In Aden, the young man stood up for holy war and destroyed a destroyer feared by the powerful," Osama bin Laden said, reciting a poem in late February 2001. She was a ship of "injustice that sailed to its doom" along a course of "false arrogance, self-conceit and strength."
"It was a well-planned act of war by obviously brave and disciplined warriors almost certainly supported by one or other enemy states who view America and Israel as mortal enemies," former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman wrote in The Washington Post, three days after two Islamic "warriors" attacked the Cole (DDG-67) in Aden's harbor on 12 October 2000. "As Americans learned at Okinawa," he continued, "where 35 ships were sunk by kamikazes, it is impossible to protect completely against suicide attacks. The only defense is good intelligence and the will to retaliate against the source. The American government has neither."
"We lost 17 shipmates and 42 others were injured," Admiral Vernon Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, wrote in his forwarding message to the Cole investigation report in January 2001. "Our heart goes out to their families and their shipmates and we deeply mourn their loss. . .Ours is a demanding profession. Sometimes it is a dangerous profession. Stay sharp. Be proud. Be safe. Be ready!"
Events of 2000, tragically punctuated by the terrorist attack on the Cole and the loss of the nuclear submarine Kursk with the deaths of 118 Russian sailors, underscored the reality that, even in peacetime, naval service is a demanding and dangerous profession. But the Cole disaster somehow signifies more. The "asymmetric threats" of numerous academic studies and analyses were proved real and perhaps far more dangerous and insidious than heretofore acknowledged, at least publicly. The Navy, in a "war for people" at home, found itself in a war of uncertain and ambiguous—albeit lethal—dimensions virtually everywhere else.
Exercises and Operations
Yet official mantras continued unabated in the face of this uncertainty. "The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps—America's naval expeditionary forces—provide the nation with a flexible and effective instrument of security policy with which to promote stability and project power in regions of importance to the United States," the March 2001 draft of the CNO's annual "Vision ... Presence . . . Power" program guide explained. "Forward-deployed, combat-credible naval expeditionary forces are vitally important to shaping the global security environment, assuring access to overseas regions, and permitting timely and frequently the initial crisis response."
Two trends—with important implications for the Navy—characterized the new global security environment. The first is a pattern of threats to regional stability and the emergence of regional actors that continue to hold at risk U.S. citizens, interests, and friends. "We must expect that regional actors and local actors will continue to pursue increased influence within their areas of interest," the program guide clarified. "These actors include rogue states, states with aspirations of regional hegemony, and new non-state actors with a capacity to influence events on a scale disproportionate to traditional measures of national power."
The second trend is increased globalization—the seemingly countless ways in which nation-states and others are linked, "economically, politically, militarily, culturally, and more," according to the program guide. "On the one hand, increased interdependence promotes a more stable world. On the other, its effects heighten the consequences of regional instability and also provide potential adversaries with new access to employ unconventional or asymmetric means to challenge U.S. interests."
For the Navy in 2000, the new security environment underscored the relevance of its enduring role of maintaining a forward presence with combat-credible naval forces—with a dramatically heightened awareness of the consequences of lapses in readiness and diligence. The Navy's operating and personnel tempos remained "red-lined" last year. On average, slightly more than 50% of the service's dwindling numbers of war-ready ships were under way at any time, and more than one-third were forward deployed—embarking some 30,500 Marines and 55,000 sailors. Five aircraft carrier battle groups and five Marine expeditionary units embarked in amphibious ready groups deployed throughout the world—and often engaged in combat during what otherwise would be characterized as "peacetime" operations.
By way of comparison, in 1992, only 20% of the Navy's more numerous ships were forward deployed on average. Eight years later, the increased tempo of fewer assets attempting to do as much as before increased the likelihood that the Navy had to gap coverage in one geographic area while surging less-ready forces for an emergent crisis in another.
In Southwest Asia, for example, the Navy maintained a continuous carrier presence in the Arabian Gulf throughout 2000, at times resulting in no carrier in the Mediterranean or western Pacific. Every battle group that operated in the Gulf last year, along with shore- and seabased Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, conducted combat operations in support of Operations Northern and Southern Watch, striking numerous targets in the respective no-fly zones. Fifth Fleet surface warships continued maritime interdiction operations in support of U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq for the tenth straight year.
Likewise, forward-deployed naval forces based in Japan and West Coastbased ships operating in the western Pacific supported the national security policy of engagement in East Asia. The Navy-Marine Corps team executed some 30 varied missions in support of the International Force in East Timor (InterFET) and related humanitarian-assistance efforts. Sailors and Marines embarked on the Peleliu (LHA-5) provided heavy-lift logistics support to InterFET and also supported the U.S. liaison staff to the U.N. transition assistance program in East Timor, transporting thousands of tons of humanitarian supplies and building materials as well as providing security support. Navy Seabees, Marine Corps engineers, and Navy Medical Corps personnel also deployed to East Timor, conducting numerous humanitarian tasks.
The Naval and Marine Corps Reserves provided more than two million man-days in support of the active forces in 2000. Reserves, including aviation units and special operations personnel, contributed major support to counterdrug operations, from bases both in the United States and overseas. Naval reservists also helped with numerous other efforts, including Operations Northern and Southern Watch; civil affairs, peacekeeping, and other activities in Bosnia and Kosovo; and the annual large-scale exercise Bright Star in Egypt. Following the attack on the Cole, Navy and Coast Guard reservists were deployed to Arabian Gulf ports to augment in-port and near-shore security.
During the past year, the Navy participated in more than 70 cooperative naval exercises with some 50 countries. Navy ships conducted numerous "PassExes"—passage at-sea exercises—with neutrals, friends, and allies (and even a few potential adversaries), to practice basic seamanship, communication, and cooperation at sea. Sometimes these exercises had unintended consequences. In January, for example, Turkish, Israeli, and U.S. naval forces participated in Reliant Mermaid III, a search-and-rescue exercise in the eastern Mediterranean that unexpectedly generated concern throughout the Arab world. "the fact that turkey is doing this now—in the midst of the Intifada—is a very powerful statement by the Turkish establishment that they intend to continue the strategic relationship with Israel at a high level," said Alan Makovsky, a Turkish and Middle Eastern expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "Symbolically," he concluded in a Washington Post interview, "that is the most important statement that this exercise makes." In the fall, three weeks after the Kursk sinking during a Russian Northern Fleet exercise, NATO began its largest-ever live submarine search-and-rescue exercise off the southern coast of Turkey, Sorbet Royal 2000—this time with Israeli units on the sidelines.
Sometimes even the best exercise planning missed the mark, or so it seemed in early March, when a Navy antisubmarine warfare live-fire exercise near the Bahamas apparently resulted in the beaching of about a dozen beaked whales, five of which died. Although the Navy had consulted with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to devise a plan that would not harm endangered or threatened wildlife, environmental-protection groups noted that previous research indicated other instances in which exercises had caused similar strandings. The Bahamas exercise involved P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft and an attack submarine, and, according to Kathy Wang of NMFS's southeast regional office, called for active acoustic searches at 200 decibels at 6,600-9,500 cycles per second. "Two of the whales had eyes that were bleeding," she said in a Washington Post interview, "suggesting acute shock trauma." A Navy spokesman stated that the Navy had followed all standard procedures to protect wildlife and that there was no connection between the exercises and the strandings. Still, scientists noted that the few times that beaked whales (which tend not to swim in pods) have washed ashore in large numbers appear to be the result of "short-term, wide-ranging insult," such as a pulse of acoustic energy that can cause an intense wave of high pressure.
On 15 December, the USS Memphis (SSN-691) and USS Toledo (SSN-769) returned to their home port of Groton, Connecticut, fours months after they recorded the explosions and unmistakable sounds of a submarine in extremis. As recounted in a New London Day article, Vice Admiral John Grossenbacher, Commander, Submarine Forces Atlantic, issued an emphatic denial that the U.S. subs were involved in the Kursk tragedy. "I'm the senior submarine commander in the U.S. Navy," Admiral Grossenbacher underscored, "and I know where all of our submarines are at any time. I know what they're all doing, and why they're doing it. They had absolutely nothing to do with the tragedy that occurred on the Kursk."
Speculation regarding the ultimate cause of the sinking has run rampant, including theories about a Russian Navy surface-launched ASW weapon attack. But clearly neither the Memphis nor the Toledo suffered any visible damage indicating that they had collided with the Kursk—unlike the heartbreaking experience of the USS Greeneville (SSN-772) off Hawaii early in 2001.
In mid-October 2000, Russia and the United States revealed their first joint effort to make safe the Russian Navy's fleet of rusting nuclear submarines. Washington provided $17 million to establish a facility in Severodvinsk to help reduce the threat of pollution as Russia dismantles hundreds of its out-of-service nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines. Thomas Kuenning, director of the U.S. Common Threat Reduction directorate, explained that the project "will help make this area safer, the Arctic region safer, in fact, the whole world safer for the work that will be done at this plant."
Readiness: People and Equipment
"It's important to be mindful of our final purpose, our ultimate mission: victory in war," Admiral Clark outlined in his 25 July "The Way Ahead" message to all Navy admirals, just after taking the helm as Chief of Naval Operations. "Our profession is not just about going to sea to be ready to fight. It's also about paying the price in terms of commitment and dedication to our tasks, so that if called upon to fight, we will win. In the end, it's all about defending our national interest and being ready to win in combat. That is what makes our profession so demanding—and rewarding." He continued by outlining five top priorities that are to guide key decisions:
- Manpower and Personnel
- Current Readiness
- Future Readiness
- Quality of Service
- Organizational Alignment
Quality-of-life and quality-of-service issues clearly framed the CNO's perspective of the Navy's critical needs. As recently as 1998, the service confronted the challenge of more than 18,000 unmanned at-sea billets. Such short manning of operational units placed extra burdens on the Navy's people, often forcing sailors to be assigned to duties outside their specialties or to be called on to do extra work—sometimes back-to-back deployments—all of which created significant problems for both recruitment and retention. As a result of several initiatives, however, the Navy reduced its unmanned at-sea billets to fewer than 8,000 at the end of last year.
"We are in a 'war' for people," was how former Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig characterized the competition with a then-red-hot U.S. domestic economy for the best and brightest young men and women. Despite the challenge, the Navy met its recruiting and end-strength goals for the second year in a row last year, making significant gains in critical skills ratings and satisfying all nuclear-field requirements. (Two years earlier, the Navy was some 7,000 recruits short of the 55,000 it needed.) In 2000, enlisted first-term retention was about 30%, an increase compared to the previous year, largely attributable to a highly successful selective reenlistment bonus (SRB)—with more than $140 million in bonuses budgeted for 2000. Second- and third-term reenlistment rates rose as well. SRB produced 3,300 more recruits than the Navy expected and surpassed 1999 performance by more than 4,100. Still, the Navy continued to experience shortfalls in critical enlisted specialties—maintenance technicians, intelligence analysts, communications/computer operators, linguists, and air traffic controllers—while officers in the 0-3 and 0-4 pay grades proved particularly vulnerable to the lure of the private sector.
In addition, the Navy put in place other programs aimed at reducing an historically high attrition rate of 38% for those people who leave the service before they fulfill their initial service obligations and after they have received substantial training—a very poor return on investment. For example, "Bearings," a new remedial training curriculum, targets young people who have reached the fleet but require additional emphasis on military and life skills. These sailors are being mentored at every opportunity, educated on the advantages of a Navy career, and given personal guidance that will see them through their Navy service and beyond. Together with extensions, these and other programs—ongoing interdeployment training cycle improvements, reductions in sea-tour lengths for some 101 rates (and, after 30 April, no service member could be deployed more than 182 days in a year unless a flag or general officer approved the assignment), the Navy's Smart Ship and Smart Work initiatives, and renewed efforts by the fleet and training establishments aimed at attrition—helped the Navy retain enough good people, in conjunction with a successful recruiting year, to end fiscal year 2000 a total of 941 sailors above end-strength.
The use of live ordnance is an important aspect of training, particularly in Navy-Marine Corps combined-arms exercises in preparation for deployments. "The inability to train with live ordnance at Vieques, Puerto Rico, continues to degrade the combat readiness of our Atlantic fleet ships and aircraft," a senior Navy civilian remarked privately. During his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee last year, Admiral Clark admitted, "We would be foolish to say there is no alternative in the long term. But I don't know what that is."
Just four days after more than 200 protestors were removed from the Vieques bombing range on 4 May, two A-4 Skyhawks based in Puerto Rico each dropped six 25-pound inert rounds to certify the range for operations. Two days later, the Stump (DD-978) fired 5-inch gun rounds, the first time since April 1999 that the Navy could use the range, after the accidental death of civilian security guard David Sanes Rodriguez. The Puerto Rican government in January 2000 agreed to let the Navy resume exercises for three years, using inert ordnance, in exchange for a $40-million payment. A referendum is to be held among Vieques's 9,300 residents to determine the ultimate fate of the range. At the end of a late-June exercise, in which five warships fired some 600 5-inch rounds and aircraft dropped more than 830 "dummy" 500- and 1,000-pound bombs without incident, scores of activists were arrested, and four Navy people were injured in the melee.
Tensions remained high throughout the summer and into the fall, particularly after U.S. and other NATO forces conducted a mock invasion of the island, simulating a noncombatant evacuation operation. In December, Secretary Danzig set 6 November 2001 as the date for the referendum, advising Puerto Rico Governor-elect Sila Calderon that her new government would have to honor the White House agreement or the Navy would not be obliged to make a second-phase $50-million payment to continue to use the range. Calderon defiantly "made clear" that she would give no assurances on upholding the Vieques accord, and Secretary Danzig decided that he would not transfer some 8,000 acres by the end of the year or begin any new projects intended to improve the islanders' quality of life. Among the flurry of activities in the White House leading up to the 20 January 2001 inauguration, outgoing President Bill Clinton on 19 January ordered the Secretary of Defense to find an alternative training site. The standoff continued into the Bush administration, with Navy officials continuing to underscore the unique aspects of Vieques to meet the needs of deploying battle groups.
Indications of a growing need to focus on training and readiness became glaring by midyear. Following a spate of groundings and other accidents at sea, on 14 September Admiral Clark ordered a "safety stand-down" for all ships to take one full day "as soon as possible" to review safety and navigation procedures. The stand-down was the result of the eighth major accident—primarily collisions and groundings—by Navy ships in the previous 12 months. On 12 September, the tank landing ship La Moure County (LST-1194) ran aground during a UNITAS exercise off the Chilean coast, flooding three compartments, damaging propellers and rudders, releasing about 40,000 gallons of marine diesel fuel into a fragile marine environment, and leaving the ship dead in the water. According to Navy data acquired by Navy Times, other incidents during 2000 included:
- On 16 February, the Shreveport (LPD-12) ran aground in the Great Bitter Lake, at the southern end of the Suez Canal, resulting in more than $930,000 in repairs.
- The dock landing ship Oak Hill (LSD-51) ran aground on 19 February off the coast of Moorehead City, North Carolina, sustaining minimal damage.
- The frigate Ingraham (FFG-61) ran aground on 8 May while transiting the channel near her home port of Everett, Washington, with minor damage.
- On 13 July, the amphibious transport dock ship Denver (LPD-9) collided with the Military Sealift Command oiler Yukon (T-AO-202) 180 miles west of Oahu, as the two ships were set to begin an underway replenishment. Damage to the Denver was estimated at $2.9 million; that to the Yukon, as much as $4.1 million. Earlier in the year the Yukon was involved in a collision with the MPV Inchcape 14 in the channel to the port of Jebel Ali, in the Arabian Gulf, sustaining minor damage.
- The Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyer Nicholson (DD-982) collided with the fast combat support ship Detroit (AOE-4) some 100 miles off the Virginia coast during a nighttime underway replenishment on 27 August. Ironically, the 31-year-old Detroit recently had undergone a $68-million refit after Navy inspectors in 1999 found the ship "unsafe for underway operations."
- On the day the Chief of Naval Operations issued his "safety stand-down," the "snake-bit" Detroit again was in the news, having collided with a tug some three miles off Earle Naval Weapons Station, New Jersey, on 14 September. About 30,000 gallons of fuel spilled into the Atlantic through a hole in the Detroit.
Navy-wide Realignment.
One way that the CNO's priorities will be pursued is through a wide-ranging realignment of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav) headquarters and fleet organizations. "Navy-wide alignment involves a couple of things," Admiral Clark explained in his 25 July memo. "First, we must ensure that our organizations, systems, and processes are aligned and deliver exactly what they are designed to produce: a combat-capable navy ready to sail in harm's way. Second, alignment also involves taking a close look at our institutional messages. Do our words match our deeds? If not, we are guilty of what I call `message mismatch,"' he underscored. "We must examine and align our messages so that our people see credibility everywhere they look." The second such major Navy headquarters realignment since 1993, this new organizational structure is touted as the principal way the readiness and warfighting needs of the operating forces can be met in the most effective manner possible.
The establishment of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N7), a vice admiral reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, is the first step to consolidate management of naval warfare programs and the generation of warfare requirements under one office. This organization formerly was under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements, Resources and Assessments (N8), and N7's establishment ushered in a period of "organizational angst" as the two offices sorted things out. "It will be interesting to see how that will change the next budget," Ron O'Rourke of the Congressional Research Service commented.
Fleet readiness requirements and assessments now are the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4). Realigning and refocusing the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics consolidated fleet readiness requirements and assessments in one office. The N4 organization is seen as the "fleet's voice" within the Navy staff, more fully developing operational readiness requirements, and assessing whether these requirements are being met throughout the Navy's resource-allocation process.
The alignment also has extended to current planning, programming, and policy offices on the OpNav staff for the Navy's training programs to provide a stronger link between fleet training and readiness. This reorganization will place responsibility for fleet and unit training requirements under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4). The former Director for Training organization (N7) on the Navy staff has been integrated into the new N7. The Chief of Naval Education and Training will remain a vice admiral reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations. Several senior officers noted privately that Admiral Clark did not go far enough, explaining that servicewide personnel, manpower, and training functions should be consolidated into a single "cradle-to-- grave" organization.
Remember the Cole!
On the helicopter flight deck, Lieutenant Commander Chris Peterschmidt, the stricken warship's executive officer, rallied his damage-control team. "I said, `Don't give up the ship,"' he recounted in a Newsweek article. "I can't believe I actually said that." In the end, heroism and selfless devotion to duty, to each other and to their ship, was the "right stuff" that saved the Cole.
It was a little after 1100 local time as the two men in their houri, a small, outboard-motor-powered skiff, worked their way close to the warship, whose guards had been issued weapons—still unloaded—with orders to shoot only if they were attacked first. The Cole had moored 90 minutes earlier and was taking on fuel at the rate of about 2,000 gallons a minute, part of a Central Command regional engagement program of showing the flag and "reaching out" to the Yemeni government, a traditional role of naval expeditionary forces. Smiling and waving to the Americans at the rails, the warriors detonated some 400-700 pounds of high explosive—in an instant blowing a 40-by-40-foot hole from the waterline to the main deck. "You have big boats, and look, they are nothing," a 17-year-old Yemeni, pointing to the gash in the Cole's hull, commented to a New York Times correspondent.
Commander Kirk Lippold, the warship's commanding officer, knew his ship was in danger of sinking. The explosion opened main engine room one to the sea, electrical power failed, and the ship was dark and full of smoke. Auxiliary pumps could not deal with the water surging into the compartments. Round-the-clock bucket brigades barely kept up with the flood. Corpsmen cared for the wounded, their dead crewmates visible in the twisted steel. Three days into the disaster, a bulkhead failed and engine room two began to flood. The only operational gas turbine generator failed, and the ship was in danger of breaking in two. Somehow, her crew rallied to the cause, and after several agonizing hours, stabilized the situation. The dead and wounded were taken off, a grim task that took ten days, but everyone else remained with the ship. They slept under tents, enduring blistering-hot days, with food and water brought in from the U.S. embassy, as they labored to patch their wounded ship. Cole's ensign never was lowered.
Ominously, the Cole was not the original target. An extensive investigation, which soon "fingered" the al Qaeda network controlled by Osama bin Laden, who has declared a jihad—"holy war"—against the United States, revealed that in August 1998 the FBI had heard about a plot to attack a U.S. warship in Aden. The 1998 report indicated that the attackers would use rockets—not suicide bombers—to inflict damage. Although the FBI did notify the Pentagon of this threat, it noted that the information was from a source of undetermined reliability and was uncorroborated. Later, National Security Council officials disclosed that the United States had learned from one of the Yemenis who helped plan the attack on the Cole that a terrorist cell, linked to bin Laden, tried a similar strike against the USS The Sullivans (DDG-68) during a 3 January 2000 stop for fuel in Aden. The attack failed when the explosives-laden skiff sank.
Seventeen days after the attack, a team of Yemeni and Navy tugs pulled the Cole out of Aden's harbor, the ship's wound clearly visible despite a shroud. The ship's crew was on deck and the national anthem—as well as a rap song, variously described as "American Badass" or "Cowboy"—blared from the sound system. "What happened on October 12 was a tragedy, an insult," said the U.S. ambassador to Yemen, Barbara K. Bodine. "But I think what was clear this morning as we watched the USS Cole is that it was not in any way a defeat. . . . The Cole left proudly. She left with some help from her friends, but she left proudly."
On 29 October, the Cole was positioned on the heavylift ship Blue Marlin, arriving home on 13 December after a 6,000-mile journey to Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Mississippi, where the destroyer was launched in 1995. The Navy estimated that $240 million will be needed for her repair and refit: $170 million for the ship's structure and propulsion system and $70 million for other costs, including replacing weapons and equipment. The Navy figured that the repairs would take about a year to complete.
In January 2001, then-Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen concluded that there had been no failures of intelligence or acts of negligence. Instead: "Everybody from the top down has to be held accountable." An initial Fifth Fleet assessment, which concluded that Commander Lippold had failed to take 31 of 62 security measures, 12 of which "were key and may have prevented the suicide boat attack or mitigated its effects," was overturned after review by the Navy Secretary and CNO. "Secretary Danzig and I agreed . . . that the CO acted reasonably in adjusting his force protection posture based on his assessment of the situation as he knew it," wrote Admiral Clark of the investigation report.
In December, Yemen's prime minister announced that as many as six Yemenis, all "culprits in preparing for the attack," would go on trial. In February 2001, however, the United States requested that the trial be postponed, after U.S. investigators received additional information vital to the case, indicating suspects in Great Britain. On 31 March, the Yemeni government stated that another two conspirators had been arrested.
Past Is Prologue
"We are in the midst of a sea change," Admiral Clark remarked at the close of the Cole inquiry. The attack on the U.S. destroyer underscored a critical aspect of this change—the insidious lethality of asymmetric warfare and the fundamental need for vigilance even in the most tranquil of situations. Questions focused on just where and how the Navy's ships, aircraft, and people truly can be safe, whether in Norfolk or San Diego or Aden or Yokosuka. "While we have also increased our understanding and tracking of this type of warfare, we must now make a monumental leap in the attention we pay to this life and death issue," Admiral Clark warned.
The Navy almost immediately empowered a task force to address critical force-protection requirements, with fleetwide meetings and briefings held into 2001. But this new-found ardor seems to confirm a pattern of knee-- jerk reactions to emergent threats, one more instance of service myopia to challenges all-but-ignored in the press to meet other, more important needs. Like the service's attention to mine warfare or antisubmarine warfare, which languish in programmatic penury until a flaming datum raises official consciousness, the successful terrorist strike against one of the world's most capable, multimission warships underscored the need to be ready, anytime, anywhere. And that will require thoughtful concentration, long-term commitment, and sufficient resources at a time when these seem to be in short supply in Washington, with attention in Congress focused on campaign finance reform and tax-cuts.
That seems to be the major lesson from the U.S. Navy of 2000, the "sea change" in which conventional military power looks to have lost currency, and in which the service is constantly on a knife-edge of war everywhere, confronted by "actors with a capacity to influence events on a scale disproportionate to traditional measures of national power," in the words of the CNO's program guide. If so, then the wide-ranging national security review announced by President George W. Bush in February 2001 may hold far-reaching consequences for the Navy—and all U.S. armed services.
Dr. Truver is vice president, National Security Studies, and director of the Center for Security Strategies and Operations at Anteon Corporation in Arlington, Virginia. Ms. Amy Palmer, of the center’s research staff, assisted him in this review.