The new Department of Homeland Security will bring the Customs Service, Border Patrol, and U.S. Coast Guard under one roof. For efficient and agile response, logic dictates that one agency take tactical and operational control of all things in the maritime security realm—and that agency is the Coast Guard.
The recent creation of a Department of Homeland Security presents an incredible opportunity to strengthen teamwork across the range of homeland security missions. In the past, the threat has been very compartmentalized—illegal migrants, drug smuggling, gunrunning, and so on. After 11 September 2001, the lines between mission areas blurred, offering the prospect of enhanced operational effectiveness, reduced redundant spending on information technology systems, and overall better use of our nation's homeland security assets.
President George Bush, writing in the June 2002 Department of Homeland Security white paper, noted, "The Coast Guard has command responsibility for countering potential threats to America's coasts, ports, and inland waterways through numerous port security, harbor defense, and coastal warfare operations and exercises." He continued, "The Department of Homeland Security must be an agile, fast paced, and responsive organization that takes advantage of 21st-century technology and management techniques to meet a 21st-century threat."
How can this tasking from the Commander-in-Chief best be accomplished, especially with regard to the maritime component of homeland security? To begin, the United States must meet three critical needs:
- A single federal agency to maintain tactical and operational control of all maritime homeland security operations along our nation's coasts
- An agency to focus on containers and entry issues
- An agency to focus on land-based security, such as the border between Mexico and the United States
Fortunately, the foundation and expertise for these requirements are in place. There will, however, need to be some changes in the structures of the different agencies.
In the aftermath of 11 September, the inefficiencies, duplication, and stovepiped systems of the agencies with large stakes in homeland security became a national concern. The U.S. Customs Service, Border Patrol, and Coast Guard historically have maintained robust but separate aircraft and small boat fleets to perform interrelated missions, but during interagency operations following the attacks, communication failures and other interoperability problems stood as barriers to optimal results. Seams between agencies' mandates often were complex, bureaucratic labyrinths through which operators had to work. Cumbersome interagency working groups had to be formed to get results, even though the goal of all participants was identical—securing our maritime borders. The urgency of this issue was made even clearer during a 31 January 2003 interview by GovExec.com with Andrew Maner, Chief of Staff of the Customs Service, who noted, "We believe the [terrorist] threat is as high today as it's ever been."
In June 2002, President Bush announced his plan to create a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. In his proposal, the President organized the department into four divisions—Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures; and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection—and directed that agencies such as Border Patrol, Customs, and Coast Guard come together under one roof.
If these different agencies with similar mandates and resources are to be linked in the same department, there is no need to maintain separate agencies and fleets of resources to perform the same missions. Logic dictates that one federal agency become the champion of all things in the maritime security realm, and the U.S. Coast Guard is best suited to take on this role. Similarly, the U.S. Customs Service should focus on container security, and the Border Patrol concentrate on land security.
The U.S. Customs Service approached container security with vigor. On 17 January 2002, the service commenced the Container Security Initiative to ensure the most secure processing of maritime trade. Its Web site notes, "In 2001 U.S. Customs processed 214,000 merchant vessels and 5.7 million containers." In addition, Customs launched the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism, a joint effort between government and private industry to make the container system as secure as possible. The task is huge, but Customs was provided $90 million over six years in research-and-development grants to improve counterterrorism technologies. This infusion of funds should help meet a very difficult challenge.
The U.S. Border Patrol is uniquely positioned to ensure land border homeland security. The United States has 8,000 miles of land border. To date, according to its Web site, the agency has intercepted 11.3 million illegal aliens. This challenge is not expected to diminish in the future.
From a maritime perspective, securing the sea borders is a daunting task. The United States has 96,000 miles of coastline, from sparsely populated, remote beaches to flourishing metropolitan maritime areas, that present a smorgasbord of opportunities, threat vectors, and vulnerabilities for our adversaries to exploit. Beyond the two coasts, the Great Lakes and the sea border with Canada and U.S. offshore territories and commonwealths such as Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and Guam also present unique challenges. St. Croix, in the U.S. Virgin Islands, is home to the largest petroleum refinery in the United States. These remote locations are critical components of a comprehensive sea border strategy.
To meet this monumental challenge, the United States must have a coordinated, fully interoperable surveillance, detection, and response system that flows between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Only through a carefully coordinated effort will the new department make maritime homeland security strategy actionable. The command, control, and operational responsibility for all small boats and aircraft fit splendidly into the U.S. Coast Guard's already nimble field command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture.
Under this construct, all agencies organized under the new department with small boats and aircraft would shift control of those resources. Customs marine interdiction officers and Coast Guard officers, who often worked hand in hand in the Caribbean, would be under one tactical commander. The improved coordination and interoperability would make our adversaries' job vastly more difficult.
Why is the Coast Guard best suited to lead these forces against an asymmetric threat? The reasons are many.
The Coast Guard has the national command-and-control capability, experience, and support infrastructure to assimilate and coordinate the resources and people of the other organizations. It has established Maintenance and Logistics commands with naval engineering support units and electronic support units throughout the country. In addition, the Coast Guard operates in every corner of the U.S. maritime realm, and its units are located in more diverse locations. As one of the country's armed forces, the service's links to the new Northern Command, Joint Forces Command, Southern Command, and the other regional combatant commanders, along with its traditional relationship with the Navy, are substantial.
This extensive interagency inshore component, when combined with the Coast Guard's offshore cutters and maritime patrol aircraft (especially in conjunction with the Integrated Deepwater System and Integrated Command Center Initiative), will present a formidable barrier to would-be terrorists—if all the forces are equipped with the same communications equipment, operated under the same rules of engagement, and supported with fully integrated tactical maritime information fusion centers. Further, merging the small boat capabilities of these agencies will streamline doctrinal development, training, qualifications, and tactics. Common doctrine can be established once all the agencies are merged.
Today, the Coast Guard operates 1,758 small boats and 157 aircraft. Customs operates 113 small boats and 132 aircraft, and Border Patrol operates 88 small boats and 125 aircraft. All of these assets should be transferred to the Coast Guard's operational control for central—effective—coordination. The potential synergy and force-multiplying effect are substantial.
Finally, the President's white paper offered some concrete benefits that would extend to a merging of small boat fleets and aircraft:
- Enhanced operational efficiencies. Having the same tactics and communications and command-and-control systems would improve operational efficiency, as would unity of command under one agency.
- Reduced spending on redundant information technology. A single architecture, command system, and maintenance/electronic support scheme would mean fewer resources expended on IT concerns.
- Effective management of research-and-development spending. If all small boats and aircraft were coordinated by the same organization, the research-and-development effort could be more focused.
- Better asset utilization. During counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean, the Coast Guard and Customs at times have deployed surface assets for the same suspect vessel without knowing the other was under way. Having all small boats and aircraft under the same operational commander would eliminate this inefficiency.
Another substantial advantage is preventing blue-on-blue events, often caused by communications nonconductivity. For example, in the Mona Passage, the body of water illegal migrants transit to reach Puerto Rico's western coast, communications connectivity problems often complicate interdiction operations. By reducing incompatibility, especially in communications, to the lowest levels possible, we reduce uncertainty for the "blue" forces significantly. The more a tactical commander can focus and direct his forces the better the outcome, especially when everyone is operating at night, in rough seas, and at high speeds. The same holds true for tactics. One operational commander presents a true unity of effort when developing a synergistic tactical picture to stop an event. All three organizations have worked incredibly well together for decades—but why not have one operational commander developing and implementing strategy? This will reduce uncertainty and enhance decision making.
From a macro perspective, there are many advantages to this unified command construct for small boats and aircraft, but there also are significant challenges that must be addressed as plans for the new department work their way through channels.
One challenge will be merging the government employees under the Office of Personnel Management (with overtime, etc.) with uniformed military personnel performing the same work. Remuneration systems would need to be examined to achieve parity between civil service coxswains and pilots and their military counterparts. This would need to be addressed on multiple levels, starting with changes in laws. This is one example where major human resources reforms must be implemented.
In addition, substantive time and resources must be devoted to producing doctrine and operational plans and establishing new/revised chains of command, potential command locations, etc. The formation of the Department of Homeland Security doubtless would mandate this activity. Consolidating the surface and air forces of the member agencies would streamline the process and result in a stronger capability to address national security concerns at our maritime borders. There also must be an understanding for and appreciation of the different cultures agencies bring to the new department.
Another significant issue will be rules of engagement and use of force. The Coast Guard, Customs, and Border Patrol each operate differently with regard to use of deadly force. Again, the issue needs to be addressed and agreed on up front. Since 11 September, tremendous effort has been put into addressing this issue, but the final resolution is pending.
Now-Secretary Tom Ridge, in his 21 October 2001 speech after his appointment as Director of Homeland Security, said it best: "We must open lines of communication and support like never before, between agencies and departments, between federal and state and local entities, and between the public and private sectors. We must be task oriented. The only turf we should be worried about protecting is the turf we stand on." In other words, no one agency can do this job alone.
Many agencies already are enjoying the benefits of sharing information and resources. Institutionalizing these best practices on a national level is an implied mandate in our Commander-in-Chief's plan to create the Department of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard stands Semper Paratus to take on these challenges and is the right choice.
Captain Mizell is chief, Operations Division, Coast Guard Atlantic Area. He is a former Group commander and Coast Guard liaison to Southern Command and Haiti. Commander DiRenzo, a frequent contributor to Proceedings, is Coast Guard Atlantic Area's Antiterrorism/Force Protection & Operations Division Regional Strategic Assessment coordinator. Qualified in submarine and surface warfare, he commanded the USCGC Jefferson Island (WPB-1340) and is a graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Naval War College.