"Joint Vision 2020" is the Navy's template to guide the continuing transformation mandated by the National Security Strategy. It lists key goals for a Navy that will be dominant across the full continuum of military operations: persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form. To accomplish this, the Navy of 2025 must focus on these operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, full-dimensional protection, information operations, and joint command and control. There are two transformation concepts for the Navy's surface combatant force. The first concept, called streetfighter, stresses the development of low-cost, single-mission, modular ships with corvette-sized hulls that can operate in the littorals. The contrasting concept stresses multipurpose destroyers and cruisers that can operate in the open ocean and the littorals. To most reliably meet the needs of 2025 and beyond, the Navy should stay with the proven multimission warship design instead of the restrictive streetfighter concept.
The Streetfighter Concept
The littoral battle space is a complex, pandimensional-threat theater in which participants can expect to be brought under concentrated attack by a variety of modes with little or no warning. The streetfighter ships will be able to provide a joint force commander (JFC) with more flexibility because they can operate in extremely shallow waters and possess combat capabilities specifically tailored to a mission. The strength of streetfighter is that it is a force of less expensive, less capable ships. The production goal is to build 10% to 20% of the surface combatants, or approximately 24 hulls, as the transformation force. This rebalanced fleet would mix existing and planned systems that focus on cost-effective strike and reach (an Economy A force that sustains the power projection pillar) and a new, networked series of streetfighter ships that are surveillance and maneuver intensive, achieve dominant maneuver, are risk tolerant, and are less costly to produce yet modular enough to capitalize on emerging technology (an Economy B force). The streetfighter ships would have to operate in groups called swarms to provide mutual protection in the most dangerous waters, but their presence should convince a potential adversary that they could not harm the Economy A force through asymmetric tactics.
The streetfighter concept proposes constructing a corvette-size ship, called the littoral combat ship (LCS), that will operate exclusively in the littoral environment. The LCS would provide critically focused-mission warfighting capabilities such as mine warfare, anti-small boat warfare, and littoral undersea warfare. One proposal for the ship based on a catamaran hull will have electric drive, a 2,500-ton displacement, a 50-knot top speed, and a 3-meter maximum draft. The ship will not possess traditional underway replenishment capabilities and could stay on station for only approximately three weeks.
Streetfighter leverages future technology to increase lethality. New tactical data links such as Link 16 or cooperative engagement capability will allow all surface forces to have a common tactical battle-space picture. Using the "Joint Vision 2020" mandate of precision engagement and network-centric warfare, an LCS could call upon an Aegis cruiser or destroyer for long-range air defense while it patrols the littorals. Furthermore, operating in swarms allows the LCS task force to provide mutual protection with its organic weapons while performing multiple missions of mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and anti-small boat operations.
The LCSs will be cheaper than the Aegis fleet and thus more expendable. It would be tightly manned with crews of 20-25 personnel and should be expected to suffer most of the Navy's combat losses in littoral warfare. Its low crew size and production costs could translate into a JFC risking them in hazardous duties: any loss of one or more LCSs would not cripple a JFC's combat capability, since Economy A force has the primary responsibility for projecting power ashore.
Multimission Ships
Critics of the single-purpose LCS counter that multimission ships such as the present Aegis fleet and the proposed follow-on multimission destroyer are the only platforms needed for 2025 since they already are operating in the littorals. The surface combatants of 2025 will consist of the next generation destroyer (DD[X]), the follow-on cruiser (CG[X]), and upgraded in-service Aegis ships. Using existing Aegis ships, the Navy can transform these proven platforms to respond to the challenges of littoral warfare. The new warships will be revolutionary, using open-architecture combat systems and modular construction techniques.
The first step in the transformation is the construction of the DD(X) multimission destroyer. This warship will provide precision fires using the vertical launch system and precision guided long-range weapons such as tactical Tomahawk, advanced X-band radars leveraging technology learned from the SPY-1 radar system, signature reduction techniques using lessons learned from the construction of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyer, advanced gun systems using extended-range guided munitions, and an electric-drive system and advanced electronic switching systems and manning systems. Crew size will be reduced to approximately 95 personnel by using existing automation from the Navy's Smart Ship program. It will conform to the "Joint Vision 2020" mandate of joint command and control by broadcasting a common battlespace operating picture. It will possess an extremely capable self-defense system using vertically launched Sea Sparrow missiles or rolling airframe missiles. Possible missions include undersea, strike, and surface warfare and maritime interception operations. The DD(X) will be the first ship designed to operate in both the littoral and open-ocean environments. The transformation is the infusion of technology designed to increase the land-attack capabilities of the DD(X) while maintaining a robust self-defense capability. The DD(X) can operate independently since it has sufficient surface, undersea, mine, and air warfare self-defense to handle any rapid, unexpected threats. It possesses adequate crew size and dimension to make it suitable for unexpected missions such as helicopter or refugee operations. It will be able to stay on station for long periods of time because the crew can perform maintenance and replenishment operations.
The cruiser conversion program will preserve the relevancy of the Aegis cruiser force into the 21st century by addressing the continuing development of theater ballistic missiles (TBM) by potential adversaries and the need for responsive, precise naval surface fire support. All 27 cruisers are planned to be upgraded with new combat systems, hull improvements, and force protection upgrades by 2007. Improvements include Smart Ship upgrades to reduce crew size, adding area air defense commander capabilities to 12 cruisers, adding cooperative engagement capability for joint command and control capacity, and adding improved 5-inch gun systems. The improved Aegis cruisers will be able to fire the Standard Missile 3 theater-wide TBMs. As it leverages the highly successful Aegis fleet, the cruiser conversion program will permit the Navy to defer the need for successor cruisers until after the DD(X) enters full production. The Aegis cruiser missions will include undersea, surface, mine, and strike warfare; maritime interception operations; and TBM defense.
The Aegis destroyer program continues with a goal of 57 ships. The Flight IIA Arleigh Burke destroyer now in production includes modifications to the combat system suite, an organic helicopter capability, and an improved 5-inch gun system. The previous Flight I ships will be back-fitted with these improvements minus the organic helicopter capability. The Arleigh Burke-class destroyer will be able to continue littoral operations through 2025.
Finally, the strike cruiser for the 21st century will be the follow-on to the Ticonderoga (CG47)-class Aegis cruiser. The design will include DD(X) lessons learned but also will include a long-range air warfare capability. Production is not scheduled until after the DD(X) enters full-scale production in 2008.
All multimission ships will be given significant upgrades to mine warfare defense with the addition of an integrated remote mine-hunting system scheduled for 2003. Warships will control remote unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), be netted to a common battle-space picture, and process remote smart sensors. Their enhanced capabilities will provide additional flexibility to the JFC and will continue the Navy's forward presence requirement.
Fulfilling the Mission
There are several attributes shared by both streetfighter and traditional multimission ships. The first is that both the DD(X) and the LCS will use modular construction to lower production costs. Second, LCS, DD(X), and the current Aegis fleet will use Smart Ship technology to lower crew size. Third, all ships will be able to control UAVs and exploit smart-sensor technology. Fourth, all ships will use common joint command and control equipment such as Link 16 and cooperative engagement capability. Fifth, LCS, DD(X), and the Aegis fleet will incorporate signature-reducing technology to make them more survivable and will use common electronic protection equipment. Finally, all ships will use an integrated remote mine-hunting system and employ an advanced gun system that will fire extended-range guided munition rounds.
Both force proponents agree that the littoral area is extremely dangerous and challenging for surface combatants. Retired Navy Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, a streetfighter advocate, summarized the littorals as the enemy's unsafe streets "cluttered with coastal traders, fishing boats, oil rigs, and boat people of all types. ... The clutter of air and surface craft give cover for enemy surprise attacks in waters where he knows every nuance of the environment." The difference between the traditional warship design and streetfighter is in how they implement the operational requirements of "Joint Vision 2020."
The biggest difference between streetfighter and traditional multimission ships is the implementation of the full-dimensional protection mandated in "Joint Vision 2020." The complex threat environment demands that warships participating in littoral operations be given at a minimum self-defense capabilities against the threat spectrum, and those capabilities cannot be packaged into a small hull. Even if the demands of stability and structural integrity are met, the resulting design would be so crowded that the weapons would interfere with each other or electronic mutual interference would degrade seriously the sensors installed on the ship.
An LCS with limited self-defense would be vulnerable to an adversary with modern weapons. Streetfighter ships will be cheap to build and have limited crew, but a loss of one ship even in a swarm could weaken the swarm's mission capability. For example, say a swarm with one mine warfare, one anti-small boat, and one undersea warfare LCS gets attacked by an adversary's mobile cruise missile site and the undersea warfare LCS is sunk. Streetfighter champions would argue that the concept was successful because the streetfighters could still perform anti-small boat operations and mine warfare; the loss of one LCS did not cost the JFC much capability or a significant amount of manpower or personnel. However, an adversary's diesel submarine then could attack and destroy the remaining LCS units without fear.
The counter to this argument is that an Economy A force (Aegis and DD[X]) fleet stationed farther out to sea will provide protection to LCS units. This idea is impractical in two ways. First, Aegis ships would need to be stationed very close to an LCS to provide protection from antiship cruise missiles. This stationing of a valuable Aegis ship in the dangerous littoral to protect an LCS combatant undermines the streetfighter concept. Second, assigning Aegis ships to guard LCSs undermines a JFC's flexibility by taking potential missions from the Aegis fleet, such as TBM defense or blue-water undersea warfare.
Focused logistics, another requirement of "Joint Vision 2020," also would be strained by the LCS concept. An LCS cannot replenish and remain on station, placing its usefulness in establishing long-term presence in doubt. The JFC would need at least six LCSs to provide two swarms with all three combat capabilities for one littoral operating area, which equates to a large footprint for support.
Precision engagement would not be enhanced by streetfighter. The size of the area these ships could patrol would be limited by their sensor range and endurance, making their effectiveness for area surveillance questionable. The ships are too small for long-range air surveillance systems and would be suitable only for undersea warfare and surface surveillance that typically is limited to 30 nautical miles. The confused area of the littoral, with its multiple contacts and challenging environmental conditions, makes this surveillance zone even smaller. Airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensors are more capable and less vulnerable than the streetfighter ships.
Streetfighter lessens the flexibility of the JFC since the LCS does not have the abilities of multimission ships. For example, an LCS would not be able to handle Cuban and Haitian boat operations because it lacks the deck space and food. It cannot perform maritime interception operations conducted in the littorals of the Arabian Gulf because it does not have enough crew. The limited watch standers of two teams could not handle multi-threat operations or manpower-intensive operations such as helicopter or small-boat operations. Preventive maintenance could not be performed under way since the crew always would be in a port/starboard rotation and all hands would be involved on watch. This carries the risk that a propulsion casualty could not be repaired by that ship and that it would need to be towed out of harm's way.
Former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay L. Johnson and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review recommended 116 surface combatants. Currently there are 27 Aegis cruisers, 57 Aegis destroyers proposed, and 32 DD(X)s proposed, for a total force of 116 surface combatants. Assuming the Navy builds 24 LCSs or 20% of the surface combatant force (four swarms per coast), it would have to eliminate 24 DD(X)s, for a total of eight. This has two flaws: the DD(X) cost would be unacceptable because the research and development costs or sunk costs have been spent already, and the Navy would be buying 24 less-capable ships and causing gaps in the power projection capability of Economy A force. The counter is that Congress will allow the Navy to buy all 32 DD(X)s and 24 LCSs, but that is uncertain given current restraints on the defense budget.
Conclusion
Multimission ships are survivable, flexible platforms that currently operate in the littorals. The joint force commander routinely positions these expensive ships in dangerous areas because they are designed to operate there and survive a fight. The LCS streetfighters add nothing to the littorals, are too vulnerable, and will not free the larger multimission ships for other tasks, as the larger ships would have to stay close to provide protection. Regardless of the cost and low manning of littoral combat ships, the JFC will not needlessly expose a ship to danger. The LCS surveillance capacity will be limited because of the vessel's size and endurance. Airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (or UAVs operated from multimission ships) can provide the needed coverage.
Commander Brawley has served on the USS Virginia (CGN-38), the USS Laboon (DDG-58), the USS Ramage (DDG-61), and the USS Normandy (CG-60). He has taught combat systems in the surface warfare division officer course and is a student at the Naval War College.