The military supply chain’s only reason for existence is to deliver support to the war fighter in such a way that combat readiness is both achieved and sustained. How to accomplish that objective is the question, and the answer lies in the reengineering of the military supply chain’s last and weakest link—delivery of support to the war fighter, in the way it is needed.
Historically, military logisticians have struggled to provided support to war fighters in accordance with the time-honored formula of the "3Rs"—the Right material, to the Right place, at the Right time. What was and continues to be missing is the fourth "R": in the Right way.
In the early days of our Republic, support to war fighters consisted primarily of dumping wagonloads of gruel, powder, and forage onto the battlefield. As warfare technology advanced, the support trilogy transformed into dumps of "beans, bullets, and black oil," but the delivery of dumped material remained unchanged. During the Vietnam War, our war fighters were subjected to "massive depots ... where it was often impossible to determine which supplies were on hand, or even where they might be found." As recently as the Gulf War, well more than half of all the containers deployed to the combat zone "had to be opened at least once to determine contents, ownership, and destination." As Professor D. Schrady of the Naval Postgraduate School concluded, "The substitution of mass for knowledge took place in the Gulf Conflict as in previous conflicts. It is truly time to do better."
There is no question that it is well past time to do better logistically, so why haven't we? One reason is that military historians generally have failed to apply the same zeal to the critical review of combat logistics as they have to the strategies and tactics of great battles. Understandably, the "tedious tasks of supply attract few readers . . . and audiences have not wished to be bothered by such details."6 But without the discipline of lessons learned from critical reviews, we are destined to repeat the logistical mistakes of past combat.
The increasing lethality of today's weapon systems and the lightning speed with which they can be deployed make it imperative that we reshape the thinking of our logistical models. We will not have the time for aimless wandering through depots and wholesale opening of containers to find out which supplies are on hand. We also will not have the luxury of diverting combat personnel to support-related tasks that could be performed more efficiently outside the combat zone.
The Lessons of Corporate America
The military supply chain is made up of many links, from the determination and procurement of requirements to the processing of warfighter requisitions, repair of weapon systems, receipt and warehousing of wholesale inventories, and, ultimately, delivery of support to the combat zone. This last link—delivery—is the only one performed exclusively within the active combat zone. It is also the link in which the contact between the logistician and the war fighter is the most intimate and most neglected.
Corporate America's supply chain has many similarities to its military counterpart, but it has two unique features. First, corporate CEOs either own or significantly influence every one of their logistics links. Second, because supply chains determine corporate survival, they constantly are optimizing processes to deliver better customer service at reduced costs. As a result, corporate America's supply chain remains perpetually a work in progress.
By contrast, ownership, control, and responsibility for military supply chain costs are, at best, not clear, and opportunities abound for rationalizing these variances. But even assuming that the services cannot change existing ownership and control structures, there are lessons to be learned from corporate America's management of supply chain techniques—especially with regard to the last link.
Surprisingly, the most important of these lessons are from retailers—perhaps the "hungriest" entrepreneurs in the corporate food chain. Out of necessity, retailers have developed the concept of "floor ready" deliveries. This means all merchandise delivered to any store within the chain must be tailored for immediate use—that is, price ticketed, prepared for display on the floor, and ready to sell. Previously, all these "back office" functions were performed at the retail store level, consuming expensive selling space and, worse still, distracting store personnel from their principal targets—their customers.
Today, in the retail business, the store is the "combat zone" and the sales associates are the "war fighters." The delivery of floor-ready merchandise to the store site is the last link in the supply chain—and unlike in the military, this last link is recognized as the most critical and is treated with the care and attention it deserves. Every day that merchandise is not on the store floor is a day it cannot be sold. As such, that merchandise is a financial burden that makes the retailer less cost-efficient and more vulnerable to competitors who seek to put it out of business.
Recognizing the strategic importance of their supply chain's last link, corporate America's retailers have totally reengineered it. No longer do their distribution centers dump non-floor-ready merchandise onto their "battlefields." They have found the time and the resources to do it better. They have learned to deliver support the right way.
Corporate America's manufacturers also have targeted their supply chain's last link as the critical path. Today, materials delivered to a manufacturing plant with multiple assembly lines are presorted by assembly line and by assembly process prior to delivery and are delivered just in time. It is no longer the job of the manufacturing plant to resort parts dumped onto its receiving docks. It also is no longer the job of the plant to warehouse parts that were shipped early simply because they were available. The manufacturing supply chain recognized early on that its job was to deliver "plant ready" parts in such a way that its corporate survival in the competitively lethal global market was achieved.
Reengineering the Military Supply Chain
To understand the root cause of the historical failure of the military supply chain's last link, a quick review of the basic workings of its supply system is helpful. Normally, the military supply system provides support only when requested by its war fighters and usually only in response to individual line-item requisitions. This is known as a "pull system." These individual line items of support are then drawn from supply chain wholesale inventories, sorted only by combat unit address, and then dumped into boxes, pallets, or containers for rapid transport and delivery to the combat zone.
Military transporters, responsible for delivering support to the combat zones, are understandably motivated by two basic concerns:
- Maximizing use of these boxes, pallets, or containers so that the price of transportation is the right price
- Shipping them as quickly as possible
As a result of these two seemingly laudable transportation goals, it falls on those in the combat zone to expend valuable time resorting the support received so that it can be used effectively. Also, to the extent the material arrives in the combat zone earlier than needed, war fighters must find storage space to accommodate what are hopefully temporarily excess stocks.
So, even with each link in the military supply chain performing admirably within its functional stovepipe, the dumping of material on the battlefield is perpetuated. Clearly, by corporate America's standards, our military supply chain's last link is neither "floor ready" nor "plant ready." Obviously, it is not "combat ready."
Making the Last Link Combat Ready—Finally
Reengineering the military supply chain so that its last link is combat ready is a project whose time has come. "Joint Vision 2010," which measures supply chain performance by the extent it satisfies "customer requirements at the point of need" was a first step toward that goal. Within its framework are two supply chain initiatives worthy of mention—focused logistics and the Joint Logistics Warfighting Initiative (JLWI). Both concepts emphasize "logistics information" and "transportation technologies", which, regrettably, tend to enhance only our capability to deliver the dump faster while ensuring that it does not get lost en route.
On a more positive note, the concept of "tailored logistical packages" represents the beginning of new thinking for delivery strategies within the combat zone. Its inclusion in supply chain doctrine at least acknowledges the need for presorting or tailoring the support package before it is delivered to the war fighter.
Clearly, a vision statement, however, does not by itself make anything happen. What is needed within the military establishment is an advocate who embraces the need for change and can articulate that need, describe the end state once the need is satisfied, develop a plan of action, and defend and secure the additional funding that may be required.
With this as a blueprint, let us start with identification of advocates for reengineering combat-ready support. In corporate America, the concepts of floor-ready merchandise and plant-ready deliveries started with the store and plant line managers, not with supply chain distribution center and transportation managers. Within the military, the most qualified advocate for revolutionizing the supply chain's last link is the war fighter—the historical recipient of support dumps. Specifically, the combatant commanders are particularly well placed and sufficiently empowered within the Defense establishment for assuming this advocacy. Obviously, they also will have to be properly resourced.
With regard to specific characteristics of the reengineered "last link," one solution will not fit all. Each of the military supply chains has a unique last link. For example, the last link in the Navy's chain—a deployed task force of widely dispersed surface combatants and submarines—is much different from the Army's—a corps of several divisions all on the move within a war theater. And both are very different from the Air Force's last link—combat deployed air wings with numerous and composite squadrons. In spite of these very important differences, however, all war fighters have the same requirement on the battlefield—delivery of support tailored to their own special needs.
It Is Time to Do Better
For too long, war fighters have abdicated logistics and, by definition, supply chain performance to the logisticians. Regrettably, the logisticians have continued to substitute mass for knowledge. For the last link to become truly combat ready, war fighters must assume responsibility. They must insist that the logistical model fit the combat support requirement.
War fighters can begin this process by developing detailed specifications and scenarios for the way support is to be tailored for delivery to their unique battlefields. They also must be more precise in specifying when the battlefield is ready to receive the support. In turn, the wholesale supply chain logisticians must break many of their old delivery support models. They can begin this process by creating, training, and deploying combat logisticians who can translate warfighter delivery specifications into supply chain processes. As a start, the wholesale supply chain must transfer some of its focus, currently on flow and tracking of the support pipeline, to the presorting of the material in it.
Clearly, this will be new territory for both sides of the supply chain, and it will not be without additional costs or organizational tensions. Nevertheless, it is past time to relegate the "supply dump" to its proper place in history.
Admiral Giordano retired in 1984 as Chief of the Navy Supply Corps. A graduate of the Harvard Business School, he serves today as chairman of the board of Joseph A. Bank, Clothiers.