In the past few years, the nation has witnessed devastating assaults on the USS Cole (DDG-67), the World Trade Center, and the Pentagon, and commencement of the military campaign against terrorism at home and abroad. These sober reminders of the current environment and the critical nature of the U.S. military's role also serve to highlight the key missions of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). Our enemies have demonstrated unprecedented boldness in their determination to threaten U.S. interests. Terrorists and criminal organizations are becoming increasingly adept at exploiting globalization in all its aspects and freedom of movement across national boundaries.
For years, NCIS has provided dependable criminal investigative and counterintelligence (CI) expertise and services. It is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for conducting or participating in the investigation of felony crimes involving Navy Department military and civilian personnel, installations, and property. Such crimes include acts of terrorism, espionage, cyber crime, homicide, and drug trafficking.
Historically, NCIS tasks have required a singular focus: strong investigative expertise to respond quickly to criminal matters and intelligence threats as they arose. Today, however, NCIS joins the many federal law enforcement agencies that have reengineered operations and supplemented responsiveness with anticipatory measures designed to prevent or reduce the major terrorist and criminal threats that confront us. The new measures represent a reformulation of the NCIS mission that emphasizes both active and reactive measures. The service now conducts a wide range of activities designed to prevent terrorism and protect U.S. Navy and Marine Corps assets. It has shifted priorities to better identify threats and improve coordination and information sharing with law enforcement counterparts.
Strategic Vision
In early 2002, the NCIS headquarters, under the leadership of Director David L. Brant and the Strategic Planning Group—an in-house think tank—developed a broad plan for implementing the expanded tasks that have arisen since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks:
- Prevent terrorism and related hostile acts against Navy Department forces and installations. The NCIS can contribute best to readiness by identifying, infiltrating, and—in conjunction with counterterrorism counterparts of other agencies—dismantling terrorist organizations that threaten the United States worldwide. This first order of business concentrates on comprehending the nature and scope of threats facing naval forces and on preventing threats to naval interests.
- Defend against compromise of information and penetration of critical operational systems. Because of its importance to national security, special agents, area analysts, and investigative support personnel will devote increased resources to this task.
- Maintain an active and innovative posture to reduce criminal activity and mitigate its effect on operational readiness. Navy Department commands and personnel expect the NCIS to continue its professional capability to act quickly at home and abroad to minimize the adverse effects of crime.
In furtherance of these tasks, the NCIS will focus its main efforts on:
- Disrupting criminal, foreign intelligence, and terrorist operations to eliminate or minimize threats
- Establishing an information-sharing system to enhance deterrent and prevention capabilities
- Extending influence over organizations that support naval security
- Hardening potential targets by identifying and neutralizing vulnerabilities
Counterintelligence Support of Force Protection
Given increased emphasis on joint U.S. and multinational operations, U.S. military forces have deployed in support of various peacekeeping, counternarcotics, and humanitarian operations. The Navy and Marine Corps play an important role in these types of commitments because they offer highly mobile forces that can operate from the sea. Unfortunately, widespread availability of sophisticated explosives, weapons, and intelligence-gathering systems gives significant capabilities to small countries, bands of narcotics traffickers, and terrorist groups. Through its counterintelligence (CI) protection program, the NCIS collects and analyzes information about possible threats from various sources and advises military commanders on how to defend against them. Investigative personnel work closely with operational planning staffs, in coordination with forward-deployed NCIS agents who act as the eyes and ears of naval forces.
Special agents with CI experience are assigned to the staffs of combatant, naval component, and fleet commanders, and to the major joint intelligence centers. They identify the military commander's CI information needs and determine how to satisfy them. The program includes investigations, threat briefings, counterespionage operations, and intelligence collection. Assigned agents routinely investigate suspected loss and compromise of sensitive military information and conduct operations to counter foreign intelligence services.
Exercise Strong Resolve 2002
An example of the enhanced counterintelligence support that the NCIS provides to ships entering foreign ports occurred in early 2002 on the USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20). The embarked Commander, Striking Fleet Atlantic, led NATO Exercise Strong Resolve 2002, a major combined exercise that took place in several northern European nations. During the exercise and follow-on port visits, the flagship received support from the European NCIS field offices, U.S. embassies, and host nations.
Special agents from the local field office contacted the embarked staff's NCIS counterintelligence support officer several days before visits by secure e-mail and secure telephone to pass timely threat information. The agents—on the ground several days before the scheduled visit—reestablished contact with the U.S. embassy country team and host-nation contacts to update information prior to the flagship's arrival. In addition, they established close contact with the U.S. naval attaché of the embassy involved. Shortly after the Mount Whitney tied up, special agents and members of the host-nation security team went on board to brief the intelligence staff section and wardroom on the latest threat information.
Before entering ports, the NCIS staff CI support officer briefed the crew over the closed-circuit television. During visits, the local agents contacted the ship's force protection officer or joint intelligence center several times every day to funnel the latest information to the staff and ship's company. They also established liaison with each area's U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, and U.S. Army military intelligence detachment. Each morning, they discussed their plans for the day, thereby affording the staff and ship's company the opportunity to have input to scheduled visits with the host-nation security services.
The NCIS local agents passed on timely information about high-interest vessels (which carried personnel and cargo of concern) that were scheduled to transit close to the Mount Whitney's berth. Armed with a list of dangerous chemicals compiled by naval intelligence and the U.S. Coast Guard, they called on the port operations office to ascertain arrival of ships that might be carrying such chemicals.
Development of threat-assessment matrixes was another initiative undertaken by supporting special agents during Strong Resolve 2002 port visits. Fielded with the assistance of the fleet intelligence officer and the joint intelligence center, the matrixes were created to enhance predictive analysis of indications and warnings of terrorist and criminal threats for a 96-hour period. Lessons learned from the deployment have been incorporated into the NCIS support package for worldwide port visits and assessments.
It was apparent that the Navy needed more frequent and intimate pre-arrival contact with supporting NCIS offices. Thus, agents strove to maximize use of secure and unclassified e-mail to establish contact with ships several days before they entered port. In several instances during the exercise, agents used e-mail accounts from the U.S. embassy and nearby Navy ships to update the Mount Whitney with the latest threat information. As a result, the commanding officer was better prepared to enter port.
Need for Change
After the 11 September 2001 attacks, it became apparent that an information disconnect between the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice impeded the timely flow of domestic intelligence threat information to the Commander, Second Fleet, and his forces—including six carrier battle groups, six amphibious ready groups, and independent deploying units. Given the threat level, it was noted by the Second Fleet staff that NCIS was the Navy's sole gateway to domestic law enforcement and terrorism investigations as well as any predictive analyses. More timely acquisition of threat information and concise analyses by NCIS were deemed essential for the fleet commander to make the necessary force-protection decisions for the ships and other units under his operational control. The NCIS understood the need for fusing CI and law enforcement data, but the Antiterrorism Alert Center (ATAC) in Washington, D.C., perceived a shortfall in assessments of threats to the continental United States. (This need had been recognized previously and several programmatic initiatives were under way.)
Based on fleet requirements, the NCIS headquarters committed to significant personnel and infrastructure upgrades in December 2001. On I April 2002, formation of a new Multiple Threat Alert Center to replace the ATAC was announced; it currently produces analytic reports, suspicious incident reports, centralized threat assessments, and other products oriented to Navy and Marine Corps commands. Further, in concert with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the NCIS arranged for Norfolk, Virginia, to be the latest venue for a ground-breaking pilot program, the Law Enforcement Information-Sharing Project. The first phase started in St. Louis, Missouri; it shares law enforcement and investigative information among local, state, and federal agencies and has shown promising results. Once fully in place, this program will give the NCIS the timely information it needs to craft improved responses and recommended force-protection measures.
Other NCIS efforts to maximize crosspollination among federal law enforcement agencies includes assigning senior NCIS special agents to local FBI-sponsored joint terrorism task force offices in the United States, with emphasis on the Second Fleet's priority areas. These task forces enable local, state, and federal law enforcement personnel to combine their expertise and more effectively coordinate actions on matters of mutual interest.
With just more than 1,500 special agents and professional staff deployed around the world—and a streamlined organizational structure-the NCIS is a flexible, operationally oriented group of well-trained professionals who are determined to do what it takes to protect and serve the Navy-Marine Corps team. At the same time, it has had to reallocate people from traditional investigative activities and is seeking increased funding to make the most of scarce resources.
Conclusions
The Naval Criminal Investigative Service adjusted in short order to the war on terrorism and the many ensuing changes in procedures and operations. Nonetheless, the public's expectations of the NCIS and other federal law enforcement agencies have risen sharply. Although the United States lost the first battle of the new millennium, it is better prepared today. A new strategy has equipped the service to work in closer concert with the fleet.
Transformation for the NCIS is a constant process of preparing to engage current security threats while attempting to predict the threats that lie ahead. With the vital assistance of U.S. and allied law enforcement and security agencies, a stronger sense of cooperation and urgency assists us in predicting the actions of our asymmetric enemy—and sailors and Marines are safer from acts of terror than they were just a year ago.
Special Agent Coyle is the Staff Counterintelligence Support Officer for Commander, Second Fleet, in Norfolk, Virginia.