With the creation of the expeditionary strike group amphibious assault ships no longer will face the enemy alone—but does the addition of surface ships and submarines mean only a Navy officer can be in command? Marines have proved they can command task forces, so why shouldn’t they be in charge when fighting in the littorals is what they do best?
In their March 2003 Proceedings article "Expeditionary Strike Group!" Captain Kendall King and Commander Tom Holmes describe the utility of the new alignment of surface and subsurface combatants with a traditional amphibious ready group/Marine expeditionary unit team to provide combatant commanders with a versatile sea-based operational force that can be tailored to a variety of missions in support of U.S. policy. They also demonstrate how the expeditionary strike group fulfills two tenets of "Sea Power 21" (i.e., Sea Basing and Sea Strike). They do not fully develop their arguments, however, on who should be in charge.
Because Captain King and Commander Holmes discussed only the options of a Navy flag officer or a "super captain" to be in charge of an expeditionary strike group, their views with regard to a Marine general officer are unknown and the doctrinal impact unexplored.
A Marine Corps general in command of an expeditionary strike group would be the de facto officer in tactical command of ships at sea. While this might be objectionable to some Navy officers, the question is, why not a Marine? Charged with developing some of the briefs and plans for the initial staffing, training, and deployment of the first East Coast expeditionary strike group, the staff of Amphibious Group Two discussed who should command under the assumption that it would be a Navy officer. The expeditionary strike group does not have any additional Marine Corps capabilities than what deploy normally with an amphibious ready group or Marine expeditionary unit. It does, however, have a significant addition of Navy assets (three surface combatants and a fast attack submarine). In the past, those additional assets would have been deployed in such a way only on a temporary basis, and they would have been under the tactical control of the ready group commander—a Navy officer. But this is a narrow view of traditional service roles. Doctrine and recent history demonstrate that a Marine officer may be better suited to be an expeditionary strike group commander.
Some may argue that Marines are neither experienced in the tactical maneuver of ships at sea nor particularly well acquainted with the tactical employment of ships' defense systems in high-threat environments. Some also may argue that the traditional command relationships established in Joint Publication 3-02 (Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations) and Naval Warfare Publication 3-56 (Composite Warfare Commander's Manual), especially those proved over time and tested in battle, should not be changed. Navy officers do have the required tactical knowledge for naval maneuvers, but greater analysis of the expeditionary strike group command relationships and accompanying doctrine should be conducted before summarily discarding any options for a function as important as command and control. Joint Pub 3-02, for example, does not specifically address any service or component as being predisposed to be commander, amphibious task force, or commander, landing forces.
How can a Marine, who most likely is not familiar with the intricacies of Naval Warfare Publication 3-56 or the supporting operational tasks and tactics, techniques, and procedures, be a better candidate to command an expeditionary strike group?
The majority of the expeditionary strike groups' objectives will be located on landmasses, with tactical actions on the high seas and in the littorals to shape outcomes ashore. During World War II, the amphibious operations in the Pacific were at risk of destruction if encountered by the Japanese fleet and aircraft. Accompanying Navy escorts were there not only in support of the landing and for antiaircraft fires, but also to defend the invasion forces against the Japanese fleet. While the littorals of today are no easier in which to operate—because of mining, coastal missile defense systems, high traffic density, bottom structure, and sound propagation—in the near term the Navy is unlikely to encounter foes that will be able to oppose all movement to potential areas of operations. "The seas are no longer the potential battle areas they once were," writes retired Navy Admiral Bill Owens. "Now they are the highways, the runways, and the bridges across which the United States can bring its forces to bear against a land power." As the Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark points out in "Sea Power 21," the expeditionary strike group will conduct Sea Strike missions in a "lesser threat" environment.
Should regional conflicts necessitate Sea Strike missions in a high-threat environment, an expeditionary strike group would join with a carrier strike group to form an expeditionary strike force. The carrier strike group commander would assume control of Navy assets (command relationships also could be designated by the joint force commander) and the full naval combat power would be used as required to deter or eliminate naval threats.
Although it is dangerous to dismiss potential threats or adversary capabilities to attack an expeditionary strike group at sea, it is a fairly sound assumption that outside of an asymmetric or limited-scale attack, there will be little opposition that would necessitate a strictly naval planning perspective to maneuver the force to use its offensive capabilities. Because the majority of the offensive capabilities (i.e., Tomahawk missiles, Harriers, Marines, SEAL platoons, and eventually the Joint Strike Fighter) of an expeditionary strike group will be oriented to attacking targets on land, the ground perspective should be the predominant orientation for the strike group's mission tasks.
Marines often assert they should be in charge of amphibious operations because they are the "main effort." The recent revision to Joint Pub 3-02 has made the appropriate provisions for command relationships between commander, amphibious task force, and commander, landing forces. "These new operational considerations—the focus on battlefield support, the notion of regional reach and the operational flexibility in the mix of deployed naval assets," writes Admiral Owens, "alter the operational relationships between the Navy and Marine, change surface-and submarine-force operations, and create a new operational relationship between naval forces and other U.S. military forces."
An important point of Naval Warfare Publication 3-56 may help clarify routine at-sea missions such as maritime or leadership interdiction operations. This publication allows for several options regarding the delegation of the officer in tactical command's authority to the composite warfare commander. An officer in tactical control may retain all authority and responsibility for all warfare areas; he may delegate some primary warfare areas and retain some primary warfare area responsibilities; he may delegate all primary warfare responsibilities; or he may delegate authority of composite warfare commander to a subordinate who may in turn do each of the above. This does not relieve the officer in tactical control of overall responsibility for defense of the force but instead allows him to bestow authority to officers who are best able to accomplish their responsibilities based on knowledge, situational awareness, and capabilities. As the officer in tactical command, an expeditionary strike group commander could opt to have his deputy or an O-6 designated as the composite warfare commander. This officer could command by negation for defensive actions and ultimately maneuver the ships in support of tasking from the strike group commander. This also would allow the strike group commander to concentrate on the planning and execution of other missions.
A Marine general has an advantage, particularly with regard to developing an operational design for land warfare, over his Navy counterpart in that he has spent his career in a service with a history of applying operational art toward maximizing the synergistic effects of combined arms. Greater than the sum of their parts, Marine Corps formations are centered on air-ground task forces—whether they are expeditionary units, expeditionary brigades, or expeditionary forces. Marines, from company grade to general officer, synchronize the effects of their combined arms—whether artillery batteries, mortars, or naval fire support and aircraft—so that those on the ground have the greatest chance of success. Accomplishing the joint force commander's objectives by employing combined arms to overwhelm adversaries with unity of effort in speed, shock, and crushing violence could be realized if a Marine general commands an expeditionary strike group.
A Marine general with an air-ground task force background also brings expertise in expeditionary warfare planning and operational maneuver. In addition to the expertise from increased exposure to operational art, throughout his career a Marine general will have greater experience in the commander's estimate process and identification of critical factors. A Marine also is more likely to have been exposed to joint and combined training, joint exercises, or joint operations—likely having attended Army and/or Navy courses of instruction and having served under the operational control of either a maritime or land component commander.
Command of an expeditionary strike group by a Marine would not be unprecedented. Joint task force commanders have been Marines (as in Operations Sea Angel [humanitarian aid to Bangladesh in 1991] and Restore Hope [Somalia]). As recently as 2001-2002 during Operation Enduring Freedom, then-Brigadier General James Mattis was Commander, Task Force 58. Attached to the task force was the Peleliu (LHA-5) Amphibious Ready Group and the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, the Bataan (LHD-5) Amphibious Ready Group and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and at any given time one or more Aegis cruisers or destroyers and other combatants. Commander, Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command, Navy Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, designated General Mattis as the officer in tactical command of Task Force 58. These forces were the first to deploy conventional ground forces to Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. While in Afghanistan, the landing forces were supported from the sea. On any given day, Harriers flew strike sorties, ship-to-shore movement was conducted under the direction of the amphibious task force commander for logistical support, and leadership interdiction operations were supported. The amphibious squadron commanders, who were delegated authority as composite warfare commanders, controlled the maneuver of the task force ships at sea in support of all operations. Having a Marine general in charge put the focus where it needed to be—on winning the battles on the ground in Afghanistan.
The expeditionary strike group concept will be put into effect this summer on a test basis. The command relationships that will be established and exercised will vary by fleet. The Atlantic Fleet version, the Saipan (LHA-2) Expeditionary Strike Group (now overtaken by real-world events and an early deployment), was to deploy without a Navy flag officer. The amphibious squadron commander will command the group and continue a supporting/supported relationship with the Marine expeditionary unit commander. With the Pacific Fleet version, there will be a Navy flag officer as the commander of the Peleliu Expeditionary Strike Group. The deployments will test which of these two command relationships is optimal. There most likely will be subsequent deployments before a decision is made to employ a Marine general to command one of these strike groups.
Lieutenant Commander Stopyra attends the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He has served as operations/plans officer for Commander, Amphibious Squadron Eight, and operations officer for the Ashland (LSD-48). He has been slated as prospective executive officer of the Carter Hall (LSD-50).