As China's and India's navies grow stronger and these nations realize they have some common interests, such as pursuing seagoing trade routes to boost economies, they could give the United States and its Navy the cold shoulder.
At the dawn of the 21st century, the United States faces a situation where the emergence of new naval powers could threaten U.S. ability to dictate the use of the sea worldwide. It would be a mistake for the United States to look at these expanding navies only in terms of U.S. relations with them, because as they expand they almost certainly will establish relations among themselves. Among the key relationships to be watched will be that between two Asian giants who are both emphasizing sea power: China and India. In spite of these two nations' history of enmity, there is reason to believe that China and India might forge a relationship that increasingly leaves the United States out in the cold.
In 1993 there occurred an incident now mostly forgotten in the United States but remembered well in important Chinese circles. The United States suspected that a Chinese merchant vessel, the Yinhe, was carrying chemical weapon precursors to Iran. The U.S. Navy began dogging the vessel and insisted that China allow the ship to be inspected. The Chinese lodged diplomatic protests; it seemed to them that the United States was flouting the very freedom of the seas it claimed to so value. As China realized, however, diplomacy cannot always substitute for a powerful navy. Unable to provide naval support to its merchant vessel thousands of miles distant in the Persian Gulf, China was forced to relent and allow an inspection. Much to the embarrassment of the United States, no chemical weapon precursors were found on board, and the incident seems to have been quickly forgotten here. To China, however, this incident served as an important signal for leaders who had to swallow the bitter pill of U.S. maritime supremacy.
China and India are virtually island nations when it comes to trade. By volume, more than 96% of India's and 90% of China's foreign trade is by sea. The Indian merchant fleet comprises more than 320 large vessels of more than 11 million dead weight tons (DWT). China has almost 50 million DWT of shipping in more than 300,000 vessels, including small craft. China's maritime economy grew 17% per year in the 1980s and 20% per year in the 1990s, and it is the third largest shipbuilding nation in the world. India and China both are increasingly reliant on imported energy for economic growth, and most of that energy almost certainly will come by way of the sea. Both nations have large portions of their populations and economies near the coast. It is easy to see why these two countries are putting an increased emphasis on sea power.
China in particular faces a daunting task. Seagoing commerce to China's east coast usually must travel through thousands of miles of ocean, where the U.S. Navy (or a regional navy) could interdict it. Closer to China's coast there are many potential flash points: the Korean Peninsula to the north, Taiwan in the center, and the Spratly/Paracel region in the south all could be locations for military actions with a great potential impact on Chinese shipping. Since the early 1980s, with the promotion of Liu Huaqing (who studied under the Soviet Navy's famous Admiral Sergei Gorshkov) to head the navy, China has been moving from a strategy of coastal defense to one of offshore defense. The successive leadership roles of Zhang Lianzhong, a submariner, and Shi Yunsheng, an aviator, have been seen as efforts to upgrade the offshore capabilities of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Offshore defense in Chinese regional waters is one thing; protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs) thousands of miles long is quite another.
China realizes that, for the foreseeable future, its ability to protect the middle and distant ends of its SLOCs will be beyond the capabilities of the PLAN. There are two ways to mitigate this weakness, and it appears likely that China will pursue both. The first is to find allies afloat. The second is to open a newer, less vulnerable SLOC.
Chinese President Jiang Zemin repeatedly has stated China's hope for the development of a "New Silk Road," and China actively has been pursuing this goal. The original Silk Road was a legendary trade route that connected the Orient with Europe, primarily via landlines across central Asia. Political and economic realities in the 20th century prohibited development of the route, but at the start of the new century there are reasons for China to believe that this route, which avoids maritime complications, is viable. The dissolution of the Soviet empire and the growing energy resources of the newly independent central Asian states are making the linkage of China and Europe across central Asia a political and economic possibility.
Already there have been a plethora of transport and energy deals to better connect China with central Asia and, ultimately, with the Middle East and Europe. The formation of the "Shanghai Five" has alleviated concerns over conflict with Russia and has eased the way for the expansion of Chinese influence in the region. The central Asian states, not wanting to rely totally on ties to the West, are eager to develop links to China. Likewise, there are plans for a southern route, its backbone being the proposed TransAsian Railway from Yunan Province, China, to Iran via Myanmar (Burma), India, and Pakistan. Such plans, while not pie-in-the-sky, do face serious difficulties. Many of the states involved are under- or maldeveloped and have totalitarian governments of uncertain long-term stability. The technical and capital requirements for many of these projects are immense, and timetables for their completion keep slipping. What can China do in the interim, and as a backstop to possible failure of the New Silk Road?
The apparent answer might be called the "New Silk SLOC." Rather than handle all of its shipping on the east coast, it appears that China is developing a backdoor line of communication to the Andaman Sea via Myanmar. As Chinese relations with Myanmar have solidified, there has been a large increase in both the number and scale of Chinese development projects in that small southeast Asian nation. The main thrust of these projects has been to develop the ports of Myanmar and connect them, via rail and road as well as waterway, to the western Chinese provinces of Yunan and Sichuan. From there could come connections to the wider Chinese transport infrastructure. Such developments could have a tremendous impact on the flow of commerce between China and the Middle East as well as Europe.
Significant efforts are under way to prepare Myanmar as a potential transhipment point for Chinese commerce. China is involved intimately with the ongoing development of the Myanmar transport infrastructure, whose development has been a priority for the rulers of that nation. The old Burma Road from Mandalay to Muse (on the Chinese border) has been reopened and the Rangoon-Mandalay railroad has been upgraded. A major new port facility at Thilawa augments the capabilities of nearby Rangoon, and a new deep sea port is under construction in Arakan. China has built up port and storage facilities in Bhamo.
Regional nations have begun to take notice of the possibilities of significant commerce to China via Myanmar. As seaports continue their development, and the Irrawaddy River and land transport are improved, there is reason to believe that trade across Myanmar will mushroom. Such developments help China meet three priorities: security, energy, and development. Strengthening ties with the border nation of Myanmar, while strengthening Myanmar, is of great interest to Chinese leaders, who always have placed great value on maintaining buffer states. Access to the fuel resources of Myanmar and use of its infrastructure for transhipment of fuel could reduce by thousands of vulnerable miles the Chinese SLOCs to important Middle Eastern oil supplies. Finally, it opens some of the poorly developed interior Chinese states to the possibility of increased foreign commerce and development. The imbalance between wealthy coastal and poor interior states has plagued Chinese leaders for decades; anything that helps the interior keep up with coastal development will be welcomed.
By avoiding the choke points of southeast Asia and the strong foreign navies astride its eastern seaboard, China could use the New Silk SLOC as a backdoor to needed markets and energy supplies. While transhipment across Myanmar would never approach the magnitude of commerce from the Chinese eastern seaboard, it nonetheless could play a significant role in providing China a safety margin against problems in the east. Of course, Chinese access to the Andaman Sea might add a whole new dimension to China's relationship with India.
India and China have a troubled past. They have clashed over border issues and continue to eye one another warily. The addition of a seaborne element to this traditional land rivalry is a possibility that has not gone unnoticed in either country. Yet, despite all their differences, China and India share some important goals, few as important as protecting the SLOCs across the Indian Ocean. China's growing economy needs oil, for example, and India is planning on developing about a dozen huge liquid natural gas facilities along its coasts. It also is possible that in the future China will become a significant exporter of coal to India. Both nations have important maritime economies and both are striving to build powerful regional navies.
Even a minimal Chinese military presence in Myanmar, like the intelligence post at Coco Island, will raise eyebrows in India. Some are quick to see a large-scale Chinese naval expansion into the Indian Ocean proper. Likewise there is talk, primarily among jingoists, of India moving significantly into the South China Sea. Neither prospect, however, appears imminent. The Chinese Navy remains relatively weak, particularly as concerns its possible opponents in the east. It has its hands full trying to implement the forward defense strategy against these opponents, let alone building a powerful long-range striking force. China has yet to establish any significant (combat forces) foreign bases, and it is unlikely that it will start by sending vessels to distant Myanmar. China's resources are needed, and better used, closer to home.
India, likewise, is unlikely to stretch its permanent presence into the South China Sea. Facing, as always, tight budgetary and resource constraints, the Indian Navy is emphasizing the construction of a bastion defense that would make use of the choke point entrances to the Indian Ocean. Like China, India also needs to develop and keep forces closer to home to deal with regional concerns, such as Pakistan.
As a result, one can envision a de facto relationship that could evolve into something more. India, with an established presence out of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, will be the power responsible for ensuring safe transit across the Indian Ocean to the Malaccan and southeast Asian straits. China will build its presence in the South China Sea and regional waters. This division of responsibility puts both nations in one another's embrace. India will be capable of interdicting the Chinese SLOCs to the Middle East and Europe through the Indian Ocean. China could shut off Indian shipping to East Asia and the Western Americas via the southeast Asian choke points. Neither nation will want to upset that apple cart.
With the Indian Navy growing in strength, China will become more confident that the United States will hesitate to act decisively in the Indian Ocean. This will help to ensure that China's Silk SLOC through Myanmar remains open despite possible crisis off the east coast. China will be free to put more resources into implementing its forward defense in the east, as opposed to trying to build up long-distance expeditionary forces that could operate across the Indian Ocean. India certainly would breathe easier with a tacit agreement about respective spheres of operation, and would appreciate the recognition as guarantor of Indian Ocean shipping. Creating such ties of mutual dependence is one way to mitigate other tensions between the two nations.
Where does this leave the United States? Both India and China (in particular) have been espousing a multipolar world to counterbalance the power of the United States, and both see themselves as potential poles. Both nations are suspicious of U.S. power in their regions. Both see themselves opposed to nations that are more or less supported by the United States (Taiwan and Pakistan), and both have felt the sting of U.S. naval power influencing their behavior. And both are making large efforts to develop their means of sea power. In addition, both nations are cognizant that friction between them could encourage U.S. intervention in what they perceive as their waters.
There is no reason to believe that India and China will enter into any grand formal alliance any time soon. A gradual acclimatization to one another's expanding naval influence, however, is a real prospect. With this acclimatization could come a growing appreciation of their respective roles and the prospect for mutually beneficial, if not combined, operations. Good fences make good neighbors, and the southeast Asian choke points make a handy and realistic dividing line for their respective areas of influence. Growing Chinese reliance on SLOCs through the Indian Ocean (be it a shortened one to Myanmar or the traditional ones) gives India a chance to assist China in its quest for security, with potentially great payback. U.S. naval influence in Asian waters has long been predicated on the theory that someone had to play the role of naval hegemon after the British, and better the United States than the U.S.S.R. With the end of the U.S.S.R., however, and the rise of powerful regional navies that respond to their own masters, the United States might increasingly find itself frozen out of Asian waters. An increasingly warm relationship between India and China could result in the United States getting the cold shoulder.
Mr. Forsberg is a freelance author residing in Houston. He served as a U.S. Navy cryptologic technician (technical) from 1986 to 1991.