Assured access is a linchpin of both our naval and national security strategies. Although our most recent strike-intensive wars have been conducted virtually free from challenge at sea, this superiority is far from guaranteed against more capable adversaries. Some potential competitors are acquiring asymmetric maritime capabilities that could deny the United States access to littoral regions where naval power may be needed to deter conflict or prevail should events turn hostile. Proliferation of these threats means we cannot simply assume future access to key regions.
As Commander, Fleet Forces Command, I have commissioned internal staff studies to chart a way ahead to ensure the fleet is adequately equipped and trained to handle those critical access mission areas that are uniquely naval in nature. It is clear that mines and submarines—especially in significant numbers—have the greatest potential to impede our access from the sea. Revitalized mine and antisubmarine warfighting capabilities are an essential underpinning of the Sea Shield concept (see November 2002 Proceedings, pp. 56-59) presented in the Chief of Naval Operation's (CNO) operational vision, "Sea Power 21" (see October 2002 Proceedings, pp. 32-41).
The Mine Peril in Littoral War
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed that "advanced mines could threaten the ability of U.S. naval and amphibious forces to operate in littoral waters" and are a likely method through which "future adversaries may have the means to render ineffective much of our current ability to project U.S. power overseas." Indiscriminate and anonymous, sea mines are a sharp instrument of naval littoral war. Their explosive shock can rupture hulls, ignite fires, and sink ships. Ships they do not sink often are left crippled to limp back to port, easy prey for the enemy. Discreetly deployed from submarines, aircraft, small boats, and other platforms, mines are an inexpensive force multiplier that can shock, damage, and deter U.S. forces, threatening access to the choke points, ports, and coastal regions needed to project U.S. power from the sea.
Given their ready availability, low cost, and ease of employment, it is not surprising that mines have caused more damage to U.S. naval ships since World War II than any other naval weapon. Fourteen U.S. Navy ships have been sunk or damaged by mines since World War II, more than three times the number damaged by air and missile attack. The latest chapter in our Navy's long history of difficulty in combating the mine threat was our response to Iraqi mining efforts during the Gulf War. Despite a rudimentary and aged mining capability, Iraq severely damaged the USS Princeton (CG-59) and the USS Tripoli (LPH-10), and prevented amphibious operations into Kuwait. Today, mines are being built and stockpiled by many of our potential adversaries, putting the global inventory at more than a quarter-million and rising.
Distinguishing Organic and Dedicated Systems
In 1995, the CNO directed that mine warfare receive greater emphasis and become an integral capability in our battle groups, in addition to our existing dedicated capability. To that end, organic mine warfare systems—including five airborne, one surface-ship-based, and one submarine-based system—are scheduled for introduction into the fleet beginning in 2005 (see Table 1).
A good way to view the distinction between organic and dedicated mine warfare resources is to classify them either as tactical or strategic assets. Organic mine countermeasure (MCM) systems are tactical in nature. Dedicated MCM systems are theater or strategic assets that conduct persistent and long-duration hunting and sweeping to clear mines in relatively larger areas.
These elements of organic mine warfare are in various stages of development. On introduction, organic mine warfare systems are intended to provide focused mine detection and limited minesweeping capabilities that will permit the battle group to "punch through" a mined corridor or strait.
Developing these organic capabilities may lead to the misconception that new organic mine countermeasures systems are replacements for existing dedicated platforms. This is not the case. We need both organic and dedicated mine systems.
To defeat the growing threat, mine warfare must be a core competency of the fleet. Successful integration of both dedicated and organic mine warfare capabilities into the force requires their promotion as major warfare specialties, similar to the traditional air, surface, and undersea warfare areas. Mainstreaming is our process for fully integrating mine warfare knowledge, concepts, and tactics throughout the fleet. Fielding an MCM capability organic to the battle group encourages the development of unit-level mine warfare expertise. At the same time, mainstreaming provides the professional foundation to develop the tactics needed to conduct mine warfare effectively with current and future systems at both the tactical and strategic levels.
Near-to-Midterm Problem and Fixes
All current U.S. Navy MCM assets are assigned to a dedicated mine warfare force. These include 14 MCM-- class and 12 MHC-class ships, 20 MH-53E helicopters, and explosive ordnance disposal/marine mammal system units. The MH-53E helicopter gives the U.S. Navy the unique ability to conduct both airborne minehunting and minesweeping operations. We must improve our mine warfare readiness by ensuring MCM ship engine and system reliability. Equally important is our need to operate our airborne MCM forces from a surrogate large-deck amphibious ship that can serve as a mine command ship. This surrogate capability was successfully tested and exercised with the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) in the Gulf of Mexico in October 2002.
- Improving MCM Ships: Dedicated surface MCM ships are key to our plans to counter the global mine threat, especially in the Persian Gulf and the Pacific. Planned organic capabilities and existing airborne MCM units may offer better response times, but they do not have the capacity for large-area mine clearance. Forward-deployed MCM and MHC ships provide an initial in-theater capability, but follow-on forces will be required to satisfy the requirements of most scenarios.
One of our most important challenges is improving MCM ship mission reliability. We are engaged in a dynamic class modernization program to ensure MCM/MHC mission viability—including engine, sonar, crane, and auxiliary system improvements. The greatest problem has been extremely poor engine reliability. Despite a decade of attempted improvements, these engines remain prone to premature catastrophic failure. After extensive analysis, we decided to replace these engines, with priority given to the oceangoing MCM class.
- Mine Command Ship: A central lesson of the Gulf War is that a dedicated mine command ship (MCS), capable of directing all aspects of the multifaceted mine warfare campaign plan, is needed to bring the various MCM capabilities together, providing unity of effort in defeating the mine threat. Until her recent decommissioning after a serious fire, the USS Inchon (MCS-12) provided command, control, and operational support to a mine warfare task force, including full maintenance support for embarked helicopters and accompanying MCM ships.
We must replace the Inchon's capabilities with new ships and systems. In the interim, however, we have a solid concept of operations to "containerize" the MCS functions for use aboard an available large-deck amphibious ship. Large-deck command ship design is required as long as airborne mine sweeping and heavy sled towing are critical elements of our mine warfare capability.
- Airborne MCM: There currently are no substitutes for the heavy-lift and towing capacity of the MH-53E helicopter, which provides a significant airborne minesweeping capability. The proposed MH-60S organic mine warfare helicopter does not have the towing capacity to use existing dedicated mine sweeping gear.
Furthermore, minesweeping gear planned for the MH-60S will be considerably less capable than the current system. Because our operational plans rely on airborne minesweeping to provide quick-response mine clearance in forward areas, the MH-53E should be retained in service until advances in technology allow for a combination of the MH-60S and new unmanned sweeping technologies to get the job done.
Unmanned Mine Warfare Systems
The requirement for a large deck to support MH-53 heavy sled towing capability is the largest cost driver in acquiring a dedicated mine command ship. Maturing technologies have the potential to alter our mine warfare capabilities dramatically in the next decade and transform the nature of mine warfare. Programmed organic systems may improve our mine hunting and neutralization capability greatly. For instance, employing AQS-20 sonar on an MH-60 helicopter will be three times more effective than the current AQS-14 employed by the MH-53, even considering the substantial range and endurance advantage of the MH-53. The AQS-20, coupled with unmanned remote mine hunting and long-term mine reconnaissance systems, offers a significant increase in mine-hunting capability. These improvements mean that fewer airborne assets will be needed to accomplish the mine-hunting mission both in the dedicated (theater) and organic (tactical) mine warfare roles.
While future mine-hunting technological developments are promising, mine hunting alone is ineffective in 60% of the littoral regions near our potential adversaries. Access to these areas requires mine sweeping. Currently, the MH-53 helicopters and MK-106 sled are needed to meet our airborne minesweeping requirements.
Many of the same technologies that are driving improvements in mine hunting could be leveraged to develop an unmanned minesweeping system. To reduce unnecessary risk and keep sailors out of the minefield, it makes good sense to move toward greater reliance on unmanned systems for mine sweeping and hunting. Developing unmanned systems also could produce an enormous savings if the future MCS need not support a large helicopter detachment. One possible solution is the employment of a high-speed vessel (HSV) acting as a transport for unmanned hunters and sweepers, and a few helicopters.
Because sweeping is presently our limiting factor in mine warfare, the Office of Naval Research performed a detailed analysis, "The Use of Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) for Integrated Mine Countermeasures in Littoral Amphibious Warfare," and confirmed that USVs have clear potential for every MCM application. The current USV concept of an 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat with two 650-horsepower engines has adequate capacity to tow a full range of sweeping systems.
The good news is that USVs already have demonstrated the potential to perform the minesweeping job. Using that concept, we were able to tow a MK-104 acoustic sweep at 21 knots as well as the 4,000-pound Australian Dyads at 28 knots. In addition, the MK-103 mine-cutting gear has been employed successfully in a recent test. These vehicles, as currently envisioned, will be limited to sea state 2, but the concept needs greater development to provide increased capability. In the end, we may have to rely on our MCM ships for those occasions when we have to sweep in higher sea states.
The concept of using unmanned surface and undersea vehicles with a few rapid airborne mine clearance system helicopters—deployed from a fast relatively small ship such as the HSV—offers great promise in combating the mine problem. Our mission area analysis for a notional strait scenario (clearing a 1,000-yard-wide channel inside a 10 miles by 100 miles strait) shows that notional unmanned systems equipped with current programmed technologies could provide a comparable capability to that of the Inchon, and at a cheaper price. We will continue to experiment with this promising concept as part of Sea Trial 21.
As we transform our naval forces, ensuring access to littoral areas means we cannot ignore the threat of cheap, lethal sea mines. Our first priority must be improving our near-term capabilities, but it also is important to keep an eye on our long-term vision of mine warfare. Unmanned systems clearly are the future. Transforming this important warfighting capability requires our Navy to remain focused on driving unmanned mine countermeasure technologies to maturity. Given the growing threat to our fleet and current state of technology, we are fools if we don't.
Admiral Natter is Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and Commander, Fleet Forces Command.