Nowhere is the lack of agreement over the Coast Guard's essence more discernible than with each Commandant who brings his own interpretation to the job. A comparison of some policies of two recent Commandants—Admiral Paul A. Yost (1986-1990) and Admiral J. William Kime (1990-1994)—illustrates the absence of internal cohesion and highlights the issues that continue to fuel disagreement.
Admiral Yost, a designated cutterman and Silver Star Medal recipient from Vietnam, modified the officer evaluation report (OER) by adding a new dimension titled "Warfare Expertise." For the first time, the Coast Guard formally evaluated the competency of its officers to conduct naval warfare missions. By long practice, the Coast Guard does not designate its officers as either "staff" or "line." All are eligible for command, given they meet prescribed requirements. Reflecting this policy, the OER did not have separate measures for line (e.g., seamanship and airmanship) and staff (e.g., law and finance). Instead, it had a single measure, "Operational & Specialty Expertise."
Many Coast Guardsmen resented this new expertise measure, which possibly gave the seagoing officers, who had greater opportunities to acquire warfare expertise, an advantage over those officers who remained on the beach to license, regulate, and inspect the merchant marine. The matter became contentious.
Admiral Kime, an officer who had spent his career principally in the marine safety field without command at sea, relieved Admiral Yost in 1990 and quickly removed the warfare expertise measure. Admiral Kime eventually replaced it with the "Work-Life Sensitivity/Expertise" measure to assess an individual's support for his personal Work-Life Program. Many officers considered this new sensitivity measure as an inappropriate litmus test for loyalty and redundant, given the full array of OER leadership measures. Like the warfare expertise measure, this too became controversial. After Admiral Kime retired, the next Commandant, Admiral Robert E. Kramek, eliminated this measure in an OER makeover.
Other initiatives by Admiral Kime signaled his view of the Coast Guard, which he referred to as "the world's premiere maritime operating agency" rather than "the world's best Coast Guard." He removed the drug interdiction assist teams from Bolivia and Ecuador, which had been established by Admiral Yost to train host country forces in riverine countersmuggling operations. He also eliminated the Coast Guard's E-2C Hawkeye air surveillance capability and the prototype HC130C Hercules aircraft equipped with an air search roto-dome radar. Interestingly, these programs could have made contributions to today's homeland security surveillance requirements. Admiral Kime also gave up the antisubmarine and antisurface warfare missions, removing all sonar, torpedoes, and Harpoon missiles from the Hamilton (WHEC-378)-class high-endurance cutters. This eliminated the sole national defense capabilities that the Coast Guard maintained in a state of readiness for warfighting not derived from "peacetime" roles.
Despite formal requests from U.S. European Command and Central Command, Admiral Kime refused to deploy a major cutter for peacetime engagement and national defense purposes. Admiral Kime did not press to deploy Coast Guard cutters to the Persian Gulf War (Coast Guard law enforcement detachments and port security units did deploy). Coming on the heels of no patrol boat and major cutter participation in the 1989 Panama Invasion, the 1987 Persian Gulf Tanker Re-flagging Contingency, and the 1981 Grenada Invasion, many officers thought Admiral Kime had an unbalanced interpretation of the Coast Guard's essence.
Officers contrasted Admiral Kime's actions with those of highly revered Commandant Admiral Edwin J. Roland (1962-1966). In his book Guardians of the Sea (Naval Institute Press, 1987), Professor Robert Johnson states that Admiral Roland engineered the Coast Guard's active combat participation in the Vietnam War because he feared the effect of another passive support role such as the one in the Korean War would jeopardize the Coast Guard's status as an armed force. Sharing this view, Admiral Yost aggressively, but unsuccessfully, campaigned to deploy Coast Guard forces to support the 1987 Tanker Re-flagging Contingency.
The divergent interpretation of the Coast Guard's essence by these two commandants drove their policies and pulled the service in opposite directions. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard still has not addressed the underlying causes of their different interpretations.