In the past decade—most recently in Afghanistan—the CH-53E Super Stallion clearly has established itself as the assault support helicopter of choice for long-range missions and operations that require the rapid buildup of combat power. However, when the MV-22 Osprey is introduced, the CH-53E no longer will be the best aircraft for long-range missions and might not be involved in the initial assault waves, a task it has come to perform routinely. Its relevancy will lie in the original mission for which it was designed: superior tactical mobility for the heavy weapons and supplies of Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs).
The Super Stallion is approaching its airframe limits; ownership costs are increasing at an alarming rate; and it requires a service-life extension program (SLEP) to remain viable through 2025. The CH-53E is the only aircraft in the Marine Corps' inventory that does not have a funded replacement or modernization program at this time.
Capabilities, Limitations, Requirements
The Super Stallion excels in the combat assault transport role. It can lift a M-198 155-mm howitzer, its gun crew, and 1,000 pounds of ammunition (about 19,000 pounds) in "high, hot" ambient conditions and reposition them 30 nautical miles (nm) away. With a relatively light load of 36 combat-equipped Marines, the CH-53E has an operating radius of 270 nm, even under high, hot conditions. Obviously, ranges decrease with heavier loads—under the same high, hot conditions, the CH-53E can carry a 7,600-pound external load out to only 200 nm.
There are limitations and costs to these capabilities. The CH-53E is beginning to experience the same type of engine degradation that previous legacy helicopters have suffered. While the engines are still acceptable, they do not produce power consistently in accordance with their performance charts. This reduces the helicopter's capability to execute designed heavy-lift mission and limits the ranges to which it can transport heavy equipment and supplies externally. The sky is not falling yet—but capabilities are eroding quickly.
Fiscal Year 2000 data indicate that the CH-53E costs more than $11,600 per flight hour and 42 maintenance manhours for each flight hour. These numbers mean more when put into perspective: with the exception of the AV-8B Harrier, every other fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft in the Marine Corps costs less than $6,300 per flight hour to operate. The CH-53E's maintenance man-hours per flight hour have increased almost 12% since fiscal year 1997. As the aircraft ages, it becomes harder and more expensive to maintain. Obsolete avionics and high-maintenance parts—such as a complex rotor head and aging main rotor blades—contribute to rising costs. Moreover, state- of-the-art communication, navigation, and data link systems are needed to ensure the CH-53E can operate with other aircraft over the battle field.
Before considering the need for modernization, we should first ask, will we need heavy lift 15 years from now? Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's strategic review should determine how to protect the nation's interests in a world that is increasingly fractious, asymmetrically armed, and unpredictable. Thus, before determining the need for heavy lift in the Marine Corps, we first must ensure that the Corps' focus on power projection and quick, decisive response to contingencies will be necessary in the future. Can the nation project power, influence international events, and react rapidly to contingencies without the Marine Corps "on point."
Heavy lift is expensive and unglamorous, but it is vital to MAGTF objectives. While it does not destroy bridges, provide intelligence, or control crowds, it provides critical support to the combat elements of the MAGTF that "kill people and break their stuff." Heavy lift builds combat power quickly, provides great tactical mobility throughout the battle space, and keeps wide-ranging tanks, light armored vehicles, and other forces supplied with fuel and ammunition. As one of my commanding officers used to say, "Now that you've inserted the first wave, how do you plan to sustain that force?"
The Threat
From 1973 to 2001, 363 helicopters were lost to enemy fire worldwide. Of those helicopters, 87% were lost to anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire or infrared air-to-air missiles (IRAAMs). During the same time, U.S. forces lost 69 helicopters—86% to AAA and IRAAM. There are only a handful of countries that do not have AAA weapons of one kind or another. To date, we have successfully used acquisition denial tactics, such as terrain flight and executing missions during the hours of darkness.
In modernizing the CH-53E, we must examine survivability carefully. The CH-53E is not a stealthy aircraft and it never will be. However, there are vulnerabilities that we can mitigate without driving up the cost excessively or affecting accomplishment of the mission. We must make threat acquisition of the CH-53E's infrared (IR) signature more difficult by suppressing the heat signature as well as by protecting critical components with kevlar armor. The IR signature can be reduced by more than 50% with the engine and airframe armor kits now used on U.S. Air Force H-53s. These improvements—coupled with an effective IR jamming pod—would increase the CH-53E's survivability dramatically.
The current expendable systems and dispensers for decoying enemy missiles are substandard. It is postulated that an assault support aircraft will need between 240 and 300 expendables (flares and chaff) to survive an engagement in a medium-threat environment. The CH-53E has 60 expendables, dispensed by a system that was designed for use by Vietnamera fixed-winged aircraft. The resulting shortfalls equate to gaping holes in aircraft survivability. We cannot wait for a modernization program for aircraft survivability equipment and self-defense weaponry. A third of the CH-53Es in the active forces do not have any radar detection equipment. Modern survivability gear is available but has not been a funding priority. Survivability must be at the top of list.
Heavy-Lift Initiatives
As noted, the CH-53E is expensive to operate and vulnerable to the current and emerging threat. Solutions to its deficiencies are proposed already—an operational requirements document is in staffing and the attendant costs promise to be reasonable. The best part about modernization is that it builds on the success of established programs and integrates those successes into a far more capable heavy-lift platform. The proposed program consists of remanufacturing efforts that bring commonality, reduction of operation and support (O&S) costs, and increased capability:
- Replace CH-53E engines with MV-22 engines adapted for use on the modernized Super Stallion. These established power producers would double the shaft horsepower and take advantage of the current strong transmissions. Increased commonality within the MAGTF and potential reduction of MV-22 costs overall are other benefits—i.e., decreasing the unit cost of MV-22 engines by increasing the number of engines produced.
- Install improved rotor blades to rectify a persistent readiness problem and reduce O&S costs. New engines and new rotor blades alone will enable the CH-53E to hover out of ground effect with a light armored vehicle (or any other 28,000-pound payload) in a high, hot scenario and go out to 200 nm. Under those ambient conditions, the current aircraft cannot get off the deck unless the payload is below 20,000 pounds and it can externally lift only 7,600 pounds out to 200 nm. The true measure of what a heavy-lift platform can do for the MAGTF is how far it can take its payload once it has been lifted.
- Install an elastomeric rotor head, based on lessons learned from the CH-53D program. The reduction in unscheduled maintenance and electric blade-folding capability will combine to make the aircraft more reliable and easier to maintain.
- Adapt MV-22 or UH-1Y cockpit design to enhance the performance and safety of the modernized CH-53E at a reasonable cost. This measure will promote commonality in the MAGTF through the use of common avionics, training to support maintenance of those avionics, and common aviation supplies. Further, it will upgrade reliability and maintainability, increase data connectivity, and improve safety through integration.
- Install a stronger and simper hook and pendant system. An aircraft that lifts 28,000 pounds day in and day out needs a reliable external lift system. This would contribute greatly to crew confidence and safety.
- Add aircraft survivability equipment necessary to survive in mid- to high-intensity conflicts. The use of engine exhaust suppressors, transmission wraps, and high technology, low IR paint can get the heat signature down by 50%. Engine, drive shaft, and key component armor will protect the most vulnerable systems and will not add much weight.
Organizational Concerns
There are six active-duty and two reserve Super Stallion squadrons in the Marine Corps. Since the 1980s, they have been called on extensively for worldwide missions. However, current modernization plans call for replacing the reserve squadrons with MV-22s. Our CH-53Es are much like strategic-lift aircraft—there never are enough of them around when you need them. Marine expeditionary force commanders should be consulted before we embark on conversions from heavy-to medium-lift roles. The entire CH-53E inventory should be reviewed carefully: eight squadrons may not be able to meet future contingencies.
There have been recent debates over the Navy's move to a single helicopter, the H-60. The Seahawk variants will be configured for a variety of missions, thereby contributing to commonality and reduced logistics requirements. One of the casualties of this strategy will be the MH-53E Sea Dragon—the Super Stallion's twin. The Sea Dragon currently is used for minesweeping and for vertical on-board delivery. A squadron of MH-53Es configured for this role keeps all our forward-deployed, sea-based forces supplied with high priority parts and supplies. The aircraft can transport large, heavy parts internally—such as engines and arresting gear cables—that the Seahawk variant will be unable to lift. Because of the helicopter's extraordinary contributions to the Navy-Marine Corps team, the Navy should consider a service-life extension program for the MH-53E.
Conclusions
The Marine Corps has the opportunity to preserve and greatly improve its heavy-lift capability. Heavy-lift pilots are confident that a service-life extension program is the right path to follow—but the helicopter community should not be the sole determining factor in whether we modernize the CH-53E. The need for the Sea Stallion and its missions has to be substantiated by MAGTF commanders.
The CH-53E has been the "go-to" helicopter of choice for many years. It appears that Marine forces will be faced with the tactical heavy-lift requirement for at least the next 15 years. Therefore, to ensure they have enough capable and survivable aircraft to accomplish this key mission, the Corps should assign the highest priority to the CH-53E service-life extension program.
Major Dowling completed an assignment with Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One in December. He is now the operations officer of HMH-466 at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California.