"The Navy needs bold officers who are willing to think creatively and take well-calculated risks. Seek to promote officers who have shown initiative in finding and pursuing the most effective ways of accomplishing our mission." -Precept to the 2002 Commander Selection Board
With the release of yearly command der selection board results, ready rooms and wardrooms across the fleet are filled with mild disbelief over some of the officers selected—and surprise over others who were not. Despite the Navy's goal of selecting the most qualified officers for advancement, that aim is not always achieved. Although clearly superior officers rarely are overlooked, officers who took roads less traveled in their career paths but who have otherwise superior records sometimes are passed over. The reluctance of selection boards to reward these officers does a disservice to the Navy, especially when less-capable officers are chosen because they followed classic career paths.
Any discrepancy in a service record seems to be viewed as an excuse for non-selection. Every junior officer knows that the most qualified are not guaranteed advancement, and they know the reasons why. Our promotion system is based on fitness reports that rely as much on whom you know as on what you know.
No subordinate officer would deny that "face time" with his superiors is an important factor in his or her performance evaluation. Although the recently overhauled evaluation instructions tried to remove and discourage subjective practices, such practices continue. Rotation dates still are manipulated for the benefit of individual officers, and fitness reports still contain cryptic messages to be deciphered by promotion boards. The fact that evaluations instructions had to be overhauled because of this (and not for the first time) is evidence that these practices occur.
In addition, no officer would deny there is an ideal career path, and that selection boards historically are unforgiving of those with any "irregularities." Despite the stated desire to advance officers with varied backgrounds, the selection results consistently bode ill for those contemplating straying from the straight path. An officer who transfers from one warfare specialty to another is taking a tremendous risk with his future promotion chances, despite the fact that anyone selected for transfer first must have a superior record. Attending postgraduate school early in a career is another high-risk deviation. The reason these and other career decisions usually result in reduced promotion rates is that they incur additional non-observed, noncompetitive fitness reports.
The perfect example of officers who followed nontraditional career paths to their detriment are the special mission department heads. Nearly every one of these officers was separated into this subcategory because of either imperfect career timing or choosing a path that resulted in "excessive" non-observed fitness reports. Whether because of some type of transition, postgraduate school, or other errors in career timing, the result has been officers with no opportunity to promote beyond lieutenant commander. Regardless of superb performance in department head billets, special mission department heads simply do not make commander.
The most discouraging aspect of the failure to promote officers with nontraditional careers is that the promotion system has no impetus to correct itself. The officers promoted in turn sit on promotion boards themselves, and they continue to select others who have chosen career paths similar to their own. Thus, junior officers who recognize this dynamic as the best way to ensure promotion perpetuate the cycle, and deny to the Navy those officers willing to meet nontraditional challenges. By not selecting officers willing to take chances, the Navy unwittingly is burdening itself with leaders who may be unable to meet future challenges in creative ways, and is condemning itself to a leadership anchored in the past.