The war on terrorism is a new kind of war that requires approaches different from those of the past. The United States is fighting an insidious enemy who does not play by the old rules; an enemy without uniforms or insignia, who mingles with civilians and hides among them, targeting innocent noncombatants without warning.
President George W. Bush's administration has proclaimed a policy of preempting terror because our traditional practice of acting only when openly provoked simply will not do anymore. Americans cannot wait for another terrorist attack before taking action. Offensive measures may well be required to protect U.S. citizens and cities.
This policy may appear to place us in the role of aggressor—a distinctly uncomfortable one for the United States, even when the cause is just. A preemptive stance often will put us at odds with allies, as the debate over whether or not to attack Iraq illustrates. But we have made it abundantly clear since the 11 September attacks that we will act—alone, if necessary—against any nation or organization that threatens us and shelters or supports international terrorism.
A shift away from the defensive mindset demands that U.S. decision makers rethink policies regarding use of the armed forces. Preventing terrorism requires access to terrorists' plans through infiltration and intelligence gathering, operations traditionally conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency. Some of these largely reconnaissance missions could be accomplished best by certain military units. Given the well-publicized failures in coordination and dissemination of intelligence among the various agencies involved in the past, it is clear that military intelligence and special operations forces must be more integrated in the future.
Covert operations against terrorists also call for reassessing the executive order prohibiting assassinations. There is no surer way to prevent or derail terrorist attacks than to eliminate the terrorists who plan them. Reportedly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is reviewing these matters and related proposals. In spite of opposition by defense critics and traditionalists who remain blind to the changing nature of warfare, these thorny issues merit urgent consideration.
The U.S. Posse Comitatus Act, which limits the use of federal troops in domestic law enforcement roles, needs to be reconsidered as well. This act was born of a different era, in response to the use of federal troops for policing the south after the Civil War. Since then, the military often has provided equipment, supplies, advisors, and technology to law enforcement agencies coping with natural emergencies, domestic riots, and the so-called war on drugs. Still, other than the U.S. Coast Guard and state national guard troops activated by governors, the armed services have little policing or law enforcement authority. This greatly restricts use of regular military forces in domestic emergencies—even though they might represent the most responsive, best-equipped resources available.
Aside from the objections of police unions out to protect their turf, the ostensible argument against using military personnel in a domestic role is that they lack training in law enforcement. But it is unpersuasive, especially when one thinks about how closely law enforcement agencies pattern their operations, training, and structure after the military—and how many policeman are service veterans. Most members of the armed forces are experienced in the use of arms. The military, moreover, has the capacity to train its people in civilian law enforcement as needed; thousands already have such training as military policemen or masters-at-arms.
Many military commanders worry about the political perils of becoming involved in domestic law enforcement and prefer the current restrictions. Using the "full plate" argument, they shy away from yet another mission. Also, they fear that service members would object to a role that could pit them against their neighbors. That concern might have had validity when the services consisted mostly of draftees; however, they are all volunteers now and presumably they know what it means when they take an oath to defend their country against all enemies, foreign and domestic.
Times have indeed changed. So, too, must some of our traditional notions about how wars are fought and by whom.
Retired Navy Captain Kelly, a former surface warfare officer, is a frequent contributor to the Proceedings. He was a reporter for The Navy Times and The San Diego Union-Tribune, and now lies in San Diego, California.