In his keynote speech at the Surface Navy Association in January 2001, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark agreed with his predecessor that "numbers have a quality all their own," and that the Coast Guard should work with the Navy through the national fleet policy to help address the "numbers problem." Admiral Clark concluded, "I stand four-square behind the arrangements and the agreements in place and the Navy's commitment to the Coast Guard.... We need to build as much combat capability into the Coast Guard as possible."
It was the harsh reality that numbers do count, and that the assets available may not be sufficient to the tasks ahead, that led Admiral Jay Johnson, the former Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral James Loy, Commandant of the Coast Guard, to sign the Navy-Coast Guard National Fleet Policy Statement in September 1998. This innovative policy committed both services to: develop complementary forces that address the entire range of 21stcentury naval and maritime threats; leverage each service's core competencies to improve capability, interoperability, and affordability; and stretch the "national" budget dollar with economies of scale in total ownership costs.
While Admiral Clark's highly supportive and clear statements are welcome, the reality is that after more than two years, the Navy has not embraced fully the national fleet concept. The admirable goals and objectives have not been translated into existing Navy planning documents that cascade down in linked, aligned fashion to direct the OpNav staff, the systems commands, and the operating forces. There are no mechanisms in place between the Chief of Naval Operations and the low-level staff working groups that commit the Navy to this policy. Key documents routinely omit discussion of the Coast Guard's defense contributions, such as:
- The Secretary of Defense's Annual Defense Report.
- The Secretary of the Navy's annual posture statement.
- The Chief of Naval Operation's Navy Strategic Planning Guidance, which is, notes Dr. Colin S. Gray, "all but oblivious both of the Coast Guard's skills and of the limitations of its own service."
In addition, there has been no Navy testimony or even informal briefings on the national fleet to the Senate or House Armed Services Committees, and no OpNav plans of action or milestones exist for the Navy to implement national fleet policy, goals, or objectives.
Obviously the Coast Guard is not located in the Navy Department. By excluding the Coast Guard from these critical documents, however, the Navy signals to the other services, Congress, and the President that the Coast Guard is not a full member of the national defense team. Such exclusion reflects too narrow an interpretation of congressional oversight, fails to fulfill the Pentagon's own logic for jointness, lacks common sense, and ignores two key realities. First, the Coast Guard by statute is "a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times." Only the Secretary of Defense with input from the Secretary of the Navy can reasonably address the Coast Guard's ability to execute this role and report that status to the President and the appropriate congressional oversight committees. It is not reasonable to expect the Secretary of Transportation to fulfill this function.
The second reality is the extensive, ongoing interaction between the Department of Defense and the Coast Guard. For example, the Coast Guard has: forces apportioned for use in the Joint Unified Command Plan; forces earmarked in the warfighting commanders-in-chief's contingency plans; flag officers commanding joint commands; a district commander who also acts as the joint naval component commander for the Alaska Maritime Region; forces routinely working for joint commanders and deploying to support overseas commands; personnel serving on the joint and unified commands staffs; authority for the Coast Guard's Commandant to attend Joint Chiefs of Staff "tank sessions" when matters involving the Coast Guard are discussed; and periodic operational command of Department of Defense forces.
It is ironic that the Coast Guard is the world's tenth largest navy, with significant defense capabilities for littoral operations and homeland security, but the Secretaries of Defense and Navy have not addressed its national defense role. This irony only increases with a report in chapter 5 of the 2000 Annual Defense Review that says, "A decision has been made to decommission six Spruance-class destroyers in 2001 in favor of retaining an equal number of Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates (FFGs). Because of their inherent utility for littoral missions and relatively low operating costs, FFGs are increasingly relied upon for employment in regional engagements and military exercises with other nations." If the Navy is concerned about providing capabilities for littoral operations, how can it seemingly ignore Coast Guard resources that are suited ideally for littoral operations? In addition, the Navy can depend on the Coast Guard reporting for duty when ordered, unlike some potential allies.
Especially ironic is the Navy's penchant for using threats and challenges best addressed by the Coast Guard to justify its own force structure and budget. In a recent book, Navy Admiral James Ellis argues that increased competition over natural resources, terrorism, ecological and ethnic conflict, mass migrations, and nationalism in the coming century will mean that naval forces will be engaged across the full range of conflict.
The Navy never will have the law enforcement component necessary to deal with all these threats, many of which are mission areas that require Coast Guard capabilities and forces. But not once does Admiral Ellis mention the Coast Guard in his essay. In a recent Proceedings article, Navy Rear Admiral Albert Konetzni follows a similar pattern when he suggests that the Navy needs more nuclear-powered submarines—not for warfare, but to counter "threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, and territorial disputes."
Dr. Gray has observed this irony as well. He writes that the Navy, in its Strategic Planning Guidance, "sees no tension between arguing soundly that '[insufficient numbers entail strategic risk as well as excessive personnel and operational tempos,' while simultaneously reaching close-in to coast guarding domain," when describing its routine engagement activities.' Without mentioning the Coast Guard, the guidance advises that the Navy will conduct "missions such as humanitarian disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), peace support missions, enforcement of embargoes and no-fly zones, counter-proliferation measures, and rapid reaction to terrorism. Future forces also must be prepared to support law enforcement agencies to deal effectively with non-military challenges to our national security, such as illegal immigration, illegal drug trafficking, and other international criminal activity."
In a surprising twist, however, the Navy's latest surface warfare vision omits any reference to providing expertise for the Coast Guard-type missions listed in the guidance and cited by Admirals Ellis and Konetzni as reasons for a navy. In fact, the vision strictly emphasizes warfighting missions and attributes to achieve the surface Navy's mission "to fight and win at sea."
The apparent disconnect between the Navy's use of nonwarfighting missions to justify force structure while espousing a warrior vision that omits nonwarfighting missions creates the impression that the Navy wants it both ways—saying it can accomplish missions normally performed by the Coast Guard while limiting the Coast Guard's national defense contributions. The Navy presently has an ambiguous and uncomfortable relationship with the Coast Guard—a sister sea service as well as a fellow naval service.
The Navy should not view the Coast Guard as a competitor for scarce budget dollars, but as a team member that brings unique skills and assets to the table. It is time to make the national fleet a reality.
Captain Stubbs recently completed a 30-year career in the Coast Guard, retiring as Director of Operations Capability. He now works for the Anteon Corporation in Arlington, Virginia.