We Have the Craft for Littoral Warfare

Last March, the Navy awarded $2.9 billion to Northrop Grumman to design a class of new ships that includes a littoral combat ship (LCS). The blessing was mixed, however—spending even a dime on an LCS design is redundant because the Navy already spent $20 million studying and designing a craft designated as the littoral support craft (experimental) [LSC(X)]. This Office of Naval Research effort began in 1997; funds to construct the craft are in place.

In 1990, the Navy and Marine Corps published “Forward. . . From the Sea,” echoing the Navy’s historical operating perspective that naval forces should be positioned forward around the world to be near potential hot spots. Key to the “forward” doctrine was the clear intent to concentrate on the world’s littorals and re-energize Navy relationships with the Corps, which had suffered during the drawdown following the Vietnam War.

Nonetheless, after Operation Desert Storm, upholding any doctrine became difficult because of diminishing funds, ships, aircraft, and personnel. Readiness became a critical issue as operational tempo increased dramatically. The declining situation prevented the Navy from adequately focusing on potential adversaries in the littoral regions of the world. In the early 1990s, it introduced 15 coastal patrol boats to naval special boat squadrons—but by the end of the decade, the littoral “light” had gone out and many of these small combatants were turned over to the Coast Guard. (The Coast Guard envisions several craft for its Deepwater program that will enhance its posture in the littorals as well as homeland defense.)

To cover the littoral regions adequately, the Navy must have a high-low mix of vessels that includes fast-attack craft. Currently, the United States is not building enough of any type. (The fleet also will need more oilers and replenishment ships to properly support littoral campaigns.) The homeland defense tasks to be assigned ultimately to the Navy are complicating factors. When the nation gets around to deciding it needs more ships, naval planners must ensure that littoral warfare is not left in the lurch.

The multihulled LSC(X) design has excellent characteristics: a 4,000-nautical mile self-deployment range at 40 knots, with a top speed of 50 knots; operable in sea states up to 4; and an estimated cost of $25 million. Its capabilities include space for unmanned aerial vehicle operations, communications connectivity, fire support, wide-area surveillance and targeting, and limited mine countermeasures. Rearming and refueling Marine Corps and close-support special operations helicopters is a primary task of the LSC(X). It will have additional berthing for special operations forces and be outfitted to launch rigid-hull inflatable boats and combat rubber raiding craft, essential insertion platforms for SEALs and Marines. Finally, the craft can be modified with a “moon pool” to accommodate wet submersibles, such as the SEAL delivery vehicle.

Ten LSC(X)s cost less—and put fewer personnel at risk—than one guided-missile destroyer. With regard to the risk factor, size does not matter. Run into one mine and the vessel is out of action, whether it is a large ship or a small craft. But, if it is an LSC(X), for example, nine will be left to fight while the crippled destroyer withdraws. Recall the sad statistics of the ships that hit mines in the Persian Gulf: the Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58)—$96 million for repairs, out of action for 18 months; Tripoli (LPH-10)—$4 million for repairs, out of action for 4 weeks; Princeton (CG-59)—$17 million for repairs, out of action for 2 months.

There has been a spate of articles in Proceedings and other magazines supporting the vital role of fast-attack craft in littoral warfare. Regrettably, almost ten years of decay in Navy shipbuilding have crippled the nation’s ability to dominate the littorals. It is time to snap out of the bureaucratic drowsiness that has characterized our approach to littoral warfare and identify and build the types of craft needed to accomplish the mission efficiently and economically.

It takes more than forward-deployed carrier battle groups to keep naval pressure on the kind of enemy that the United States faces now. The Navy should proceed with the affordable experimental littoral support craft instead of spending more money and time in yet another long, drawn-out design and development effort. At the very least, the LSC(X) could function as a prototype to generate and validate requirements for another class of littoral warfare ship.