"What Shall It Profit a Man?"
(See K. Eyer, pp. 42-45, May 2003 Proceedings)
Storekeeper second Class Kenneth G. Hagner, U.S. Naval Reserve—Hats off to Commander Eyer. He has given voice to many of the same observations I have had over the years. As he states, naval officers (and petty officers as well) have a responsibility to look after their people, but not at the expense of readiness.
This also applies to evaluations and fitness reporting. I have been witness to so-so sailors getting top evals although they were lacking in true leadership qualities. When discussing this with others I have been told things such as, "Well, he is high-year-tenured and we don't want him to leave the Navy," or "Well, he needs to make chief." Since when is every E-6 destined for chief or a commissioning program?
I also have witnessed sailors being given outstanding evaluations because of their contributions in extracurricular activities. I am a proponent of volunteer work and community involvement, but helping to plan the Navy Ball and working a homeless shelter do not make one a war fighter. These things might make for good public relations, but they do not ensure that officers have the trust of their subordinates or can lead in a crisis.
Commander Eyer states, "We have become so occupied with issues that we are told obliquely but genuinely contribute to combat readiness that true preparation for combat is almost an afterthought." When used correctly, our system can produce terrific leaders. Achieving high marks on evals and fitness reports should not be a popularity contest. Promotion for any and all is a condition we will never achieve. Combat readiness through the truly best leaders is one we can.
"Net-Centric Fogs Accountability"
(See C. Johnson, pp. 32-35, May 2003 Proceedings)
Adam Bruski—Captain Johnson's article on accountability and net-centric operations is to be commended for pointing out the potential of net-centricity to further obscure proper chains of accountability. I believe, however, that the author begins from the faulty premise that the ability of remote actors to influence the success of a ship at sea is a direct by-product of net-centricity. The problems he cites are not recent developments. Instead, they are trends that have been developing since the very creation of the U.S. Navy.
First, Captain Johnson writes that responsibility for a ship's success has diffused to the periphery, citing four actors who have the ability to influence the operation of a vessel at sea: an intelligence officer, a supply clerk, a budget analyst, and a training specialist. These actors, however, always have been able to affect the success of a sea patrol. Net-centricity may have increased the speed at which these actors can bring their influence to bear, but it certainly did not create their influence. Intelligence officers, for example, might be able to provide information in something closer to real time, but their ability to influence the success of a ship is not new. Neither is the influence of supply clerks and budget analysts on operational efficiency.
Second, Captain Johnson points out that net-centricity is enabling decision making to move up the chain of command, away from the officer on the deck. I grant that recent technological advances have tended to accelerate this shift, but his claim that "in the U.S. Navy of the 20th century, we were alone at sea" is a faulty baseline from which to measure net-centricity's effects on accountability. American commanders have not truly been "alone at sea" since before the advent of the telegraph. Since then, commanders could receive orders that constrained their independent decision making simply by reaching the next port with a telegraph office or receiving the latest set of radio broadcasts.
To identify net-centricity as the cause of the accountability problem is an incorrect analysis. Instead, a more useful analysis would have been to study the degree to which net-centricity has increased or altered the long-standing ability of remote actors to influence the success of a ship at sea. Then we would have a clearer picture of the areas where accountability should be reallocated.
"Should Marines 'Join' Special Operations Command?"
(See W. Parks, p. 4, May 2003 Proceedings)
Colonel Bruce E. Brunn, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Having served a number of tours in force and battalion reconnaissance, I share Colonel Parks's concern over the future of assigning Marines to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom). This is a bold transformational move by the Marine Corps, but given the changing nature of joint warfare, I believe this effort could be a major benefit to both the Marines and the Special Operations Command.
As the G-2 (Intelligence) of I Marine Expeditionary Force in the months leading up to Operation Desert Storm, I frequently was frustrated by the difficulty of trying to employ Marine reconnaissance in a joint environment. While the commander's need for critical intelligence has continued to increase, there also has been an increasing reluctance to risk human sources behind enemy lines. Recent reports on Operation Iraqi Freedom indicate that this problem continues. The one group that has gained increasing acceptance for conducting missions behind enemy lines has been the Special Operations Command, and it is through this group that force reconnaissance will have the best chance of performing its traditional deep reconnaissance mission (defined as "strategic reconnaissance" in joint terminology).
The addition of force reconnaissance units to USSOCom not only will improve strategic reconnaissance in support of the Marine Corps and joint force commanders, but also will benefit the special operations community. The number of strategic reconnaissance requirements is increasing daily in the effort to hunt down terrorist forces, and these highly trained Marines can readily help a special operations community that is being tasked and stretched to its limits. In addition, unlike the days when Colonel Parks and I were in reconnaissance, the Marine Corps now includes intelligence officers as scout and reconnaissance platoon leaders. Using some of these personnel in these USSOCom billets will provide officers experienced in reconnaissance without endangering their careers in the Marine Corps. In fact, having both service and USSOCom experience will make these intelligence officers valued assets in the joint intelligence community.
"U.S. Naval Aircraft and Weapon Developments"
(See D. Parsons, pp. 120-27, May 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Andrew W. Smith, U.S. Navy—The author is incorrect in his mention of the contributions of naval aviation during Operation Enduring Freedom. Of particular notice was the lack of mention of the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70). Rear Admiral Tom Zelibor embarked on the Carl Vinson in the positions of Commander, Task Force 50, and Commander, Carrier Group Three, not on board the USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74).
As a member of the Carl Vinson crew during this deployment, I think it is important to mention the contributions of the ship and Carrier Airwing 11 (CVW-11) during Operation Enduring Freedom. In brief summary:
- The Carl Vinson was the first carrier on station in the North Arabian Sea following the attacks of 11 September 2001.
- She was the first carrier to launch air strikes into Afghanistan on 7 October 2001.
- The ship and air wing conducted flight operations for 70 days supporting Operation Enduring Freedom.
- The Carl Vinson and CVW-11 team completed 4,200 combat sorties, dropping 2,025,176 pounds of ordnance.
"Publisher's Page: Anonymity"
(See T. Marfiak, p. 8, February 2003; G. Schultz, W. Morgan, W. Holland, pp. 14-16, March 2003; V. Addision, M. Collins, D. Richardson, pp. 10-14, April 2003; R. Dunn, J. Mazzafro, P. Hall, May 2003 Proceedings)
"Using Anonymity Is Dysfunctional"
(See J. van Tol, p. 48, April 2003 Proceedings)
Anonymous Serving Naval Officer—I intended to remain silent during the debate on whether Proceedings should publish authors who would remain anonymous. I was lulled out of my complacency, however, by Captain van Tol's contribution.
Until recently, I shared Captain van Tol's conviction that authors always should go on record. I was concerned that making anonymous "reports" is too easy, and would lead to a dangerous condition where unreasonable and destructive accusations could proliferate. Enough bizarre proposals pass through the portals of Proceedings with the authors' names attached. I shudder to think what would happen if we allowed anonymity. I absolutely agree with Captain van Tol that the Navy ought to be a place where people are free to make legitimate proposals and recommendations without fear of reprisal. But it is easy to assert the way things ought to be. The real world is more complex.
Over the past decade I have written for Proceedings. Although these contributions have been well received, I have been motivated to stop writing by two dynamics: (1) the assertion from both peers and superiors that if I kept writing I would put my career at risk, thereby eliminating any possibility that I would ever rise to a level of seniority where I could do anything to improve the conditions about which I wrote; and (2) the perception that, by attaching my name to my writing, I was raising antibodies to the extent that people were reacting not to what I was saying but to who was saying it.
Regarding the first issue, I can't count the number of times I've been told by senior officers that my writing would hurt my chances of promotion. Different people gave different reasons for this. I've been reminded more than once that Edward (Ned) Beach retired a captain. Others warned me that by making myself more "visible", shields would be formed between me and superiors who preferred a lower profile. In fact, unbeknownst to these well-meaning critics, much of my writing was done at my boss's request. Sometimes I was asked to go public with positions that my bosses, because of their status, could not discuss freely.
Other people expressing concern for my fate suggested that my writing would somehow distract me from my "real job." Even if one were to label as a "distraction" the four hours a year I spent writing articles, the truth is I only wrote while I was on shore duty and assigned to think grand thoughts. I have never spent time writing articles while at sea.
These warnings never really had any effect on me because as long as I told the truth—and as long as my ideas added value to the debate—I believed that it was worth personal risk to engage in the discussion. In fact, it was the second issue that has caused me to reconsider, because I've learned that the messenger does at times get in the way of the message.
I tested this theory by changing an article of mine that generated some negative reaction. I modified the title, author's name, and structure, but otherwise left the language unchanged. I had a coworker e-mail this "new article" to one of the earlier article's biggest critics, asking for his reaction. Surprise—he loved it. I've since begun to notice similar reactions to other authors. An article's credibility and value frequently are determined as soon as the reader gets to the author's name.
It is this latter dynamic that bothers me the most. I'd like people to measure the merits of my arguments independently of who wrote them. If anonymity removes prejudice, either for or against, then it may be worth the cost.
Chief Warrant Officer Richard W. Beauchamp, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Contrary to what Admiral Holland and others have written, there can be repercussions for the author of an article. A number of years ago, I submitted a letter supporting the use of warrant officers as patrol plane navigators in the P-3 community. While I had qualified as a patrol plane tactical navigator a few years prior, once my letter was published I started meeting increased resistance to my continuing flight duties, culminating in a directive from the wing to my commanding officer that I not deploy with the squadron as a navigator, although I continued to pass all squadron and wing naval air training and operating procedures standardization exams with consistent 4.0s.
I believe my flying career would have extended a few more years had I been smart enough to write an anonymous letter rather than proudly signing my name. Public discussion of topics outside the mainstream of current naval thought is done at the risk of one's career.
Clayton Bush—Publishing articles anonymously would promote dissension. This practice was commonplace in the 1800s. Philosophers used the practice to distribute heretical ideas, politicians attacked kings, and so on. A pseudonym commonly was used, such as the letters by "Leonidas" and "Veritas" that misreported events during the Mexican-American War. (The letters figured in the court of inquiry that ended the war by poisoning command relations.)
The U.S. military encountered anonymous publication in the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Mexican-American War. Authors published their versions of events, attacked disliked officers, and disparaged other units freely. The victims then responded. Teamwork suffered.
Captain Mike Boettcher, U.S. Navy—As a lieutenant commander carrier pilot in the mid-1990s, I found myself working on an article for Proceedings to express my observations and concerns on female integration. My gripe was that the female chief petty officers of an inspection team were receiving serious VIP room service in an officer stateroom (mine), while the male master chief petty officers were being treated to "don't know, don't care." Less than an hour after verifying facts with the ship's wardroom office, I was summoned to my commanding officer's stateroom. He told me he had received a call about my article from the commander of the carrier air wing. I was informed by my commanding officer that he had seen the careers of other "good officers" ruined by Proceedings articles they had written and would hate for that to happen to me. The message was loud and clear. Since I had made the commitment to stay Navy (contracted for the bonus) and not fly for Federal Express, I had to ask myself if writing this article was worth my career.
Don Richardson wrote, "Surely our military seniors would not indiscreetly punish someone for speaking the truth." No, but they certainly could punish discreetly. The problem for the junior officer is not the flags inside the beltway. It is the commanding officer he works for who has to answer the phone calls from above. It would be quite easy for a commanding officer to view a controversial Proceedings article written by one of his junior officers as a lack of proper judgment. This might not lead to overt action, but the commanding officer might simply give another officer from today's highly competitive wardroom the prime job that sets them up for the early promote ticket. If the author in question is already in a prime job, there is no recourse when "in the CO's judgment," the offender is ranked lower than he would have if the article had not been written. It is just part of office politics in our zero-tolerance Navy.
I fully agree with Captain von Tol and with Commander Addison's comments that granting anonymity treats the symptom, not the disease. I would argue, however, that many times treating the symptom is required because some diseases simply cannot be cured. There will always be sexual attraction within a mixed-gender crew and we will treat the "symptom" of behavior that is prejudicial to good order and discipline. Human nature being what it is, there will always be officers in leadership positions who do not want the boat rocked or their decisions questioned.
Admiral Dunn implies that fear of retribution from a Proceedings article is an indicator that the officer may lack the courage required in combat. I have not been shot at, but from what I have read, most of those who have experienced combat also experienced fear. There is a difference between facing the enemy with confidence in your equipment, training, and abilities, and facing the officer who signs your fitness report. Most aviators I know dread fitness report time more than the opportunity to test themselves in operational missions. I find it difficult to believe an officer could rise to the three-star level without being keenly aware of what role politics plays in our organization.
Admiral Dunn also states that if retribution occurs, senior leadership is at fault. I agree, but the junior officer still will pay the price personally. It is interesting that only two of ten commentaries on this subject are from active-duty officers.
Some argue that adopting a policy of accepting anonymous articles will result in more articles that are written with incomplete or inaccurate data. We have that now, but "Comment and Discussion" (my favorite section) provides ample opportunity to correct or add as required.
"The U.S. Navy in Review"
(See S. Truver, pp. 88-94, May 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Adam Dworkin, U.S. Naval Reserve—The author noted that the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) spent 153 days at sea without a port visit. In fact, our deployment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom kept us at sea for a total of 159 days. Those six extra days were not insignificant to those who served on board during that time.
"Is Manned Space Flight Worth It?"
(See J. Byron, pp. 120-21, March 2003; R. Truly, pp. 27-28, May 2003 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral John P. Cryer, U.S. Navy, Commander, Naval Network and Space Operations Command—Captain Byron brings up some key points for which there has not been much national dialogue. He challenges us to consider what direction we should take after the shuttle to truly explore space and not merely "continue to circle the planet."
I believe, however, the premise of his commentary is wrong. It presumes we have been wasting time and resources while engaged in a very dangerous strategy. My exposure to our Navy astronauts has taught me that there is a spirit in man that needs to know more, that needs to explore the unknown, and that needs to continue to learn by being there. These brave men and women are intensely dedicated to that spirit of exploration, and their dedication continues to result in scientific and technical improvements that benefit our nation as well as the world community. The drive that is so evident in our nation's astronaut corps should not be slowed by the cautionary alarm that Captain Byron raises. The astronauts of STS-107 who gave their lives on 1 February 2003 were dedicated to the spirit of exploration, which suggests we need to stay in space, perhaps never more so than now, to continue to learn, grow, and prepare for the day we can indeed go beyond "circling the planet."
Captain Byron does well to suggest that the time for discussion on the future of manned space flight is now, but we should not be debating whether our current program has been worth it; to many, including myself, this is self-evident. Certainly we need to move beyond the current shuttle mission, but we should not give up the precious toehold we have in manned space exploration. The crew of the Columbia, in particular Navy heroes Laurel Clark, Dave Brown, and Willie McCool, deserve at least that.
"Leadership Secrets of Down Periscope"
(See D. Szelowski, pp. 77-79, April 2003 Proceedings)
Commander John Cordle, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Oscar Austin (DDG-79)—Vindication! That's what I felt as I turned the page to Colonel Szelowski's unlikely but insightful article. Having subjected two wardrooms to "mandatory" showings of this movie, enduring countless groans and rolling eyeballs as I quote the prophet Buckman on Operational Risk Management ("When you rush, that's when accidents happen"), I was thrilled to see someone who shared my propensity to shout during a tactical antisubmarine warfare exercise, "See what he's doing, just like Down Periscope!" Thank you, Colonel, for pointing out some of the pearls of wisdom hidden in this politically incorrect movie that does for the Navy what Legally Blonde did for Harvard. And who among us has not at some point in his career stood at attention, enduring the admonition, "Don't you realize that you are speaking to a superior officer?" and wished for the courage to reply "No, Sir, merely a higher-ranking one."
One disclaimer, however: I beg to differ strongly with the author's dim view of current command leadership. I have watched many of my peers rise through the ranks as intelligent, loyal leaders who know and trust their crews and lead with integrity. Many of them are on station right now in the Arabian Gulf. It is unfair to categorically dismiss commanding officers as "just checking the block." Most are dedicated to the same ideals as Commander Dodge, forging their crews into a winning team using humor, innovation, and panache. You do not have to have a tattoo to be a good commanding officer. Other than that problem, thank you for a good read!
"Faster Is Not Always Better"
(See D. Goward, pp. 70-72. April 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Michael F. Trevett, U.S. Coast Guard—I applaud the publishing of this article. Many in the Coast Guard have focused too much on speed as a necessary requirement for many of the boats that comprise our boat force. Obviously, there are trade-offs and middle ground among the various characteristics of missions and characteristics of vessels. While the element of speed has received too much attention, almost no attention has been given to the vulnerability of Coast Guard boats performing national security missions in non-permissive and semi-permissive environments or against determined enemies. Unlike Navy ships, no Coast Guard boats are designed to sustain attacks while maintaining the capabilities of maneuverability, sea keeping, and speed.
The rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) cited as very fast boats in the article are not practical for national defense or law-enforcement operations in non-permissive or semi-permissive environments. In fact, no RHIB is practical for national defense because they easily can be disabled by such crude and effortless methods as cutting into the pontoon with a pocketknife or by running over or into sharp obstacles. After the inflatable pontoon partially or completely deflates, the maneuverability, sea keeping, and speed of a RHIB are so reduced that these factors become negligible. In addition, because keeping the boat afloat and getting back to shore or the nearest support becomes the overriding focus of the crew, a potential enemy does not have to focus on defeating the crew of an RHIB. He only has to eliminate the boat's potential capabilities. It does not matter if the enemy uses less maneuverable and slower vessels.
A potential enemy does not have to outgun, outmaneuver, or outrun Coast Guard boats. A potential and determined enemy can simply eliminate the possibility of Coast Guard involvement by the use of small arms, even a pellet gun, or by employing an unlimited array of crude or sophisticated methods to deflate a RHIB before it is launched, while it is approaching, or while it is in pursuit.
The Coast Guard needs a boat that can receive sustained fire from small arms to crew-served weapons while protecting the crew and maintaining its maneuverability, sea keeping, and speed. Obviously, the boat must be able to mount sufficient armament to return overwhelming fire. The only boats in the Coast Guard inventory that can come close to this definition are the fiberglass Boston Whalers. They do not, however, have armor to provide sufficient protection to the crew.
The Coast Guard is establishing Marine Safety and Security Teams in the nations important ports. These new units are supposed to be the nation's last line of defense against maritime threats, especially terrorism. All of these units, however, use RHIBs. Our nation and our Coastguards-men deserve better than a cushion of air to protect them, whatever the cost.
"Net-Centric Is Not Decisive"
(See M .Vego, pp. 52-58, January 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Hix, U.S. Army—Dr. Vego offers a useful and necessary skeptical assessment of the various "transformational" concepts offered as the answer to future warfare. Even as an aggressive proponent of strategic, operational, and tactical military transformation, I find his analysis to be considerably on target. Net-centric warfare appears to be a 21st-century equivalent of Blitzkrieg—a tactical concept of great utility that will not deliver when pressed beyond its limits to the operational and strategic levels. Blitzkrieg proved wildly successful when applied under optimal conditions within Western Europe's compressed lines of operation, against physically and psychologically ill-prepared opponents, and executed within the context of a well-focused operational plan. The concept fell apart on the Eastern Front, done in by the depth of the theater that exacerbated imbalances in the agility of the executing forces, a lack of operational focus, and an opponent that proved more resilient than the French and more determined than the attacking Wehrmacht.
Alternatively, the challenge is to embed net-centric warfare and other promising concepts and capabilities into the emerging operational and strategic art and science of 21st-century warfare. Ideas emerging from systems and complexity theory provide the basis for such unifying concepts as effects-based warfare (how we apply our capabilities more effectively) and operational net assessment (how we better understand our opponent, beyond the traditional military aspects of order of battle). These concepts can provide an important framework for linking strategy to operations to tactics while leveraging new thinking and new capabilities.
Net-centric warfare provides a useful structure for integrating current and emerging capabilities so that we can act more swiftly, effectively, and even efficiently. This approach helps us enhance our performance, executing tasks more rapidly and accurately. Net-centric warfare, however, does not ensure that these increases in performance are necessarily effective in achieving the purpose of those actions-the desired outcome of an operation. This is the realm of operational art, and the heart of Dr. Vego's misgivings.
These doubts center on the inherently tactical focus of both the net-centric warfare concept and our officer corps. The tactical level is where our officer corps' comfort zone exists. This tendency often results in the pursuit of tactical solutions to operational and strategic problems. Our success over the past decade has done little to challenge this tendency. The challenge for transformation is to recognize that from the perspective of military art and science, net-centric warfare is but one new element that must be artfully applied to fulfill political and military objectives—but it is not the unifying construct for future warfare.
"Wing in Ground Effect Vessels Are Fast Sealift"
(See D. Jacobs, pp. 110-11, March 2003 Proceedings)
Captain Joseph Lynn, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The wing in ground effect (WIGE) vessel also has been called a winged-hull. In 1969, the National Research Council, under Project Nimrod, conducted a study of minelaying. As a part of that study, a brief study of a winged hull as a mine delivery vehicle was conducted. Using optimistic technology projections, Lockheed had developed some preliminary winged-hull designs in the early 1960s. For the Project Nimrod study, the performance of these designs on a mine-delivery mission was compared to the performance of a C-5 on the same mission. The study concluded that selection of a particular delivery radius could cause one or the other of these aircraft types to have a competitive edge. The slight advantage that might be achieved with a winged-hull design, however, did not justify the high development cost for such a vehicle. I suspect that a thorough study combining current heavy-lift aircraft, high-speed ships, and prepositioning would reach the same conclusion.
Mr. Jacobs would like to classify a WIGE as a ship but concedes that it might eventually be classified as an aircraft. A WIGE definitely is an airplane. It does not float and is not an air-cushion vehicle. In conventional airplane fashion, it is supported by a wing that is unique only in that it is optimized for efficiency when operating in ground effect. If the captain of a ship becomes uncertain what is ahead of him, he can stop and think about it. The captain of a WIGE cannot stop and cannot maneuver at the altitude at which he would normally be operating. At a 15-foot altitude, the pilot's visual and radar horizon is about 1.2 minutes away at 216 knots. WIGE studies seem to assume that the surface of the ocean always is smooth so that the altitude of the WIGE above the surface is constant and that the lift/drag ratio will therefore be a constant. The lift/drag ratio is a function of the ratio of the aircraft's altitude to the length of its wing chord. Thus, a WIGE operating at 15 feet above the crest of a smooth five-foot swell at a lift/drag ratio of 30 will find its lift/drag ratio degrading about 25% over the trough. Further, the trim of the aircraft would be constantly changing as it flies over the wavy ocean. While we can certainly provide an autopilot capable of maintaining safe flight, the constant control movements necessary to accomplish this will further degrade the aerodynamic performance of the vehicle. Increasing the flight altitude of this aircraft to 50 feet would degrade its lift/drag ratio to about that of a conventional airplane operating out of ground effect.
Mr. Jacobs makes the point that the WIGE would not require any "formal port facilities" but could operate over a beach. An amphibian WIGE could operate from coastal airfields that currently support conventional transport aircraft. Efficient ports also require systems for loading and unloading vessels and for highways and railroads for moving goods inland. Because of its huge size and unique configuration, a WIGE would require unique support facilities in a conventional seaport. Many ports might prove unsuitable for such vehicles because of lack of space or because of the lack of a suitable landing and take-off area. If you are considering an amphibious landing, an over-the-beach operation might be acceptable. A beach could not be used as a transfer point for logistic support operations.
"Flag List"
(See pp. 143-67, May 2003 Proceedings)
Ted Pederson—More than 400 individual photographs of flag and general officers and senior enlisted leaders are shown in this feature. Approximately 20 black persons are shown in the photos. I find this both amazing and disgusting. It is very hard to believe that there our so few black persons capable of gaining such a high place of authority in our naval services. What other conclusion should, or could, I have drawn?
"Global Concept of Operations"
(See M. Mullen, pp. 66-69, April 2003 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)—It is good that Proceedings has undertaken to publish "Sea Power 21" and its supporting papers. There is no better way to get the word out to the active-duty professional, the interested retired community, or the reading public. At the same time, there is a problem. While these pieces were written in the offices of the Pentagon with all its usual baggage language, the editors at Proceedings have failed at purging the articles of Pentagon jargon.
In reading Vice Admiral Mullen's piece the reader is driven to distraction by the jargon. The only reason I continued to plow through it was to see just how much there was. Regular readers of the magazine probably can figure out terms such as "antiacess," "distributed," and "netted," but how will occasional readers who want to learn something decipher the code? They will flip the page and go on to the next article.
Worse yet are terms such as "enhanced capabilities" (enhanced over what?), "combat-credible forces" (would we use forces that are not combat credible?), "lighter carrier groups" (lighter than what?), and "joint force packages" (perhaps something from CARE). "Highly adaptable" also is open to question. Does the author really mean there will be room for growth as new systems are made available? And what in the world is "1/4/2/1"? Nowhere can the reader find it defined. There's more, but there's no point in nitpicking.
I just wish the editors would do a bit more translating. Less jargon would make the piece much more readable and easier for future historians too.