The first true year of the new millennium, 2001 was yet another "bookend" year for the U.S. Navy. Crisis and conflict bounded 12 months of routine operations, triumph, and tragedy. Last year saw the U.S. Navy on station and on call, worldwide, from New York City and San Francisco to the northern Arabian Sea, supporting homeland security and defense, routine theater-engagement operations, and overseas crisis-response needs. It also saw the Navy hounded by misfortune and heartbreak.
The Navy's operations during 2001 were carried out against a backdrop of close scrutiny and debate about military strategies, force structures and mixes, and "defense transformation" that seemed to bring into doubt the very systems, weapons, and platforms that had proved to be so flexible, adaptable, and effective. President George W. Bush entered the White House with promises to rebuild the armed forces, transform them for 21st-century needs, and "leap a generation" of technology in a quest for a revolution in military affairs. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered a series of studies to address changes in strategies and investment priorities, while the Defense Department and four of the five armed services focused on the second congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). (The Coast Guard was not formally included in the 2001 QDR). All soon learned that the Cold War "legacy" ships, submarines, aircraft, and systems—particularly carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups—had what it took to meet the needs of the "new kind of war" the United States found itself fighting.
Being There
Because of its presence in forward operating areas, the Navy served as a stabilizing force and helped to ensure access to overseas regions that are important to the United States economically, diplomatically, politically, and militarily. "At the same time, the Navy is a powerfully independent force," said Rear Admiral Joseph Sestak, former director of the Navy's 2001 QDR organization and its follow-on "Deep Blue" research and analysis cell. "Operating from sovereign 'sea bases,' our multifaceted and multi-mission naval systems depend on neither foreign facilities nor, typically, overflight rights to carry out important tasks. Deploying from the sea, using amphibious craft and fixed and rotary wing aircraft, the Navy has the means for independent operations and ensuring access for joint forces around the world."
This is a critical discriminator in a world in which U.S. access to land-based support is increasingly uncertain, as events later in the year would attest.
Five carrier battle groups and five amphibious ready groups deployed during the year, manned by more than 55,000 sailors and Marines, and each battle group saw combat. The nation's submarine force was pushed to the limits, constrained by force levels, as regional warfighting commanders increasingly relied on the Navy's submarines for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and striking power.
As highlighted in the 2002 edition of the Chief of Naval Operations' "Vision . . . Presence . . . Power" program guide, the Navy maintained a constant carrier presence in the Persian Gulf throughout 2001, and at the height of Operation Enduring Freedom in late fall, four battle groups and two amphibious ready groups were on station in the Arabian Sea conducting combat operations. And for the tenth straight year, Fifth Fleet surface warships continued maritime interdiction operations in support of U.N. sanctions against Iraq. Operating with their U.S. and allied land-based counterparts, Navy aircraft conducted combat operations in support of Operations Northern and Southern Watch, striking numerous targets while enforcing no-fly zones.
Sometimes, however, even the best of plans went awry. On 16 February, some 36 U.S. and British aircraft conducted strikes against radar sites and air-defense command centers in Iraq, with some attacks well north of the southern no-fly zone, the first time this occurred in two years. "We will continue to enforce the no-fly zone until the world is told otherwise," President Bush stated. The strikes came in response to increased Iraqi anti-aircraft aggressiveness, including the launching of 14 surface-to-air missiles against U.S. and British patrolling aircraft. Air Force F-15s and F-16s and British Tornadoes operating from Kuwaiti airfields, joined by Navy F/A-18s embarked on the carrier Harry S. Truman (CVN-75), attacked approximately 25 targets. According to news reports, however, virtually all of the Navy's new AGM-154A Joint Stand-Off Weapons (or JSOWs) fell wide of their marks, with indications of a software glitch in the weapons' global positioning system guidance packages. Later, on 10 August, British and U.S. aircraft, including F/A-18s from the Enterprise (CVN-65), carried out more strikes, including some on targets that were missed in February.
U.S. naval forces in Japan, as well as West Coast-based ships, continued to provide visible overseas engagement throughout the Pacific Rim. The Navy-Marine Corps team carried out more than 30 missions in support of the International Force in East Timor and related humanitarian-assistance efforts. In defense of U.S. maritime sovereignty, the Navy continued to work closely with the Coast Guard, a practical implementation of the 1997 National Fleet policy. On 24 February, for example, a Navy destroyer with a Coast Guard law-enforcement team on board seized a fishing boat off the Pacific coast of Mexico loaded with nearly nine tons of cocaine—the fourth-largest drug haul in U.S. counternarcotics history. Elsewhere, 86 Navy ships operated at various times in the Mediterranean Sea, conducting 127 exercises and 586 port visits. And three Navy ships participated in the annual UNITAS deployment to South America, promoting multilateral security cooperation and enhancing interoperability with our regional partners.
"Our port calls, multinational professional conferences, joint engineering and construction projects, international military education and training, and officer exchanges are other important instruments of international cooperation," the 2002 "Vision . . . Presence . . . Power" program guide explained. "Collectively, these 'combined' efforts with the naval and maritime forces of our friends and allies play important roles in preventing and diffusing crises. By our presence, we act as a stabilizing force and we learn important doctrinal and tactical lessons regarding how we all will fight in a future conflict."
Tragedies
"My God," Commander Scott D. Waddle exclaimed from the control room of the Greeneville (SSN-772), "what was that?" Moments later, peering anxiously through the periscope, he saw the unthinkable: he had collided with a commercial fishing vessel, the Ehime Maru, which was sinking so quickly that it was impossible to do much more than watch in horror. Nine people died in a tragedy that severely strained relations between the United States and Japan and brought into focus critical standard operating procedures and accountability. "I am fully responsible for this truly tragic accident and for the rest of my life I will live with the horrible consequences of my action," Commander Waddle later stated before a military court of inquiry.
The 174-foot, 830-ton Japanese vocational high school fishing vessel sank on 9 February, some 16 miles off the Hawaii coast, after the nuclear-powered attack submarine collided with her during an emergency blow drill. The Greeneville had been on a routine "distinguished visitors" cruise, with 16 civilians on board, in a long-standing program that all five services see as valuable for fostering good relations between the military and civilian sectors of U.S. society. That day, sadly, routine turned to crisis and worse: although 26 crewmembers and students were rescued, 5 men and 4 boys perished. The vessel came to rest in 2,000 feet of water, but the Navy was determined to salvage her in an attempt to recover the bodies of victims-or some of their belongings-and return them to their families.
On 17 October, the remains of Hirotaka Segawa, the ship's radio dispatcher, were the first to be found in an extraordinary, and grim, operation. Ultimately, eight bodies were recovered, in a delicate, dangerous, and expensive (costing some $60 million) effort by the commercial salvage vessel Rockwater 2. Under the overall command of Rear Admiral William Klemm, the Rockwater 2 used remotely operated vehicles to fasten cables, straps, and bars around the hull, and gently lifted it for transport to shallow water.
Once the vessel was in 116 feet of water off Honolulu's airport, U.S. Navy and Japanese divers searched for remains and personal belongings. Divers found a wedding ring inscribed with the name of Hiroshi Makisawa, one of the teachers on board; it was returned to his wife, Mika. When the divers completed their work, on 26 November, the Navy towed the ship offshore to her final resting place 6,000 feet beneath the surface. Only the body of Takeshi Mizuguchi, 17, remained missing. A year after the sinking, at a ceremony honoring the nine dead, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker stated, "I hope each of you will accept the heartfelt apology that I humbly offer on behalf of the people and government of my country." (On 4 April 2002, the Navy agreed to pay the Japanese families $11 million in restitution.)
Damage to the Greeneville cost $2 million to repair, and the submarine was back at sea in mid-April 2001. (Snakebit, perhaps, the Greeneville later in the year suffered a minor grounding and early in 2002 she collided with another ship in the Gulf of Oman.) A special Navy court of inquiry found the sub's skipper had cut corners in his attempt to get his civilians back to Pearl Harbor on time. Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, found Commander Waddle guilty of dereliction in the performance of his duties and that "negligent handling of a vessel" had led to the collision, but there was no evidence of "criminal intent or deliberate misconduct." Commander Waddle was allowed to retire.
"I am reminded today of how dangerous service can be," President Bush remarked during a speech in Florida. On 12 March, five U.S. servicemen and a New Zealand Army officer were killed when an F/A-18 Hornet from the Harry S. Truman in the Persian Gulf dropped three Mk-82 500-pound bombs that missed their intended target during a nighttime training exercise in Kuwait. Another nine U.S. servicemen and two Kuwaitis were injured.
The Central Command investigation concluded that the pilot, Commander David Zimmerman, had not been "cleared hot" by ground controllers and had "released his weapons before receiving clearance." Conditions on the desert bombing range made it difficult for him to distinguish the ground controllers' observation post from the target a little more than a mile away. One of the injured ground controllers, Air Force Staff Sergeant Timothy Cruising, was tasked with guiding Commander Zimmerman's final approach to the target but lost track of the aircraft. By the time he focused on the Hornet, realized that it was targeting the observation post, and called for Zimmerman to abort the run, it was too late.
"Tragedies such as this occur without warning," a statement issued by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted, "and for reasons that are difficult to understand." Commander Zimmerman was relieved of his command.
"This Guy Just Killed Us!"
As Lieutenant Shane Osborne recalled the 1 April incident, "The first thing I thought was 'This guy just killed us!'" A Chinese pilot had stupidly, if accidentally, rammed his F-8 fighter into the Navy EP-3 Aries II surveillance aircraft. "I'm here to tell you," Lieutenant Osborne underscored to an exuberant crowd of dignitaries, well-wishers, and families at his home base of Whidbey Island Naval Air Station on 14 April, "we did it right. No apology is necessary on our part." But it was a harrowing two weeks before he and his crew of 23 men and women could enjoy freedom again.
The Chinese F-8 had twice closed to within three feet or so before finally striking the lumbering EP-3, which was on patrol in international airspace well offshore Hainan Island, outside the People's Republic of China's 12-mile territorial sea. "We snap-rolled to an about 130-degrees angle bank," Lieutenant Osborne explained, "which is getting near the inverted side. I remember looking up, seeing water when I lifted my head up. And then I saw another plane smoking toward the earth with flames coming out of it. We saw a chute."
The Chinese pilot, Wang Wei, never was found, despite the largest search-and-rescue operation ever attempted by China's navy.
After plunging some 7,500 feet in a matter of seconds, Lieutenant Osborne muscled his crippled aircraft into level flight. He then alerted his crew to prepare to ditch and implement emergency-destruct procedures. Astonishingly, even with a badly damaged propeller, a severely damaged aileron, and a ripped-off nose cone, the aircraft kept flying. "That kid was one hell of a pilot that day," a retired senior naval aviator with many years of P-3 experience noted privately.
"We made about 15 'Mayday' distress calls before landing on Hainan," noted Lieutenant (junior grade) Regina Kaufman, the aircraft's navigator. "I picked Hainan because it was the easiest and closest airfield."
Once on the ground and shut down, the plane immediately was surrounded by Chinese troops, followed by a 15-minute standoff before the crew opened the hatch and surrendered. That quarter-hour was critical. "With respect to the gear, the crew has a checklist," Defense Secretary Rumsfeld remarked the day the crew returned home. "They went through that checklist and did an excellent job of doing everything that was, I believe, possible in the period of time they had." Secrets had been safeguarded by the professionalism of the crew.
The 24 Americans were taken into custody-"guests" of the People's Republic of China-and questioned for 11 days before being released. As the crisis continued, Beijing demanded that the United States curb its "spy flights" or move them much farther from Chinese territory. According to retired Rear Admiral William "Bear" Picavance, the United States typically sends about 200 such reconnaissance flights near China each year, and the Chinese launch fighter aircraft to intercept about one-third of the flights. Negotiations became heated, and soon hinged on Chinese demands that Washington take complete responsibility for the collision and make a full apology for the loss of the Chinese pilot. "The United States should apologize to the Chinese people," President Jian Zemin declared, "and should bear all responsibilities for the accident."
"We regret that the Chinese plane did not get down safely," Secretary of State Colin Powell stated on the fourth day of the crisis, "and we regret the loss of life of that Chinese pilot. But it's time to move on." Part of the planning for moving on involved the Japan-based carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63) to help protect reconnaissance flights once they resumed. That proved unnecessary. "Our view is that the flights are so benign that they do not need escorts," noted Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command.
Hard-nosed negotiations ultimately freed the crew, and they arrived at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island on 14 April to a highly emotional, ecstatically patriotic crowd of more than 10,000 people and worldwide television coverage. Not until 3 July did the Chinese release the aircraft, only after demanding that it be cut apart and flown out in the belly of a Russian An-124 transport. The Chinese also demanded $1 million to pay for the housing and feeding of the 24 "guests" and for other expenses associated with the three months that the aircraft was on Hainan. The United States recalculated the bill and in August sent $34,567. The check has not been cashed.
On 24 April, President Bush seemed to pour salt into still-fresh wounds with his decision to "do everything it took to help Taiwan defend itself." That day he promised to sell weapons to what Beijing regards as its "renegade province" to enhance Taipei's ability to deter a Chinese naval blockade or attacks. To be sure, the President did not offer everything on the Taiwanese military's wish list (Aegis destroyers, Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles, and high-speed antiradiation missiles [HARMs] were absent from the U.S. plan), but the 8 advanced diesel-electric submarines and 12 P-3C Orion patrol aircraft on offer clearly angered the Chinese. The offer also confused many observers: U.S. shipyards have not constructed a conventional submarine since the three-sub Barbel (SS-580) class in 1959.
"We're Here to Help"
"These young men have done a great deed, a glorious deed," Osama bin Laden intoned in what was his last videotape of the year, aired in late December. "Our terrorism against America is commendable. It seeks to make the unjust stop making injustice."
"The Twin Towers are actually a navigational landmark on my charts," Second Mate Sean Tortora, navigator on board the USNS Comfort (T-AH-20), remarked as his ship arrived at New York's Pier 92, just three days after the 11 September terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. "When I took the charts out in Baltimore, I was struck by the fact that they are no longer there."
As the report of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review was being finalized last September, terrorist strikes against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon proved what many had been warning: U.S. borders are dangerously porous, critical centers of gravity and infrastructure are at risk from a variety of asymmetric threats, and the United States for some time had been in what President Bush later called a "new kind of war." More than 3,000 people from 87 countries died as a result the 9/11 attacks. Looking back at the first four months of Enduring Freedom, the operation launched in response to those attacks, the Defense Department and Congress relearned the old lesson that the presidential "toolbox" must include highly effective and flexible naval power.
In the hours following the attacks, President Bush mobilized key elements of the military and focused all agencies of government on ensuring homeland defense, giving it the name Operation Noble Eagle. On short notice, the Navy sortied the aircraft carriers George Washington (CVN-73), John F Kennedy (CV-67), and John C. Stennis (CVN-74) to patrol the waters along U.S. coasts, and the hospital ship Comfort steamed north to provide assistance to survivors and rescuers at "ground zero" in New York City. The Aegis cruisers Leyte Gulf (CG-55), Mobile Bay (CG-53), Monterey (CG-61), Hue City (CG-66), Valley Forge (CG-50), Vicksburg (CG-69), and Vella Gulf (CG-72), and the Aegis destroyers Decatur (DDG-73), Higgins (DDG-76), Ramage (DDG-61), Ross (DDG-71), Russell (DDG-59), and Stethem (DDG-63) deployed to assist the North American Air Defense Command, Air Force, and Air National Guard in defending critical airspace.
Other Navy assets were committed to patrolling maritime approaches to the United States, including the Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyer Fife (DD-991); the five Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates Rodney M. Davis (FFG-60), Ford (FFG-54), Rentz (FFG-46), Sides (FFG-14), and Thach (FFG-43); and the amphibious assault ship Bataan (LHD-5), the amphibious transport dock Shreveport (LPD-12), the combat support ship Detroit (AOE-4), the salvage ship Salvor (ARS-52), and the Military Sealift Command oiler Yukon (T-AO-202).
When it became apparent that few people survived the attacks in New York, with emergency room staffs all but idle in the critical hours after the Twin Towers' collapse, the Comfort's crew focused on providing logistics and support services. Even so, "our mission never really changed," Captain Ed Nanartowich, the ship's master, explained. "We're here to help the people of New York any way we can." By the time the Comfort returned to Baltimore in November, the 61 Military Sealift Command civilian mariners and 190 military medical personnel on board had served more than 17,000 meals, provided berthing for some 2,300 people, washed 4,400 pounds of laundry, treated nearly 600 people with injuries, and provided 500 mental-health consultations.
The Navy quickly joined with the Coast Guard in protecting key ports and waterways, as well as contributing to force-protection needs at home and abroad. The Coast Guard, augmented with Navy personnel, operated several Cyclone (PC-1)-class fast patrol craft to carry out port security and other homeland security tasks. It also mobilized Coast Guard Reserve port security units to provide protection to key U.S. and overseas ports.
"Eat This, Osama!"
Half a world away, with suspicion growing that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist network based in Afghanistan had been responsible for the attacks against the United States, U.S. and British naval forces were on station, ready to retaliate in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The Enterprise and Carl Vinson (CVN-70) carrier battle groups already were deployed in the Arabian Sea, along with other U.S. warships and a Royal Navy attack submarine, constituting an immediate capability to conduct manned-aircraft and Tomahawk cruise-missile strikes.
"We asked the Taliban to turn over Osama bin Laden," a senior officer on board the Carl Vinson remarked on 8 October, right after the first wave of strike aircraft launched. "They said no. This is our answer."
On 12 October, a third carrier, the Kitty Hawk, arrived on station off Pakistan, but with much of her air wing on the sidelines. Instead, the Japan-based carrier embarked special operations forces with Black Hawk MH-60 attack helicopters, MH-47 Chinook medium-lift helos, and MH-53 Pave Low helicopters. More than 1,000 special forces troops operated from the carrier, including the Army's 160th "Night Stalkers" SpecOps Aviation Regiment, Navy SEALs, and Air Force special operations personnel. The Kitty Hawk's success in this role both pleased and concerned Navy planners, who pointed to the inherent operational flexibility and adaptability of the nation's carrier forces and their continued utility in the unconventional war on terrorism. Concerns also were raised about taking one of the Navy's 12 carriers out of normal rotational duties. Both reactions prompted intense inquiry about a new-design afloat forward staging base or converting a large commercial ship to this role.
The near-immediate availability of sea-based striking power was a critical factor as concerns increased that U.S. ground-based forces would be unable to have access to in-theater bases and facilities. In early October, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld flew to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to solidify political support to use in-country assets. A few weeks earlier, the Saudi government had indicated "unease" about U.S. assumptions about using a new command-and-control center at Prince Sultan Air Base to plan strikes against Afghanistan. So uncertain was the use of this and other facilities that the U.S. Air Force quickly made contingency plans to move the center and other assets to another Persian Gulf location. While access to the Prince Sultan center for planning ultimately was approved, the United States was constrained in the use of Saudi bases by strike aircraft against Afghan targets. In addition to Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Georgia were targets of U.S. diplomacy to gain access and use of land bases, and at year's end a concerted buildup of facilities in several countries was well under way. "We are in this for the long haul," President Bush warned.
After five days of intensive flight operations, in mid-October, the Carl Vinson's commanding officer, Captain Dick Wren, told his crew, "Be ready to rumble for whatever is tasked to us." It was a sentiment clearly embraced by his crew; "Eat this, Osama!" was penned on a bomb being loaded onto a Hornet by an ordnance handler.
Later in October, with the U.S.-Egyptian Bright Star Exercise completed, the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) Battle Group steamed out of the Mediterranean and made for the Arabian Sea. The Peleliu (LHA-5) and Bataan amphibious ready groups—with some 3,200 Marines—soon joined the Theodore Roosevelt Battle Group. On 3 November, Marine AV-8B Harrier II aircraft embarked on the Peleliu took part in a strike against a Taliban command-and-control center in the south, marking the first time that the aircraft had been used. The Peleliu later became a half-way house of sorts for prisoners, including "the American Taliban," John Walker, before they were transported to the United States or to the new "Camp X-Ray" detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. On 26 November, the Marines seized an Afghan base (renaming it Forward Operating Base "Rhino") and began attacking Taliban forces in the south.
The Navy and Marine Corps team supporting Operation Enduring Freedom comprised more than 50% of the total U.S. military presence in the area through the end of the year. (Meanwhile, other Navy assets continued to carry out routine and contingency missions throughout the world. Two U.S. sailors from the Peterson [DD-969], Petty Officer First Class Vincent Parker and Petty Officer Third Class Benjamin Johnson, died during a late November maritime interception operation against a tanker suspected of smuggling Iraqi oil out of the Persian Gulf.) Complementing B-52 and B-1B sorties from Diego Garcia and 40-hour B-2 sorties from the continental United States, the Navy's aircraft delivered more than half of all manned-aircraft strike weapons against a broad range of targets, usually with pinpoint accuracy. And they did so by flying sorties against landlocked targets as far as 900 miles from their carriers in the north Arabian Sea, supported by Saudi Arabia-based Air Force and carrier-based Navy tankers.
"I think that we can fly pretty much where we want to without fear of the Afghans being able to keep us from flying there," Captain Chuck Wright, deputy commander of the Carl Vinson's air wing, remarked in late October. Still, the Navy was mindful of the possibility for asymmetric threats without warning-in a port or crowded sea lane. Lessons learned from the October 2000 terrorist attack against the Cole (DDG-67) were applied throughout the fleet, reflecting the Navy's readiness to deal with these more likely, if more ambiguous, threats.
By the end of December, the Navy's aircraft had flown 72% of the tactical and strike sorties (77% if sorties by Marine Corps aircraft are added). Ship- and submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles provided another critical contribution to the war effort. Combined, the Navy and Marine Corps delivered more than half of all precision-guided weapons targeting al Qaeda and Taliban forces. Advanced weapons, such as a thermobaric warhead rushed to the campaign from its inventors at the Naval Surface Warfare Center's Indian Head laboratory, proved to be vital for flushing out al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghan mountain caves.
The Navy thus was a key factor in the rout of the Taliban, and in supporting joint efforts to ferret out Osama bin Laden and monitor and interdict maritime traffic should he and his terrorist thugs attempt to evade capture by sea. General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that the order for the Navy to stop and search any commercial vessel off the coast of Pakistan suspected of carrying bin Laden or other al Qaeda or Taliban leaders was a "precautionary measure." But it was one that only the Navy could carry out.
An Enduring Value
Punctuated by crisis, conflict, and tragedy, the Navy's operations during 2001—particularly its responses to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and the longer-term missions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom—underscored its core competencies and enduring value to the United States, providing flexibility and adaptability, guaranteed access, immediate time-critical precision strikes, and sustained presence, flexible positioning, and surge response.
These key characteristics will be especially important over the long haul as the war against global terrorism will be neither easy nor of short duration. As 2001 drew to a close, U.S. forces were headed for Yemen, Somalia, and the Philippines, with U.S. promises to work with other countries or go it alone in attacking terrorists wherever they might lurk. In the event, the Navy will be a key element in the war on terrorism. But it will have to do much more with much less, as today's spending plans and programs will not support the 305-ship Navy of the Quadrennial Defense Review, but a 250-ship "post-post-Cold War" Navy of 2020. The implications of this future for the United States are grim indeed.