new national military strategy is centered on crisis planning and swift, flexible and often limited application of military power. The current emphasis is on precision strikes and responses. The opponents are varied and each situation is new, the campaigns are short, and thus the intelligence required rarely exceeds one to two years of background. Nonetheless, there is little risk of a major fleet engagement of the type we faced in World War II and the Cold War, and a much greater risk exists of tactical surprise from a failure to prepare fully for the war over the beach or immediately offshore. That is where the Joint Intelligence Center's efforts are justifiably concentrated.
"Open Standards: The Alternative to Microsoft Office 2000"
(See J. Yarger, pp.91-93, January 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Houston H. Stokes, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired), Professor of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago—In this important article, Captain Yarger forcefully argues that the Department of Defense (DoD) must adopt an open-source document interchange standard. In my judgment, he correctly identifies the extensible Markup Language (XML)-based definition as an appropriate candidate. Adoption of this standard would allow DoD to process documents on a variety of platforms, such as Windows, PC-Linux, and the various flavors of Unix. Although not stressed in his article, an open-source document interchange standard can be read and processed by many software systems and thus does not lock DoD into any one software vender. In his view, the current adoption of the Microsoft Office 2000 standard (*.doc and *.xls file formats for documents and spreadsheets respectively) "may expose us to future price increases and unwieldy licensing requirements—not to mention increased vulnerability to hackers who exploit well-known security flaws in Microsoft products."
Although not mentioned in his article explicitly, a well-known problem with the Microsoft document format is that modification history information is placed in the file. In the preparation of a document, many groups may have had provided direct and known input. Of more concern is that the document may have been seen and modified by groups whose very existence is classified. The existence of these groups may be unwittingly disclosed to those without a need to know by the fact that the documentation preparation history is placed in the file. Thus there is an unwitting danger for sensitive information to be revealed when Word is used to prepare the document.
The access code requirement that is part of Microsoft Office 2002 and Windows XP provides even more of an argument against using Microsoft Office products in any mission-critical environment. If a Microsoft software system contains the new access code requirement, it only will work for a limited amount of time before requiring an access code to be supplied. After the code has been obtained, any changes to the machine at a later time can unexpectedly trigger a request for a new access code. Sometimes this is automatically handled over the network while at other times a call to Microsoft is needed. At the University of Illinois at Chicago, we have experienced situations in which even the movement of memory chips on a fully licensed computer has required us to contact Microsoft for a new access code. Such a hidden trap is an unacceptable risk for any DoD mission-critical machine. Often times, because of excessive heat or some other problem, it is necessary to pull parts from machines to get things up quickly.
The potential to have a requirement to call Microsoft to get the correct authorization code to get the software up in such a crisis could unnecessarily risk men and equipment and, in fact, the mission itself. To avoid this problem, it would be appropriate for DoD to issue a blanket requirement banning Microsoft products that have activation codes from all DoD machines. This requirement may be hard to enforce because personnel may purchase software from outside venders and unwittingly bring Microsoft products that require an access code into a mission-critical environment. To be sure that this does not occur, all software on DoD computers should be certified to be compliant by signature of a responsible officer.
"Name the Supercarriers with Care"
(See P. Handleman, p. 47, February 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Henry V Rhodes, U.S. Naval Reserve—Mr. Handleman should make his point clearer. He is not really opposed to the politicalization of the Navy, he is only opposed to what he considers the wrong sort of politics. This becomes apparent toward the end of his article with his gratuitous attacks on President Bill Clinton. No doubt Mr. Handleman believes our supposed superior moral judgment entitles some of us to continue to deny the reality of the people's choice in 1992 and 1996. It's been more than a decade. Get over it!
Over its history, Proceedings has served the nation as a forum where members of the sea services can express their opinions without official retribution, and it should continue to do so. Lately, however, some members seem to think our forum is an opportunity to burden us with right-wing dogma. Give us a break!
Paul H. Silverstone—I whole-heartedly support Mr. Handleman's proposal to name the next aircraft carrier United States. The first ship of that name was the sister ship of the honored USS Constitution. Her gallant career ended only in the conflagration at the Norfolk Navy Yard in 1862. The name has been getting a raw deal ever since.
It was given to one of the battle cruisers cancelled in 1922 (CC-6). The next opportunity was the supercarrier laid down and immediately canceled in 1949 (CVA58). CVN-75 was to be named United States but then this name was changed when CVN-75 and CVN-76 were named Harry S. Truman and Ronald Reagan.
The great passenger liner United States has lain dormant for years. We should have a major ship bearing our country's name to represent us at sea.
Captain Robert C. Peniston, U.S. Navy (Retired), former commanding officer USS New Jersey (BB-62) —Although I agree with Mr. Handleman's proposal, I take exception with his recommendation that the next carrier be named the United States. I do so for the same reason that caused Adolph Hitler to change the name of the Deutschland to Lutzow. He did not want to lose a ship bearing the name of the Fatherland. Nor would we wish such a fate to befall one our ship's bearing the nation's name.
"Searching for Relevance"
(See N. Ruenzel, pp. 56-58, October 2002; R. Ross, pp. 22-24, December 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Leonard V Dorrian, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—I was disappointed when Captain Ross, Chief, Office of Strategic Analysis, responded to this article with a status quo defense. The Coast Guard should welcome debate about roles deemed essential to the country's welfare, not limit such discourse to what is best for the Coast Guard. If anything, the attacks of 11 September 2001 should challenge all assumptions, even those based on Title14. Demeaning the "tone" of Mr. Ruenzel's article because it offers a perspective different from the official position is suspect at best.
Equating the cost effectiveness of traditional Coast Guard functions with the absolute homeland security need is preposterous. Saving tens of million dollars a year in aids-to-navigation costs compared to the destruction of a major city is not a suitable tradeoff. It is clear where the national priority should lie.
Although the Coast Guard is an excellent organization, it exhibits characteristics of group thinking. The majority of its previous decisions were sound, but all decisions, especially in our present national security situation, are not of equal weight or importance. On critical issues, we can not afford mistakes driven by preemptively discarding external or internal alternative approaches.
It is rare to see public discussion on a topic of major service importance, with various Coast Guard officers (active or retired) and other qualified individuals offering alternative approaches. Certainly, Coast Guard mission priority fits that criterion. Unfortunately, the usual article is the official Coast Guard version of the subject, authored by a flag officer or a mid-level staff officer writing with suitable guidance. Coast Guard policy should encourage all reasonable input, even that at variance to an established Coast Guard position. Captain Ross's response does not lead to the conclusion that Mr. Ruenzel's article received either unbiased evaluation or suitable analysis.
Finally, it is my hope that the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will shed light on the relative importance of existing and contemplated Coast Guard missions. What made sense in a 19th- and 20th-century environment should not be the basis for the tasking of Coast Guard resources in the 21st century.
"Naval Service Isn't a Remedial Social Program"
(See J. Hudson, pp. 72-73, February 2003 Proceedings)
Yeoman Second Class Robert G. Jenkins, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I am no stranger to recruiting. I have been active on a volunteer basis as a member of Recruiting District Assistant Council since 1980. Much of what Lieutenant Hudson writes is true, but whether we are in the Navy or in a civilian job all of us have to contend with the 10%. We can't all be 4.0 sailors. I was not one, and the author probably is not one. We just have to work harder bringing those sailors along the best we can. I found it most gratifying when those I thought would not pass their tests did. Life is all about helping others to succeed. Those division officers who think helping is too much trouble should examine their motives. They should be leaders and mentors, not just managers.
"See the World Through Their Eyes"
(See B. Hosmer, p. 96, December 2002 Proceedings)
Bill Orr—The opening statement of this thoughtful commentary was off base. The British did not "invent" the Enigma machine. That honor goes to Arthur Scherbius, a German engineer who received a patent in 1919 for the first iteration of a 11 ciphering device" which was intended to allow commercial interests to render their telegraphic and other communications unreadable to their competitors.
Around 1928, the German military began using the machine, and ultimately, the various German forces and agencies settled upon their own versions of it. In the early 1930s, Polish mathematicians and code breakers excruciatingly replicated the machine by mathematical analysis and were finally successful in reading the Enigma code. By the time Poland was invaded and fell in late 1939, the Poles had given the fruits of their fantastic efforts to the French and British. The Brits capitalized on their good fortune, and the rest is history.
"'Look Truth Right in the Eye'"
(See D. Hackworth, pp. 50-53, December 2002; J. Conlin, pp. 10- 11, January 2003; M. Einbinder, P. Espenschade, D. Stephens, pp. 11 14, February 2003 Proceedings)
Robert Mooney—David Hackworth says "We never trusted the South Vietnamese on an operation. If it were an anvil-and-hammer operation, we'd never put the South Vietnamese as the hammer or the anvil, because they wouldn't be there for the job."
That is not correct. In early April 1963, I was advisor to a South Vietnamese infantry company that was inserted as the anvil (in relieving a Viet Cong attack on Quin Nhon) and performed well. We got an estimated 80 enemy killed in action and took 2 prisoners in a day-long battle.
Incidentally, the hammer also was a South Vietnamese Army unit.
"The American Way of War"
(See A. Cebrowski, T. Barnett, pp. 42-43, January 2003 Proceedings)
Brigadier General Michael Vane, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Doctrine Concepts and Strategies, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command—Vice Admiral Cebrowski's and Dr. Barnett's article offers compelling insights into how emerging technologies will enable joint tactical actions within the framework of an emerging American way of war. In doing so, they illuminates important and as yet unanswered strategic questions about how we will build our future armed forces. The article, however, does not adequately account for the full dimensional operational complexity and moral imperatives that they rightly identify as crucial to understanding how our nation fights. Ultimately, how we conceptualize future warfighting must account for achieving political termination criteria and for achieving military objectives in ways that support U.S. exit strategies. This is an important dialogue that the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is tracking carefully and eager to contribute to. I would like to take issue with the focus on strike-based destruction, the focus on efficiency versus effectiveness, and the misplaced emphasis on "superempowered individuals."
In The American Way of War (Indiana University Press, 1978), Russell Weigley characterized America's first 200 years of warfighting as being dominated by attrition and intense destruction. Perhaps the advent of new capabilities decreases the need for attrition, but the defeat mechanism of destruction appears dominant in the article. Destruction alone as a defeat mechanism has not proven to be wholly successful at achieving strategic ends, nor is it likely to be tolerated by an increasingly altruistic U.S. public. Nonattrition and nonlethal effects will be more important in the future and are not always as amenable to precision solutions. Moreover, network-centric, precise, and fast warfare is not distinctly American; we will not be the only country to ever have the capabilities that underpin this vision.
Precision clearly offers battlefield benefits, but it is important to understand its limitations. The battle of Tora Bora is a testament to the limitations of precision capabilities and a cautionary tale for a military in danger of confusing efficiency and effectiveness. The seizure or killing of Osama bin Laden was a precise strategic objective that we failed to achieve. In hindsight, we see that other capabilities were needed. To use the author's cop metaphor, we needed a drag net, and they are inherently imprecise and inefficient operations. Moreover, urban and complex terrain create daunting challenges to precision, particularly when a single operation includes tasks from the full range of military operations, such as those of Operation Just Cause and those likely to exist in any operation in Baghdad.
The author's state that the ultimate attribute of the emerging way of war is the super empowerment of the war fighter and that the hallmark of success will be joint tactical operations. Joint tactical action is an exciting prospect, but the real excitement is the potential to integrate the efforts of hundreds and thousands of air, sea, land, and space warfighters and synchronize unit operations across an entire theater, or even globally to achieve strategic effects. As we develop future strategic and operational level organizations, it appears clear that battle management and logistics will be joint tasks, requiring joint units. So too are theater air and missile defense and strategic mobility. As high-speed as joint tactical action will be, it pales in comparison to the potential improvements in operational art and the ability of the United States to plan and execute complex global campaigns.
We also must be careful not to overemphasize the impact of individual combatants. It is a mistake to characterize al Qaeda as merely a group of individuals. Al Qaeda is a system of systems that will require the full resources of the United States to defeat. They can only be defeated through the execution of a sustained campaign that includes widely distributed, fully integrated tactical actions. Opportunities to achieve decisive effects will be fleeting, and we must be capable of responding with precision and mass.
Is there a uniquely American way of war emerging? It is a question worthy of detailed study, and the authors have offered some valuable insights focused on the tactical level. As we work our way through joint transformation, the answers we come up with will drive the organization of our armed forces for years to come. It is important that we achieve a balanced force, ready to realize the potential of technology in ways that meets the demands of the American people.
"JSF & UCAV Aren't the Answer for the Navy"
(See R. Harrison, pp. 59-61, December 2002 Proceedings)
Captain James R. Gwyn, U.S. Navy Reserve—Lieutenant Commander Harrison's article was riddled with misconceptions. For example, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the right answer for the Navy. The F-18E/F is not in the same ballpark in terms of observability, sensor performance, or range. The argument for single vs. twin engines is specious, because the F-8 and A-7 were single engine aircraft, and the A-7 exhibited outstanding mission reliability over its lifetime. The argument for the external payload versus low radar cross section is flawed because no aircraft can maintain low observability with external ordnance. When was the last time anyone saw an F-18E/F going in harm's way without external tanks and weapons? The JSF can carry sufficient fuel and weapons internally to complete an air-to-air or strike mission, all while meeting current and future signature requirements that enhance survivability.
The author is wrong about the functional focus of the unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV-N) development. The Navy's urgent need is organic, real-time surveillance, especially surveillance that is survivable and capable of long-duration operations. A perusal of the NavAir PMA263 (Unmanned Vehicles) web site, as well as the Defense Acquisition Research Programs Agency (DARPA) UCAV-N web site, reveals that the UCAV-N program is focused on demonstrating a system that has sea-based surveillance as its primary mission. The author's summary about any UCAV-N being a "low-altitude, high-speed" platform is off the mark—UCAV-Ns will use high-altitude, submach speeds with low observability in order to provide a penetrating, wide-area surveillance capability, one that Predators and Global Hawk cannot provide.
I also take issue with the author's views about the lack of a pilot and the situational awareness difficulties. The primary benefit of being unmanned is not just that a higher level of risk can be accepted. Being unmanned increases flight duration to support missions of 8-12 hours. With air-to-air refueling, this could be extended to days. The primary benefit of UCAV-N will be providing penetrating, persistent, multispectral surveillance, organic to a carrier battle group. With onboard weapons, it can immediately kill an emerging target.
The autonomous situational awareness, carrier operations, and air-to-air refueling challenges are daunting—that's why the UCAV-N program is a risk-reduction demonstration, and is not ready to transition to production in anyone's book. The critical needs include autonomous recognition and understanding algorithms within a sensor.
The Navy needs to fully support the F/A-18E/F fleet deployment if it wants to maintain its strike edge for the near future, and a manned aircraft always will be the most flexible in the inventory. It should transition to the JSF as early as feasible in order provide a survivable, multimission capability for the long term. But the Navy needs to look beyond manned aircraft to find solutions to the tough problem of finding and targeting highly lethal threats that are fleeting, networked, and increasingly mobile in order to survive. A combination of manned and unmanned platforms will provide the best potential solution in this area.
"December Cover"
(See December 2002; W. Wells, R. Jacobs, p. 10, January 2002 Proceedings)
Sergeant First Class Thomas A. Cerafice, U.S. Army (Retired)—Chief Wells is right in that these men don't have hats on, and their sleeves are not rolled up. They don't even have shirts on, but that could be because of the heat. If the chief looked closer at the picture, he would see a full lieutenant standing in the boat over the side of that rust bucket. I spent 32 years in the military (21 in the Navy), and these men look very professional to me. Looking even closer, the young sailor with the weapon has a military patch on his flak jacket. These men weren't inspecting a cruise ship full of civilians, but a ship suspected of carrying illicit cargo. The look on that man's face speaks professionalism to me.
"Naval Aviation Is Behind the Power Curve"
(See M. Spence, pp. 48-51, February 2003 Proceedings)
Dr. Loren B. Thompson, Chief Operating Officer, Lexington Institute—I read this disturbing essay on aging aircraft only days after the Columbia shuttle disaster. NASA may never definitively determine what caused that accident, but surely the fact that Columbia was designed a quarter-century ago made a contribution. When it comes to maintaining America's aerospace edge, the federal government seems to reflexively favor patching up relics over buying state-of-the-art equipment. The notion that metal fatigue and corrosion might someday lead to tragedy doesn't compute politically.
If it did, the sorry state of Prowlers or Sea Knights already would be a scandal. Instead, a country in which few citizens seek military service seems content to keep risking its warriors' lives even before they reach war zones. The problem is not confined to the sea services. One Air Force officer found the cockpit instruments in his F-15 failing over northern Iraq. It turned out he was flying the same plane that he'd first used at Kadena a generation earlier; the insulation on wiring had turned to powder, causing a short-circuit. Every category of Air Force vehicle—fighters, transports, tankers, electronic aircraft—is near or beyond its desired median age. The Army is getting ready to do yet another service-life extension of its Chinook helicopters.
With Washington now facing billiondollar-per-day budget deficits, prospects for a surge in procurement funding are remote. The military services will have to address the aging-aircraft challenge primarily through adjustments to their internal spending priorities. In the case of the Navy, that means making a choice between its current practice of spreading pain evenly, or finally focusing funding on the assets most critical to future warfighting. It doesn't take a lot of analysis to figure out that the carriers are more important to coping with emerging threats than other classes of warships. If the service can't acknowledge that fact in its spending priorities, then the political system will get the message that even the warriors don't take the aging-aircraft problem seriously.
"Access Is Not Assured"
(See R. Natter, pp. 39-41, January 2003; C. Home, pp. 20-22, February 2003 Proceedings)
Sabrina Rufty Edlow, former Director of Mine Warfare Systems Team, Center for Naval Analyses—Admiral Natter addressed and emphasized some critical issues: mines can deny access; we need both organic and dedicated mine countermeasures (MCM) forces; the vision for the future looks promising; we must address the loss of the USS Inchon (MCS12); and high-speed vessels may be a solution. The Quadrennial Defense Review quote is compelling.
Upon closer inspection, though, significant oversights and misconceptions are apparent. For example, mine warfare is much broader than MCM. The discussion on mainstreaming focuses only on active MCM, limited to the successful integration of both dedicated and organic mine warfare capabilities. If the goals of mainstreaming are to leverage today's embedded mine warfare capabilities—which provide fertile ground for the transition of organic MCM systems into capabilities beginning in 2005—then today's mainstreaming initiatives must focus on mine warfare across the board.
The operational components of mine warfare can be defined as countermining and mining. The subcomponents of countermining are captured in Fifth Fleet's five phase countermining plan:
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- Indications and warning
- Interdiction (including rules of engagement implications)
- Post-interdiction intelligence collection
- MCM (passive and active)
Second Fleet has used this framework to leverage today's embedded mine warfare capabilities. The mainstreaming initiatives at Second Fleet have focused on the first four phases of countermining and passive MCM (signature control and threat awareness), mining, and defining and embedding the mine warfare commander roles and responsibilities within the existing carrier battle group and amphibious ready group command structures.
MCM is not just about clearing mines. Most of the MCM effort is spent reconnoitering areas, showing where mines are least likely to be found, with only a small percentage of time actually spent clearing mines. The long-term mine reconnaissance system (LMRS) is reconnaissance only, providing identification with only mine-like object densities with rough location information. The remote minehunting system and AQS-20X sonar provide true mine hunting with reconnaissance, localization, and identification. These differences are not clear from the article.
The discussion on sweeping misses this point as well—sweeping is a crap shoot unless you know what mine/settings you're sweeping against. Theater and tactical intelligence are key.
The article states that we may need to rely on the MCM ships for sweeping. Only the MCM-1 class supports sweeping. How often do the ships train with this gear? The gear is ancient. If we are really going to rely on it, what plans and funding are in place to bring it forward several decades? Isn't the goal to remove the man from the risk of the minefield, as is done with the MH-53E.
Despite its shortcomings, the Navy has emphasized development of future organic MCM systems to complement the current dedicated MCM force to combat this threat. Second Fleet's mainstreaming initiatives are critical for realizing mine warfare capabilities and serves as a solid framework for further application and evolution as organic mine countermeasures systems mature.
"Enough Marine Air on Carriers Already"
(See S. Garrick, pp 62-64, August 2002; J. Jogerst, pp. 12-14, September 2002; M. Spence, pp. 20-22, October 2002; D. Goodwin, pp. 1822, November Proceedings)
"A Leatherneck JSF Is Just Right"
(See A. Tomassetti, pp. 32-35, September 2002; D. Goodwin, pp. 18-22, November 2002 Proceedings)
Captain Mark. W. Elfers, U.S. Marine Corps, Expeditionary Warfare School—Major Goodwin points out what he considers critical points when discussing the U.S. Marine Corps Harrier program and the short take-off, vertical landing (STOVL) version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the F-35B. The first is that the AV-8B has never operated from forward-operating bases. The second is that there is no real need for the F-35B because the services already coordinate 50 to 60 aircraft strike packages from bases located thousands of miles from each other without a hitch.
During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Harrier was the first Marine Corps tactical strike platform to arrive in theater and subsequently, operated from various basing postures. Three squadrons, totaling 60 aircraft, and one six-aircraft detachment operated ashore from expeditionary airfields, while one squadron of 20 aircraft operated from a sea platform. During that conflict, AV-8Bs were based as close as 45 nautical miles from the Kuwait border, making them the most forward-deployed tactical fixed-wing aircraft in theater. The AV-813 flew 3,380 sorties for a total of 4,083 flight hours while maintaining a mission capable rate in excess of 90%. Average turnaround time during the ground war surge-rate flight operations was 23 minutes. At the end of the day, General Norman Schwartzkopf evaluated the Harrier to be one of the six most significant weapons systems of Desert Storm. The Harrier has operated from forward bases and the community continues training to this capability.
Major Goodwin also notes that the Harrier has been notoriously absent from the Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEU [SOC]) deployments in recent years. During a 12month period from September 2000 to September 2001, the Harrier community did not participate in these deployments while it replaced a faulty engine bearing in almost all of its aircraft. When this maintenance was complete, however, Harriers deployed with both the 26th and 15th MEU(SOC)s. These Harriers provided support to the joint forces air component commander during operation Enduring Freedom. MEU-based Harriers continue to do so to this day. In the years leading up to the engine repair, MEU(SOC) Harriers flew combat missions over both Bosnia and Kosovo. Harriers are not absent from MEU(SOC) deployments.
Joint Publication 0-2, United Action Armed Forces, allows the Marine airground task force (MAGTF) commander to retain operation control of organic air assets. Forward-deployed Harriers, flying with MEU (SOC)s worldwide, are the only fixed wing aircraft for which a MAGTF commander has operational control. Not until other units deploy to reinforce a MEU or establish a Marine aircraft group for a Marine expeditionary brigade will a MAGTF commander have other tactical fixed wing assets at his disposal.
The X-35B will provide a much more capable asset for the MAGTF commander as it replaces the Harrier. The Harrier is not, and never will be, a Hornet. It is, however, a combat-proven light-attack aircraft that has the capability to fly from austere sites, decreasing its sortie length, decreasing its dependence on joint assets for aerial refueling, and increasing the ground combat element's available fires. This capability must not be lost. It will be retained for the MAGTF commander by the F-3513.