Abdul Al-Shakuras thought it would be a good chance to take a smoke break and get some fresh air. The new guy on the desk seemed to have everything under control. Stepping outside the Iraqi military command and radar center at Al-Taji, Abdul was pleasantly impressed with the evening. It was nearing midnight and at this time of night it was quiet; the lights of Baghdad twinkled on the southwest horizon. Abdul stood against the building's wall, lit his cigarette, and inhaled. He contemplated the stars; was one moving? Then he heard an odd noise above him, an ominous low-pitched rattling, growing in intensity. Not too worried about it, he started to take another puff when the sky erupted around him and instantly he was ushered into the presence of Allah.
Abdul had just been "shwacked" by the pointiest end of the United States' stick. A SLAM-ER (standoff landattack-missile expanded response), dropped by a Navy F/A-18 at about 30,000 feet and 30 miles south of the Taji command-and-control center, had found its mark. The F/A-18 flying from the carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) was part of the highly publicized strike conducted by Joint Task Forces Southwest Asia on 16 February 2001. Participating in the strike were Marine F/ A-18s of VMFA-312, but what were Marines doing bombing Baghdad?
VMFA-312, the noted "Checkerboard" squadron, is one of four Marine F/A-18 squadrons that are "dedicated boat squadrons." They are tasked with full integration into a carrier air wing (in this case CVW-3) on a recurring basis, just like a Navy squadron. This policy began with an agreement made in 1992 by then-Commandant General Carl E. Mundy Jr. and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso. Post-Gulf War downsizing drove the agreement. Both Navy and Marine Corps aviation were under the budget trimming knife. To minimize their losses, the Marines agreed to supplement the Navy's carrier air wings.
Of course, Marine aviators serving on board U.S. Navy carriers were nothing new. Marine aviators have operated off flattops since before World War II. But one would have to look back to the Korean War to find a time when Marine squadrons served with such regularity and in such large numbers in proportion to the overall size of Marine fighter aviation on board flattops. The four F/A-18 squadrons represent about one-fourth of all Marine fighter aviation.
This policy and the nature of international relations in which the United States has undertaken enforcing the peace have put carrier-dedicated Marine fighter squadrons on the front lines. VMFA-312 participated in Operation Desert Fox in 1998, and other Marine boat squadrons have participated in Operation Southern Watch. The Baghdad strike of February 2001 was a Southern Watch mission.
This mission was newly elected President George W. Bush's response to increased Iraqi activity in the southern no-fly zone (SNFZ), below the 33rd parallel that defines the SNFZ's northern boundary. In the first week that President Bush was in office, there was a threefold increase in surface fire directed at coalition aircraft that patrolled the no-fly zone. In addition, during the first two weeks of February, coalition aircraft were "engaged"-fired at or illuminated by Iraqi radar-20 times. The ground fire was antiaircraft guns (AAA) of various calibers, including the 100-mm variety that could easily reach the higher altitudes that allied aircraft flew and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The Iraqis even employed multiple-launched rocket systems occasionally.
Checkerboard pilots and their Navy counterparts retaliated. On the day of President Bush's inauguration, Checkerboard pilot Captain Sean Garick, along with Navy F/A-18 pilots, dropped 2000-pound GPS-guided joint-direct attack munitions (JDAMs) on an AAA site. This strike was historically significant in that it marked the first time that aircraft launched from the spanking new Harry S. Truman delivered ordnance against a hostile target.6 A few days later, on 12 February, Major William H. "Slap" Maxwell led a small strike package of about 20 Harry S. Truman aircraft that included a division (four aircraft) of VMFA-312 pilots in a strike on a S-60 AAA site in southern Iraq. Maxwell's division also successfully used JDAMs.
This was only the warm-up for the big event, when the fight would be taken to Saddam's front and back porches. The targets to be hit were some of the most significant, both politically and militarily, in recent years. A few were even north of Baghdad, an area untouched since the Gulf War. This was not without its risks as the sky over Baghdad was one of the most heavily protected in the world. Flying to the outskirts of Baghdad certainly qualified as combat, and Marines were in the middle of it. Planning for the Baghdad strike, as a contingency operation, had been completed over the previous month. It was a joint effort by Lieutenant Colonel L. P. Futch and the commanding officer of VFA-105, a Navy F/A-18 squadron, also on board the Harry S. Truman.
Another aspect of Marine fighter aviation involvement in carrier operations is the opportunity it provided for Marine aviators to become intimately familiar with joint and multinational planning and operations. This was readily apparent from the Baghdad strike. Lieutenant Colonel Futch, and squadron members working with him, took "highly directive instructions" from higher echelons and choreographed the air assets to fulfill these instructions through a smooth flowing and successful strike operation. Thus, Saddam got the right message without it seeming overbearing to sensitive coalition countries. The number of aircraft required to pull off such an adroit act of "diplomacy" was considerable.
There were about 70 aircraft involved. Slightly more than one-fourth actually delivered bombs. The strike aircraft - those dropping ordnance - included 14 F/A-18s from the Harry S. Truman, 8 U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles, and an element of Royal Air Force GR-1s. The U.S. Air Force and Royal Air Force aircraft were based in Kuwait.
In the supporting cast were Navy E-2Cs and Air Force AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft, Navy F-14s and Air Force F-15 airborne interceptors, Air Force KC-10 and Navy S-3 tankers, and Marine Corps and Navy EA-6Bs that provided electronic countermeasures. The U.S. Air Force's A-10 Warthogs even got involved, dropping leaflets over southern Iraq urging the people to overthrow Saddam. Once the varied elements knew their places in the overall mission, which was spread over a two-hour period, they ran their tasks like parts of a smoothly functioning machine.
The Marine Corps F/A-18s under combat loads for the trip to Baghdad were decidedly burdened. They each carried three joint stand-off weapon (JSOW) bombs, two external fuel tanks, an AIM-120 air-to-air radar missile, two AIM-9 guided missiles, and 200 rounds of 20-mm ammunition. The AIM-120, AIM-9s, and 20-mm ammunition were for self-defense against an airborne threat; the JSOW s were for Saddam.
The Iraqis thought by tucking their radar and command-and-control systems above the 33rd parallel and out of the no-fly zones, they would be safe from retribution. This was not the case. The JSOWs and SLAM-ERs are a new generation of bombs and air-to-ground missiles, are longrange and precision-guided. The JSOWs are glide bombs, relatively new in the arsenal. They are more than 13 feet long and weigh about 1,300 pounds, with an 800-pound warhead. Depending on the parameters under which they are dropped, they can reach a target up to 50 nautical miles from launch point. Only 60 had been dropped previous to this mission, and 30 were to be dropped this night.
Take off occurred just at dusk, and the first stop was an Air Force KC-10 tanker. The aircraft met the KC-10 over Kuwait. It was dark, no moon, the Hornet pilots were wearing night vision goggles, and there was only one tanker. With one of the tanker's hoses transferring fuel slower than normal, it took longer than expected. Nevertheless, the tanker fulfilled its mission, there were no midair collisions, and the Hornets were topped off. It was time to head into Iraq.
Off the tanker, Major Robert A. Peterson's section of two Hornets, which had been flexed to different targets, proceeded ahead of the others, with Lieutenant Colonel Futch's element of eight about ten minutes behind. They pressed into Iraq heading west-northwest, staying away from populated areas.
It took 45 minutes to get to the launch point for their bombs. The 100-knot headwind did not help. The key turn point was an imaginary line through the center of Baghdad and extending south. When they crossed the line they made a "tac right" and pointed their noses north. Baghdad, now a distinct mass of lights, was at their one o' clock. The radio that had been quiet now gave intermittent bursts of information. The F-15Es, which had just fired AGM-130s, were reporting to the AWACS on their launches.
Lieutenant Colonel Futch's element was the last one to Baghdad. The Iraqi gunners had been alerted by the previous strikes and were at their posts and already throwing up a lot of ordnance, mostly AAA that did not quite reach their altitude. As they approached the 33rd parallel, about 20 miles south of Baghdad, they were well within their bomb drop parameters. When Lieutenant Colonel Futch's wingman saw the flashes from the small explosive charges that kicked the bombs off the wings of Futch's plane, he pickled his, too. The others in Futch's division followed suit and a flurry of JSOWs dropped off the Hornets and dove toward their respective targets around Baghdad-Al Taqaddum airfield, radar stations, and the Taji command and radar center, north of Baghdad. Launched at above 30,000 feet and about 30 miles from their targets, it took five or six minutes for them to impact.
That meant that the bombs Major Peterson's section dropped, as well as the others, were hitting just as Lieutenant Colonel Futch's element was nearest to Baghdad. It was like taking a stick and whacking a hornet's nest. The sky over Baghdad erupted in a blaze of antiaircraft fire, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and who knows what else; it was reminiscent of the scenes of Desert Storm on CNN. With bombs off, Futch called for a hard right turn away from the 33rd parallel and Baghdad. Having climbed into the rarefied air at 36,000 feet to launch their JSOWs, the F/A-18s were slow and unable to maneuver aggressively, which is what one certainly wants to do when SAMs are inbound. Futch called for a descent and afterburners - a move that would increase speed and get into lower, thicker air.
The pilots were inundated with threat warnings·. The radio was alive with calls of SAM launches and even a report that a MiG-23 had taken off from Al-Taqaddum airfield, which they could see below them. Although they did not know it at the time, the MiG drove due north, evidently not wanting to tangle with the Tomcats and Eagles that escorted the strike force. The Tomcat crews' disappointment was evident in their prodding of AWACs for more information on the MiG. Inside the cockpits of the F/ A-18s, warning equipment lit up indicating that Iraqi radar was looking at their aircraft-more indications of SAMs. There were plenty of indications outside the cockpit to indicate they were being shot at. The AAA, though well below them and distant, was intense. SAMs were worrisome though, coming up and breaking their altitude. A couple of what must have been SA-2s came up behind and above them. None were guiding. They were ballistic, rising, peaking, and going straight back down and exploding in Baghdad, which no doubt is the cause for the collateral damage that the Iraqis always were feeding to the media.
The fighters were lighter after expending their bombs, not to mention the fuel that had been burned. They ramped downhill with afterburners ablaze behind them. The burners were good for speed but also clearly visible at a great distance. Sure enough, they began receiving reports that their aircraft had been spotted by the Iraqis, so they turned off the burners for the long flight home, which seemed to take forever even at ten miles a minute.
While they drilled toward the tanker posted on the border of Kuwait, a drama of modern war played out on their radios. A British voice was heard, one of the GR-1 pilots. In typical British detachment he reported that he was being targeted by a SA-6 radar and taking evasive action. His voice belied a fairly serious situation. The SA-6 was getting good tracking information from a radar and if launched would come after the GR-1 like a hound after a rabbit. Then, within three seconds another voice over the radio called "Magnum." This was an EA-6B pilot reporting that he fired a high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) at the SAM's radar. Since the HARM guides on the threat radar's energy, it will hit the radar dead on unless the Iraqis turn it off, which means that the SAM has no guidance information. Either way, it rescued the GR-1. Survival in the ongoing war of attrition with the Iraqis is dependent on acquiring and processing electronic information.
The F/ A-18s got to the tanker with only a little gas to spare. They took what they needed and were on their way back to the Harry S. Truman. The last hurdle was the night carrier landing. It puts it all in perspective when the pilots attested that the night carrier landing, even under the fair weather conditions, was scarier than the mission itself. It was nearing midnight when they all recovered safely. The mission had lasted slightly more than four hours. The mission accomplished its purpose. The Iraqis shut down their radars, and there was less shooting at coalition aircraft over the no-fly zone, at least for a time.
Disregarding the debate whether Marine F/A-18s are properly used when tasked to serve on aircraft carriers, one thing is certain. The carrier-deployed Hornet squadrons get lots of practice in handling and employing the latest ordnance in combat conditions. Carrying real ordnance under combat conditions will pay dividends when Hornet squadrons are called on to perform any of their missions, including close-air support. As we see today in Afghanistan, the most forward-deployed Marines are those in F/A-18 squadrons on board a carrier. They are available not only to participate in the strategic air war but also to support a ground operation. In addition, squadron officers and enlisted men gain tremendous experience working in the joint and coalition environment.
Carrier operations are intense and demanding, not just on the fighter pilots but on the entire squadron. Excelling in this demanding environment can only mean better trained Marines. Marines who participate in Southern Watch are gaining the unique experience of operating in actual combat. This is giving Marine Corps aviation a cadre of combat experienced personnel who will be available to lead in present and future conflicts.