At first blush, the Coast Guard would seem a natural key player—if not the lead federal agency for maritime security. This new focus provides an opportunity that has not been available since 1967, when the Department of Transportation was cobbled together, and the Coast Guard moved from the Treasury Department. There is every reason, however, to expect that the Coast Guard will miss the boat.
Despite a multimission history beginning in 1790, the Coast Guard has yet to learn the importance of relevance that its sister services—as well as key federal agencies that compete with the Coast Guard for scarce resources—have learned and relearned. There is a pressing need for the service to:
- Become expert in what it does well and shed nonessential chores
- Train hard and specialize in key mission areas
- Develop clear mission doctrine that members understand and believe
- Clearly define the hazy concept of Deepwater
- Energize relationships with Capitol Hill and within the shipbuilding, airframe, and electronics industries
- Establish a fit in the Homeland Security Department
- Focus, focus, focus
A History of Missed Opportunities
World War II provided the Coast Guard with its greatest opportunity to seize the initiative when it was moved from the Treasury Department to the Navy Department and ballooned to 180,000 members. The operation of troop transports and landing craft in several hard-fought campaigns added luster to an organization sometimes jokingly described as the "shallow water navy." In a war that offered many major command opportunities, however, Coast Guard officers filled few. Imbued with a compliant nature, the service went where it was asked to go and did what it was asked to do. By war's end, the Coast Guard was anxious to return to its regulatory roles, boat patrols, and the operation of ocean station cutters.
A comparison with the next smallest service is revealing. In 1917, the tiny Marine Corps undertook a rapid expansion to field two combat regiments in World War I. Although the postwar draw down returned the Marine Corps to its role as the U.S. police force in various Banana Republics, its wartime combat exploits were the stuff of legend. Postwar Marine Corps leaders took the lessons they learned in World War I, honed them, and looked forward for relevance in a changing world. Well before 1941, Marines had developed the amphibious assault tactics sorely needed for the Pacific campaign. In the savage battles that followed, they seized many opportunities, including commanding Army divisions. By war's end, no one doubted the Marine Corps. The Coast Guard, on the other hand, proved it could do dramatic things in World War II, but went home to wait rather than consolidate its lessons and prepare to be relevant in the next conflict.
If Korea was a forgotten war, then the Coast Guard was its forgotten armed force. It operated cutters on mid-Pacific ocean stations and provided long-range aid to navigation signals from island networks, but others services answered the call to arms. Ocean stations, marine inspection, search and rescue, bridge administration, and aids to navigation were all performed under the unofficial mantra "In our obscurity lies our security."
Following Korea, the opportunity to cultivate a powerful congressional base and a supportive constituency within the marine and boating industry was squandered. The service lacked the visionary leadership that could have focused its roles and missions into a comprehensive set of military and regulatory programs, civilianized the uniformed clerks and bureaucrats, and demanded the assets needed to develop a first-rate maritime military service. Developing doctrine was a foreign concept.
The Coast Guard answered the call to arms as the Vietnam War heated up. In this instance, the organization was quick on the uptake and activated squadrons of 82-foot patrol boats, high-endurance cutters, and began a variety of maritime-support activities. Coast Guard performance in the combat zone was exemplary, with cutters often in the line of fire when the Navy's less capable small craft had to remain at the dock. This contribution took place during an unpopular war, however, and the Coast Guard chose to portray its humanitarian face to the public rather than its combat role. Much of what the Coast Guard did in Southeast Asia blended into Navy gray and remains unknown to the American public. Indeed, during the Vietnam War, Coast Guard ranks swelled with people who wished to avoid the draft, knowing the odds of getting shot at were slim.
It is no secret that the armed services each have private and congressional advocacy "clubs." Their leaders often are retired flag and general officers who continue to influence events as respected gray beards well into their retirement years. Their value comes not only from fighting hot wars but also from fighting battles on Capitol Hill, through the Pentagon bureaucracy, and with defense contractors. They also have been elected to high office and serve on powerful boards, and their opinions are sought and often published. This phenomenon is all but absent in the Coast Guard. Most of their elders really do retire.
In addition, each new commandant tries to reform the organization in his image. If he has a marine safety background, members know where the emphasis will be. Some of the more energetic commandants will commission a "Roles and Missions Study" or introduce a trendy management program that will disappear on the last day of their watch. This predictable behavior has led to an institutional confusion prevalent for decades. The organization has tried to be all things to all people for too long. Members proudly define themselves as generalists in an age of specialization. If the organization lacks cohesive definition and doctrine, what are its support constituencies supposed to draw from this conundrum?
Tin Cupping
Military organizations exist to serve defined public needs. The better suited the organization, the easier it is for it to define its requirements and obtain the means to carry out the mission. The battle must be joined on Capitol Hill, which is unfamiliar territory for the Coast Guard. Members and staffers of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee and the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee should be familiar with Coast Guard leaders and vice versa. White papers and position documents need to be published to keep members on the same page. Compared with the Marine Corps—whose congressional lobbying President Harry Truman once compared to Stalin's propaganda corps—the Coast Guard is a babe in the woods and outclassed by both military and civilian congressional liaison organizations.
The Coast Guard Academy's recruiting pitch is emblematic of the services' view of Congress. It touts itself as having a purely competitive recruiting process, one devoid of congressional appointments. By taking Congress out of the process, the organization has cut off its main line of support.
Another shot aimed at its institutional foot is the oft-used recruiting line: "While other services spend their time training for war, we spend our time saving lives and protecting the environment." Not only is this insulting to the four larger armed forces, it perpetuates the stereotype of a softer alternative for those who like uniforms but would prefer to avoid traditional military missions. There is great virtue in humanitarian service, but this slogan perpetuates the lack of a cohesive definition for the service and the will to pursue the means to carry out its objectives.
Examples of this confusion abound: the Coast Guard pursued drug interdiction for 25 years before campaigning for "go-fast" boats that could actually catch the smugglers. The service generated a lot of angst over arming law enforcement officers. The President selects drug czars from the ranks of the Army rather than the service that is leading the war on drugs. Marginally capable cutters were introduced in the 1970s and 1980s. The Coast Guard stripped combat capability from the largest cutters in service.
Add to that a March 2002 New York Times article by Joel Brinkley entitled "Coast Guard Faces Hurdles in Effort to Screen Ships." The article explains that the Coast Guard is having great difficulty obtaining and interpreting faxed crew lists from foreign vessels arriving at U.S. ports. Further, it is unable to analyze the sketchy information it receives because it has no access to other law enforcement databases because its computers cannot communicate with those from the FBI, Customs, or the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Coast Guard has been a law enforcement agency since its inception and has had port security/safety responsibility for many decades. Someone needs to break some china.
Time to Draw the Line
The service currently reports to the Department of Transportation and stands in line far behind commercial aviation, rail, and highway transportation to get whatever funding is left over. Opportunities are created in the chaos of food fights. Strong leaders set a strategic course to relevance. They understand the signals and act when it is time to step out. Staying above the fray and accepting meager results is unacceptable.
The clock is ticking and a flurry of activity is taking place in the homeland security arena as its pecking order is defined. Greatly increased resources allocated to bolster homeland security have triggered a feeding frenzy in Washington. Assets will be needed to provide required capabilities. Many of these assets will be drawn from existing agencies while others will be glued together to provide streamlined solutions. Opportunity knocks as our nation pursues the war on terrorism, opportunity that could provide a renewed relevance for the Coast Guard. It is past time to step up to the challenge.
Neil Ruenzel served in both the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, retiring from the latter. He holds a management position in public affairs.