The homeland security mission brings new responsibilities and a higher profile to the Coast Guard—which was a great comfort to New Yorkers in the days after the September attacks. But the service must be careful not to run into funding shoal waters when it comes to its long-term Deepwater project.
The horrific events of 11 September 2001 merely added an exclamation point to the current geopolitical trend. The fall of the Soviet Union essentially removed the most significant, purely military threat. International organizations have emerged, multiplied, or evolved, significantly increasing their political influence. National boundaries have blended as a result of economic and political interdependence, and nongovernmental organizations flourish in their newfound influence in international politics.
Threats to our national security likely will be distinctly nonmilitary, either asymmetric or indirect long-term threats. Typically carried out by nonstate actors, these potential threats are terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, illegal migration, international crime, illegal narcotics, and transnational health and environmental concerns. As a result of this environment and its horrible manifestation on 11 September, homeland security now will have increased emphasis. This focus likely is to embroil the U.S. Coast Guard in what some might call a political "perfect storm" as it struggles to meet short-term mission requirements and maintain focus on its long-term goals.
By law, the service is one of the five armed services, and like its Department of Defense counterparts, is sworn to defend the Constitution of the United States. The Coast Guard has the unique distinction of being part of the Department of Transportation. With the recent creation of a Homeland Security cabinet-level position, future security strategy and subsequent military force structure inevitably will embrace a much more significant homeland security mission. Many of the other services already have begun publicly positioning themselves to inherit these mission requirements and the resultant resource allocations. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was quite specific in stating "that U.S. forces, including the United States Coast Guard, require more effective means, methods, and organizations to perform these missions." Unfortunately, the Coast Guard has exhibited more talent in mission performance than in political maneuvering.
That said, the service can leverage its unique experience and proven success to become a formidable player in homeland security. To realize this potential, the Coast Guard has some considerable challenges to overcome as it struggles to develop a credible plan to secure its position in the future force structure.
Liberal vs. Realist Theory
To gain a basic understanding of the emerging geopolitical environment, one must first examine the basics of the two most popular international political theories. Realists believe that security begets prosperity. They typically limit their national security environment to military conflict, believing that maintaining a sizable and capable military force will deter or defeat any potential adversary. The theory is grounded in the Westphalian system of states, assuming adversaries will be nation-states whose leaders represent state interests. Hence, all conflicts can be either resolved through diplomacy or coerced through the use of military force.
This concept worked well during the Cold War, but even after the fall of the Soviet Union, it retains a great deal of credibility. History has shown that world dominance is short-lived and that eventually a peer competitor will emerge. Unfortunately, the "state-to-state" resolution of conflict has, at least recently, been of limited utility. While the importance of maintaining a huge expeditionary military force has been validated countless times, one could argue that the liberal model has gained considerable ground in framing our national security strategy.
Liberals believe that global economic cooperation and interdependency will lessen the likelihood of traditional military conflict. Threats will rise as a result of socioeconomic or ideological issues, and nonstate actors will play a larger role both in the initiation of conflict and its subsequent resolution, challenging conventional diplomatic strategies. The rise of nonstate actors also has made military response a dirty proposition. Liberals contend that these threats will be increasingly nonmilitary, and many of them will cross our nation's borders. They insist that we must move away from traditional military response, and many cite homeland security as an increased priority in our national security strategy.
It would seem prudent to entertain both extremes, as both contain substantial arguments. A sensible approach would be to superimpose both theories over a credible scenario to create a balanced force structure. An effective expeditionary military force remains a necessity, but the events of 11 September have driven home the need for increased homeland security. It is logical to assume that services and agencies involved in prosecuting homeland security missions should inherit more responsibility and resources as this new force is conceived and built. This force could be augmented by traditional military forces in the short term, but long-term Department of Defense participation should be limited, lest we degrade our readiness to respond to future national defense threats.
The Coast Guard has significant experience with many of the threats described above. In an address to the Naval War College in 1998, Admiral James M. Loy, Commandant of the Coast Guard, discussed the emerging threats defined by the Office of Naval Intelligence and reiterated in the President's National Security Strategy for a New Century. He stated, "All of the threats are present today, not hypothetical. All of them are growing . . . these threats are conveyed towards our shores in ways that are not effectively countered by traditional naval forces. We can't launch cruise missiles or air strikes against them; they draw near in civilian vessels that look like and mingle with legitimate commercial and recreational traffic . . . . They are best combated by the combination of military discipline and law enforcement authority that comes together only in the Coast Guard."
In Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Securing the National Homeland, the U.S. Commission on National Security described the Coast Guard as "a highly disciplined force with multiple missions and a natural role to play in homeland security. Indeed, in many respects, the Coast Guard is a model homeland security agency given its unique blend of law enforcement, regulatory and military authorities that allow it to operate within, across and beyond U.S. borders."1
Civil vs. Military
The creation of a homeland security force could be perceived as a risky proposition. Early arguments labeled this initiative as "homeland defense"; however, the term has evolved into "homeland security," in part because of sensitivity to a domestic military police function, as well as in deference to the civilian agencies identified as likely participants.
The tension of civilian rule over the military is not a new phenomenon. Soon after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Samuel Adams clearly stated the problem: "Soldiers are apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of the Citizens . . . Such a Power should be watched with a jealous Eye."2 The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits federal troops from conducting arrests, searches, and seizures of U.S. citizens. Enacted to protect the southern Civil War population from their occupying Northern troops, the act is dated, but its statutory and political effect still is quite prominent in today's government. For example, U.S. Navy ships deployed in support of counternarcotics missions typically carry a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment to perform vessel boardings. This statute has survived because the majority of Americans are uncomfortable with a military that is involved in domestic issues.
Many also have argued that military operations other than war detract from the military's primary mission of war fighting. In his 1990 essay "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Colonel Charles Dunlap describes a fictitious U.S. military that has for many years been overtasked with missions such as peacekeeping and counternarcotics. These distractions, coupled with the constant drain on resources and subsequent reduction in readiness, cause U.S. forces to be decimated in their next armed conflict. As the title would indicate, the defeat and resultant chaos culminate in a U.S. military coup.3
The Coast Guard's position in the Department of Transportation and the public's inclination not to see it as an armed force have made this service virtually impervious to the civil-military debate described above. In fact, the nature of the service's small boat mission and its local search-and-rescue efforts have interwoven the Coast Guard into the fabric of the local community. A recent example of this wide public acceptance is the deployment of Coast Guard port security units to patrol the harbors of Washington, D.C., New York, and Boston. By all media accounts, the public is comforted by their presence, despite the camouflage uniforms and large-caliber weapons.
In addition, the Coast Guard has developed relationships with a number of civilian agencies likely targeted for participation in the homeland security effort. Years of counternarcotics, law enforcement operations, and search-and-rescue missions have forged close, multilayered relationships with federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations as well as interagency ties with the Border Patrol and Customs Service. The service's marine safety community works closely with the civilian maritime community, and its environmental protection efforts and licensing function have necessitated cooperation with the U.N.-sponsored International Maritime Organization, not to mention ties with the Federal Emergency Management Agency with regard to coastal disaster response.
The QDR and accompanying Chairman's Assessment are indicative of the debate that will arise over this issue. The QDR clearly states that "the Department of Defense does not and cannot have sole responsibility for homeland security." In the then-Chairman's response, however, General Hugh Shelton was less guarded, stating, "As a start, an integrated DoD Homeland Security working group can identify [homeland security] roles and missions for DoD and examine resource implications." Already, many legislators and defense officials have mentioned a congressional review of the Posse Comitatus Act.
Coast Guard and Navy Synergy
With tongue in cheek, the Coast Guard has been known to refer to itself as "the hard nucleus around which the Navy forms in time of war." In truth, the service takes great pride in its execution of the military readiness mission. For many years, Coast Guard personnel, cutters, patrol boats, and port security units have served either under or alongside the Navy. They have deployed in support of military efforts abroad, including actions in World War I, World War II, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and more recently, deployments to the Arabian Gulf and port security response to the attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67).
This synergy has paid big dividends. In past years, as a result of scarce resources and mandated reduction in the number of hulls, the Navy saw great value in ensuring Coast Guard cutters were capable of performing national defense missions. As a result, Coast Guard cutters have been equipped with Navy supported weapon systems such as 76-mm guns and Mk 92 fire-control systems. Probe refueling equipment, missile defense systems, and electronic warfare/countermeasures also have been installed. Cutters preparing to deploy are retrofitted with state-of-the-art communications equipment and increased information-handling capabilities. In addition, Coast Guard cutters have been subjected to the same afloat training regimen conducted on Navy vessels, in many cases with the same Navy trainers. U.S. Navy-sponsored equipage additions, technical and financial support, training, and combined mission execution all make for an enhanced platform/crew capability, which translates to enhanced readiness for all Coast Guard missions.
Some argue that our preeminent naval power and the great expanse of ocean separating us from our threats have caused the coastal defense mission to atrophy. Others argue that in an environment of scarce resources and ever-increasing missions, the Navy and Coast Guard have concentrated on other, more pertinent issues, yet laid the foundation for a combined response to homeland security. Both are correct, but no one could have predicted the enormity of the recent terrorist attacks and the subsequent requirement for immediate efforts to shore up our coastal defense efforts. The lines of communication are open, however, and the infrastructure is in place to craft a response.
In 1998, Admiral Loy and then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson signed a policy statement that established the concept of the National Fleet, in which both services maintain their cultures and capabilities but ensure that they remain interoperable and complementary. This policy allocated responsibilities to each service, with the Navy retaining the full range of naval operations and the Coast Guard providing smaller maritime security cutters for peacetime and crisis response and to meet the requirement for general purpose, shallow-draft warships for low-intensity conflict, particularly in the littorals. This policy statement served to frame the Coast Guard's most ambitious acquisition program, the Integrated Deepwater Project. This significant multibillion dollar project is an integrated ship/aircraft/communications acquisition and is nearing completion of the design phase. As advertised, it will represent a quantifiable advance in the service's ability to support joint operations, perform traditional missions, and conduct national security operations, including future homeland security missions.
In a speech at the Surface Navy Association in January 2001, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark stated that the Coast Guard should work with the Navy through the National Fleet policy to help address the "numbers problem." He concluded, "I stand four square behind the arrangements and the agreements in place and the Navy's commitment to the Coast Guard. . . . We need to build as much combat capability into the Coast Guard as possible." Unfortunately, the reality is that after more than two years, the Navy has not given its full attention to the National Fleet concept. The goals and objectives have not been translated into Navy planning documents.4 Continued Navy support of the Deepwater Project is critical, both from a mission validation as well as a platform capabilities perspective.
In enhancing its relationship with the Navy, the Coast Guard must ensure its inherent "can do" culture does not cloud the case for Deepwater. While the Coast Guard works 24/7 to fill the homeland security gap, the other services and agencies are planning to stake their claims on what promises to be a highly resourced mission. When the Secretary of Defense cites homeland security as his top priority, every action officer in the Pentagon lays awake at night trying to "transform" his particular program into a necessary "homeland security asset." The Coast Guard should be fully engaged with the Navy to ensure it is steaming in the company of a capable ally, maintaining clear communications and a watchful eye while keeping station. Full realization of its Deepwater project may depend on it.
The Question of Resources
The Coast Guard has a long history of doing more with less. A few years ago, the service performed its many and varied missions with this as its mantra, taking great pride in its organizational success at a very reasonable price. Unfortunately, this soon became a congressional expectation, and only recently have the organization's leaders begun to identify shortages in readiness as a result of this gross underfunding. In 1998, Admiral Loy said the service's equipment is overworked and its staff—35,000 active duty military, 5,700 civilians, and 7,000 reserves, about the same as in 1967—is straining to keep up. The average age of the Coast Guard fleet is now 27 years—older than 38 of the world's 42 naval fleets. One would have a hard time identifying another federal agency that gets more from the taxpayer's dollar.
The service's wide variety of missions has attenuated this problem. The Coast Guard has seen "mission creep" of astounding proportions. In 1976, the amount of territory the Coast Guard was required to patrol and protect from foreign fishing fleets was extended from 12 miles to 200 miles offshore, increasing the operating area 3.3 million square miles.5 The war on drugs now represents a significant portion of operations. Add Cuban and Haitian mass migrations, and a more recent influx of Central American and Chinese migrants, high-seas drift net patrols, supporting the unified commander-in-chiefs, nation-building deployments, and port security, and one can understand why the 1967 vintage Coast Guard personnel strength is somewhat overtaxed. To compound the problem, the service enthusiastically responded to downsizing and streamlining initiatives throughout the 1990s, degrading its own infrastructure and resource base.
As if this were not enough, the service's multimission role increases its resource challenges in other ways. Some of its missions are under the auspices of Transportation, such as maintaining aids to navigation, inspecting commercial vessels, domestic maritime licensing, and operating vessel traffic services in the nation's busiest harbors. Other missions fall under law enforcement and the Department of Justice, such as counternarcotics efforts and illegal migrant interdiction. Still others reflect the interests of the Department of State, including nation building and international maritime negotiation and treaty/sanction enforcement, and still others fall squarely within the Department of Defense. Considering the stovepiped nature of the federal budget process, the Coast Guard always has had considerable difficulty negotiating the bureaucratic maze to fund all these missions adequately, yet doggedly defended each and every one. This dispersal across departmental/agency lines, particularly the hard line between military and civilian funding sources, has left the service without an adequate budget, an advocate, or a clear constituency.
Finally, the service's lack of advocacy from the executive branch is exceeded only by a historical lack of representation from the legislative branch. The basis of congressional support for the Coast Guard is not hard to trace. Representatives of land-locked states have little interest, and the Coast Guard's modest acquisition budget, pre-Deepwater, made it unlikely to attract even those states with significant defense contracting potential. Frankly, most Coast Guard support traditionally comes from representatives of states either with a relatively significant Coast Guard presence, or with a significant interest in local fisheries or some geopolitical or commerce consideration.
This situation seems to be changing, as the "Congressional Coast Guard Caucus," introduced by Congressman Bill Delahunt (D-MA), now is composed of representatives of several New England, Mid-Atlantic, and Pacific Northwest states, as well as Alaska and Florida. It now has more than 50 members. The challenge will be to maintain and increase this base. The media have identified and embraced the service as a logical player in the homeland security effort, and the service's public affairs officers need to sustain the message and the service's visibility. However, Congressman Delahunt's chief of staff, Steve Schwadron, summarized the service's most recent dilemma, stating, "Unless Congress and the administration step up and define the mission and then pay for it, then the Coast Guard will not be able to fulfill its many duties."6
Without sufficient political and monetary resources, the Coast Guard is in danger of being the short-term hero, ultimately suffering significant damage to its long-term mission and resource base. The Coast Guard leaders will need to be very innovative to meet immediate mission requirements, very bold as they state their capabilities and resource needs, and very cautious as they navigate the homeland security shoal waters.
Commander Kelley, a 1982 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy, is a student at the Naval War College. He has had several afloat tours, most recently as the executive officer in the USCGC Hamilton (WHEC-715).
1. United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Securing the National Homeland, 15 February 2001, pp. 16-17. back to article
2. Kenneth E. Harbaugh, "Bridging the Civil-Military Divide," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2001, pp. 34-37. back to article
3. Col. Charles J. Dunlap, USA, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters, Winter 1992-93, pp. 2-20. Brigadier General Dunlap's eerily predictive letter remains available for view at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/1992/dunlap.htm. back to article
4. Captain Bruce Stubbs, USCG, "Whither the National Fleet?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2001, p. 72. back to article
5. Anne Laurent, "The Curse of Can-Do," Government Executive Magazine, 1 March 1999, p. 20. back to article
6. John Leaning, "Coast Guard Pinch Worsens," Cape Cod Times, 5 October 2001. back to article