The Marine Corps has undergone many changes in missions, tactics, equipment, and personnel, but one thing has remained the same—percentages of mission-capable equipment are used to measure and improve equipment readiness. Although this is the universally accepted metric, when used in isolation of other standards of measurement, it prevents genuine improvements to equipment readiness.
In theory, the current metric is intended to provide commanders a quick and accurate snapshot of their units' equipment availability for operations. In reality, it is a measurement of maintenance performance that provides only a limited view of equipment availability and does not indicate expected reliability in combat. Commanders and maintenance personnel have become enslaved to weekly equipment readiness reports for fear their units' readiness may drop below 90%. Because training and operations cannot be stopped to reduce the possibility of breaking equipment and there are not enough personnel and hours to devote to organizational maintenance, organic unit maintenance sections are expected to elevate equipment readiness. But they are hard pressed to keep up with the workload, lack the skills and resources to correct recurring problems, and are rarely able to make more than a dent in readiness percentages. As regards their ability to improve equipment readiness significantly, commanders are set up to fail.
The Marine Corps Logistics Campaign Plan (MCLCP) defines logistics requirements for current and emerging warfighting concepts that enhance expeditionary and joint warfighting capabilities of Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). One of the plan's major objectives is to upgrade equipment readiness substantially by initiating actions to improve equipment reliability on the battlefield. It focuses on establishing a responsive and effective materiel life-cycle process for ground tactical equipment that will lead to reduced probabilities of equipment failure on the battlefield. The MCLCP highlights two metrics that will assist the process:
- "Mean time between failure" is the time that an end-item and component can be expected to operate before a failure. While the aviation community has been using this metric for years, it has eluded the ground forces. Capturing the requisite data will be daunting, but the results can transform reliability, availability, and maintainability of ground tactical equipment. Commanders will have a "predictive readiness" tool that shows the expected performance of equipment on the battlefield. Equipment program managers will be empowered to constantly monitor, evaluate, and correct problems.
- "Total ownership cost" complements the mean-time-between-failure metric by providing the total costs of operations and maintenance. Although this metric is not associated directly with combat, it lends valuable insights to equipment support costs and strongly supports budget justifications for improving equipment readiness.
Without a strong, standardized materiel life-cycle process, however, these metrics are relatively useless—which is why the Marine Corps Materiel Command is working on a better system. Once fully developed and augmented by mean-time-between-failure and total-ownership-cost data, MAGTFs will begin to benefit from the high degree of equipment reliability required to employ and sustain combat elements over the distances envisioned in current and emerging warfighting capabilities. Such reliability is an operational necessity.
The buyer of a new car can expect to drive up to 100,000 miles without a mechanical or electrical failure; in the armed forces, equipment failures are expected. The Marine Corps fielded the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) in the mid-1980s. By the time replacements started arriving in 2000, the average HMMWV had been driven 17,000 miles. (If you bought a car that lasted only 17,000 miles, a lawsuit would be in order.) In retrospect, part of the solution would have been to invest in a better product before it came off the assembly line; another part would have been an effective program to constantly monitor, evaluate, and improve the HMMWV throughout its life cycle.
Today, if there is a problem with alternators in the operating forces, more alternators are put on the shelf to meet demands. In the future, equipment program managers will correct the problem and provide new and improved alternators, thereby improving equipment readiness and reducing operating costs.
Coupled with other initiatives outlined in the MCLCP, responsibility for equipment readiness in the operating forces will be shifted. In conjunction with the realignment of maintenance capabilities in the MAGTF, units will remain responsible for properly operating and conducting first-echelon maintenance, but the combat service support element (CSSE) commander will be responsible for second- and third-echelon repair of ground tactical equipment in the MAGTF. Although the using units and the CSSE will contribute to readiness, the materiel life-cycle process owner—Marine Corps Materiel Command—will be responsible for overall equipment readiness in the operating forces. Equipment readiness will then more accurately reflect equipment reliability, not maintenance performance.
The underlying premise of the new process is that maintenance can reinforce failure—aside from damage caused by combat, accidents, and operator misuse, the failure is in equipment breaking down in the first place. Emphasizing maintenance as the solution to equipment readiness has done little to improve equipment readiness and has resulted in directing most MAGTF combat service support capabilities toward maintenance. Marginal reliability and large maintenance footprints are in conflict with emerging warfighting concepts, such as sea basing and ship-to-objective maneuver.
Highly reliable equipment does not require huge maintenance organizations and systems. In the foreseeable future, the Corps may not be able to field maintenance-free equipment, but actions can—and must—be taken to reduce maintenance requirements and improve reliability.
Major Wagner is an action officer in the Logistics Vision and Strategy Center at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.