First Honorable Mention, Arleigh Burke Essay Contest
To paraphrase Karl Marx, there is a specter haunting U.S. defense policy. It is the specter of a growing gap between civilian authority and the military.
This perceived gap has been the subject of newspaper and journal articles, broadcast reports, surveys, scholarly research, and popular novels. In fact, an intellectual industry seems to have sprung up to analyze the depth and danger of this gap. It is the subject of a book review by a former Secretary of the Navy and impassioned pleas for professionalism by otherwise astute strategists. Senior Pentagon correspondents, such as Tom Ricks of The Washington Post and Jim Kitfield of National Journal, speak at conferences about such dangers to the republic as political endorsements made by retired officers and expressions of religiosity by uniformed service members. Military attitudes toward fraternization, adultery, and homosexual behavior are portrayed not simply as prudish but as out of touch with the norms of society. The image is of an increasingly reactionary military institution teetering on the edge of insubordination. For those who love the Constitution, this is truly a chilling image.
And like other specters, it is an image without substance.
Continuing Natural Distinctions
There is a cultural gap between many civilian and military attitudes and behaviors. But it is natural distinction, and from a long-term historical view, actually is diminishing. The "gap" represents the simple fact that military life is vastly different from civilian life. Obvious ways include the potential (and reality) of combat, the willing subjugation of the individual to the group, the intensity of operations, and, of course, long separations from family and home. Subtle differences include the fact that every service member is essentially a public figure, a representative of the United States (both at home and abroad) whose every action is subject to scrutiny. The "gap" also reflects the divergence in personal attitudes between individuals who might be attracted to volunteer military service and those who are not. Such is the reality of an all-volunteer force.
Critics charge that this natural gap is unbridgeable and that it has created a sense of disdain among military members—particularly officers—toward civil society. At the extreme is the view that the military now perceives itself as "leading" civil culture rather than reflecting it. Tom Ricks, who otherwise has demonstrated considerable understanding of military culture, alleges that "there has been a disturbing decline in American military professionalism." This decline is seen through three leading indicators: that military personnel (particularly officers) have become more conservative, that they are more expressively religious, and that they are more vocal about their political preferences.
Whether or not these indicators are statistically accurate—poll and survey data remain unconvincing—they seem anecdotally so. But do they reflect a change in military professionalism? Or are they actually the basis for military professionalism? To answer this question, and to determine the extent to which the natural distinctions between the military and civilian experience threaten civil society, requires a closer look at these indicators.
- Military members are more conservative than civilians. This would seem to be true, reflecting the fact that individuals who voluntarily accept the discipline of a hierarchical military organization can be perceived as more conservative than those who would find such discipline confining or abhorrent. Individuals who are comfortable in a military setting might not be in an artists' colony—and vice versa. But does that reflect a difference in social values, or simply a difference in personal priorities? Is it different from the gap in attitudes between "average" persons living in rural areas and those living in urban areas? Most critics accept the fact of this natural distinction but worry about its consequences. But the result can hardly be as bad as what happened to the United States in the Vietnam period-when the military was statistically less conservative than today.
- Military members have become more religious, or expressive of spiritual views, than civilians. It is hard to determine if this is true. But if so, the likely explanation is that more than most civilians, service members deal with issues of death and human suffering on a routine basis. Religion represents, in part, an attempt to make sense and provide comfort. Most civilians will never experience the slaughter of vast numbers of human beings except through television; it is another thing completely when you are involved directly. It is true—there are no atheists in foxholes. They may not be members of religious denominations, but they do a lot of praying. And they often are not afraid to admit it in times of peace. Spirituality is what keeps souls alive in the face of trauma.
- Military members have become more expressive of their political views. Military members appear to be more publicly expressive of political opinions only because all Americans now seem more so. Individuals who would have been ignored by print reporters 40 years ago today are being chased by people holding microphones who need to fill 24-hour coverage cycles. None of this necessarily indicates a change in attitudes toward governmental authority over the military—only a change in how far attitudes are broadcast.
Divergent or Just Different?
In building their case, critics cite four specific examples of the military's divergence from social norms and composition. But examination indicates that each of these issues has been portrayed inaccurately or misunderstood. Adultery and the Kelly Flynn Case. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) contains laws against adultery; most Americans think adultery is wrong—not a conflict in attitudes. But adultery is not illegal under civilian law, in part because it is not viewed as life threatening. During the court-martial of Lieutenant Kelly Flynn in 1997, critics denounced the military's "criminalization of sexual relations"—with absolutely no recognition of what the case was truly about. Realization of the significance of the insubordination and false statements involved in the case was belated. But more important, the issue of power and authority that is the defining element of adulterous relations in a military situation was rarely acknowledged.
The following discussion I had with a journalist at the time illustrates why the UCMJ prohibition against adultery is maintained:
Suppose your boss was having an affair with your spouse and had the power to say: "if you protest you will lose your job"—that's bad enough. But what if your boss could say: "if you protest, I have the power to ensure you will never again work in journalism, the career you've dedicated your life to." Worse. But imagine if your boss could say: "if you protest, I have the power to order you into a dangerous assignment in which you will likely die." The latter is the reason the military prohibits adulterous relations—because situations like that can and have happened.
- The Ivy League Issue. Concern is that the "intellectual elite"—identified as those who attend prestigious universities—are not choosing to serve as military officers. This might be true, but it is not new. Historically, graduates of Ivy League and other elite colleges provided a considerable slice of the officer corps only during wartime.
There is continuous trickle of ROTC/NROTC graduates from such schools today that is on a par with the numbers that have ever chosen to serve in the peacetime military. It is hard to see how it can be otherwise; very marketable individuals who attend institutions in which a considerable number of the faculty are indifferent or even hostile to military service are not going to see military service as their top career option.
The perception of being elite also is associated with wealth. It may be that the richest families are not sending their sons and daughters into the military—but in comparison to the pre-modern European military in which only aristocrats could become officers, this hardly seems to be creating a gap between the military and most of society.
- Political Endorsements by Retired Military. There is a historical difference here. Today, retired military leaders endorse presidential candidates. In the past, they were presidential candidates. Of 43 U.S. presidents, 22 served as military officers, many attaining general officer rank (and fame) in wartime. Six could be considered professional military officers. Somehow the republic survived this militarization of the presidency. The perception that U.S. military leaders are not committed to constitutional democracy is possibly the greatest canard in history.
That retired military officers appeared to be partisan in the last presidential election reflects both the divisive nature of the election and the ubiquity of the media. There is no actual evidence of greater partisanship, just greater interest in their views by the story-hungry 24-hour media. Endorsed or not, the current administration appears to have appointed fewer retired general or flag officers to civilian positions—such as ambassadorships—than its predecessor. It also appears to contemplate more radical changes to the U.S. defense structure than its predecessor.
The perception that public endorsements by retired military leaders will sway the votes of the military rank and file also is without evidence. Such public endorsements are considered professionally inappropriate, and are likely to offend, rather than sway, military voters.
Ironically, it was largely the military vote that saved our republic in the 1864 election between incumbent Abraham Lincoln and recently retired Union General George McClellan. McClellan, who once remarked that it would take a dictator to end the Civil War, got the vote of Southern sympathizers and others who wanted the war to end at any cost. But he did not get the vote of his own Army of the Potomac; the soldiers wanted a preserved Union and an end to slavery—even at the cost of their lives.
- Conflict with Civilian Authority. Another overblown concern is the public struggles between senior military and civilian Department of Defense officials. These are debates over policy; they are not conflicts with authority.
By law, the civilian authorities with operational control over the military forces of the United States are the President and the Secretary of State. The service Secretaries also are civilian authorities for matters under Title 10. All other appointed civilians in the Department of Defense—Under Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, etc.—are simply staff advisors. They hold no operational or direct administrative authority over military forces except when delegated responsibilities by the Secretary of Defense.
This distinction is not a bureaucratic nuance, since much of the reporting of a civil-military gap concerns clashes over prospective policies between the civilian-led staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military staffs. These clashes, a normal part of political policy-making—and defense policymaking—in a democracy represent disagreement between differing personal perspectives and priorities. They do not, of themselves, represent any challenge to civilian authority—at least not any more than disagreements between staff members of the Health and Human Services Department and the Commerce Department represent some sort of revolt of humanists against business people.
The senior staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense is made up of ambitious, competitive, forceful, confident, and well-meaning individuals. The officer corps of the U.S. military attracts ambitious, competitive, forceful, confident, and well-meaning individuals. Clashes over policymaking are natural; they reflect the competition of ideas within a democracy. But once the President or the Secretary of Defense issues a clear, definitive policy, the clashes subside. Recent controversies, such as over the drafting of "don't ask, don't tell," do not reflect a military leadership unwilling to carry out presidential policy but an unclear policy never affirmed by civilian leadership, and a military leadership willing to give its professional advice.
The perception of a civil-military gap is premised on the existence of a common social viewpoint that the military does not possess. But the existence of a common social viewpoint on the issues identified above is an illusion. As Samuel Huntington stated in his classic study of military professionalism, The Soldier and the State:
No dichotomy exists between the "military mind" and the "civilian mind" because there is no single "civilian mind." There are many "civilian minds," and the difference between any two civilian ethics may be greater than the difference between any one of them and the military ethic. Consequently, the military ethic can only be compared with particular civilian ethics.
The Real Gap: A Clash of Particular Ethics
If there is a growing gap throughout American society made evident in public discussion of military issues, it is the result of a clash of professional ethics-not societal values. For convenience, I refer to this clash as being between military, legal, and journalistic ethics. What follows is a commonsense—which means vastly oversimplified—approach to describing these ethical systems.
The differences among ethics are illustrated by the issue of an individual's professional responsibility. Under legal ethics, the individual advocate is not responsible for the delivery of a just solution—that is the responsibility of the system. This permits—in fact, requires—a lawyer to encourage a client to plead innocent and to argue a passionate defense even when he or she knows (or believes) a client to be guilty. And it allows a lawyer as part of that defense to cast aspersions on others, introduce confusing or inventive theories, and even make charges of injustice in the press. It is the system of adversarial procedure—presided by the judge—that is to determine the truth, not the individual (lawyer) who is charged with "operating" the system. Outside of a military courtroom, this is vastly different from the individual responsibility required of military leaders.
Under the military ethic, the individual leader is charged with looking out for the welfare of his or her troops. Though the military system has safeguards to prevent generalized unjust treatment, the primary burden for ensuring justice lies with the individual commander (leader). That is why we speak of military leadership as a "sacred trust"; that is why strict rules of evidence do not apply to non-judicial punishment. It is the individual who is expected to deliver justice, not the system.
This burden on occasion has been dropped by certain individuals, but there is no room within the military ethic for relying on adversarial procedure to determine "the truth." Truth and its determination are an individual's responsibility within the day-to-day context of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It is the responsibility of military personnel to speak the truth under all circumstances, because it is assumed that lives might hang in the balance. Thus, it is the individual's responsibility to seek out the truth and stake a position based solely on it.
Journalists, too, attempt to seek the truth, but their ethic differs in that they are expected to report what they encounter in a manner that does not prejudge the veracity of any report. Thus, claims by the Taliban are treated as if they are of equal validity with those of the U.S. government. It is presumed that there are two sides to every story and that the truth falls somewhere in between—the truth being an entity "outside" of the individual. In theory, the journalist maintains the neutrality of an observer and does not bear personal responsibility for the outcome of the event or the interpretation of the audience. But viewing themselves as part of a "third estate," journalists maintain a skepticism toward the authority the military serves.
All three of these ethics intersect in the public discourse concerning defense policy, which is shaped by the adversarial nature of political campaigns, the expectations of personal integrity, and the skepticism of inquiry. The result is an inevitable conflict between the requirements and output of professional ethics, not a military ethic at odds with society.
If there really were a dangerous gap between military and civil attitudes, how could we close it? One proposal—frequently espoused by former Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig—is to recruit more minority personnel and women into the officer corps. Laudable on its own merits, this proposal assumes that the values and attitudes of all women and ethnic groups are uniform and held by each individual—something like the perception of "class" attitudes in Marxist theory. But we know this is not true. Increased efforts at such recruitment most likely would mean simply that more "conservative" women and minorities would enter the volunteer force—because they would be the types of individuals most attracted."
The only way to provide such closure is to "draft the artists" through some form of peacetime conscription or universal service. This goes against current wisdom, and even the critics of the gap thus far have avoided such a suggestion. But it is the solution to almost every concern listed above. If every American served in the military for a while, there obviously would be no gap. Universal service has its proponents, but thus far it does not seem to include those who view the "gap" as a danger."
Until Americans are willing to adopt universal service, it is time to "quit worrying and learn to love" the natural distinctions between military and civilian. It is these distinctions—reflected in professional ethics—that are the basis for military professionalism in the modern era.