Deployment of as many as five U.S. divisions and coalition forces to Southwest Asia makes a significant statement about the criticality of ground forces even in the high-technology era. Winning war requires command of the ground, despite pundits who argue that "silver bullet" packages have reduced the need for land forces. Yet, the notion persists that small ground forces backed by air and naval precision-guided munitions (PGMs) are sufficient to defeat Iraq.
In any number of scenarios, however, the simplistic formula—special operations teams plus precision munitions equals victory—is flawed because it presents the enemy with only a limited threat that makes his defensive tasks less difficult. Firepower advocates have missed the point that destruction is not sufficient to ensure victory and achieve the political aims of war.
In the event of war, Saddam Hussein does not have to win to be successful; he just has to keep from losing. He can hold on by defending Baghdad, baiting coalition forces into bombing it, and then inviting the news media to report on destroyed hospitals and mangled bodies. A strategy that relies primarily on PGMs plays into the Iraqis' hands. They learned in the Gulf War that any armored vehicle sitting in the open will be attacked. Thus, Saddam will gather forces loyal to him in Baghdad and dare coalition forces to strike. Precision munitions are far less effective in built-up areas—and rest assured any collateral damage will be featured prominently in the media. If we deploy too small a ground force to the battlefield, Saddam will rely on U.S. fears of bloodshed and lack of combat power to deter us from attacking his capital. He hopes to exhaust our will to fight.
War is a contest of wills, not attrition. Psychological collapse occurs when combatants no longer believe they can win. Sizable numbers of U.S. ground troops complicate the war for Iraq. If Saddam reacts by scattering his forces and retreating to Baghdad to avoid PGMs, he will be more vulnerable to our ground attacks. Conversely, efforts to concentrate his units and fight in the open would be defeated through joint and combined air-ground operations. In the same vein, deployment of U.S. ground forces to the theater offers the best chance of inducing political change before the shooting starts.
The PGMs can shatter armored vehicles and pulverize communications networks. They cannot win the hearts and minds of ordinary Iraqi citizens; they cannot secure them from thugs; and they cannot offer hope for a better future. To set conditions for a stable postwar Iraq, we must have large, disciplined ground forces that dominate combat while safeguarding noncombatants.
The best way to defeat the fortress-Baghdad strategy is to combine our advantages in PGMs and soldiery with the necessary political, economic, and diplomatic instruments to achieve the war aims. Such a plan must begin with the creation of an interim government that includes the Kurds and the Shiites, backed by the might of the international community. Coalition forces would focus on destroying any resisting Iraqi forces, concurrent with the occupation of Iraq outside Baghdad. This would impede the use of enemy mobile weapons and begin restoring the social, political, and economic fabric of Iraq. Meanwhile, special operations forces in conjunction with opposition groups would foment revolt in Baghdad. With most of Iraq under occupation, revolution imminent in Baghdad, and ground forces outside the city poised to strike, it is unlikely that Iraqi forces will keep up the fight.
Although some might argue that large formations present attractive targets for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their danger to our forces is greatly exaggerated. Aside from the extreme difficulty of employing WMD effectively, their use would undermine Saddam's attempt to portray himself as a victim of U.S. aggression.
If U.S. planners keep in mind the end state of the conflict—a viable and stable Iraq—they must conclude that we cannot win the war on the cheap with precision-guided munitions. Putting our forces on the soil of Iraq is essential for the United States—and the people of Iraq.
Major Kolenda, an armor officer, is a career manager at the Army Personnel Command. He is the editor and co-author of Leadership: The Warrior’s Art (U.S. Army War College Foundation Press, 2001).