Dick Behrenhausen, a retired U.S. Army brigadier general, was lobbing mortar rounds on the banks of the Severn River in Annapolis.
But he was not aiming at the Naval Academy, Army's traditional rival. This time the target was West Point—his own alma mater. In his view, the Military Academy is drifting away from the Spartan ideals that produced soldiers such as MacArthur, Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton and marching steadily toward the ivied walls of academe, an area in which the Military Academy cannot—and should not—compete if it hopes to retain the admiration of the American people and the support of the Congress.
His remarks came during a panel discussion on maintaining the service academies' relevance at the U.S. Naval Institute's 128th Annual Meeting and 12th Annapolis Seminar. Dr. Charles Neimeyer, Academic Dean at the Naval War College, moderated a panel that included Behrenhausen; Captain Arthur Athens, U.S. Naval Reserve, Commandant of Midshipmen at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy; Major General Murray; and Captain Bruce Stubbs. All but Athens had been at Cantigny in March.
Over the past 30 years, Behrenhausen said, West Point has changed its vision: from that of an academy—a place where special skills or subjects are taught—to that of a university—an institution of higher learning providing facilities for teaching and research and authorized to grant degrees. "In making these changes, it is rapidly losing its viability," he said. Behrenhausen focused on four areas:
- Academics—junior officers formerly spent only three years instructing, which kept West Point in touch with the Army as the bulk of the faculty turned over every three years; a cadre of permanent professors provided continuity. Today, as the academy pursues its quest for the holy grail of accreditation, a trend toward longer tours, more Ph.D.s, and more civilian instructors has reduced contact with the active Army.
- Admissions—the quest for the best and the brightest students has shifted to a quest for the "brightest." The admissions process now looks for candidates with high ACT/SAT scores and has deemphasized the value of service as team captain or class president or Eagle Scout—traditional indicators of leadership potential.
- Resources—DoD funding insufficient to maintain what the administration calls a "Margin of Excellence," flowing from the proliferation of academic programs that has led to reliance on private fund raising, even for necessities. West Point has not conducted a winter intramural program for five years because it lacks adequate gymnasium facilities.
- Intercollegiate Athletics—get into conferences to generate money; as a result, the academy is fielding "mediocre teams in nondescript conferences," doing absolutely nothing for the viability of West Point.
All of this has resulted in lower retention rates, which is hardly an attractive proposition for a Congress well aware that West Point graduates cost five times more than ROTC graduates do at service entry, he said.
Having lost the battle to the bean counters, Behrenhausen predicted, the Army eventually will be forced to close Ft. Leavenworth's Command and General Staff School and Carlisle Barracks's Army War College. What may happen then, he said, is that West Point will become the training academy for all officers of all grades; it will not, however, be a service academy or a university.
A more-optimistic Athens, paraphrasing the conclusion used by then-Colonel Victor Krulak as the rationale for the Marine Corps, said that the United States might not need the academies—but that it wants them. Athens, a Naval Academy graduate who served on active duty in the Marine Corps, said the nation expects them to produce leaders; serve as symbols of service heritage; and provide "springboards" for youths who might not otherwise have an opportunity to attend college.
As challenges facing the academies, he cited a nationwide high-school conduct and honor system gone askew, academy schedules so full that cadets and midshipmen have little time for reflection, and the tendency for some academy graduates to be a bit impressed with themselves.
Murray, also a Naval Academy graduate, said that recent experience in the Persian Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan demonstrates that the nation needs the corps of officers who are produced at the academies; the academies are today as relevant as they have been at any time in our history. Many of the highest-ranking officers in the Navy and Marine Corps are Naval Academy graduates, he said. Taking an approach different from Behrenhausen's—specifically the costs over a 20-year career and varying retention rates—Murray said that Academy graduates are a more cost-effective alternative than ROTC officers.
All indications are that consumers like the Naval Academy product, according to Murray. At Quantico, for example, the Marines consider Naval Academy graduates undergoing training as second lieutenants at The Basic School to be far superior to their contemporaries. He is convinced that Naval Academy training is what distinguishes its graduates, and believes that the Naval Academy is far more rigorous, academically and militarily, than when he graduated in 1968. Citing the Naval Academy's strategic vision as one sensitive to the need for change over time, he said the academy experience today does reflect the needs of the services.
Stubbs said that the Coast Guard Academy can sustain close scrutiny, but that it has not kept pace with the times. The Coast Guard is the nation's preeminent federal agency for executing the nation's ocean policy, but the Academy has no academic major in ocean policy and national maritime security studies to provide the required intellectual foundation for these operational missions. Instead, he said, the Academy is pursuing excellence in support missions such as civil engineering, which are increasingly attractive to outsourcing.
The Coast Guard Academy must graduate officers prepared to fulfill "a kluge of six different agencies": a maritime constabulary, an environmental protection agency, a life-saving service, a regulatory agency, a navigation service, and an armed service. "Yet, within the Coast Guard," he said, "there is no broad agreement on the service's essence. Is it humanitarianism, law enforcement, or military?" The academy's emphasis is on humanitarianism, he said. Reinforcing Behrenhausen's view, he said that the military mission should be "first among equals," but observed that the classroom now dominates the drill field at New London. Concern over accreditation has resulted in less focus on the military mission. Behrenhausen commented that Harvard does not care about accreditation: "Harvard sets its own standard—and the academies should do the same." He reflected that West Point did not award degrees until the mid-1930s, and that MacArthur et al. got theirs by mail long after they graduated.
Comments from the audience generally reinforced the view that the academies' primary mission is to produce military leaders, which prompted an observation from Behrenhausen: "We've got to win the [officer] quality and quantity battle or we will not get the resources [from Congress]. We can't make the case on academics." Murray acknowledged that there always would be tension between academia and the military but felt that Naval Academy leadership was committed to a careful approach to integrating the military with academics. An active-duty member of the audience reported mixed performance results from a very small sample of officers; when he recently ranked his 12 subordinates—which included three Academy graduates—the graduates ranked first, middle, and last. "At least there is diversity," he said. The same questioner also said he was disappointed to find no active-duty Naval Academy representation on the panel.
Neither West Point nor Annapolis wanted this subject on the agenda, Behrenhausen replied, "They're afraid of this dialogue . . . because the numbers are so poor and the gap has narrowed so dramatically between [academy] graduates and [ROTC/OCS] graduates. . . . Unless we do a dramatic turnaround in retaining service academy graduates . . . and these quantity graduates ascend to quality positions, we will not win the resource battle."
Athens said the academies have a big advantage over ROTC in that most of their faculty and coaching staff are "on board" with the mission of the institution in a closely integrated approach to producing officers. In contrast, he cited an unnamed civilian institution where the football coach had no interest in the ROTC program and some academics were not even aware that one existed at their university.
Noting that two members of the panel (Murray and Athens) had spent 26 weeks at The Basic School for Marine officers even after graduating from the Naval Academy, Behrenhausen asked rhetorically, "Why not send all ROTC graduates to West Point/Annapolis for 26 weeks of training?" thus reinforcing the role of the institutions.
On how the academies can win the battle of the bean counters and acquire the resources necessary to modernize, Murray cited the need for more military interaction with Capitol Hill, where fewer and fewer members have any military experience. Stubbs, recalling the debate at Cantigny, pointed out the need to close the gap between the military and the nation's elite.
Behrenhausen took the challenge, citing studies by Charles Moskos, distinguished military sociologist who teaches at Northwestern, where almost no one goes into the military, especially given the long service commitments popular with Congress. But when Moskos asked his students if they would buy into a 12-month program—3 months training and 9 months active duty—after which they would return to college with their final two years paid for, 30% said they were interested. "There's your elite . . . [but] we never think outside the box until it's too late," he concluded.