"Interview: Joe Galloway"
(See F. Schultz, pp. 50-52, February 2002 Proceedings)
Captain Keith F. Kopets, U.S. Marine Corps—I enjoyed your interview with Mr. Joe Galloway. Shortly after the publication of his book We Were Soldiers Once . . .And Young (New York: Random House, 1992), the Marine Corps began requiring—and still requires—its lieutenants to read the book. I've since read it twice and couldn't agree more with Mr. Schultz: the book's recurring theme is "one of love—love of comrades, love of service, love of country."
Your interview touched on the book and its recent film adaptation, as well as Mr. Galloway's thoughts on heroes, sacrifice, and the 11 September terrorist attacks. Not mentioned, though, was Army Colonel Cyril R. (Rick) Rescorla, a platoon leader at Ia Drang whose photo appears on the cover of the book.
He died, not in Vietnam, but in New York City, on 11 September, as head of security for the investor group Morgan Stanley. A woman who worked on the 100th floor of 2 World Trade Center (the south tower) remembered running past him on the 44th floor. It was just after United Flight 175 slammed into the building between the 87th and 93rd floors. He was standing in the stair-well with a megaphone, she said, "yelling for everyone to 'be American, be patriotic."'
Six of Morgan Stanley's 3,700 employees failed to make it out before the building collapsed; the 3,694 who survived did so, in part, because of Colonel Rescorla's sacrifice, dedication, and devotion to duty. Now that's a hero.
"John F. Kennedy: Where Were the Chiefs?"
(See R. Jackson, p. 73, April 2002 Proceedings)
Senior Chief Journalist (Surface Warfare) Fred J. Klinkenberger Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—This diatribe bordered on a personal attack against each of the USS John F. Kennedy's (CV-67) chief petty officers (CPOs). Throughout December and January, the public had been inundated with tales of the carrier's travails since it was reported the ship's captain was relieved because of the John F Kennedy's deteriorated material readiness. It could not have been easy to relieve the ship's captain, effectively ending his career. It also must have been dispiriting for the ship's sailors to walk through their Mayport exchange where, for weeks, bold headlines in Navy Times and other publications virtually shouted their ship was in such bad shape she could not deploy on time to relieve USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71).
Senior Chief Jackson's scorched earth response to the situation assumes—without proof—that the ship's chiefs were either afraid to exert their influence or collectively just didn't care about their ship. According to him, the ship's chiefs should bear the lion's share of responsibility for the ship's state. In fact, his recommendation to cashier the command master chief and all senior department chiefs ("just for openers," he writes) is nothing short of a pogrom. What does he suggest be done with the executive officer, the ship's maintenance and material management coordinator, and the repair officer—should they be keelhauled, or perhaps swung from the yardarm?
Throughout his commentary, the senior chief refers to the CPO creed, yet the one word strangely absent is "loyalty." Indeed, it is any afloat or ashore chief's responsibility to speak up when he sees something amiss, be it material or administrative. How does Senior Chief Jackson know the John F Kennedy chiefs didn't do this? How does he know there was not a concerted "Goat Locker" effort to make the chain of command aware of the carrier's poor material condition? If they were rebuffed with their warnings, should the chiefs have ignored established grievance procedures and circumvented the chain of command? Senior Chief Jackson also seemingly assumes every khaki except the relieved captain walked away scot-free, without any adverse comments in fitness reports or performance evaluations. Does he know that to be fact?
Also prominent throughout the commentary were references to the author's past duty stations and experiences, where all references were to "I.": "I" did this or "I" would. Where was the "we?" Did Senior Chief Jackson never accept counsel from those above or below him during his career? Perhaps he served in a variety of independent duty tours whereby teamwork was not as critical as it is on board ship. I think not, especially if he spent time with Fleet Training Group Atlantic (which, incidentally, makes his harsh piece all the more difficult to accept). I served on board five ships-three aircraft carriers, a guided-missile cruiser, and an amphibious flagship-during a 23-year career; I was a chief aboard two of those ships. Yes, there was occasional frustration when—despite collective CPOs' recommendations—some suggestions were not accepted up the chain of command. We pressed on, nonetheless; it's called teamwork, and if material resources were the issue it was documented, and we made due with what was available.
One could spend years assessing the blame for what happened on board the John F Kennedy. It's no secret that responsibility began at the Navy's highest levels because it involved insufficient overhaul and upkeep funding, a decision to shorten a major overhaul because of the closing of a shipyard, and more. Yet, before punishment is meted, calm heads must prevail and ask if these were all acts of criminal malfeasance or duplicity. Could it have been that—in the Navy's current tough fiscal times—officials might have meant well but were not using common sense when making shortsighted decisions because of political and other pressures? If so, do we learn from those mistakes, or do we go on a witch hunt and let the consequences be damned?
Despite the media hype and the predictions of bathtub admirals, the John F. Kennedy sailors did turn to when the order was given last December. The ship ultimately showed up on station to relieve the Theodore Roosevelt, which—despite all the hand-wringing and professed anguish—returned to her home port only a week later than scheduled. To think the John F Kennedy chiefs played no part in that success would be denying them justified credit.
Maybe this credit is the last thing we can give to the chiefs before Senior Chief Jackson takes custody of all the members of the CPO Mess and stands them before a firing squad.
"Jack of All Trades, Master of None"
(See D. Harris, pp. 90-93 March 2002 J. Schaaf, pp. 26-28, April 2002 Proceedings)
"'We Were Great': Navy Air in Afganistan"
(See J. Nathman, pp. 94-96, March 2002; J. Conn, p. 12, April 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David L. Woodbury, U.S. Navy, operations officer, VFA-82—Curiously, Lieutenant Commander Harris's article condemning the last ten years of U.S Navy strike-fighter evolution appeared next to Vice Admiral Nathman's parading the successes of carrier tactical aviation in Afghanistan. The latter seems more true to the situation.
Commander Harris's argument in favor of mission specialization with regard to F/A-18E/F development is unsound in its premise. He sites degradation in Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) levels since 1992 as a measure of a flawed training philosophy. In truth, SORTS reporting levels are dependent on many factors in addition to aircrew readiness. The low levels that now characterize the first year of the F/A-18C interdeployment training cycle are driven by equipment shortages, specifically the transfer of forward-looking infrared radar pods to squadrons closer to deployment. A condemnation of the acquisition process may be in order, but certainly not the multimission model.
Similarly incorrect is the author's assertion that prior to 1992 the F/A-18 was a specialized light-attack aircraft with an appropriately focused training agenda. In fact, the Hornet was designed and employed as a strike-fighter from day one. Its Desert Storm service included air-to-air, air-to-ground, antisurface, and suppression of enemy air defense missions. Hornet pilots dropped bombs, guided smart weapons, and killed MiGs. The multimission concept has been a community trait from the very beginning; the difference is that we are now much better at it.
Since the introduction of the Strike Fighter Weapons and Tactics program in 1995, the F/A-18 and F-14 communities have made giant strides with regard to mission effectiveness. The respective weapons schools have become a haven for our best and brightest, while the TopGun tradition embedded within the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Fallon, Nevada, has created the best environment in the world in which to train. The new training and readiness reporting guidelines arriving this fall should diminish the criticism that we lack a metric to quantify our improvement. We may not be as good as the F-15C at the air superiority mission yet, but we are a lot closer than we were in 1992.
The Air Force has unique flexibility with regard to training and specialization. The Air Force can deploy those units most suited for the mission at hand while leaving the rest at home. The A-10 Thunderbolt II, Desert Storm's close-air support superstar, made its first appearance five months into the war, and the highly specialized F-15C has yet to cross the border into Afghanistan. The relative rigidity of carrier air wing composition precludes the luxury of specialization. The carrier air wing cannot fight the war using only the 12 aircraft tailored specifically to the task at hand, while parking 30 or 40 more that excel in other mission areas. Nor can we fly all capable aircraft but accept lower standards from those who were not lucky enough to emphasize the relevant mission during training. To remain a viable combat option, the carrier must have a flight deck geared toward maximum participation. As the uncertainty of the new millennium offers highly varied combat potentialities, the only way to ensure relevance is with multimission-capable aircraft.
The F-14 is an outstanding precision strike aircraft. Its dual-seat configuration does lend itself nicely to certain missions. It is, however, a dubious leap of faith to argue that Tomcat crews somehow maintain an air-to-ground credibility gap over their Hornet brethren. Even more faulty is the marketing of this credibility gap as argument in favor of F/A-18F mission specificity. The F-14 has a superior targeting pod that gives it a significant advantage over the Hornet with regard to high-altitude, good-weather, laser-guided munitions employment. This advantage is tactically significant in specific scenarios, but certainly not validation of the author's multicrew assertions or coronation as "premier." Let's not forget that within Commander Harris's own airwing, F/A-18s dropped 77% of the total ordnance on Afghanistan, including 100% of the satellite-guided weapons.
It is time to embrace the immense success that both of the Navy's strike-fighter aircraft enjoyed in Afghanistan. Carrier-based naval aviation starred because of its ability to sustain an extraordinarily flexible and highly lethal tactical aviation presence. Instead of crippling that flexibility via mission specialization, let's equip, train, and employ our strike-fighters to be the most versatile and adaptable force in the world. Let the Air Force keep mission-specific bragging rights—I'd rather be in the fight.
Lieutenant Colonel Jay Stout, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Lieutenant Commander Harris made the point that Navy tactical aviation is second-rate when compared to its Air Force counterpart. He correctly pointed out that the Air Force outshines the Navy in the execution of both the air-to-air and the air-to-ground missions. There is no one who has been in the business for the past 20 years who can honestly disagree. In fact, I'll go Commander Harris one better because I've already retired: When compared to Air Force tactical aviation, the Navy and the Marine Corps are pure bush league. Because our leadership consistently has failed us for at least ten years, we're not as well trained, equipped, or supported as we need to be. Fortunately, our adversaries have been even more pitifully prepared. For that, we should be thankful-and perhaps even more thankful that the Air Force fights on our side.
That the author had the guts to make his point in public is laudable. But he followed up his discussion with a solution that is in some respects a cop-out. He made the argument that the F/A-18C and its redundant and questionably more capable follow-on, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, are too versatile for any one pilot to master. That being the case, he suggested that the different aircraft specialize in particular mission types with the aim of optimizing training, resources, and ultimately effectiveness. For instance, he suggested that the F/A-8E should be used primarily in the air-to-air mission, while the two-seat F/A-18F would make the best strike aircraft, and the F/A-18C might be relegated to the suppression of air defense and close-air support. He doesn't believe that training to the types' other capabilities should be entirely abandoned, but that those other capabilities should receive less emphasis.
This isn't a good solution. Our taxpayers paid-and are paying-premium prices for advanced, multimission fighter/attack aircraft. To field crews who aren't capable of employing them as they were designed would be an enormous waste-not to mention an enormous slap in the face for our aircrews. After all, the Boys in Blue seem to be able to handle the multimission capabilities of their F-16s and F-15Es very well. Though our Air Force brothers may specialize in executing various categories of air-to-ground missions, they also train vigorously to a high level of proficiency in air-to-air combat. You can safely bet your next paycheck that most F-16 units can fly circles around any Navy fighter squadron in the air-to-air arena.
Why is it that the Air Force is able to do this? Their pilots aren't any smarter than ours. They aren't better looking, and their uniforms are uglier than ours. The Air Force has been able to do this because its leaders have ensured that their warriors are funded adequately for the training and equipment they need. Unlike in the Navy, Air Force units don't regularly give their aircraft away every time they return from a deployment. The Air Force doesn't try to keep their pilots current by making them share a handful of flying wrecks during their first few post-deployment months. Their maintenance troops aren't typically exhausted from working 14-hour days, day after day after day. Further, those troops aren't reduced to horse trading or stealing aircraft parts from other units, or diddling records to give the impression that their readiness rates are high. Their pilots don't pull collateral duty as the maintenance officer, or the logistics officer, or the legal officer. In short, their leaders have done a better job of giving their people what they need to ensure that they field the most potent air force in the world.
The leaders in naval aviation haven't done the same. Obviously they need to. What is needed isn't a minor plus-up of parts here and an incremental increase in manpower there. What is needed are large—some would say huge—increases in buys of aircraft as well as the parts and other support needed to maintain them as they should be maintained. Further, increases in funds for training need to be brokered. Also, decommissioned units need to be brought back to life so that the Navy can project the power the nation wants, when it wants it, and still rest and train. Admittedly, getting the funding isn't going to be easy. But right now, the iron is hot. Air Force leaders have been able to do it. Why can't Navy leaders? With enough training and equipment our aircrews can be as potent and deadly as their Air Force counterparts.
Finally, the stewards of naval aviation need to be smarter about the way they spend money. The mistakes of the past cannot be repeated. The cancelled A-12 was a disaster. The incremental improvements that the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet will provide are hardly worth the billions they are going to cost. When it isn't grounded, the AV-8B Harrier is one of the best second-rate tactical jets in the world. But only barely—and at huge cost. Why a vertical version of the Joint Strike Fighter? Did the laws of physics change? The MV-22-well, that deserves pages worth of writing. Just this small summary of billions of dollars of poorly spent money would likely fix many of the problems that naval aviation faces today.
It is distressing that our shortcomings are so frustrating that our best officers write and publish proposals to underutilize their weaponry. This fatalistic decay will end only when naval aviation stops lurching along on threadbare equipment flown by undertrained pilots and serviced by worn-out troops. That is, unless the leaders are satisfied with their second-rate force.
"Bring Back the Privateer"
(See D. Winters, p. 112, April 2002 Proceedings)
Boatswain's Mate Master Chief Ray Bollinger, (LS. Coast Guard Reserve (Retired)—Congratulations to Lieutenant Commander Winters on a real out-of-the-box piece of thinking and to Proceedings for having the courage to publish it. The great thing about out-of-the-box thinking is that it often makes us get off of our comfortable position in the middle of the box and go scan the outer edges for tools that were always there, but we forgot about them.
Unfortunately, a return to the old letter of marque isn't likely to be met with as many takers as the author thinks. These aren't the cargoes of luxury items that attracted the privateers of the Revolution or the Civil War. This is dope that when captured—no matter its millions of dollars of "street value"—is slated to be burned. What the privateer wannabe gets is the boat. Recent government experience indicates that once the boat falls into the hands of the privateer, his best bet is to sell at 10% to 25% of fair market value. The government pretty much has to do this to avoid very expensive storage and maintenance expenses. Given the capital investment involved in securing the right type of pursuit boat, the letter of marque, any performance bonds, weapons, and a skilled and trustworthy crew, there aren't likely to be that many takers. The profit margin just isn't there.
Then there is the political issue. Our government has reserved the right to commission privateers, but the rest of the world has rejected the concept. One man's privateer is another man's pirate. There is the issue of control: how does the government keep the privateers honest?
Many of the elements that are proposed in this article have been employed successfully by the Coast Guard in the past in the form of commissioned auxiliaries. The Coast Guard has an existing legal structure for this concept last used in World War II. The Coast Guard has an auxiliary described in Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations Part 5. This organization has the authority to enroll people, vessels, aircraft, and radio stations into Coast Guard service on a voluntary basis for any Coast Guard mission except law enforcement or military operations. There is no cost to government except expenses, and no compensation to the dues-paying uniformed members. There is a way to move Auxiliary-enrolled assets into law enforcement and military service as long as the member and asset owner is willing. Section 893 of Title 14, U.S. Code, provides that members of the Auxiliary and "temporary members of the Reserve" are "entitled only to such rights, privileges, and benefits as are specifically set forth for them in this title." By enrolling desired assets in the Auxiliary during World War II and simultaneously in the "Temporary Reserve," the Coast Guard created several unique surge requirement assets.
One was the "Corsair fleet" used for antisubmarine warfare patrols. These were armed yachts and small commercial fishing boats manned mostly by men overage or partially physically unqualified for unrestricted military duty. These volunteers trained largely as unpaid Auxiliary members while working their regular jobs. Then the boats were armed, provisioned, manned, and sent out on patrol for periods ranging from a weekend to two weeks. Before sailing each crewmember was sworn into the "temporary reserve." This eliminated any prohibitions against combat activity applicable to the Auxiliary for the duration of the mission.
Something similar was done for port security. Many of the port security pier patrols and boat patrols were augmented by auxiliary/temporary reserves. Again the Auxiliary structure provided the organizational and social structure to attract, keep, and train the volunteers. When patrol time came and the armory issued these men weapons, they became temporary reservists. Finally some of these auxiliarymen volunteered with their boats to serve with General Douglas MacArthur in the retaking of the Philippines. Known as "MacArthur's Navy," they provided patrol and shuttle services between the islands and were on full-time extended active duty as temporary reserves.
The advantage of these commissioned auxiliaries is that the vessels are temporarily legally government vessels, the crews have a long-term association with the parent service, and they are enrolled military members during their actual deployments. As such, they are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and direct supervision by their active-duty superiors in the chain of command. The Corsair fleet was highly irregular and may have looked a bit ragtag at times, but there was never any question of its being out of control. It proved a very tough, disciplined, and effective force.
Hours after the events of 9/11, modem day Auxiliary members were on scene in New York harbor providing logistic support to recovery efforts. Since 9/11, the Auxiliary has provided thousands of man, boat, and aircraft hours in support of hard-pressed Coast Guard civil missions. If the decision is made that we must do something drastic and cost effective to fill the gaps in interdiction work, the legal framework is there to reassemble the types of armed auxiliaries that we fielded in World War II. Congress could even offer prize money to help encourage volunteers.
"Faster 'Street-to-Fleet' for Naval Aviation"
(See J. Gallardo, K. Ireland, G. Pittman, D. Hampton, pp. 50-53, February 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Timothy O'Grady Sheehan, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (Retired)—Had this revised "Street-to-Fleet" program been in place in July 1970, perhaps I would have earned wings of gold instead of thinking years later about my unsuccessful experience at Pensacola.
I encountered my first "pool" delay immediately after finishing the indoctrination and preliminary ground school at Mainside. Saufley Field, then the home of primary training in the T-34B, was backlogged. For the next three weeks, my classmates and I mustered daily in the parking lot near the base exchange, endured a brief personnel inspection from an unhappy ground school instructor, and then went home or to the beach.
Once I actually started flying, I was stunned by the intensity and pace of the instruction. I made it through VT-1 with only weather-related delays, but was then sent on to jets at Naval Air Station Meridian. Shortly before I completed primary training at Saufley, more than 500 students had been purged out of the multiengine pipeline. Some were within a few days or weeks of receiving their wings, and had been in the training command far longer than the targeted 15-18 months.
I found basic jet training to be much more difficult than I had anticipated, primarily because of the endless delays in the pipeline. When I flew daily, or at least three times per week, I was able to maintain my basic airmanship skills and make adequate progress in the syllabus. Although I lacked confidence, my instructors assured me that my skills were average for basic, and that I was progressing.
Unfortunately, VT-7 had too many students and too few instructors or T-2Cs in an "up" flight status. It was common to wait at least a week or two between each stage of the training. Once a phase such as basic instruments or precision acrobatics began, there were long intervals between flights. Sometimes I'd fly only once or twice per week, even when the squadron went to a seven-day schedule to try to catch up on student completions.
When I finally went back up in the air my flying was erratic or unacceptable, and therefore I earned more than my share of "downs." As a result of each "down" I received two extra-time, non-syllabus flights, which further exacerbated the shortage of instructors and aircraft. While I'm certain the "downs" were deserved, I also remember thinking that I would not have needed the extra flights if I had been scheduled every day.
Somehow I made it through VT-7, including carrier qualification, and was sent back to Mainside for the gunnery phase at VT4. Again, I waited in pool status for several weeks, followed by an intermittent flight schedule in which I was lucky to fly two or three times per week. My flying was awful, and I was dangerous in the aircraft. One instructor was slumped over in the rear seat after having been frightened to death by two near mid-airs with the banner or the tow aircraft. It did not help when I hit rudder shaker on my approach to Sherman Field. His comment—"Dammit, Sheehan, I thought you could at least land!"—still reverberates in my helmet earphones.
I knew I was in trouble when I had several unplanned changes in instructors, and each guy in the backseat was more senior than the last. I went from regular first-tour instructor to flight leader, to standardization officer, and finally to the VT-4 executive officer. It was at that point that I decided to drop out. My friends who already had gone on to advanced training at Corpus Christi told me that the delays and pools continued there as well. I just didn't think I'd ever be safe in the air unless I could fly every day.
Looking back 30 years later, I can see that the delays and pools that plagued the program in the 1970s were only partially responsible for my departure from flight training. I applied to Pensacola for the wrong reasons and ended up in the jet program for lack of seats in the multiengine pipeline. The jets were too fast for me, and I might not have been successful even if I flew every day.
But the on-and-off nature of the training and the lack of coordination between various squadrons definitely contributed. Squadrons rushed to complete students by the end of the month or quarter to look good on paper, knowing that the next squadron already was overloaded and the students would do nothing but sit for weeks before being able to get into the air again.
I went to sea on a tanker and found that I was a much better officer of the deck (formation) than I was pilot in command. My training on the bridge was uninterrupted and continuous, four hours on and eight off!
I loved being a surface warfare officer on an oiler, but whenever we refueled an aircraft carrier, I just couldn't help but wonder "What if?"
"No More Catch Phrases, Please"
(See J. Murphy, pp. 30-31, February 2002; R. Dunn, p. 14, March 2002; D. Nystrom, pp. 29-30, April 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Steven F Davis, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Klakring (FFG-42)—Though I understand Chief Murphy's frustration with jargon leadership and Vice Admiral Dunn's subsequent commentary on the subject, there are critical areas the authors missed.
Like Chief Murphy and Admiral Dunn, I have struggled with the ebb and flow of en vogue leadership theories. Total Quality Management (TQM)/Total Quality Leadership (TQL) in particular was spoken in a language that was inappropriate for those whose sole commodity is combat readiness, not camcorders. Many theories have been difficult to implement or explain to sailors.
That does not mean, however, that these leadership initiatives were without value. The study of leadership should be a lifelong commitment for chiefs and officers. Far too often, it is not. Many of the leadership programs Chief Murphy and Admiral Dunn cite were given to us by the Navy in an attempt to codify or simplify complex leadership studies and make them digestible for those who would not otherwise consider these things.
The most effective leaders with whom I have had the privilege to serve were students of the subject, listened carefully, and were open to the suggestions of others. They were able to co-opt each of these leadership initiatives, find a way to make them appropriate for sailors, and leverage the insights to improve the quality of life for our men and women at sea. I never could figure how to apply many of the tenets of total quality leadership to my organization as a department head, but I still hear the phrase "continuous process improvement" even as a commanding officer.
Continuous process improvement implies that our knowledge of leadership is incomplete or needs reevaluation. That doesn't mean that there's anything wrong, but there may be a better way to skin the cat. My concern with Chief Murphy's article is that he states that simply because he's a chief that his knowledge of leadership is sufficient to challenges we are going to face in the future. Many of my peers and many in Chiefs' Messes I've been acquainted with have felt the same.
Leadership may be the single most complicated, dynamic, and difficult to implement issue we regularly face. Understanding effective leadership demands that we study, think, get engaged in conversations about ourselves that challenge long-held beliefs, and listen to our leaders about the direction of the Navy. We off-handedly dismiss leadership initiatives at our own peril.
"World Naval Developments"
(See N. Friedman, pp. 4-6, April 2002 Proceedings)
Major Elliott Stoffregen III, U.S. Force Reserve—This letter is for the seemingly dyslexic editor who proofed the caption for the picture on page 4. The number associated with the Sea Knight's designation is 46. The number 64 is assigned to what many consider the world's finest attack helicopter, the Apache (AH-64).
"Interview: John Lehman"
(See F. Schultz, pp. 70-73, December 2001; K. Kopets, p. 22, January 2002; W. Morgan, J. Pauly, pp. 14-16, February 2002; P. Neira, pp. 22-24, March 2002 Proceedings)
"We Need More Civil-Service Mariners"
(See M. Morris, pp. 76-79, October 2001; H. Stokes, p. 24, February 2002 Proceedings)
"A Legacy of Bravery"
(See M. Files, pp. 60-61, February 2002 Proceedings)
Salvatore Mercogliano, Visiting Assistant Professor of History, East Carolina University, 2nd Mate (Unlimited), Master (Unlimited)—While the U.S. Naval Institute identifies Proceedings as the independent forum for the sea services, many of its contributors and commentators have little understanding of one major component of the sea, the merchant marine. Three mistakes in the February issue reflect this.
In his response to the interview with former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, Staff Sergeant John Pauly stated that, "with half a dozen commerce raiders, the South destroyed the high seas merchant fleet of the union." Actually, ships like the Alabama were one of many factors that contributed to the loss of the U.S. merchant marine. Prior to the Civil War, sectionalism over slavery had made the issue of shipping, primarily a New England and Mid-Atlantic enterprise, an issue of contention. In addition, the adoption of new technologies by the British-iron hulls and steam—along with an extensive worldwide network of coating stations, made U.S. ships less competitive. Finally, the U.S. Navy, more than the Confederate Navy, proved a greater hindrance to U.S. trade. Because the Union lacked an adequate fleet to blockade the South, or to support the Army in its campaigns, it chartered, bought, or requisitioned the best ships in the merchant fleet. To protect their interests, many shippers reflagged their vessels to protect them from both sides in the Civil War.
Commander Houston H. Stokes's comments on Michael Morris's essay on civilservice mariners is further proof of the void between the Navy and its own merchant marine command, the Military Sealift Command (MSC). First, Commander Stokes completely misunderstood the fact that 63% of the ships operated by MSC, and not the crew on board, are manned by civilian mariners (those designated as United States Naval Ship-USNS), and of that number 25% are Navy retirees. He then goes on to say, "allowing private maritime ships to service an underway task force would make the security problem more complex." This has been standard operating procedure since 1972, when the USNS Taluga and the SS Erna Elizabeth, one manned by civilian mariners and the other by merchant mariners, initiated the routine resupply of Navy vessels at sea. By 2004, the entire underway replenishment fleet of the Navy will be manned by civilian mariners, and chartered and long-term merchant ships will supplement them.
Finally, and perhaps the most common mistake, is the incorrect identification of merchant vessels. "A Legacy of Bravery" refers to the maritime prepositioning ship (MPS) Pfc James Anderson Jr. as USNS when she is actually a M/V (motor vessel). The 13 original MPS are long-term charter ships, and they are owned and operated by commercial companies. Three new enhancement vessels are in the process of joining them, and they are government-owned, hence their designation as USNS.
"Transformation, Billy Mitchell Style"
(See W. O'Neil, pp. 100-104, March 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Frank McAdams, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve—The author implies that President Calvin Coolidge "adroitly maneuvered General Billy Mitchell into resigning, denying him much of the mantle of martyrdom that harsher treatment could have brought." We are led to believe that General Mitchell did not face a court-martial.
General Mitchell repeatedly had accused the Army (and the Navy) and his superiors of "incompetency and criminal negligence" for not recognizing the unlimited potential of air power after World War I.
The record shows, however, that General Mitchell faced a court martial. He was convicted in December 1925 of insubordination and sentenced to five years suspension from duty without pay. He subsequently resigned from the Army on 1 February 1926 and retired to Middleburg, Virginia. He spent the rest of his life writing in defense of his claims, one of which was that the Hawaiian naval base at Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to an attack from the air, mostly likely from Japan.
In 1955, Gary Cooper portrayed General Mitchell in the film The Court Martial of Billy Mitchell directed by Otto Preminger from a script by Milton Sperling (a World War II Marine) and Emmett Lavery. Sperling and Lavery were each nominated for Academy Awards.
"Stop Rogue Merchant Ships"
(See H. Caldwell, p. 77, February 2002 Proceedings)
Commander C. Roger Wallin, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Mr. Caldwell addresses a threat that should be considered seriously, and he offers an interesting out-of-the-box approach to disabling a surface merchant ship that is recognized as hostile. His concept of using wire-guided lightweight torpedoes to attack those vessels, however, is impractical, unless a vast amount of development effort is applied to it. Of initial concern is that he refers to lightweight torpedoes as weapons that were designed to be launched from aircraft, but that "are small and light enough to be launched from surface ships." Many of us are aware that lightweight torpedoes have been launched over the side from several classes of surface ships using the Mk-32 torpedo tubes since the 1950s. They continue to be a standard armament, but none is wire-guided.
Mr. Caldwell suggests that these torpedoes could be modified "with relative ease" to incorporate technologies that would ensure hitting a surface target. If that means converting existing small torpedoes into wire-guided types, the engineering and reconfiguration process would be far from trivial. The greater problem is that the article ignores the issues of launch and control that are essential parts of any weapon system. Skilled personnel also would be required. Compounding the complexity of his concept is that he proposes wire-guided torpedoes be launched from a variety of platforms, including waterfront land facilities. Therefore, the scope of development and support needed to field a complete, unique, and adaptable wire-guided torpedo system would be enormous.
Aside from those criticisms, the article serves to recognize the potential threat of innocent-appearing shipping that could inflict damage reminiscent of the great Halifax, Novia Scotia, explosion that occurred during World War I. Although using a torpedo to disable a threat merchant ship is intriguing, it may be more practical to consider just shooting it in the stern. Projectiles fired from a 3-inch gun probably would mess up the steering engine and propulsion mechanisms of a tanker, if directed into the after section of the hull. An underwater explosion should not be necessary to disable such a vessel. The threat, however, is viable and definitely deserves consideration and discussion.
"Every Sailor Should Be a Rifleman"
(See R. Everson, p. 128, October 2001; J. Gelfand, pp. 20-22, December 2001; M. Keane, p. 18, February 2002 Proceedings)
Senior Chief Aviation Warfare Systems Operator Kenneth W Foster, U.S. Navy—As a member of the Navy Marksmanship team and a competitive rifle shooter, I contend that Chief Everson, Captain Gelfand, and Chief Keane are all correct. Chief Everson's thought that sailors need rifle marksmanship and rules-of-engagement training is the basis of the entire discussion and has not been countered by anyone within this forum. Captain Gelfand and Chief Keane have only differences of opinion in the direction such training should take and, presumably, agree with the requirement for rules-of-engagement training. There is another solution to the marksmanship training that is simple and relatively inexpensive.
Annually, the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, sponsor rifle and pistol competitions in the Norfolk and San Diego areas, respectively, followed by an All Navy Rifle and Pistol Championship, conducted by the U.S. Navy Marksmanship Team. Selected members of the All Navy matches represent the Navy at the interservice matches, hosted by the Marines Corps, and at National Championship Matches sponsored by the National Rifle Association. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, supports the East Coast, West Coast, interservice, and national matches with competition-grade service rifles and pistols as well as ammunition and armorer support.
During the fleet-level competitions, Marksmanship Team members provide marksmanship training in service rifle (M-16/M-14) and service pistol (M-191 1/M-9) to regular sailors who see the announcement in message traffic or find the Navy marksmanship team site on the Web (www.usnt.org). In addition, marksmanship team members build local command teams) to represent that command at the matches and provide year-round training to sailors at local area matches held monthly at military ranges as well as other civilian events. These competitions teach sailors how to accurately engage targets from 200 to 600-plus yards for the service rifle and 50 yards with the service pistol.
With direction from fleet commanders, the Navy should allow more sailors time and orders to attend the fleet matches and follow-on matches if they are selected to compete with the All Navy Team. Command-level teams should be built that can compete at the weekend matches with command-owned service rifles and ammunition. Allowing these teams to compete at local area matches with command-owned service rifles and ammunition benefits the watch standers with increased practice time with a weapon that the sailor will carry on watch. Also, this arrangement will allow the sailor an opportunity to refine, immensely, a particular weapons elevation and windage adjustments for different ranges, wind factors, ammunition lots, light conditions, temperature variations, and other variables.
"The China Sailors' Homer"
(See D. Noble, pp. 74- 77, April 2002 Proceedings)
Stanley Kalemaris—Page 76 includes a circa 1948 photograph of then-Chief Petty Officer Richard McKenna. The caption refers to him as Master Chief, but his insignia is clearly that of a chief (now E-7). According to the Naval Historical Center, the "Super Chief grades were created in 1958, with the first promotions to senior and master chief becoming effective on 16 November 1958.
"Defend the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean"
(See J. Harvey, pp. 89-90, December 2001; D. Trinique, pp. 16-18, January 2002 Proceedings)
Captain Joseph Sensi Jr., U.S. Navy—Recently an article and a response debated the ship selection process for the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (SNFM). Both authors debate the merits of SNFM ship type assignments with regard to Aegis ships. Broad assumptions are made that merit further discussion.
Before we debate the worthwhile content of the two articles, I would like to address some of the espoused assumptions. Both articles use the term "old ship" with alarming ease. When we start bemoaning the capabilities of ships that are 15-25 years old, referring to them as antiquated, we have larger issues than SNFM. In general, age should be a consideration but not a matter of mission accomplishment. On good ships, the crews are too busy creating the best ship and team possible and have little time to contemplate the ages of their ship and team. Further, these same "old Spruances" (DD-913) have a host of offensive and defensive weapons that make them better suited for some missions than their newer counterparts. Clearly Aegis is the weapon system of choice for a heavy antiair environment, but there are few of our "more experienced" ships that would shy away from cruise missile threat environments. Perhaps the tools these "older ships" add to the mix would permit the enemy to be defeated beyond the radar horizon.
The assignment of an Aegis destroyer to SNFM is not new. Each battlegroup commander looks at the upcoming mission and decides which asset is the correct contribution to SNFM. In some cases, armed helicopters equipped with forward-looking infrared radar, installed equipment such as Outboard/Rubicon, or helicopter ordnance magazines may affect which asset is selected. It's not always the "older ship." Of note, the USS Gonzales (DDG66) was assigned to SNFM recently from the Enterprise (CVN-65) Battle Group. Finally, to infer that assigning a U.S. ship to SNFM precludes support to national policies or interests is a shallow interpretation. Frequently port visits and/or engagement activities accomplished under NATO auspices can have very positive results for both the United States and NATO. Ship selection aside, let's look at the bigger SNFM issue, which both articles do not recognize.
At this very moment, thousands of NATO and coalition naval forces are working across the Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and Mediterranean. They are successfully linking, communicating, exchanging tactical information, conducting maritime interdiction operations, and logistically supporting each other. Each U.S. Navy ship and coalition partner has some percentage of communicators, boatswain's mates, radar operators, flight deck crews, aircrews, officers and chief petty officers-to name a few-who have operated with SNFM or NATO and do not find the battle against terrorism with coalition maritime partners to be an interoperability challenge. They will not have any consternation when the untensioned close-in NATO refueling rig requires a 60-foot ship separation to manually bring the refueling rig aboard. The idea of transmitting hundreds of high-frequency messages daily to a coalition partner will not be daunting. Division ship-handling drills at 500 yards will be nothing new. The cost for the ease of operations during the critical war on terrorism is the strategic investment in the NATO programs that build a sufficient level of compatibility to allow complex operations to be accomplished routinely in times of conflict.
"Sea Lance Ensures Access to the Littorals"
(See R. Harney, p. 96, October 2001; E. Mulcahy, D. Byrd, pp. 28-30, November 2001; T. Schoene, p. 32, December 2001 Proceedings)
Hugh C. Ware, maritime journalist—The concept of a littoral fighting combo using two wave-piercing vessels—one essentially a combatant tug and the other a missile/sensor-carrying barge—is both interesting and provocatively imaginative. But the article leaves this reader with many questions about the Sea Lance.
As far as this writer knows, there is nothing in the commercial literature about any similar single-towbar device. Is there any practical experience with towing a largish vessel only 20 feet behind the towing vessel by use of a semifixed towbar, as is proposed for the Sea Lance? One might imagine that the twin hulls of the barge would track well in the wakes from the twin hulls of the towing vessel under calmish conditions but what about performance at speed in a nasty cross sea at speed with evasive maneuvering thrown in? And what happens in a crash stop?
There are multipoint connector systems that rigidly connect two vessels, so as to allow the "pushing" vessel no movement in any axis except pitch. Such a configuration is known as an Articulated Tug/Barge (ATB), and ATBs routinely operate in very bad weather and sea conditions while coupled together. Perhaps such a system might be more practical for the Sea Lance than the single towbar.
Little information is given about the weapon and/or sensor load carried by the towed wave-piercer since these devices are not yet designed. But we learn that the contents of the modules "are deployed on the move from the bottom of the center hull ... using a gravity feed mechanism similar to the bomb-release device on a heavy bomber." One can but wonder what type of weapon would be used with such a delivery system. A floating missile? Torpedoes? What did the design team have in mind here?