After years of under funding, the [fiscal year] 2003 budget request ... represents a dramatic improvement for the Department of the Navy," Secretary of the Navy Gordon R. England told the Senate Armed Forces Committee earlier this year. But that "dramatic improvement" is being seen by some observers as doing little for the long-term future of the Navy.
The FY 2003 budget provides for the construction of only five ships, as shown in Table 1. Although Secretary England also told Congress that there is a need for the steady-state procurement of eight to ten ships per year, such a building rate is unlikely in the foreseeable future. On the basis of an average 30-year service life, a building rate of ten ships per year would be needed to sustain a fleet of just more than 300 ships. A further complication is the recent statement by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark that he wants to add 30 to 60 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) to the fleet. How will those ships figure in the shipbuilding budget?
The Bush administration has increased the defense budget significantly in comparison with funding under the Clinton administration, but the additional movies have not gone to shipbuilding. Indeed, Secretary England has listed the Navy's priorities for FY 2003 as:
- Salary and benefits
- Operation and maintenance
- Munitions
- Aircraft procurement
- Research, development, test, and evaluation
- Shipbuilding
In this context, the Navy's submarine program is in difficult straits. The Navy is now constructing one attack submarine per year of the Virginia (SSN-774) class. These submarines reportedly are as quiet as the previous (and larger) Seawolf (SSN-21) but with an estimated 30% lower total ownership cost and modular design intended for the insertion of advanced technologies. However, assuming a 30-year service life, the building rate eventually could mean a force of some 30 attack submarines (SSNs).
Compounding the problem is the austere SSN building rate of the 1990s. The FY 1991 through FY 2000 shipbuilding programs provided only four SSNs—two of the Seawolf class, including the Jimmy Carter (SSN-23), which will be completed to a special missions configuration, and the first two Virginias. (In comparison, during those same ten fiscal years 35 Aegis destroyers were funded.)
Today, the Navy has 54 SSNs in commission. But submarine community leaders cite a requirement of 68 SSNs by 2015 and 76 by 2025. These numbers are based on a Joint Chiefs of Staff study of the requests put forward by area commanders-in-chief.
Such SSN numbers appear impossible under current Department of Defense (DoD) and Navy plans. The long-range shipbuilding plan calls for an increase in SSN construction from one to three submarines in FY 2008. The two existing submarine construction yards, Northrop Grumman/Newport News Shipbuilding and General Dynamics/Electric Boat, have the facilities to produce more than three SSNs per year, but most shipbuilding experts agree that going from one to three boats per year in that time frame will be difficult. In addition, the delay until 2008 will give the next presidential administration an opportunity to change or further delay the increased submarine program.
A more reasonable approach would be a building rate of two SSNs per year beginning in FY 2005 (permitting the needed advance procurement of components in FYs 2003 and 2004). Later, the rate could be increased to three SSNs if necessary. Two SSNs per year would provide a force of some 60 attack submarines.
Another means of increasing SSN availability would be multiple crewing—two crews per SSN or three crews for two SSNs. Such manning schemes have long been rejected by the submarine community, but a recent study by the Congressional Budget Office examines this concept in detail and raises some interesting questions.
Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) always have had dual-- crew manning, but those submarines have limited mission profiles. Attack submarines have extremely complex missions, which tend to require at-sea training, which deters the dual-crew concept. Yet, under Navy planning, the multimission cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) converted from Trident SSBNs also will have dual crews. To a large degree, the SSGNs will be employed in attack submarine roles.
Still another factor is forward basing. Three SSNs will be based at Guam by the end of 2003. This move will reduce SSN transit times to the Western Pacific, and the mission days of those submarines will be about three times what a U.S.-based SSN provides today. A major construction effort is under way at Guam to provide support for the crews and their families, and one of the Navy's two remaining submarine tenders, the USS Frank Cable (AS-40), is based at Guam.
That investment in support facilities may be expanded further to support additional SSNs, thus reducing the overall force level requirement. For example, the Congressional Budget Office study notes that "a force of 11 Guam-based submarines and 44 other attack submarines [based in the United States] would provider slightly more mission days than a force of 76 SSNs based in the United States."
Beyond SSNs, the attack force level is expected to be increased by the four Trident ballistic missile submarines planned for conversion to combination cruise missile/special operations submarines. These four SSGNs will begin entering the fleet about 2007; each is expected to have a 20-year service life.
At this time, the first two SSGN conversions appear to be ensured. The Navy's estimate of the conversion/nuclear refueling cost is just more than $850 million per submarine; but DoD estimates are running in excess of $1 billion per conversion. Still, from a fiscal viewpoint, the program appears to be cost effective in view of the current estimate of at least $2.2 billion to construct a Virginia-class SSN.
However, many questions about the efficacy of the SSGNs remain, especially with respect to their special operations role. Related to the special operations role of the SSGNs, sea trials continue in Hawaiian waters with the first Advanced Swimmer Delivery System (ASDS) vehicle. Following compatibility trials on board the Charlotte (SSN-766), later this summer the ASDS No. 1 will undergo submerged mating trials with the Greeneville (SSN-772). Problems have been encountered with the craft, especially limited battery capacity, and its initial operational capability has been moved to FY 2004. At this time, the production plan for additional ASDS vehicles is undergoing review, and No. 2 probably will not be started until FY 2006.
The ASDS is a significant advance over the existing, wet swimmer delivery vehicles in the fleet. The delay for this highly capable and highly touted system is a setback for more effective SEAL operations and could negate some of the justification for the SSGN program.
But there is good news in the submarine picture. The long delayed Seawolf and Connecticut (SSN-22) at last have undertaken deployments. Completed in 1997 after being under construction for almost eight years, the Seawolf deployed to the Atlantic and Mediterranean from June to December 2001. The deployment was considered to be successful, although the total lack of publicity does raise some questions.
The Connecticut, completed in 1998 after a six-year building period, sailed to the North Pole in 2001, again with virtually no publicity. She began her first full deployment to the Atlantic-Mediterranean on 1 May 2002.
Work continues on the third submarine of this class, the Jimmy Carter, which will be completed to a greatly modified design to replace the Parche (SSN-683) for deep-ocean search, research, and recovery operations. She also will have an enhanced special operations capability. The Jimmy Carter's construction start date was December 1995, and she now is scheduled for completion in mid-2004.
Submarines are important to current U.S. naval operations. There are many questions unanswered in submarine programs, the most critical being how to increase the building rate of attack submarines.