Second Honorable Mention, Armed Forces Joint Warfighting Essay Contest
Although most articles about the Gulf War treat it as such, air power is not limited to manned aircraft. It also includes theater offensive missiles, which can allow military planners to sidestep questions of air superiority and air defenses and strike targets behind enemy lines. As was shown in the Gulf War, this can be both a benefit and a danger to U.S. military operations.
Precision cruise missiles such as the Air Force's air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and the Navy's Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile allowed U.S. forces to strike Iraqi air defense centers, electrical power systems, and command-and-control sites at the start of the air war. Of the 323 fired, 141 were used within the first 24 hours. These attacks opened holes in the Iraqi air defense network and caused the remaining air defense sites to reveal themselves for targeting in the next wave.
The fact that no pilots were at risk allowed us to strike far more heavily defended targets than anyone previously would have considered on the first day. Even after coalition air superiority was ensured, cruise missiles were the only weapons employed in downtown Baghdad during daylight hours. This was a huge leap forward in air power strategy. Historically, air campaigns focused on "rolling up" enemy air defenses from the outside in. This would take days, weeks, or even months of concerted operations. Instead, using cruise missiles and stealth aircraft, U.S. air power struck both the entire air defense network and other strategic targets throughout Iraq from the opening minutes of the campaign. Cruise missiles won a key spot in all future air campaigns.
This assessment of the cruise missile's utility was not universal, however. Before the Gulf War, some senior officials, General Norman Schwarzkopf among them, were not sure they would work at all. Afterward, the missiles largely were ignored in writings about Gulf War air supremacy or criticized for their high cost or tendency to promote ineffective "cruise missile diplomacy."
Those who downplayed cruise missiles' contributions did so largely based on numbers. Manned aircraft struck many more targets over the course of the air war than did cruise missiles, and cruise missiles were unable to strike moving or hardened targets. If they struck fewer targets, the logic goes, they had less of an impact on the course of the war.
A second line of criticism flowed from economics. Cruise missiles are expensive and, unlike manned aircraft, are not reusable. In truth, at $1-1.5 million a copy, they are orders of magnitude more expensive than traditional aircraft-dropped precision munitions. The missiles launched on the first day of the Gulf War totaled almost $158 million—a lot of money even for the United States. Some argue we cannot afford this kind of "success."
Last, some critics see cruise missiles as too successful. Because they are relatively precise and risk no U.S. casualties, cruise missiles become too easy to use during a crisis. Rather than complementing manned aircraft, they will be used in situations where military force may not be the best answer or in situations better suited to other military means. They fear that the easy ability to "do something" militarily will prove irresistible to politicians. Given the use of cruise missiles during the Clinton administration, the critics might have a valid point.
However, all of these criticisms rest on a fundamental misreading of U.S. experiences with cruise missiles in the Gulf War. In Desert Storm, cruise missiles did not replace aircraft; they complemented them. And while they did not strike anywhere near as many targets as conventional aircraft, their strikes were instrumental in establishing air superiority and giving manned aircraft the freedom to maneuver. By striking soft, well-defended targets, such as power systems and command-and-control sites, cruise missiles both freed stealth aircraft to strike harder targets and helped paralyze the Iraqi air defense net. They also kept the psychological pressure on the Iraqi regime by providing daylight strikes in downtown Baghdad. This was a significant contribution to the war effort.
As for their expense, cruise missiles in the Gulf War were used only against targets considered too dangerous for manned aircraft. This makes comparing munitions costs a false analogy. The true cost of attacking those sites with manned aircraft could have included the cost of the aircraft and the life of the pilot. Considering these factors, cruise missiles seem more of a bargain in those cases.
That is not to say that those who worry about "cruise missile diplomacy" are correct. The temptation to misuse cruise missiles is there, but that is not the lesson of the Gulf War. In Desert Storm, cruise missiles were part of an overall combined air plan. The cruise missiles and stealth aircraft kicked in the door, and conventional aircraft steamrollered the Iraqi military. This is a far cry from launching unsupported cruise missile attacks and calling it a battle plan.
Therein lies the real lesson on cruise missiles. They are a tool for conducting an air campaign. They are not a panacea—good for all situations and targets. When used on the proper targets, however, they bring a substantial advantage to the force that employs them.
The lessons to be drawn from the Iraqi Scud missile attacks are less obvious, because Saddam Hussein misused them. One must also examine what he might have done. A more effective employment might not have prevented the Coalition victory, but it could have made it significantly more costly. Given the rapid proliferation of these ballistic missiles, the United States must consider the implications of fighting a Scud-armed enemy that actually knows what it is doing.
Because the United States gained and maintained air superiority from the beginning of the war, the Scud was Hussein's primary air weapon. In his air campaign, he used it as a terror weapon in pursuit of strategic rather than operational gains. He launched Scuds singly and in small groups at U.S. troop concentrations and at U.S. allies in Saudi Arabia. These strikes were intended to demoralize troops and leaders rather than to inflict any significant damage. He also launched them at uninvolved Israel, hoping to spark an Israeli response and break the U.S. coalition with his Arab neighbors. He was unsuccessful at both objectives.
U.S. efforts to find and silence Hussein's Scud launchers were equally ineffective. Although circumstantial evidence indicates that increased Scud-buster patrols reduced the frequency of launches by a small factor, there is no evidence that even a single mobile Scud launcher was destroyed by Coalition efforts. In spite of good launch detection and warning, the Scud launcher's ability to move and hide after launch, often called "shoot and scoot," left Coalition forces often unable to locate them. In one case, a U.S. F-15E crew actually saw a Scud launch and still could not find the launcher.
Before the war, Coalition intelligence estimated that Iraq had 36 mobile launchers and 300-700 Scud missiles. Approximately 80 Scuds were launched against U.S., Coalition, and Israeli targets, and after the war, Iraq had 14 mobile launchers left intact. Given the effort put into attempting to find and destroy those launchers, this speaks well of their ability to survive on the battlefield.
Most critics of the Scud's performance in the Gulf War claim they largely were irrelevant to the conflict. This certainly was General Schwarzkopf's opinion. He repeatedly told the press that they were militarily insignificant. Indeed, with a circular error probable of 900 meters and a fairly small 250 kg warhead, Iraqi Scuds did major damage only by chance. Overall Scud casualties, both military and civilian, were light.
The Scud was hardly ineffective, however. Iraqi launches forced the Coalition to divert large numbers of air sorties from attacks on strategic and tactical targets to hunting the mobile launchers. They also forced the United States to spend a great deal of diplomatic influence and effort to prevent Israel from entering the war and possibly breaking the Coalition. That Israel stayed out was not a failure of Saddam's Scud plan but a triumph of U.S. diplomacy. Nevertheless, Hussein missed an opportunity to do far more damage to Coalition forces. Because, like U.S. commanders, he considered the Scud a terror weapon, Saddam rarely launched more than a handful at a time. Attacks on single large targets ranged from one to five missiles. With a circular error probable of nearly a kilometer, he was lucky to get his missiles in the neighborhood of his target.
Even so, there were several close calls. The near miss off the bow of the Tarawa (LHA-1) and the hit on the barracks at Al Khobar are cases in point. U.S. troops were packed tightly into Saudi bases, and equipment and ammunition were packed even more tightly. An internal VII Corps report noted after the war that a sustained Iraqi attack on the camps at Ad Dammam and Al Jubail could have been devastating. General Schwarzkopf noted in his autobiography that a single Iraqi plane reaching the base could have "wreaked havoc," largely because of secondary explosions from aircraft and munitions stored too closely together. A successful Scud attack on those fields could have produced similar results. That they did not was as much luck as it was successful defense by the Patriot missile batteries.
Had Saddam used his capabilities wisely, he could have overcome both the Scud's inaccuracy and the Patriot batteries. Instead of plinking away like a sniper, he should have sent large-scale barrages at individual targets, compensating for his inaccuracy by increasing the volume of fire. A launch of 14 Scuds at a single, closely packed target like a port, airfield, or even a formation of ships in the littorals would have had a good chance of causing severe casualties. Launched from dispersed locations, the massed effects of these ballistic missiles could have been severe.
The United States has at least three options against this threat. First, it could move its base and support operations outside the threat envelope. This would be a costly and evolving effort as threat ranges of ballistic missiles are expanding. U.S. strike capabilities also would need to expand, allowing power projection from farther and farther afield. This would not alleviate the threat posed to ground forces, which must operate in contact with the enemy, and so be in range.
Alternatively, the United States could pursue a strategy of dispersion. With U.S. forces spread in small groups over a large number of sites, an adversary would lack a lucrative target for his missile salvos. This strategy, too, would incur high costs. It would increase the support structure required for U.S. forces as normally consolidated functions spread to each new dispersed base. It also would incur opportunity costs in the increased time needed to coordinate and mobilize the dispersed forces, even with modern information technology. It would help protect ground forces in garrison, but would be of less help for large formations, such as those used in the Gulf War. An adversary also potentially could mass his own forces against the smaller elements of the U.S. forces.
Third, the United States can pursue theater missile defense. This also will incur heavy expenses, this time in development and procurement. An effective theater missile defense network, however, would allow U.S. forces to operate from larger bases and formations in closer proximity to the battlefield, either on the ground or in the littorals. In this case, costs born before the conflict could prevent much greater costs during it.
Many nations are studying the lessons of the Gulf War and of theater offensive missiles. A look at how ballistic missiles and, to a lesser extent, cruise missiles are proliferating around the globe bears this out. The United States must make sure it learns these lessons as well, and prepares both to employ theater missiles as part of a total air campaign and to defend against them.
Major Fabian is currently assigned to the Air Staff as Deputy Chief of the Joint Wargaming Branch. He wrote this essay while a student at the College of Naval Command and Staff.