The short take-off/vertical landing Joint Strike Fighter is an ideal way to support the Navy's "Sea Power 21" concept of Sea Basing by enabling the use of unconventional aircraft carriers, allowing increased sorties per mission, and decreasing host nation logistical support. Adoption of STOVL JSFs by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force would dramatically increase aviation capability and transform the nation's carrier air power.
Force transformation is mapping the way for U.S. military forces to wage "an American way of war," as coined by leaders in the Department of Defense's Office of Force Transformation. One of the transformational concepts being pursued by the Navy and Marine Corps is Sea Basing, part of the Navy's "Sea Power 21" strategy. Sea Basing generally is thought about in terms of logistics or as a managed provision of sustainment to units ashore from ships offshore. These capabilities rest with the elements of the amphibious ready group, the maritime prepositioning force, and individual vessels such as the large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ship.
Although sustainment may be an overriding aspect of how Sea Basing is perceived, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vern Clark describes it instead as "a foundation from which offensive and defensive fires are projected—making Sea Strike and Sea Shield realities." In the future, the expeditionary strike group, an amphibious ready group augmented with surface warships and submarines, will prosecute Sea Strike missions in the lower-threat environments where the carrier strike group's robust Sea Shield competencies may not be required. The Navy has acknowledged that the new platforms being developed to support the expeditionary strike groups, which include maritime prepositioned groups as part of the sea base, should be designed to realize their warfighting potential. Sea Strike as the prime generator for projecting decisive combat power within the Sea Basing concept will involve a large percentage of the joint force's combat power—its air power.
Of the aforementioned expeditionary strike group elements, only the amphibious ready group can employ manned combat aviation assets; this includes all rotary-wing aircraft but only one fixed-wing strike aircraft—the vertical/short take-off and landing (V/STOL) Harrier. However, with the development of the short take-off/vertical landing Joint Strike Fighter (STOVL JSF), a new breed of robust, stealthy, supersonic fighters will be able to use unconventional aircraft carriers (ships without catapults or arresting gear) to enhance the Sea Basing concept by increasing the number of aircraft available for Sea Strike missions. The Navy states that "as operational concepts evolve, and new systems like the Joint Strike Fighter deliver to the fleet, it will be advantageous to maximize this increased aviation capability." Implementing the STOVL JSF as a common triservice (Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force) aircraft means the number of ship-capable, fixed-wing combat aircraft not requiring conventional aircraft carriers would increase dramatically, thereby supporting the transformation of carrier air power as it relates to Sea Basing. With the Air Force's participation, no longer would sea-based aviation be a unilateral naval aviation affair. There are reasons to field a large joint STOVL JSF force as a means to sustain sea bases' combat power.
The Argument
The justification for replacing conventional aircraft at sea with V/STOL aircraft has been argued since the 1950s. Initially, vertical recovery was seen as a safer way to return aircraft to ships at sea. The Navy understood the intrinsic value of operating aircraft from warships other than conventional aircraft carriers "to apply the advantages of sea-based air across a broader spectrum of Navy ships." The early technology, however, could not provide comparable tactical performance, so the idea went dormant. By the late 1970s, it was given new life, this time in response to budget constraints being considered by Congress. The Navy was certain its large, expensive carrier force would be in jeopardy, so the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, wrote, "The ability of the U.S. Navy to carry out its missions will depend on the use of manned, tactical, sea-based aircraft. To be able to afford them, the Navy will have to switch to V/STOL planes and carriers." If V/STOL aircraft were to be introduced fleetwide, Admiral Holloway would have to ensure they would be used from all types of ships and have comparable performance to their conventional counterparts. One of the two advantages he deemed critical was that "[t]he design of future carriers, required to operate only V/STOL aircraft, could be enormously more flexible without the requirement for angled decks, overhang, arresting gear, and high capacity catapults. Carriers could then be large or small and either nuclear or conventionally powered."
By the early 1980s, the advocates of an all-conventional carrier force were back in control, as new funding had been allocated for more large carriers and the performance margin for the new fighters heavily favored conventional aircraft programs over the unfunded advanced V/STOL programs. As long as the performance (and funding) gap between conventional and V/STOL aircraft remained, the basic aircraft carrier design would revolve around the launch and recovery of tailhook-equipped aircraft, which require complex systems and extensive pilot training.
Enter the STOVL JSF, the aircraft that has closed the fighter performance gap and does not suffer from funding inequities, possessing all of the V/STOL flexibility previously desired. With a concept generated almost 30 years ago—and in consideration of future Sea Basing—not only can aircraft carrier design be modified to include less complex, multirole platforms, but shipboard aircraft training and employment also can be made much less challenging and cumbersome.
The New Challenge
In the "Sea Power 21" concept of Sea Strike, the CNO created a framework for sustaining sea-based fires. The sea base lays the foundation, beginning with its ability to build, project, and sustain combat power through fully networked, forward-deployed joint forces and assets. This power can be maintained while virtually eliminating the footprint ashore. By operating from the maritime domain, double-handling of supplies and equipment is reduced and the self-imposed operational pause associated with buildup ashore is eliminated. The greatest potential benefit from Sea Busing and the elimination of the large permanent forward air base comes with the reduction of host nation support. This is a major step forward in embracing the concept of a fully noncontiguous battle space supported by joint forces capable of flexible strategic structuring and timely operational maneuver.
Limiting the footprint also reduces the logistics burden. By basing afloat a greater percentage of his joint fighter/attack assets, a commander is able to reduce the demand on available transportation and materials. This is not to say those air assets will not become forward based, but it gives the operational commander the flexibility to posture his forces as the situation dictates. Even in this context, the STOVL JSF gives the commander unmatched flexibility by dramatically increasing the number of existing runways available worldwide for his use, as STOVL operations require minimal runway length. As retired Navy Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of Force Transformation for the Department of Defense, sees it, this flexibility to move forward falls in line with the concept of the sea base: "Forces that would come to that sea base—air, sea, or land forces—need to come in one smooth motion and then maneuver operationally from it."
The Benefits of Change
Even after Admiral Holloway's edict in the 1970s was superceded, further studies compared the effectiveness of conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) and V/STOL aircraft at sea. One study, conducted by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) in 1980, concluded that V/STOL aircraft provide better mission performance at sea with fewer aircraft. This stems from the V/STOL's ability to generate a greater number of sorties for a given time period, primarily because it is unconstrained by the normal deck cycles of CTOL aircraft. The AIAA study points out that "the air platform from which V/STOL operates can be smaller than today's large deck carrier. The support costs, including logistics, maintenance, manpower, et al. are reduced for both the aircraft and the ship." This concept sets the stage for reducing the large overhead normally associated with sea-based tactical aviation to the point where it can be considered viable on many more seagoing platforms.
The STOVL JSF greatly reduces the training and currency requirement for fixed-wing operations afloat. This increases commensurately its ability to be adopted and employed jointly as the Air Force is no longer excluded from non-land-based operations. With the large power margins, enhanced stability control, and pilot augmentation systems the STOVL JSF will incorporate, safe and efficient landings at sea will become easy and straightforward. This should lead to streamlined training and extended currency limits—so much so that non-naval-trained pilots could become ship-qualified in just a few days. Consider the flexibility of being able to jointly sea base all of the services' primary tactical air assets, not only in the context of the tenets mentioned earlier, but also in the form of indefinite sustainment for the force structure. The STOVL JSF squadrons from any service, with minimal effort, could provide forces for surged or sustained sea-based maritime operations—a force planner's dream.
While a modern aircraft carrier can employ the STOVL JSF, we must examine new complementary designs that more fully would support the Sea Basing concept rather than merely providing platform space for short-term surge capability. By expanding the number of platforms available, maximum operational flexibility is attained. Because of the cost of a new ship, designing one with multiple capabilities should be a prerequisite. A suitable cost-efficient family of vessels focused on the objective capability of Sea Basing might be found with the combination of an aircraft carrier or amphibious-warfare ship and a maritime prepositioned ship. The CNO is convinced there is "unique and powerful" potential for maritime prepositioned ships once they are unloaded.
One ship design agent, Naval Sea Systems Command/Advanced Marine Enterprises, has designed several such unique ships. Cost was the principal design driver, but current and evolving technology were leveraged to develop these designs to meet the maritime prepositioned group's Sea Basing capability. One design incorporates the facilities of a maritime prepositioned ship, including cranes and a roll-on/roll-off ramp, along with the helicopter capability of an amphibious assault ship (general purpose), albeit with fewer operational spots. The aviation-capable design has a dedicated flight deck designed for helicopters and STOVL aircraft, which gives the impression of an aircraft carrier. However, most of the below-deck spaces are dedicated to roll-on/roll-off and cube cargo, along with aviation fuel and ordnance. This concept capitalizes on the AIAA finding that "V/STOL can provide equal or better [mission] performance with many less aircraft."
Fewer aircraft require less hangar space, fewer maintenance and support personnel, and for STOVLs, fewer ship systems to support them and a much smaller air department. STOVLs require 30% less deck space for operations, which leads to increased operating efficiencies. Those efficiencies allow generation of more sorties given equal mission performance. For example, STOVL aircraft can generate 30% more sorties than CTOL aircraft for targets out to 400 nautical miles, and 15% more for ranges to 700 nautical miles. The affordable combination of multiple missions within one hull design can become a reality based on our emerging technology.
That is not to say the aircraft carrier does not have its place within this concept; it probably will become the keystone of the sea base under certain threat levels. However, when we allocate funding for new vessels, we should choose wisely and purchase a family of ships capable of performing multiple roles dedicated to transforming our force in the face of the uncertainty that confronts us. Within this family, the carrier may become primary for most Sea Shield capabilities and long-range power projection, and the new class of vessels would enable the sea base by providing basing and force flow for a majority of Sea Strike's flexible and persistent offensive power.
A Historical Example
Although Sea Basing may be seen as a transformational concept, and the notion of using cargo ships as aircraft carriers while allowing Air Force pilots to fly from them seems to support transformation, there is a historical precedent. During the 1982 Falklands campaign, Great Britain executed a version of Sea Basing to support Operation Corporate and its retaking of the islands. It did not do this in answer to any new doctrinal concept, but of necessity. Operation Corporate highlights the two topics important to the STOVL JSF's support to Sea Basing. The first is the use of non-purpose-built ships as aircraft carriers. The Atlantic Conveyor, a commercial container ship, was pressed into service as a transport for Harriers, helicopters, spare parts, fuel, ordnance, supplies, and equipment. The converted ship originally was not intended to launch operational missions, but it had two operational deck spots, one of which was manned by an armed Sea Harrier during transit from Ascension Island to the task force. Although there was no operational employment of the fighters from the Atlantic Conveyor, the V/STOL aircraft remains the only type of fighter aircraft that can, and did, self-deploy and redeploy to and from that type of vessel.
The second topic has been incorporated as part of Great Britain's strategy for projecting combat power. This concept involves using the Royal Air Force (RAF) as a member of the deployable sea-based air arm. (The concept is still in use today under the title "Joint Force Harrier.") The RAF's early adoption of V/STOL aircraft was the critical element that allowed it to espouse this idea. V/STOL aircraft negate the greatest danger of fixed-wing shipboard operations—the speed at which the aircraft approaches the ship when landing—and can use normal land-based confined-area landing techniques to safely land on any suitably sized deck at sea. The RAF pilots proved this point as many of them executed their first shipboard landings, embarking on board the two aircraft carriers of the task force en route to the South Atlantic. By supplementing its task force with container vessels and transporting V/STOL strike-fighter aircraft, operationally manned by squadrons from two different services, the United Kingdom provided an unprecedented, unforeseen, highly flexible power projection and sustainment capability.
The STOVL JSF is the single weapon platform that can provide enough flexibility to the sea base to ensure its tenets—to build, project, and sustain combat power—are realized and maximized. This aircraft can provide fire support for sustained combat power from a multitude of legacy and future maritime platforms with minimal initial and recurrent aircrew ship qualification training. With the Sea Basing concept, footprints ashore are reduced, force protection is much easier to manage, and a very high operational tempo can be initiated and maintained just as the force enters the joint operating area.
The design and composition of the Sea Basing family of vessels may be in flux, but the STOVL aircraft already is a funded requirement for the U.S. Marine Corps and the United Kingdom. To maximize the return on investment for the Sea Basing concept in support of national security strategies, we should ensure a percentage of the STOVL variant is procured by the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force. This aircraft has closed the CTOL fighter performance gap, and would provide each service an extremely flexible platform capable of expeditionary operations while based afloat or on shore. This flexibility may include mission-specific aircraft transformations to alter the aircraft's capability and performance at times when STOVL operations may not be required.
Understanding that "global joint operations against regional and transnational dangers" represents the CNO's emergent strategy, and acknowledging that area access and host nation support are by no means guaranteed, we must embrace Sea Basing and adopt a triservice acquisition strategy for the STOVL JSF. Adoption and joint operational employment of the STOVL JSF will ensure that the capacity to enhance the sea bases' combat power through sustainment of airborne fires will be maximized.
Major Shorter is the AV-8B requirements officer, Air Warfare Division, on the Chief of Naval Operations staff. In his last assignment he was an exchange pilot for the Royal Navy, flying the FA.2 Sea Harrier. While in the United Kingdom, Major Shorter deployed with 801 Naval Fighter Squadron on board HMS Illustrious as part of Joint Force Harrier, which included a Royal Air Force GR-7 Harrier squadron.