At a recent precision targeting workshop, a carrier air group (CAG) commander gave an impressive presentation on the manner in which his squadrons had conducted strike operations during a recent deployment off Afghanistan. I thoroughly enjoyed every word of his briefing—until he described the challenges of loading the optimum weapon mix each mission because "they never knew what the weather would be."
As the Navy's top weather guy, my heart sank to hear such a statement from a returning warfighter in the presence of 200 professionals focused on improving the way we fight. Naturally, I had to ask him if he really meant what he said. Having identified myself prior to asking the question, the briefer quickly pointed out that what he meant to say was: "We didn't know which targets would be assigned until we checked in with 'Boss Man,' the combined air operations center. If sent south, the weather could include blowing dust; if sent north, blowing snow; if directed to central Afghanistan, it could be clear to the moon. We knew what the synoptic (big picture) weather was across the country—we just didn't know where we would be sent."
Having defended my community's honor, I began to consider the effects of his response. The goal of any combat operation is to deliver the most decisive and effective payload on the enemy, anywhere, anytime, and in any weather. The sub-optimization of his strike missions, because of weather, was not being caused by inaccurate forecasts. It was caused by the manner in which targets were being assigned to his strike aircraft in the conduct of the air campaign. This is a procedural issue that can be improved by getting the best forecast to the decision maker assigning strike platforms to available targets. He or she must know the current and forecasted weather affecting the battle space and specific weapon loads of the available strike platforms to best match the assets at hand with the targets on hand.
In fact, improving the weapon-to-target-to-weather matching process may be far easier to accomplish than trying to improve the science and art of weather forecasting. From the meteorology and oceanography perspective, we have been concentrating on improving primarily high-resolution forecasting to support precision weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The focus on higher resolution forecasts is driven by the need to accurately depict wind speed and direction at weapon launch points, along the flight path to winds over target, and to be able to predict dispersion of biochemical agents over population centers.
These high-resolution, atmospheric computer models are initialized (or driven) by larger scale models that we try constantly to improve. It is safe to say, however, that we concentrated primarily on improving fine-scale models during the past decade because, as we rely more and more on precision weapons, the requirements for more accurate weather forecasts increase. With reduced weapon payloads and the ever-present desire to minimize collateral damage, an unexpected wind shear along the flight path or in the weapon's terminal phase could mean the difference between mission accomplished or re-attack. Wind profiles are just one of many environmental parameters that affect the "fog of war" when supporting precision weapons. Cloud decks and slant-- range visibility severely affect the flight profiles of aircraft and the laser targeting abilities of ground forces.
Considering the trends in weather modeling and research and development, the recent briefing by the CAG commander made me wonder if we were taking a step backward. The correct conclusion is to improve forecasting to support all levels of engagement: tactical, operational, and strategic. But precise forecasts are of little value unless operators and decision makers use the latest forecasts in the planning and execution stages of operations. This involves confidence in the forecast—which must be earned—and a process by which decision makers plan operations to account for forecasted weather, instead of changing plans because of unexpected weather. We should match the scale of forecasts to the scale of operations, and the forecast should reside in the common operational picture.
In conducting a country-wide air campaign against fixed and mobile targets, the latest synoptic scale weather picture should be readily available to Boss Man to help in weapon selection. For example, in planning for underway replenishment, the ship's navigator should be able to see the sea state forecasted in the future for a particular location, and the special operations force commander should be able to assess predicted surf conditions in his planning. The forecast in the common operational picture should be shared across the battle space, from the combined air operations center to carrier ready rooms.
Statistics show we can forecast synoptically out to 36 hours with the same accuracy we had ten years ago out to 24 hours. To translate that into expectations for accurate target forecasts in support of precision weapons at the 36-hour point would be unwise, if not dangerous. Nonetheless, if the Navy is going to assign strike platforms to targets in near real time, it must have the latest forecasts available to optimize the weapon-to-target-to-weather matching. Although my community is making progress, we must do better. During an analysis of 300 internet chats (involving an average of ten weather forecasters) supporting Operation Noble Eagle, weather affected the planning or execution of operations in 67 instances.
The Navy must improve the process for taking weather into account as the tempo of war increases. It cannot afford to have planes return with ordnance because "we didn't know what the weather was going to be."
Admiral Donaldson heads the Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command.