"One Year Later: Frozen in Time"
(See W. Toti, pp. 36-41. September 2002 Proceedings)
"'I'm Alive!'"
(See K. Shaeffer, pp. 38-39, September 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Michael Harkleroad, U.S. Naval Reserve—Reading these two articles shed light on the final moments of a former shipmate of mine—Commander Pat Dunn.
On that day, I had a feeling that someone I knew had been killed in the Pentagon. I didn't know who it might be, but I knew. When the list of casualties was released I saw his name. He was assigned to the Navy Command Center.
I had last seen Pat when I left the USS Inchon (LPH-12) in November 1988 on my way to Pensacola to begin training as a naval flight officer. While he and I were not close friends, we did those things that junior officers do while on deployments and I considered him a "shipmate" in the truest sense of the word. He was serious when needed but always had a good joke or story at the ready. I also remember a particularly trying time while the Inchon was at Guantanamo Bay for refresher training. Six of our sailors were killed by a drunk driver in a fiery crash. Pat's leadership abilities were readily apparent as we mustered the crew to find out who the six sailors were. He was an outstanding division officer, demanding a lot of his sailors and himself. I can remember many times at sea during watch turnover being impressed by his thoroughness and preparation and trying to emulate him.
I heard through other shipmates that Pat had done extremely well in his career. Before reporting to the Pentagon he had been the executive officer of the USS LaSalle (AGF-3), where I am sure his leadership skills were put to the test on a daily basis.
He reminded me of a bulldog, grabbing hold of life and never letting go. It was clear to me back in 1986-88 that Pat loved being "haze gray and under way"!
I can only hope that the war against the militant Islamists who perpetrated this attack will continue to be prosecuted to the fullest.
Goodbye, shipmate!
"What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom?"
(See M. Vego, pp. 28-33, July 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Donald Rose, U.S. Coast Guard—While Dr. Vego's sympathies have found support with a few disgruntled Air Force planners, his argument that operational and strategic planners spend too much time on targeting is misplaced. In fact, targeting decisions were so directly related to Enduring Freedom's political objectives and legal justification that operational and strategic planners had no choice but to give them substantial scrutiny. This careful focus has proven to be an important ingredient in the success of Enduring Freedom.
Dr. Vego is correct that strategy and military objectives should be the main focus of combatant commanders. But the strategic objectives and desired end state from Enduring Freedom as stated by Dr. Vego missed an important goal: the elimination of al Qaeda functionality around the world. In that context, public and international support, become, in many respects, the main object of the military action. In fact, if Enduring Freedom can be considered a success, it is because it allowed for the expression of public support in Afghanistan for supplanting the Taliban, and generated international resolve in support of the global war on terror. Large battlefield victories were less of an issue in Enduring Freedom, and the physical elimination of al Qaeda forces or surrender of al Queda leadership was an unrealistic and unverifiable objective from the beginning. Rather, tightly focused targeting of primary perpetrators and supporters of international terrorism, in a cross between law enforcement and military action, was demanded of Enduring Freedom forces.
The key remains the unique "law enforcement" aspect of this mission, attempting to direct military action only against individually culpable persons. Our stated intent to target individuals has garnered the international support we need to fight an amorphous enemy that claims no borders and can gel and disperse in places of least resistance or among pockets of public support.
To fight this global war against an amorphous enemy, domestic and international public and political support is required. If public support can be viewed as a military objective, then focusing on operations and actions that will preserve that support becomes more than a passing interest for planners, and scrupulous compliance with the laws of armed conflict becomes a baseline expectation.
This takes on a particular importance when considering our stated basis for intervening in Afghanistan. The goal was not to remove the Taliban—it was self-defense against al Qaeda, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Al Qaeda's armed attack on 11 September 2001, and it's declaration of their intention to continue with similar attacks, provided both our authority and our objective for subsequent military action. Every action that followed, then, needed to be tied to that objective, and narrowly targeted to intercepting the threat.
We are less free to define our objectives in this age of coalition warfare, and in warfare under the U.N. Charter. The right to go to war today is limited to that prescribed by the U.N. Security Council, in self-defense, or, perhaps, as our United Kingdom allies asserted in Kosovo, for the limited purpose of humanitarian intervention. One only has to look at the disastrous Soviet actions in Afghanistan, where massive, indiscriminate bombings were roundly denounced by the world community and fomented substantial, lasting resistance from Afghanis.
In Afghanistan, the threat to the United States was from al Qaeda. When the Taliban refused to take action to eliminate al Qaeda, our response was to neutralize al Qaeda ourselves. Armed Taliban resistance to our actions in Afghanistan against al Qaeda caused us to neutralize Taliban resistance as well—not for the military objective of taking over Afghanistan, but to eliminate the al Qaeda threat. At that point, the United States became engaged in international armed conflict with the Afghani government, entitling us to use the full panoply of wartime tools, subject to the laws of armed conflict, against "Afghanistan." But, politically, we were extremely reluctant to admit such a situation existed.
Had the Taliban allowed U.S. and coalition forces free reign to target al Qaeda, we would have had no basis to target Taliban forces. With those self-imposed, but politically necessary, limiting factors, the selection of targets to stay within those limits became a complex but critical task, tied precisely to our objectives.
Perhaps what Dr. Vego means is that unique targeting demands should not translate to planning and execution of future military operations. He seems concerned that legal review of targets and focus on the minimization of collateral damage is a dangerous trend that increasingly is reducing the efficiency of our forces in accomplishing traditional military objectives.
Dr. Vego may be right in downgrading the consequences of targeting efforts in a traditional warfare sense, where capture and control of real estate from an opposing armed force is the main objective. But this perspective is perhaps unrealistic with respect to future warfare challenges. The improved technology Dr. Vego claims should speed up the targeting process instead provides more and more information about targets that planners have to consider. More and more of the targets we are selecting are dual-use and intertwined with protected civilian identities. Fewer targets are traditional, identifiable combatants. Each weapon fired carries a considerable price tag and many weapons in our arsenal can be relatively precisely targeted. Each target we hit is seen within hours of the strike on television screens around the world. Each air strike is seen by the world as being relatively unopposed—the victims are seen as being at the mercy of deliberate military action. U.S. commanders, diplomats, and presidents are called to explain each one. These elements make targeting an important issue for combatant commanders, and targeting decisions take on a level of importance not seen in traditional combat planning.
"Book Review: The Liberty Incident"
(See P. Tobin, pp. 88-89, August 2002 Proceedings)
Mike Weeks—I had hoped to read a review of A. Jay Cristol's book, but was instead presented with Admiral Tobin's personal opinion that the attacks by the Israeli Defense Forces on 8 June 1967 were deliberate because they had to know that the ship was American. Yet Admiral Tobin offers only "professional instincts" and his impressions of what he encountered the day following the attack. Where is the review of what Cristol actually presented, material that would allow the reader to understand how many myths and mistaken impressions do not stand up to examination?
For example, where is the review of the material Cristol presented in such chapters as "Survivor's Perceptions," "Conspiracy Theories," "Tall Tales vs. Reality," and "Red Herrings and Myths"? Why is there no review of Appendix 2, which for the first time collects the complete Israeli Air Force transcripts of what was reported by multiple Air Force personnel, including the attacking pilots?
Admiral Tobin implies that Admiral Isaac Kidd was silent for 30 years, and "suspects" that "he had strong guidance from above." Yet Admiral Kidd is quoted in a Los Angeles Times article by David Smyth on 30 November 1984. Is it possible that Admiral Kidd was not out beating the drum because he didn't want to play that game?
The most questionable comment is that "the most inexplicable action of all was to recall the U.S. strike from a nearby carrier that left the Liberty's crew with no knowledge of their fate as they lived through the long night. Why (and where) was this decision made?"
The why, where, and who are fully explained, as is this myth of a "nearby carrier," in Cristol's book (for example, p. 99 with footnote 52 for further documentation). To address the first part of his question, Commander, Sixth Fleet, Vice Admiral William I. Martin made the decision because the Liberty was reporting that the attack was over and she was moving out of the area, and more important, he had received word from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv that the attack had been in error by the Israelis. Naturally, a strike package of A-4s and A-Is would be recalled, because there was no longer any attacking force to drive off, even if the location wasn't within eyesight of the Sinai and an ongoing major regional war. In addition, the Liberty radio logs clearly demonstrate that the Liberty and the Sixth Fleet were in communication throughout the night via the fleet Hi-Com high-frequency unsecure voice net, and an airborne E-2A from VAW-122 was in support. I respectfully ask what sources Admiral Tobin used to support his question of why and where.
When Admiral Tobin makes the statement that "the decision to attack the ship could not have been made at the scene," I wonder how much of the book he read. Cristol states that a combination of personnel located in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the on-scene division commander made the decision.
What evidence aside from "professional instincts" can Admiral Tobin provide that would demonstrate that Cristol is inaccurate about what his extensive research uncovered? I believe a disservice was provided to the Proceedings readership because we still are waiting for a review of what was actually written in Cristol's book.
"SWOs Should Be Specialists, Not Generalists"
(See M. Crockett, pp. 82-83, August 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander James P. McGrath III, U.S. Navy—When I read the title of this article I cringed—not another surface warfare officer (SWO) telling me that the career path I had chosen (and been promised since commissioning) was anachronistic and needed to be eliminated. Luckily, I decided to continue reading the article and found that Lieutenant Commander Crockett had taken the time to address my usual arguments against specialized SWOs.
I am a nuclear-trained SWO who considers himself a SWO first. I am one of those that he mentions who served as the operations officer on a destroyer before returning to my nuclear roots for a tour as a nuclear principal assistant on a carrier. Aside from the selfish desire to command at sea, I have found that officers with engineering experience tend to be more "well-rounded" SWOs. Although my data is all observational, I feel that a solid background in engineering helped the commanding officers under whom I have served. I have found that operational experience, outside of engineering, was essential to the functional operation of the engineering plant. The limited-duty officers in reactor and engineering had a much harder time understanding the constraints placed on performance of maintenance and the priorities of the commanding officer with regard to propulsion and power. Officers with topside experience, who have seen both sides, are better prepared to anticipate the commanding officer's needs in operating and fighting his ship. As a rule, I don't think that keeping SWOs out of engineering and focusing on operational billets would improve the quality of the SWO corps.
I do see the benefits of the author's proposals in engineering. My experience has been that young officers assigned to engineering are ill prepared for those responsibilities and their SWO requirements prevent them from ever truly learning their engineering jobs. This manifests itself when the same officers are assigned as chief engineers based on their service record that says they were engineering division officers. Now those officers, with little more engineering experience than their operations division officer counterpart, are responsible for the entire engineering plant. There are a lot of excellent chief engineers, but we are not readying the future chief engineers for success with the current SWO career path. There is a lot of merit in recruiting officers specifically to operate the engineering plants on our warships, and I think it will be easier to find those officers than many say. I even believe nuclear power will be able to meet their officer manning needs as long as they recruit officers with an honest presentation of the career path. I know of many officers who would be perfectly happy staying in engineering billets for a 20-year career (although I am not one of them).
"Enough Marine Air on Carriers Already"
(See S. Garick, pp. 62-64, August 2002; J. Jogerst, pp. 12-14, September 2002 Proceedings)
Captain Mike Spence, U.S. Navy—Captain Garick doesn't get full credit for his criticism of increased U.S. Marine Corps presence in carrier airwings because he didn't once invoke memories of the Navy aircraft carriers abandoning the Marines at Guadalcanal! Didn't we just deploy a sizable Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) into Afghanistan and successfully provide it with fixed-wing carrier-based tactical air support? The biggest question regarding naval aviation in Operation Enduring Freedom was not 11 where are the carriers?" They were there, two at a time, providing coverage for a diverse, joint expeditionary ground force without doctrinal difficulty. The question of the day was "where are the Harriers?"
Marine air operations at Rhino and Khandahar provided the perfect opportunity for the forward deployment of Marine fixed-wing assets—until the logistic realities set in. The transport air bridge could not supply enough fuel and ordnance to support fixed-wing operations and the foreign object damage (FOD) situation was deemed too unsanitary to risk the Harrier's fragile engines. What about all those old McDonnell Douglas calendars with artist conceptions showing Harriers operating out of Norwegian forest clearings? I guess that's what is called "artistic license."
Harriers did operate once from Khandahar. After a two-day FOD cleanup effort, two AV-8Bs landed to provide a backdrop for a visit by the Commandant. In its 25-year history with the Marine Corps, the AV-8B has never deployed in a combat situation to anything other than a carefully prepared airfield.
But the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will fix all that, right? It had better, because there may not be enough deck space on current amphibious ships to fit both the required numbers of MV-22s and the JSE Captain Garick notes that all Marine fixed-wing squadrons are currently spoken for. This simplistic analysis can lead to trouble, however. His Harrier numbers show seven active AV-8B squadrons supporting seven Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU). Each of those squadrons contains 16 aircraft (the requirement actually is 20 but there aren't enough Harriers remaining to field that many), yet only four aircraft at a time currently deploy with each MEU. This means the Marines need 160 Harriers total in the force to support 16 aircraft at sea at any one time on deployment or in workups. What about noncarrier-based Marine F/A-18s? Marine F/A-18 squadrons routinely deploy to Operations Northern and Southern Watch and were a significant presence in Operation Allied Force. This has gotten Marine air into recent fights but only as part of a joint force, and not in direct support of Marine ground troops. Neither the land-based Harriers nor Hornets have played in a recent conflict unless infrastructure was available and access was assured. Sounds an awful lot like our light blue brethren.
As for joint doctrine, significant concessions were made to allow the MAGTF to retain operational control of its air assets. Forcing the Marine Corps to sign up totally to centralized air component command and control under a joint force air component commander would have precipitated an interservice war that was untenable, especially in the face of considerable (at the time) Marine congressional support. Over time, the Marines have turned that doctrinal "decision of least resistance" around to justify retaining force structure and, as Captain Garick does, to use as an excuse to thwart change whenever this issue arises.
Instead of continuing to drag out tired old arguments, it's time for Marine Corps aviation to get fully onboard, if not because ship-board operational flexibility provides the best means of support for Marines on the ground, then because the General Accounting Office is going to make the argument stick that the country can do without another garrison tactical air force that can't get to the fight.
"Book Review: It's Your Ship"
(See H. Giffin, pp. 85-86, September 2002 Proceedings)
Mr. Douglas Combs, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for Strategic Initiatives—Vice Admiral Giffin's review was dead on. I'd like to comment from a businessman's perspective. Captain Abrashoff crafts a compelling story of his experiences leading a "billion dollar business activity." The ideas he presents are not novel and could be found in many basic management texts. But here's the catch: knowing what to do is often easy, doing it is the hard part.
How did Captain Abrashoff and the Benfold (DDG-65) crew do it? Captain Abrashoff unleashed the talent of 310 sailors by granting his people the "freedom to manage." He viewed the Benfold as a business enterprise, and urged his crew to use an entrepreneurial spirit to solve their business challenges. While his management "secrets" may not be original, he demonstrates an ability to abide by many well-known leadership principles that are all too often ignored by leaders, both business and military alike.
It's Your Ship's vivid and empowering stories of everyday sailors becoming superb "business solution providers" make this an entertaining read but there are areas where the book disappoints. First, the author's tone often implies that he was the only person in the Navy smart enough to figure out certain management challenges. His treatment of his predecessor and his relief are less than most of us would hope for were we in their position. Second, given his success, one wonders what could have been had Captain Abrashoff "stayed Navy" and shared his successes "enterprise-wide." Nonetheless, the Navy can take pride that this success story has transcended the military arena and is now showcased for business leaders in a best-selling book.
Captain Abrashoff transformed the Benfold into a ship that executed common-sense management uncommonly well. From a literary perspective, It's Your Ship follows a similar path—it is the story that many successful ships might have in common, but one that has been marketed and related with uncommon skill.
"A Common Support Aircraft Is Possible"
(See M. Prosperi, pp. 52-55, July 2002; R. Brooks, pp. 16-18, September 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Matthew J. Duffy, U.S. Navy—Commander Prosperi presents superb arguments for why the Navy must reexamine its tactical and maritime aircraft roadmap. Devoting 8 of the 26 F/A-I8E/Fs to assume the duties currently carried out by the S-3B limits the employment of the new F/A-18E/F aircraft in strike and air-defense missions. The Navy should examine using new production S-3s for organic refueling, antisubmarine warfare, and as a future carrier onboard delivery replacement (COD).
With the exception of the C-2A service life extension program, there is no plan to offer a long-range carrier logistics solution. VAW-120 recently transferred its C-2As to VRC-30 and VRC-40 to supplement their deteriorating fleet. C-2A pilots are now trained in E-2Cs at the fleet readiness squadron and subsequently cross trained in the C-2A once resident in their fleet squadron. The US-3A, a future carrier onboard delivery replacement, has room for 5 passengers plus 4,600 pounds of cargo, or an all-cargo load of 7,500 pounds. Furthermore, the US-3A has inflight refueling capability and a higher operating ceiling than its C-2A counterpart.
In reducing the tactical air complement on the flight deck to two airframes—the E-2C and the F/A-18E/F/G—the Navy severely restricts its ability to expand its employment of new technologies and systems. A third host—the S-3B—adds greater flexibility and capability to the future airwing.
As Commander Prosperi offers, $10,000 per airframe would allow the S-3B to complement the airwing for another two decades. I submit that the Navy consider an S-3B detachment option. Similar to the C-2A detachment process, the community could still contract and ultimately provide four-- plane detachments to the airwing for organic refueling and to supplement the COD and antisubmarine warfare effort. We must not restrict the use of new F/A18E/Fs from strike and air-defense missions by tasking them with these support roles.
"Let Squads Call Air Strikes"
(See F. West, pp. 38-42, July 2002 Proceedings)
"Give Terminal Control to the Grunts"
(See J. Kuzmick, pp. 40-42, July 2002 Proceedings)
Major Greg Zehner, U.S. Air Force—Unfortunately, there are numerous errors in Mr. West's piece. More important, Colonel Kuzmick's and Mr. West's pieces suggest "grunts" can employ air power effectively. These mischaracterizations are wrong and even dangerous if relied upon to support future courses of action.
For instance, Mr. West states that in current practice a forward air controller 11 visually identifies and clears hot the aircraft which is approaching at about two to three thousand feet." That is far from true, especially in the joint arena. It was common in the late 1980s in Europe, but Desert Storm signaled a massive shift: the last decade has seen a dramatic change in focus for air strike control tactics, techniques, and procedures. In fact, in fall 2000 the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Close Air Support Joint Test and Evaluation team, produced interim results from data gathered at the National Training Center covering 11 maneuver brigades participating in 22 battles and controlling 307 air strikes by joint aircraft. The team found that tactical air control party (TACP) personnel conducted about half of the total controls and half of the TACP controls (25% of the total) occurred when neither the TACP nor anyone else on the battlefield saw the target. In addition, forward air controllers (air and ground) used the doctrinally desired positive direct control method (seeing the aircraft and the target) in only half of the 307 sorties. Clearly, having to see the aircraft is not established, current practice. (The revised joint close-air support publication due in January 2003 acknowledges this fact and does away with positive direct control and associated terms, replacing them with three types of control based on risk, weapons, threats, environment, etc.)
Another significant error: despite what Mr. West infers, non-aviator, enlisted personnel controlled almost all the air strikes in Operation Enduring Freedom. Operations did not require "waiting for an aviator forward air controller to come forward [to control an air strike]."
The most egregious error, however, is the idea implied by Mr. West's plea, "why can't all squads [call in air strikes using non-aviators]?" He highlights how "a single Special Forces team [emphasis added] directed 175 air strikes in a 25day period, averaging 7 strikes a day." The "team" did not control the air strikes—a highly trained and experienced tactical air controller (TAC) team member did. The difference is key. The two articles infer that controlling air strikes requires no additional training and any grunt can do it, as long as he has sufficient, fully interoperable equipment. Reality shows otherwise. In the first days of Enduring Freedom, untrained ground troops controlled a significant percentage of available sorties but were unable to effectively and efficiently command, control, and employ air power. Joint leadership, aviators, and ground troops realized those untrained personnel created undue delays, provided insufficient coordination, and did not employ the limited resource as effectively or efficiently as the formally trained and certified TACs. Immediately, dedicated combat controller team or tactical air control party TACs deployed with the teams.
It was not the fault of the Special Forces troops—they are extremely competent, especially with "weapons they know, trust, and directly control," but air power is not airborne artillery. Knowing how to call in a fire-support mission is not enough, especially when using new weapons or unfamiliar platforms. Employing air power is a three-dimensional art that requires extensive years of schooling, training, proficiency, and experience.
In fact, the experience of Enduring Freedom is the major reason the Commandant of the Marine Corps is bringing back to active duty the Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO). An infantry soldier, no matter how well trained in ground tactics, is unable to employ air power as well as a specialist in the field. When air power is a scarce resource in an operation, getting less than 100% effectiveness is unsatisfactory.
During numerous Enduring Freedom "road-show" briefings earlier this year, frontline Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel highlighted the indispensable part the TAC played in an SOF team. In one story, a Special Forces team leader initially was reluctant to drag along a TAC. After those first few days of ineffective air strikes, however, his opinion radically changed. He realized the decisive component of his team was was the TAC who could effectively maneuver and employ air power. In addition, air strikes were not only decisive in battle but also provided the team leader with tremendous prestige when Raising and advising his local Afghan leader. He could go to that general and say, "You want that enemy to go away. OK, tomorrow at 0900, it will happen." His ability to effectively summon such massive firepower was priceless. Because of this, instead of being excess baggage, the SOF team leader told the TAC, "my team's mission has changed: my job is now to protect you so you can do your job."
"It's the Cartridge, Stupid—Not the Rifle"
(See A. Milavic, pp. 80-81, August 2002; H. Tiede, L. Schuette, pp. 18-22, September 2002 Proceedings)
Major James L. Murphy, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Major Milavic presents a strong argument against the small 5.56mm cartridge. Perhaps he should have presented a little more background and history regarding a larger cartridge, such as the 7.62 mm or .45 caliber versus the 9 mm now standard in the issue pistol.
There are a wide range of arms available to Marine Corps special units. Those weapons include significantly larger bullets than the standard 5.56 mm. It should also be noted that 7.62-mm weapons are still issued to ground troops, most notably as "machine guns."
In World War I and in the early days of World War II, the '03 Springfield, with a five-round clip, was the standard infantry weapon. Sergeant Alvin York proved the value of carefully aimed fire, and his capture of a great number of Germans earned him our nation's highest honor for heroism. When the M-1 was introduced with its eight-round clip, many lauded the weapon, and rightly so. It did not negate single shot, carefully aimed fire, but the semiautomatic feature allowed relatively rapid fire, as quickly as one could pull the trigger. (I recall that the first time I was confronted in Korea, I unloaded those eight rounds so quickly, I was in a mild state of shock when I heard that familiar "ping" as the clip ejected!)
The M-1 and M-2 carbines were losers in almost every respect. Certainly, they were lightweight, and intended to replace the pistol for certain ranks, especially in the army. The lightweight bullet with a relatively low muzzle velocity, coupled with a completely inadequate sighting system, required a high volume of fire to offset its basic inaccuracy.
In the early 1900s, our military was battling the rebels in the Philippines. The standard .38-caliber revolver was inadequate to stop a fanatic (as in the author's reference to some of the experiences in Vietnam). The .45-caliber pistol M-1911 was born. Yes, it had a slow muzzle velocity, but with a bullet diameter of almost a half inch, it was intended as a defensive weapon. It proved itself to be outstanding in this regard. Only one minor change over the years reidentified the pistol as M- 1911 Al. The recent adoption of the 9-mm (basically .38-caliber) handgun to replace the .45caliber pistol, might also be considered by many to be a step backward, except this new weapon has a larger magazine.
The whole discussion begs the real issue: Why do we spend so much time on the rifle range seeking a high level of accurate fire, when we continually increase the rounds carried and discharged without truly seeking a kill? I always was trained that our purpose was to kill the other folks, not just make a lot of dust.