"A Public Relations Disaster"
(See J. Byron, p. 2, April 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William L. Sommer, U.S. Navy—Captain Byron's discussion of the Navy's mishandling of the USS Greeneville (SSN-772) incident made sense right up to the point where he declares, "So why were we not we forthcoming? I can guess only two reasons: Either we wanted to protect legal proceedings or we just plain do not trust the public. Neither is sufficient. The legal niceties [italics mine] are small in the international context." Legal niceties indeed. The very concept of due process of law and justice is one of the bedrock principles that separates this nation from all others.
We in the service are accountable to the American public for the proper execution of our duties and the stewardship of the resources provided. Judgment of our conduct and performance is at the hand of the Congress of the United States, however, not the Associated Press. The Congress shall raise and maintain the Navy, not CNN, not Fox, not Hearst. Congress established the legal framework to answer the questions and administer justice in cases such as the Greeneville's. The Uniform Code of Military Justice is that framework. We cannot be so naive as to believe that justice is served by trying the Greeneville and her crew in the press prior to their day in court (should such a proceeding be determined necessary).
Giving the press access to the full investigation prior to its completion jeopardizes justice to all parties involved. If the Greeneville and her crew were operating in a criminally negligent manner, then the prosecution's case might be lost for the want of an unbiased jury and the victim's families would not see justice for their loved ones. On the other hand, if the Greeneville and crew were not criminally negligent, then the court of public opinion would have denied the Greeneville and her crew justice by recklessly defaming their honor and integrity.
It is true that the incident was handled poorly. We must not, however, entertain the notion of compromising the investigative process to make a neat and tidy public affairs presentation. Protecting the integrity of the legal proceedings is not a "nicety"; it is the very manner of issue that caused our forefathers to embark on the perilous campaign to devise a more perfect union. Even those of us who volunteer for the hardships of service have not waived those rights and truths our forefathers deemed "self-evident." If at any point we subjugate due process of law to satisfy immediate political expediency, then the grand experiment has failed and we are then doomed to Rome's fate. Rome did not fall because of its international standing; it fell when the heart of the republic died.
"Deadly Force Is Authorized"
(See W. Parks, pp. 33-37, January 2001; P. Skutta, pp. 27-28, February 2001; C. Weston, J. Dineen, K. Rardin, pp. 14-20, March 2001 Proceedings)
Colonel Michael Kershner, U.S. Army, Deputy Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne)—Colonel Parks mentions an incident in Bosnia where a Special Forces soldier shot and killed a Serb that attacked his A-Team. While the essentials are accurate, Colonel Parks writes, "Although his action clearly was in self-defense, authorities weighed his court-martial for violating ROEs [rules of engagement] before ordering him out of the area of operations." This is incorrect. I was the commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) at the time of this incident, and I exercised operational control of the team in question. Under this relationship, I had the responsibility to provide authoritative direction over all aspects of their military operations.
The only feedback the soldier in question ever received from his chain of command was that he had done exactly the right thing. There were questions on the part of the conventional command in charge of the area where the shooting took place. Those questions centered on other aspects of the tactical standard operating procedures used by the CJSOTF for the special operations personnel, which differed markedly from those of other forces in country.
The conventional forces thought the soldier had violated other rules (not ROEs) and were surprised that the special operations forces were operating under their own instructions. In fact, had he not been operating under CJSOTF rules, he probably would have been killed or more seriously injured.
The result of that conflict was that the CJSOTF standard operating procedures were amended slightly for clarification, but the rules continued to be enforced. The noncommissioned officer (NCO) was moved out of country, not for disciplinary reasons, but for his own protection. His team experienced frequent and prolonged contact with the civilian populace of the region and I did not want him to become a target of Serb retaliation. There is a long Balkan tradition of letting no transgression, however slight, go unpunished. That is one of the reasons that our grandchildren will still be in Serbia. I moved him at the request of his company commander.
Another by-product of this shooting was improved force protection for our soldiers. Several of our many Serb contacts let our people know that, in shooting this individual, our NCO had forcefully demonstrated that our soldiers were well armed and well trained. Simply because they looked nonthreatening (CJSOTF personnel, for instance, did not wear rank or body armor or openly carry weapons, but kept their sidearms under their jackets) did not mean they were not dangerous. By shooting one deserving individual, this NCO probably prevented a number of other such attacks.
Special Forces soldiers operate every day in the dangerous and volatile environment that we call our world. Having clear ROEs is essential to their safety and their mission. Support from their chain of command is also essential.
Colonel David E. Graham, U.S. Army, Chief, International and Operational Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Director, Center for Law and Military Operations—Colonel Parks offers the provocative view that overly restrictive rules of engagement (ROEs) endanger U.S. forces currently engaged in missions around the world. In so doing, he paints a vivid picture of JCS Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) that essentially are dismissive of the right of individual soldiers and Marines to resort to deadly force in self-defense and of inexperienced judge advocates left largely to "fend for themselves" in drafting ROEs and developing ROEs training.
Many readers of your publication undoubtedly are aware that Colonel Parks is the leading expert in the United States on the law of war, and his views on such matters carry great weight. I have known him for almost 30 years and have worked for him in the past. He now works in the office that I head, although he did not author the article in his official capacity. We have rarely experienced professional disagreements over the years. On the matter at hand, however, our views differ dramatically. A reading of the article leads me to the following observations:
- The contention that the current ROEs applicable to U.S. forces deployed on peace operations place greater constraints on individual service members than those that existed during the Vietnam War is a provocatively phrased non sequitur. The fundamental differences between the nature and purpose of the combat operations conducted against an enemy force in Vietnam and the peace operations ongoing in the Balkans are self-evident. ROEs applicable to peace-support operations will, by definition, be more restrictive in character than those related to combat operations. They also are much more difficult to craft, given the nuanced nature of the missions, and require far more sophisticated training programs.
- For each of the two incidents offered as examples of the adverse results of "overly restrictive" ROEs in Bosnia, it would be possible to offer 20 examples of how the ROEs specifically tailored to peace operations in the Balkans—together with an aggressive training program—have prevented the escalation of violence, saved lives, and preserved the integrity of these exceptionally politicized missions.
- The brief history of the development of the JCS SROE is both misleading and revisionist. All practitioners of the art of drafting ROEs fully understand that the SROE are not intended to function as the exclusive ROEs applicable to ground forces engaged in various operational scenarios. These ROEs will always be mission driven. Moreover, while a decision was made in 1993 that it would not be appropriate to set forth ROEs for self-defense by individual servicemen in a separate annex of the SROE, this decision evolved as a matter of format and was most certainly not the result of any "Navy resistance to the acknowledgment of individual self-defense." I was a participant in this decision-making process.
- Though noting that the JCS SROE promulgated on 15 January 2000 contain the admonition that "commanders have the obligation to ensure that individuals within their respective units understand and are trained on when and how to use force in self-defense," Colonel Parks faults the SROE for failing to advise these same commanders on precisely how and when soldiers or Marines under their command might exercise this self-defense right. Although central to his criticism of the SROE, this is a puzzling observation. I have never functioned on the premise that the SROE was intended to provide detailed guidance to commanders regarding the manner in which individuals under their command were to exercise the inherent right of self-defense. Nor have I ever assumed that, in the absence of such guidance, commanders and their staffs would find themselves powerless to formulate mission-dependent, effective ROEs. This is simply not the way the ROEs process works.
- I strongly disagree with the contention that U.S. personnel have been forced to labor in operations around the world under "poorly drafted, cobbled-together, highly ambiguous, and confusing ROEs" as a result of the "failure" of the SROE to provide commanders with the detailed guidance they require concerning the individual use of force in self-defense. Even more troubling, however, is the follow-on contention that these deficient ROEs are the product of commanders systematically turning to junior, inexperienced judge advocates who are left to fend for themselves in drafting ROEs and developing ROEs training programs. Void of input from a commander's staff, these judge advocates, it is said, turn to the SROE and ultimately produce "cut-and-paste, copycat products lacking in original thought or analysis and unsuitable for current missions." Quite simply, these statements are completely belied by the reality of today's operational environment and do a disservice to the extraordinary work being done in the ROE arena by young, but experienced, Army and Marine operational law attorneys around the world. The entire process of the development, dissemination, and training of ROEs has taken a quantum leap forward over the past decade, both within individual units and at the Army's Combat Training Centers. Moreover, significant attention has been focused on the provision of realistic ROEs training prior to the deployment of U.S. personnel to ongoing Balkan operations.
- I disagree with the author's contention that military and Department of Defense civilian attorneys should look to federal case law relating to the use of deadly force in law enforcement situations to develop effective ROEs for peace operations. Is it prudent to examine judicial decisions speaking to when use of force by law enforcement authorities is warranted? Absolutely. Should such domestic law govern use-of-force provisions applicable to peace operations? Absolutely not. Colonel Parks bemoans the fact that ROEs use-of-force provisions applicable to peace operations are often more restrictive than those use-of-force measures available to U.S. law enforcement agents. I am surprised only by the fact that the author finds this to be both surprising and subject to condemnation. I would think that the distinction to be drawn between FBI agents dealing with criminals within the United States and U.S. soldiers and Marines interacting with third country nationals while deployed on exceptionally politically sensitive peace operations overseas is an obvious one. The purpose of the U.S. military personnel in issue is to facilitate mission accomplishment—to maintain the peace in a highly stressful environment, not to arrest or "take down" known criminals. The applicable ROEs thus reflect the nature of the military mission. Might these ROEs contain use-of-force provisions more restrictive than those sanctioned by U.S. courts for U.S. law enforcement agents? Absolutely. Might there be an element of risk that must be assumed by U.S. military personnel as the result of such ROEs? Absolutely. The assumption of risk is inherent in the policy decision to engage in politically charged peace operations for which such ROEs are required. Given this fact, the author's criticism should perhaps be focused on the policy decisions to become involved in peace operations—not the ROEs mandated by the political realities of such activities.
- Lastly, I would speak to the author's comments regarding the fact that ROEs applicable to peace operations often are based on a level of force continuum. He dismisses this approach as both academic and unrealistic, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has opined that a law enforcement officer is not required to select the least intrusive alternative, only a reasonable one. As noted earlier, the reality of the situation is that the U.S. military personnel in issue are operating in Kosovo, not Kansas, and are engaged in politically fraught peace operations often requiring measured restraint. In keeping with this fact, carefully crafted ROEs based on a force continuum are essential to the success of the mission. Moreover, appropriate ROEs training clearly incorporates the idea that a soldier or Marine need not systematically exhaust all other means prior to resorting to deadly force, when such force is warranted. The ROE Handbook published by the Army's Center for Law and Military Operations, which contains the VEWPRIK mnemonic to which Colonel Parks refers, very clearly makes this point.
In addition, while the various mnemonics in use by a number of Army units are by no means perfect, and are not without their critics, it is important that such mnemonics serve only as a base on which to provide further ROEs training. More comprehensive ROEs are both crafted and trained on a mission-specific basis.
Colonel Parks closes his article by noting that the FBI's deadly force policy begins with the words, "This policy is not to be construed to require Agents to assume unreasonable risks," and he urges that the JCS SROE be based on a similar premise. However, in the world in which the U.S. military functions, U.S. personnel are systematically required to assume risks that would very often be deemed "unreasonable" within the civilian community-even that of FBI agents. ROEs can be structured to minimize, but not eliminate, the assumption of such risks.
"Assigning Blame to the Greeneville"
(See K. O'Connor, p. 22, April 2001 Proceedings)
Captain John L. Byron, U.S. Navy (Retired)—We students of the USS Greeneville (SSN-772) incident must all feel a bit of cognitive dissonance. Two mutually exclusive views keep intruding themselves. One view: great boat, great skipper, as good as the submarine force has. The other: bad boat, rogue skipper, incredibly sloppy submarining. Which picture is wrong? Trick question: neither is, if we permit ourselves to look at readiness with two sets of standards. And that is what we do, relaxing our discipline until an incident occurs and then breaking out the rigorous standards that should have been imposed all along.
Standards matter. They are vital to running a warship, giving the captain and crew benchmarks in safety and readiness, telling higher authority that the ship can do its job. Failure to impose consistently high standards toggled the Greeneville to the fully armed position—it only took a certain contact geometry to trigger the tragic accident.
If only the sea were as forgiving as our staffs, as tolerant as our senior officers in charge. The Greeneville's easy standards did not satisfy the unforgiving demands of real operations in the real ocean, and this killed nine people in the Ehime Maru. The same breed of relaxed standards blew a hole in the side of the USS Cole (DDG67), nearly sank the USS Stark (FFG-31), shot down a civilian airliner with a missile from the USS Vincennes (CG-49), and blew up a main turret on the USS Iowa (BB-61). Classified submarine incidents would make this list longer. In none of these cases did we seriously question the role of fleet staffs or the system of fleet readiness itself.
The real issue is the quality of our reaction to a serious fleet incident. As the Greeneville shows, our reaction often is poor. We investigate the accident and we pin down legal culpability, but do we insist on true accountability? Clearly no. We measure the standards in the ship, but we ignore the standards prevailing in the fleet. We extract justice from the ship's captain, but even when events give prima facie proof that they have failed badly, we give a bye to the training centers, staffs, and senior officers whose sole job it is to produce trained and ready ships.
When we have a design issue or an engineering problem, it gets fixed because the customers (fleet) hold accountable the providers (shore establishment). We fail in operational matters where the fleet is both customer and provider. Here, any criticism is self-criticism and so we back away. In operational matters, a truly objective pursuit of accountability by the fleet might hit close to home and so it limits its investigations to the operating units involved. Simple blue-suit professionalism demands that we expand the scope of inquiry to include the fleet itself, with Greeneville the place to start.
We need two bold improvements. First and most basic, we must insist on unwavering high standards for fleet readiness and show willingness to pursue this issue wherever it leads. Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, could have reinforced this when he established the Greeneville court of inquiry, but he simply ignored it. These are the additional questions he should have tasked the court to consider:
- Does the type commander have proper operational standards in place?
- Does the training system adequately train ships to meet these standards?
- Do the fleet staffs at squadron and group level conduct inspections effective enough to give assurance that these standards are met?
- Do these staffs and the type commander take proper actions in response to deficiencies and weaknesses revealed in training and inspections?
- Do these staffs and the type commander effectively communicate lessons learned to the operating units?
Indeed, these five questions should be automatic in any serious fleet incident. Knowledgeable submariners would add one more for the Greeneville incident:
- Has the screening system for submarine officers gone too far in emphasizing engineering background above operational experience and abilities?
Until these questions are answered, the Greeneville's investigation is incomplete.
The second necessary improvement: our fleet staffs at the squadron, group, and type commander levels must be made more accountable for fleet performance. Accountability has a public character, but our current system for fleet staffs treats it as a private matter, mistaking behind-the-scenes retribution for the real thing. Incidents may color a leader's reputation and perhaps derail a promotion or prized assignment, but we avoid public accountability for staffs because it might embarrass those in senior positions. That is much too kind for our serious business.
The system must change so that leaders of fleet staffs know that they will be publicly held to account for what happens to their ships on their watch and that this judgment won't wait until their tours are over. Why? To inform others, prevent future incidents, and improve the performance of the fleet. Samuel Johnson said it well: "Depend on it, sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully."
External accountability for fleet leaders makes everybody aware of what the standards are, that the standards apply to everyone regardless of rank, and that we have ceased accepting the two-tier system of swift justice for skippers but soft landings for flag officers.
Captain William L. Hicks, U.S. Navy (Retired)—As I follow the reporting of the court of inquiry concerning the sinking of the Japanese fishing vessel by the USS Greeneville (SSN-772), I cannot help but think of the Wall Street Journal article a few months ago concerning the philosophy and command actions of Commander, Submarine Force Pacific, Rear Admiral Al Konetzni. It was clear to me from the article that Admiral Konetzni's highest priority was retention. He was reported to have criticized publicly the commanding officer of a submarine that achieved a battle efficiency award for requiring extra time on board the ship to get the job done correctly. He was described as "Big Al, the sailor's pal." He was reported to have specified a standard plan of the day for the submarines of the Pacific submarine force. As a commanding officer in that environment, I would have gotten the message that the boss wants retention over readiness, and that he wants it with the fewest demands on the crew. Although I do not know the Greeneville's commanding officer, Commander Scott Waddle, the press reports of his rising-star status lead me to suspect that he would have understood the right answer, when told.
An article in Seapower at the same time discussed how the Pacific submarine force was overcommitted with reduced training time. That condition, coupled with the command environment seemingly espoused by the force commander, leads to situations such as too many qualified watchstanders left in port; no junior officer of the deck to assist the officer of the deck; inadequate manning of sonar; and assignment of trainees without direct supervision.
While the reports I have read have not commented on the level of qualification or the operational experience of the various crew members, it is clear that Commander Waddle did not rely on or defer to his crew. That may either have been a lack of confidence in his crew or an overreliance on his own ability. Either way, it does not reflect a ship with a high level of readiness to deal with difficult or unexpected tactical or casualty situations. Readiness, however, was apparently adequate to meet the standards of the force, particularly in light of the Greeneville's superior retention statistics and as reflected by the complementary comments reported at the court of inquiry.
In recent press accounts, Admiral Konetzni is quoted as criticizing some of the actions and decisions of Commander Waddle. It seems to me that the actions and decisions he criticizes are a natural and predictable result of the command environment he established through his words and actions, if the Wall Street Journal article is accurate. The Submarine Force Pacific's chief of staff as well as the Greeneville's squadron commander reported being unsatisfied with the performance of Commander Waddle in both his command style and some specific actions prior to the accident. There is no indication, however, that they took corrective action. In this situation, when a superior officer does not object, he indicates approval of the actions.
To understand the impact of the command environment, the court must address the following questions: How many other ships of the submarine force are operated with the flaws in readiness and command judgment now being identified in the Greeneville? Which other commanding officers have recognized the right answer when they heard Admiral Konetzni speak of the importance of retention and the need to achieve readiness without impact on routine liberty call. How many other commanding officers will err on the side of leaving too many experienced crew members in port during routine operations? In how many other ships is readiness deficient, and this deficiency unnoticed or uncorrected? What is the process used the by the submarine force to determine readiness? Are the routine evaluations adequately rigorous and challenging to reveal the status of readiness? Are rigorous tactical readiness evaluations still an annual event on each ship?
I submit that a failure of the submarine force to candidly and brutally asses the situation and take immediate and aggressive remedial, compensatory, and corrective actions will allow an unacceptable situation to continue with the increased risk of even greater tragedy. In this accident, it was not guaranteed that the Greeneville would survive. The submarine force cannot afford to miss this indicator of deteriorating command expectations and standards. I hope that the court of inquiry and Admiral Fargo understand and act on this opportunity to take action to restore readiness.
"On a Bittersweet Adventure at Sea"
(See S. Percy, pp. 96-101, March 2001 Proceedings)
David W. Anderson—I never met Bart Creed, but he is a personal hero of mine. I never met his family, but I am immensely pleased that his son and his daughter have chosen service in naval aviation.
I came to know Bart Creed by listening to my new shipmates in Attack Squadron- 145 beginning in August 1971. I had reported to that A-6A squadron just after it had returned from the western Pacific embarked with Carrier Air Wing Two in the USS Ranger (CV-61). They talked a lot about how they liked Bart and how he had not come back from his last mission. They had patches on their leather flight jackets that read, "Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club," and "Ski Mu Gia Pass," and "Laotian Highway Patrol." They talked about nights over the Annamite Mountains so black that you'd swear you had your helmet on backward. They talked about miserable Commando Bolt missions trying to get ordnance on a moving target that you never saw. The missions were full of bad weather, of formation flying with spatial disorientation, and of night carrier landings low on fuel. It did not make any difference if you did not come back; your sortie was counted in the press releases anyway. The missions were hardly worthwhile in results, but the orders were lawful, making them a duty to be done.
Bart Creed and other guys such as Fred Holmes, Ray Donnelly, Mike Bixel, Nick Brooks, and Bruce Fryar showed us how to do our duty. Later, on the first night of Linebacker II, we crossed the beach toward Haiphong, and it looked impossible to fit a big A-6A between the red tracer streams from the automatic weapons. Nonetheless, we had been shown by our heroes how to stick our noses into the fight and get to the target. I still carry in me the sadness of the survivor who had to turn and leave friends behind. And they were the absolute best of us all.
Congratulations, and thanks, to Susan Percy and Proceedings for sharing with us the "Bittersweet Adventure" and another memory of Bart Creed, my hero.
"It's About Accountability"
(See C. Nesby, p. 2, March 2001; J. Kelly, p. 28, April 2001 Proceedings)
Commander D. W. Trandal, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Nesby obviously has never been a surface line officer. The officer of the deck (OOD) in port has the responsibility to brief his watch. He also will instruct his watch on approaching small craft and check to ensure the sentries are aware of the proper method of challenging. If they sense danger, the sentries will notify the OOD and the OOD will make the decision on how to challenge and what other action is necessary. He might even have to consult with the command duty officer if he decides to open fire. This does beg the question of whether the sentries were armed.
Captain Nesby states, "Our leaders don't know what to do to combat the unconventional threat." Our military leaders know what to do, but our politicians do not. He also states, "Bad decisions were made by all in the chain of command that allowed the Cole to be attacked successfully and those individuals should be reprimanded for it." Again, the bad decisions were made by the politicians and not the shipboard personnel.
It is rather naive to think that we can identify the enemy, as Captain Nesby believes. Lots of enemies are unknown until they commit an aggressive act. We cannot employ lethal force in elimination of the enemy as it is not just one religious group. As for calling terrorists the "enemy," an attack is not a military act of war. It is an act of aggressive forces existing in a supposedly neutral country. We can attempt to thwart the act, but if an enemy is intent of doing destruction, it will happen. They could have used a plane, underwater demolition, or whatever means to accomplish the mission.
Captain Nesby writes that the commanding officer (CO) should have refused to go into port. I would like to see how many COs would refuse to proceed as directed. There are probably very few.
The comment that "the Cole's crew was not well led or well trained and lacked the know-how to defend their ship" is a very loose statement, and unless Captain Nesby knows more than Admiral Vern Clark, he should withhold those types of opinions.
Lieutenant Youssef Aboul-Enein, Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy, Mideast/North Africa Navy Foreign Area Officer—I enjoyed seeing a discussion reclassifying Islamic terrorists and calling them the unconventional enemy. This kind of debate is healthy and needed. Being from the region, I have witnessed the evolution of Islamic radicalism from separate entities to a global network unified by the common experience of the war in Afghanistan. They are highly organized today, but I do not agree they can be classified as an army unto themselves. They are more similar to a highly sophisticated global organized crime syndicate.
The only way to really combat these elements is to cooperate with our Arab allies who also suffer from their activities and treat them as criminals. Their bombings have affected tourism in Egypt and have threatened the credibility of ruling governments to provide for internal security within their own borders, not to mention stifling the quest of Arab nations to join in international trade.
The problem was considered so serious that, in 1995, interior ministers (in charge of police and internal security apparatuses) from Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and other secular Arab nations met to discuss and enhance cooperation against Islamic extremism. The vision of these Islamic radicals to establish their version of a religious-based government scares many Arabs, who worry about the type of Islam they want to enforce. As in Christianity, Islam has many sects and shades of doctrine, and imposing one brand of religious thought creates tyranny that many in the region fear. This does not even include non-Muslim communities living in places such as Egypt, where they represent a large minority.
The kind of rhetoric espoused by Islamic radicals can be summed up in this statement by Mustafa-el-Sibai, founder of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood Organization: "We wish to establish a state in which there is no egoism, despotism, or suppression; we want a community that finds death agreeable and that shakes mountains." Needless to say, there are a few swayed by such language, but many in the region do not share in this vision. In the United States, we are fortunate to have an unparalleled level of diversity that needs to be harnessed to make sense of those clandestine organizations operating within the region.
"TriCare from the Inside & Out"
(See L. Hieb, pp. 62-65, November 2000; R. Ryan, J. Sears, pp. 12-16, January 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander James B. Canby IV, Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy, (Retired), former comptroller, Naval Hospital Oak Harbor—Dr. Hieb's impassioned article unfortunately will be received with a thud, and not the reveille it richly deserves. When the Department of Defense (DoD) spends millions in taxpayer dollars to support corporate contractors in the design and development of innovative technologies for revolutionary weapon systems, why do the people who operate those systems feel uncomfortable about their health care system? There is cause for anxiety if there is truly a crisis of trust in the leadership of DoD medicine.
At my private-sector healthcare facility, the reimbursement rate for a Medicare patient is virtually double that of the active-duty member. This means that for a given inpatient charge—after contractual discounts are applied—Medicare pays the hospital twice as much on a percentage basis for the elderly patient visit relative to the sailor in uniform. Furthermore, the facility loses money on the sailor because it is unable to cover fixed costs. This means that the hospital loses money each time a sailor comes through the door.
The Department of Corrections reimburses the hospital for care to criminals at a rate double that of what is provided for a TriCare patient. Again, the reimbursement does not even cover total costs. I am told that the outpatient reimbursement scheme is even more bloody. As TriCare forces private-sector institutions to subsidize the cost of the TriCare patient by charging other payors at a higher rate, it enters into a risky arrangement with the private health care industry.
When the majority of private-sector healthcare institutions no longer accept TriCare patients (as many health-management organizations have done with Medicare), and the word gets out on the enlisted messdecks, trust evaporates. The TriCare bureaucracy could do better by aggressively promoting the improvement of the relationship between regional TriCare offices and the private-sector CEO who manages the safety net.
"Transduction Revolution Might Lead to DD-21 Sonar"
(See E. Walsh, p. 105, January 2001 Proceedings)
Maurice E, Simard, LBVDS (lightweight, broadband variable depth sonar) Project Manager, Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island—This article stated that the LBVDS system is being developed with Lockheed Martin acting as prime contractor. The LBVDS program was conceived as a joint partnership between the Navy and Lockheed Martin with NavSea Newport, Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC), leading the government's development efforts in the LBVDS program and Lockheed Martin's Naval Electronics and Sensor Systems division in Syracuse leading the industry effort.
The partnership approach was unique in that it allowed for NUWC and Lockheed Martin to have both lead and support roles in the development and testing of the LBVDS system. For example, the Navy has the lead in the development of the tow body subsystem and the conduct of all sea tests. Lockheed Martin has the lead role in the development of the transducer arrays and the control, processing, and display subsystem. Each member of the team has a support role in those functions for which they are not the lead activity. This partnership arrangement is clearly a departure from the standard programmatic approach of having industry as a prime contractor and the government acting as technical design agent.
"Manning DD-21"
(See J. Cordle, pp. 59-61, February 2001; W. Laraby, p. 24, March 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Clint Johnson, U.S. Navy—I'd like to make some points regarding this terrific article. I have served in a Type 23 frigate, the Royal Navy's version of the DD-21. The Type 23 is less than ten years old now and includes a host of advanced features similar to those proposed for the DD-21, such as fully automated engineering and damage control, electric drive, stealth design, integrated smoke boundaries, and other innovations that are largely the upshot of lessons learned in the Falklands War. A key element in the Type 23's design was the "lean-manning" concept. A full complement is about 170 personnel.
Central to the lean-manning theme is recognition that business must now be done differently—most cleaning and maintenance on the Type 23 was to be done pierside by contractors, with the ship deploying no more than 45 days in between pierside services. British warships have no deck division. Departments on board ship have an area of upper deck maintenance as a collateral duty. It was recognized that on a busy Type 23 sailors wouldn't have the time to devote to ship husbandry and buffing decks.
Paper concepts give way to practical reality once a ship steams out of the yard. Type 23s deploy for extended periods as long as nine months. Money that was supposed to fund routine pierside maintenance was not appropriated and ship husbandry fell to the ship's company anyway. While the ship has enough operators to man stations at sea, in-port duty sections of enough personnel to respond to emergencies limit the size of the off-duty section. With modem naval manning difficulties experienced by most, if not all, volunteer naval forces, these Type 23s are particularly susceptible to any manning shortfall. In addition, while "Defence Watches" and "Action Stations" can be established in conflict areas, Type 23 crews seem to show some fatigue after periods of more than five to ten days at heightened readiness.
There are some Royal Navy standard operating procedures that I imagine the DD-21 also must employ. In addition to having no deck division, there will be no "Flying Squad," as all members of ship's company and the air detachment (including aircrew) will be equally capable of responding to shipboard emergencies and cross-trained in other tasks. The Lynx detachment on board HMS Somerset had six aircraft maintainers, one chief petty officer, a single pilot, and a naval flight officer—an entire detachment of nine people. The maintainers also were the ship's hangar and flight deck firefighters and aircraft flight deck handlers. As most of us know, the Royal Navy requires only two people on the bridge during a watch, except for during "specials" such as underway replenishments and coming alongside. Watchstanders always have the same watch to ensure the mind and body are most alert. (In fact, there is some speculation that the U.S. Navy's poor record for collisions at sea is a result of too many people on the bridge and too little sleep for watch officers).
On the Somerset, all officers and chief petty officers (except the commanding and executive officers) were administratively responsible for a small division, including the specialized marine engineering officer, the supply officer (who is also the damage-control officer), and the weapon systems engineering officer.
To sum up, there must be follow-through and a careful look at all the implications of lean-manning concepts. The British have years of experience in this area, as do other highly capable European navies. Before the U.S. Navy commits the final draft to paper, the results of these experiences should be studied and the best of their solutions and even of some of the more revolutionary approaches to personnel and manning issues should be seriously considered for integration in DD-21.
"Eliminate the Air Force"
(See J. Coe, pp. 65-68, April 2001 Proceedings)
Major Steven Ziomek, New Jersey Air National Guard—After a few years of relative peace, it seems parochialism has returned to the pages of Proceedings. While it may be only a predictable response to the continuing problem of aging equipment and an underfunded budget, it nevertheless is a shame.
It seems the only purpose of many of the articles written over the past few months has been to build up the Navy at the expense of the other services, particularly the Air Force. They run the gamut from subtle but misleading statements about the Navy's role in Allied Force to articles that call for the abolition of the Air Force (to the Navy's benefit) in the name of defense reorganization. At the same time, commentary in the Air Force Association magazine Air Force is often even more misleading and more partisan. While such articles surely generate discussion, they do little to develop the naval profession. They also ignore an obvious historical lesson: far from being competitors, the Air Force and the Navy are at their best when they complement each other.
This isn't a new idea. One of the primary reasons for the capture of the Gilbert Islands in 1943 was to ensure the availability of land-based air coverage during the planned landing in the Marshalls. On the other hand, one of the objectives of the Navy's raids on Japan in 1945 was to support USAAF B-29 operations. Navy fighters escorted B-29s during the Korean War, and in Vietnam Marine Corps Phantoms flew for KC135s during Air Force raids on North Vietnam. During the 1980s, B-52s from Guam and Loring Air Force Base were outfitted with Harpoon anti-shipping missiles to support Navy operations. In fact, only once in the past century has the Navy been able to operate without outside support. In 1944 and 1945, the Pacific Fleet carried such firepower in its "Big Blue Blanket" of Hellcats and Corsairs that its ships could operate without land-based support. Those days, however, are long gone. The Navy is unable to carry out its mission without Air Force help and the Air Force is just as dependent on the Navy to do its job.
The services tend to work best when they work together. Considering the inevitable changes facing the armed forces under the Bush administration, there is little to be gained by the constant sniping at each other. Both the Air Force and the Navy would be best served by figuring out where they could work together for the good of the nation, instead of focusing on the good of themselves.