In the mid-1990s, a handful of defense intellectuals hatched the idea of converting older ballistic-missile submarines into SEAL platforms and cruise missile shooters. They found some allies in Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the submarine community, and now that program—the conversion of Trident submarines to SSGNs—is taking shape.
The SSGN is transformational. It offers stealth and access, and unlike surface combatants, as the attack on the Cole (DDG-67) as she refueled in Yemen reminds us, the SSGN has no need for force protection for close-in platforms. A perfectly good Cold War asset can be used for new missions.
With the SSGN, deterrence no longer is a solely nuclear decision. This stealthy, nuclear-powered platform, with up to 154 cruise missiles on board, will work as a campaign opener, like the first strikes of Iraqi Freedom on 21 March 2003. And it also will be an effective instrument for suppression of enemy air defenses, preparing the battle space for Navy and Air Force tactical aviation. The giant undersea boat will hit its targets from a safe, secure location so you do not have to tip your hand.
Naturally, the price has gone up as the conversion program has become "real" and the design has matured. The technical issues assumed in the late 1990s now are being worked out—like putting seven Tomahawks in a ballistic missile tube and shooting them behind the sail—and they were trickier than expected. The latest estimate for the four boats being converted is $3.8 billion. They are fully funded in President George W. Bush's budget.
The SSGN program has the potential to reshuffle the calculus for Navy Tomahawk land-attack missions. A rough rule of thumb is one-third of Navy Tomahawks are fired from submarines, two-thirds from surface ships. Once the SSGNs are in the water, those percentages may change. Approximately 270 Tomahawks were fired against targets in Iraq from subs between 20 March and 30 April 2003. The United States could have done the same number of submarine-based Tomahawk shots with two SSGNs, freeing more nimble attack submarines for sensitive intelligence operations, or freeing surface combatants for missile defense, antiair and anti-submarine warfare, and other more traditional battle group missions.
The SSGN and its missile tubes will have so much volume that Special Operations Command could place enough equipment and people on one boat to run a campaign with multiple sorties for weeks. It is a near permanent sanctuary. The huge volume also gives the SSGN flexibility for multiple missions such as launching unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), special operations forces, and various intelligence collectors.
The Giant Shadow exercise conducted by the Florida (SSBN-728) earlier this year in the Bahamas used a P-3 with an APY-6 radar acting as a Global Hawk, a Seahorse UUV, and a small, low-flying Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle, all networked together with excellent situational awareness that did not rely on overburdened satellite links. SEALs from the boat were able to find, confirm, and destroy a weapons of mass destruction site from a single platform. The success of Giant Shadow shows why future Navy plans have SSGNs operating as their own strike group.
Paul Wolfowitz views U.S. undersea dominance as an asymmetrical advantage in future wars. The SSGN program may prove him correct.
Mac Carey is CEO of the Lexington Institute. He is a former senior aide on Capitol Hill and Naval Reserve intelligence officer.