Those of us who have been involved in the requirements and design of the armed forces have the feeling that the way we have done this business over the past 40 years has about run its course. Fundamental changes in geopolitics, technology, and budgets will determine the kind of forces we need in the future. Because of these changes, we too need to change. We are tapping the enormous talents of our young people to make our armed services better.
In the 21st century, the armed forces of the United States are not facing a Cold War with a single dominant antagonist. We are dealing with a number of unresolved conflicts—such as in Korea and across the Taiwan Strait—that could flash into major wars, with dissatisfied powers that want to extend their influence, as well as with widespread communal violence and transnational concerns. We will be dealing with a continually changing series of threats to—and opportunities for—promoting security and peaceful development in many regions of the world.
In the Cold War, we built a defense to stand off the Warsaw Pact, and it had the embedded capacity to deal with conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm. During the 1990s, we maintained a defense capable of winning two major regional conflicts, and it had the embedded capacity to deal with contingencies such as Bosnia and Kosovo. In the 21st century, there is not now a contingency that will dominate our planning. In addition, if we think only in terms of threats in our strategy, we will miss opportunities to forge security structures that can keep threats from arising. Southeast Asia, for example, is a region in which generic threat-based thinking offers no guidance for military activity, while opportunity-based thinking offers great promise.
In terms of technology, information technology is going to have the most significant effect on warfare of the 21st century. Especially in the communications fields, we cannot stay with the same tried-and-true technology, or the rest of the world will pass us. In 1927, Harry Warner of Warner Brothers, on hearing about a major technological breakthrough in film, said, "Who the hell wants to hear actors talk?" If he had kept that attitude, I can guarantee that brothers Albert and Jack Warner either would have gotten rid of him, or would not have kept that Hollywood studio afloat. Instead, they released The Jazz Singer that year, and history was made.
Information technology is changing every aspect of warfare in an evolutionary way, and warfare as a whole in a revolutionary way. Vice Admiral Art Cebrowki's three-word formulation, "network-centric warfare," is the best shorthand for it.
But we in the Department of Defense (DoD) are not well organized to handle information technology. A couple of years ago, DoD issued a series of Defense Reform Initiative Decisions, or DRIDs. One of those abolished the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C4I—i.e., command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence. The position did not fit into policy; it did not fit into acquisition; it was not effective; it was too involved, and the raps go on and on. But after about a month of head scratching—What do we do with the pieces of the office? Where do they fit?—this Assistant Secretary position quietly was reestablished. If DoD has such a tough time determining the right organization to handle the single area that will transform warfare, it is an indication of our structural
problems.
Similarly, the Department of Defense acquisition system is simply not well suited to exploit information technology. It is still tied to projecting distant threats and creating programs to acquire major systems that take decades to field. In short, it rewards freezing programs at an early stage and penalizes change. It is geared to Augustine's Laws, where the real growth in costs of major platforms runs from 5% to 7% per year, rather than to Moore's Law, where the capability doubles every 18 months and costs go down. As Norm Augustine has said, with this rate of cost growth, in the year 2054, the entire DoD budget will buy one airplane that the Navy flies half the year, the Air Force flies the other half, and the Marines fly for a day on leap years.
This leads us to budgets. Everyone is familiar with the formidable shortfalls in resources for the major categories of our forces. I can tell you that Pacific Command forces are not as ready as they need to be—e.g., the readiness of air wings bottoms out between deployments. Walk around any base in the Pacific, and you will see the signs of inadequate funding for maintenance of real property.
The service chiefs have testified about the underfunding of modernization to replace today's force structure. There have been Congressional Budget Office estimates and think tank studies that peg the entire shortfall in the $50 billion per year range.
But step back from our internal view of defense resources. The U.S. position in the world has not deteriorated in recent years. In fact, it has strengthened. We are not in a period like the late 1970s, when the Soviet Union was advancing and the decline of U.S. military power was undercutting our position in the world. We are not in a period like the 1930s, when fascist nations were on the march and the United States was deluding itself about the threat. We may well be in an interwar period, but we have not yet discerned the next critical opponent.
It is not the responsibility of those of us in uniform to advocate specific strategies and budgets; that is up to the President and the Secretary of Defense. However, we should not bet our armed forces on the expectation of budget increases on the order of $50 billion per year, and it is our responsibility to think through better ways of doing business at limited levels of resources.
Geopolitics, technology, and budgets are pressuring our current ways of doing business and are incentives for change. I offer some recommendations for change to get us moving in the right direction. They are based on the view from the Pacific, and need to be compared with the ideas of other combatant commanders and service chiefs.
Acquisition by Adaptation
The paradigm for the current acquisition system is reaching a point solution by analysis—i.e., cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) process—and then freezing design, building, and fielding. When this system is applied to large-scale information systems, such as JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) or MILSTAR (Military Strategic and Tactical Relay System), the inevitable result is lots of obsolete technology.
The paradigm for the future should be based on putting a prototype system out quickly, then adapting and improving it as it is fielded. The best way I know to do this is to connect the engineers directly with fleet and field units—with the acquisition community as enablers for that process, not controllers of it, and the theater commanders-in-chief (CinCs) identifying requirements and setting priorities and providing venues where systems can be tested and adapted.
When I deployed from San Diego six years ago with the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) Battle Group, I took two new information systems to sea. One was a strike planning system, designed to plan coordinated aircraft and Tomahawk land-attack missile strikes. The other was an air defense planning and command-and-control system. The engineers for one of the systems sailed with us. As a bug or an opportunity came up, the engineers would act on the spot, backed up by the lab team at home. By the time we finished the cruise, that system was very effective, and we would not have wanted to go to war without it. The other system had the usual first-time fielding glitches, and my staff tried to use it for a few weeks by themselves, then they gave up. When we requested support, we were told to document the problems, and they would be addressed in the next update to the software. The system gathered dust in the corner for the rest of the cruise.
Another way to ensure a system is relevant in the field is to develop it in the field. Recently I received a briefing on an air contingency planning tool, for use when setting up air operations at an unprepared airfield. It tapped into about four worldwide databases maintained by other organizations, and cut the planning time from weeks to hours. It was developed in the Pacific Air Force headquarters by a colonel, a couple of captains, and one contract programmer, and it met a real need in the Pacific.
If we drive our acquisition by the real problems we face today and create ways to adapt rapidly to challenges on the horizon, not only will we increase current readiness, we will solve tomorrow's problems better than if we try to predict them and build distant technical solutions.
There are programs that inject up-to-date technology quickly into the fleet and field: advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs), which have given us Predator and Global Hawk; the joint warfighting interoperability demonstration (JWID) series; the Chairman's Initiative Fund administered by the Joint Staff; and DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) programs. But these programs do not yet make a coherent system that affects major investments. We need a larger-scale approach that bridges the gap between technology demonstration and system acquisition.
I do not know exactly how it would work, but we CinCs now conduct activities that could make valuable contributions. We exercise our major war plans in command post exercises (CPXs) and fleet exercises (FTXs). Although there is a large training element to these events, there is room for an adaptation-based acquisition system.
A good recent example was the Combined Forces Command in Korea a couple of years ago when Army General John H. Tilelli incorporated a Navy Fleet Battle Experiment into a Foal Eagle Exercise. The exercise validated the concept of using Apache helicopters against special operations forces infiltration craft, and left behind a system for linking Navy and Army fire control systems. General Tilelli would not have wanted to go to war without that system.
Currently efforts like this are ad hoc. What is needed is a coordinated system between the services and CinCs in which we incorporate emerging systems into major CPXs and FTXs to ensure they are meeting real current and future needs.
What are some of these needs in the Pacific? The air picture over the land and sea areas of Korea is not as coherent or as integrated as it should be. Counterfire operations in Korea are a kludge of many systems and procedures held together by the ingenuity and training of our operators. Our capabilities against swarm tactics in littoral areas need improvement. Combat search-and-rescue concepts and equipment are barely adequate. Force protection technology is still rudimentary.
I do not know what all our warfighting requirements in the 21st century will be. However, if we have an adaptive system that can bring new technology into the field quickly, addressing today's needs, we will have a system that meets the missions of the future as they become clearer. If we continue with a system in which it takes more than ten years to develop a major new capability, and during that time there is no system to revalidate the requirements and to adapt to changing conditions, we will be much more likely to get it wrong.
Start Joint and Combined
Despite provisions in our acquisition regulations that direct new systems to be built to operate in a joint environment, the practice is to start single-service and add joint and combined links later. The bottom line is a loss of combat power. This process is the result of incentives and penalties—i.e., the procedures of the current acquisition system.
We will make the greatest near-term gains in the warfighting power of the U.S. armed forces if we develop the networks to create a seamless battle space, in which all service weapon systems and sensors contribute to their full potential.
Recall the fleet battle experiment in Korea. By bringing Army attack helicopters to bear in the counter-special forces infiltration campaign and by bringing Navy firepower into the counterbattery campaign, the fighting power of the Combined Forces Command was increased without building new platforms. We unlocked the potential that was latent in the joint task force but had been wasted because of the segmentation of the battle space.
There have been significant improvements in making systems joint since the legendary invasion of Grenada in 1984 that inspired the Goldwater-Nichols Act: Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) road trips and the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessments (JWCAs) process have helped; so, too, have the improvements in the Joint Monthly Readiness Report (JMRR) process; and finally, the chartering of Joint Forces Command to speak for the CinCs on key joint warfighting areas has been important.
If we put more emphasis on acquisition by adaptation, we could put prototypes into the field in a joint environment at an early stage. New systems would have to prove they are interoperable with systems of other components, as well as with coalition partners at an early stage.
We recently implemented a series of joint task force (JTF) command-and-control exercises in the Pacific. I designate a Tier II JTF commander—such as Commander, Seventh Fleet; Commander, Third Marine Expeditionary Force; or Commander, First Corps. The theater component commanders (Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet for the Navy, for example) designate Tier III JTF component commanders (typically a carrier battle group commander for the Navy, or the equivalent for other services). Over the course of a one-day exercise, we tie together the Tier II commander and Tier III headquarters from each service, establish a common operational picture, and transmit important planning and operational messages, such as air-tasking orders and requests for joint fires. Virtually all the services are scrambling to make these command-and-control exercises (C2Xs) work. It turns out that despite the large number of joint task force exercises that we run in the theater, and despite all our developmental efforts, the Tier III headquarters still face major challenges routinely exchanging information as components of a joint task force.
These command-and-control exercises would make excellent venues to wring out prototype C4 systems at an early stage. It is one thing for a service program manager to give a briefing to his boss along these lines:
"General, I can report that our program to build the MSQ umpty clutch is on time and on schedule, but we're still working a few challenges in joint interoperability."
"Great job, Colonel. Keep me informed of progress in the future."
It is another to have to give this briefing:
"Admiral, we just took our prototype for the MSQ umpty clutch to a C2X in Pacific Command, and, frankly, sir, we could not get it up and running in their system. We've been asked to bring it back in six months to try again."
"Damn it, Captain, what's the problem? What do you need to fix this so it will work in the next C2X?"
Everything I said about being born joint goes in spades when it comes to coalition interoperability. It is harder and more neglected. Yet, as a combatant commander, I cannot conceive of wars in the 21st century that will not involve coalition partners. And especially in the Pacific, each contingency may require a different set of coalition partners. We cannot expect to rely on alliance protocols such as NATO. We need systems that have been wrung out in the development stage with our coalition partners so that we identify what part of the operational picture needs to be seen in all coalition headquarters, what messages need to be passed back and forth, and how we can solve the daunting information assurance challenge in a coalition environment.
Experiment as We Exercise and Operate
Some have contended there must be a bright and shining line between training and experimentation. They say too much experimentation during an exercise on the one hand degrades the training and on the other hand constrains the development of truly revolutionary leaps forward in warfighting concepts. I believe that experimentation meshes well with training. We should incorporate an element of experimentation in our exercises in a way that will accomplish the goals of both and often will enhance both. This is especially true for sensors and communications systems, the keys to information dominance. Last year, in the RIMPAC exercise, there were experiments with a coalition-wide area network that enabled great strides in combined operations. Later this year, we are incorporating a major experiment of the extended littoral battle space advanced concept technology demonstration.
We need to go beyond individual initiatives, such as my deployment with Kitty Hawk. We need an organized incorporation of prototypes into joint exercises to improve the operation of joint task forces. The experimentation would be coordinated by service and CinC staffs, so that over time it would lead to more rapid selection among candidate systems and more rapid incorporation of systems into fleet and field units.
There are important people benefits to this change. Experimentation is exciting. When I talk to our officers and enlisted personnel who are involved in experimentation, I see their eyes lighting up and their enthusiasm flowing. This is tough, but rewarding and satisfying stuff! We are making the armed forces better. We are improving our own capability, and that capability will be available in our next operation. Even more important, we are tapping the enormous talents of our young leaders. By demanding that they innovate and use their creativity in a systematic fashion, we are realizing improvements we had never imagined.
We do not want to be like the computer geniuses at Atari and Hewlett-Packard in the 1970s, who turned down Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak and their crazy idea for personal computers just because these folks had not finished college.
Let me try to bring this idea alive by describing a visionary deployment for a WestPac carrier battle group on its way to the Central Command. During workups, the battle group exercises under a realistic scenario, acting as part of a Navy component of a joint task force. The battle group maintains a common operating picture with a JTF commander's headquarters and other Tier III service components. During that time, it experiments with a new C4 system being developed by, say, the Army—for example a new version of the coalition-wide area network—holding common operational picture checks with brigade headquarters in Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines.
As the battle group approaches Japan, it forms a two-aircraft carrier task force and conduct an area access exercise involving Japanese and Republic of Korea forces in both coalition and opposition force roles. It joins the Japanese global command-and-control system. It then integrates into the Korean area air defense and conduct "ring of fire" experiments, including live ordnance fire on ranges in the face of a combined opposition force.
The task force then transits from Korea to the South China Sea, where it exercises operational deception, employing information from national technical means to evaluate effectiveness. The task force also conducts antisubmarine warfare (ASW) exercises, working the seams between carrier battle group and area ASW in littoral regions, developing new concepts and establishing C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) requirements. It exercises area air and missile defense with a U.S. Air Force component flying from Okinawa and Guam, working air-tasking order improvements and experiments with information operations. Finally, it operates routinely with Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles to hone new joint concepts.
The transit culminates with a dissimilar air engagement exercise with Singapore and port calls in Southeast Asia. During the port calls, battle group officers hold seminars with counterparts in host countries to improve coalition interoperability at the tactical level.
All of this could be done in 10-14 days. And what would we have accomplished?
- Increased readiness of all forces involved to respond to contingencies
- Regional engagement that reassured allies and deterred those who would use aggression to impose their will
- Progress in transforming the way we operate, both to take advantage of emerging technology and to address emerging challenges
Readiness, regional engagement, and the transformation of our armed forces—our three priorities in the Pacific Command—are not distinct efforts accomplished by separate organizations at separate times. We do them together with operational units. If we experiment and adapt, we are increasing our readiness while we make the evolutionary changes in technology and concepts that will lead to the transformation of war fighting. If we do them with our allies and security partners, we have the most effective kind of military engagement possible.
Change is difficult, but it is possible. Failure to change is dangerous—for our troops and for our nation.
Admiral Blair is Commander-in-Chief Pacific. This article was adapted from his 22 January address at West 2001, the annual AFCEA-Naval Institute cosponsored symposium and exposition in San Diego.