Chesty: The Life and Times of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller, USMC
Jon Hoffman. New York: Random House, 2001. 696 pp. Illus. Notes. Bib. Index. $35.00 ($31.50).
Reviewed by Captain Tim Bairstow, U.S. Marine Corps
One would be hard pressed to undertake a more ambitious project in documenting U.S. Marine Corps history than that of writing a biography of the Corps' most celebrated hero, Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller. That is, however, exactly what Jon Hoffman has done with this new work.
The first question a potential reader probably will ask is, why bother reading this work when Burke Davis wrote Marine (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962) some 40 years ago? The answer, as the author points out in his preface, is that while Marine relies almost solely on one source (interviews with Puller himself), Chesty draws on hundreds of sources. Chesty is more than just an entertaining tale of the Marine Corps' most worshipped Marine, it is an impressive work of history. Jon Hoffman has written as objectively as anyone who has worn the eagle, globe, and anchor ever could hope to do. While Puller is rightfully revered throughout the pages of Chesty, there is none of the pandering of other writings about him.
Most readers will be impressed with the richness of detail in this book. Every portion of Puller's career is addressed, from his time as a gendarmerie lieutenant in Haiti to his post-Marine Corps life. Some little-known facts of Puller's life are disclosed, such as his summary courtmartial while a student at Candidates School in 1921, which found him guilty of being absent without leave for two hours, or that he testified at the infamous Ribbon Creek trial. Fortunately for most readers, the detail of Chesty is most prevalent in those chapters that deal with the lesser-known portions of Puller's life.
Chesty contains a myriad of lessons for the modern military reader. There are the lessons that one would expect to find here: lead from the front; be an avid student of military history; and share the hardships of one's subordinates. Other lessons, such as Puller's use of tactical decision games with his subordinates, are less expected. Many readers will find direct parallels with the practical issues faced by Marines today: in his observations of training prior to Guadalcanal, Puller noted that divisions spent too much time on skills such as air landings, demolitions, and small-boat operations, to the detriment of other skills that proved more decisive.
The author is not shy about addressing some of the criticism that was levied at Puller both during and after his career. Numerous denunciations are refuted. The then-lieutenant colonel's performance on Peleliu, where Puller had been accused of being a butcher, is staunchly defended as necessary because of a lack of maneuver space. On several occasions, The assertion that Puller relied too much on the frontal attack throughout his career is refuted. Other criticisms, however, remain upheld. The author agrees that Puller judged subordinate units' performances in battle by the number of casualties taken, and he questions Puller's decision to launch Task Force Drysdale north from Koto-ri in Korea when other, more cohesive units were available.
The integrity and candor of Jon Hoffman's work are among its most admirable qualities. These, along with the attention to detail put into the supporting research, make Chesty not just a biography but a scholarly work of history as well.
The Final Crucible: U.S. Marines in Korea, Vol. 2: 1953
Lee Ballenger. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2001. 300 pp. Illus. Bib. Index. $26.95 ($24.25).
Reviewed by Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Even though the war was 50 years ago, readers of The Final Crucible who fought on the outposts in the last phase of the Korean War will get night sweats. Those who were not there will understand why when reading the book. This is the second volume of Lee Ballenger's coverage of the Korean War. Although it is about the Marines on the western front, those who fought on the Korean hills with the Army will recall their own crucible.
From the time the Marines dug in on the hills on either side of the site of the Panmunjon peace negotiations in the early spring of 1952 until the cease-fire in July 1953, they suffered more than 13,000 casualties. Volume 1 covered 1952, which included the bloodbaths on "Bunker Hill" and the "Hook." The Final Crucible carries the story to the gory war's conclusion with the final convulsive battles for outposts "Reno," "Vegas," and "Carson," and the bitter struggle for "Boulder City" on the very eve of the Panmunjon truce.
Prior to the start of prolonged peace talks with the Communists in the late fall of 1951, the war had been one of fire and movement. Once the talks were started, movement ceased and firepower held sway. The final year and a half of the war saw the antagonists in fixed positions quarrelling over advantageous terrain in the no-man's-land between opposing trench lines. Human flesh was pitted against steel in fierce battles in which steel inevitably won. Rarely did either side assault the other's main defenses. The struggle was over small outposts situated to protect those defenses.
Outposts were manned by as few as a fire team and rarely by more than a platoon. Invariably fighting started at night. An outpost would be pummeled by artillery and mortar fire and then assaulted. If it was overrun, counterattacks were launched to retake it in a series of skirmishes that left the slopes of the hills covered with dead until one side or the other grew tired of the carnage and conceded possession—if only temporarily.
The author served in combat with the Marines in Korea during 1953. He brings a passion to the story he tells. Volume 5 of the official history of U.S. Marine Corps operations in Korea provides a clinical history of the 1st Marine Division's battles against the two Chinese armies it faced on the western front. The Final Crucible draws some of its material from this. The official history, however, does not capture the human drama; Lee Ballenger does this in spades. Not only does he write well and keep the purely military context in balance, but he also writes his history through the eyes of those who made it. The Final Crucible borders on being a passion play. The war of 1953 was a lieutenants', sergeants, and privates' war to fight. It was these who were targeted when this book was researched.
Occasionally the author takes a critical swipe at the Army high command's strategy in Korea, but his real focus remains the Marine teens and 20-somethings who did the fighting. The reader vicariously experiences the black humor, forbearance, terror, and pain they felt and the bravery they exhibited on besieged outposts when in a desperate attempt to halt a Chinese onslaught the chilling call went out for artillery to "Fire VT on my position!"
If the Korean War and the Marines are remembered at all by Americans it is for the gallant fighting in the Pusan Perimeter, Inchon, and the Chosin Reservoir. It is well that the author chronicles the later forgotten phase of the "Forgotten War."
Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense
James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001. 258 pp. Maps. Charts. Appendices. Notes. Index. $24.95 ($23.70).
Reviewed by Commander Paul James, U.S. Navy
National missile defense (NMD) has emerged as one of the most emotional issues confronting the Bush administration, and in Defending America, the authors, two well-known defense analysts from the Bookings Institution, propose to offer "a sober analysis of the role national missile defense can play in American national security." In general, they succeed, by discussing the technology, threats, and both the domestic and international politics of NMD. In the end they propose renegotiating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty through diplomacy with Russia and fielding a limited two-tiered capability.
The authors argue that emerging threats necessitate construction of a missile-defense system, but the phased solution proposed by the Clinton administration, particularly in its final or "CY configuration, would unnecessarily sour relations with Russia, provoke China, and fuel resentment among NATO and other U.S. allies. Both authors argue effectively' that missile defense is not a panacea and must be considered an adjunct to an overall strategy based on deterrence, preemption, and prevention (or counterproliferation). Correspondingly, they propose a methodological approach ("do it right, not just fast") to solving both the technical and political challenges inherent in fielding this capability.
The book does provide a balanced review of the issues, though it is not without flaws. As might be expected from two distinguished policy analysts, the book is strongest in its analysis of the international politics and domestic policy. It is weaker in its analysis of the systems and technology. It also contains some confusing statements concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (i.e., its observation that Navy theater-wide [NTW] defense may not be treaty compliant) and in its assertion that theater high-altitude air defense (THAAD) is inherently superior to NTW in its resistance to decoys.
Renegotiation of the existing treaty with Russia is central to the authors' missile defense strategy. The authors are contemptuous of the Clinton administration's efforts to modify the existing Anti-- Ballistic Missile Treaty, which consisted of little more that asking for changes and offering nothing in return. The authors propose incentives (such as a reduction in nuclear warheads) and confidence-building measures to mollify Russian concerns and assuage Russian pride. If faced with the inevitability of U.S. deployment and the alternative of unilateral abrogation, the conclusion that Russia will negotiate is reasonable. As for China, the authors conclude that its objection is most likely unavoidable and eloquently recite potential Chinese reactions. They note, however, that China cannot be allowed a veto on deployment and argue only that the United States should avoid unnecessary provocations such as widespread weapon sales to Taiwan.
The technical solution proposed is a boost-phase capability designed to engage enemy missiles during the initial, powered minutes of flight backed by a limited midcourse capability. A boost-phase capability does have certain diplomatic advantages, as it poses virtually no threat to either China or Russia. The difficulty, however, of hitting a missile with another missile when both trajectory and final velocity are uncertain is understated. In fact, a boost-phase capability could play a role in any eventual architecture but it is highly dependent on proximity to the launch site and a reliable course-correction capability to account for errors in predicted point of impact incurred during the interceptors' time of flight.
The commitment of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and President George W. Bush to national missile defense over vociferous objections sounded by voices around the world (and a not inconsiderable number domestically) makes Defending America a timely analysis of a key policy issue. Whether it succeeds or fails, NMD will affect the future role of the United States in the world community and the eventual legacy of the Bush administration. This book is not perfect, but for anyone interested in gaining an understanding of the technology and policy issues surrounding national missile defense and the possible alternatives, it is a worthwhile read.