Special warfare forces operate extensively with surface and subsurface assets that deliver them from the sea, but they lack the rotary-wing support they need to carry out their littoral missions on land.
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. naval warfare has shifted its focus from blue-water domination to littoral warfare. Despite a concentrated effort, however, the process of transforming naval units into a cohesive team skilled at navigating, operating, and supporting missions in the brown-water environment is far from complete. In a recent Proceedings article, Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and Captain Wayne Hughes warn, "Today the United States is master of the seas. Unless we adapt our Navy for future war fighting in contested, close-in waters, however, we risk our ability to influence events."
In many respects, Naval Special Warfare (NSW) personnel are considered the experts on littoral warfare. From their inception as underwater demolition team frogmen during World War II, they have performed missions in virtually every corner of the world. In 1961, they were redesignated SEALs because of their unique ability to perform covert operations from the sea, air, and land, but in today's Navy, this title is somewhat misleading. SEALs train and operate extensively with the surface and subsurface assets that deliver them from the sea, but they lack the dedicated rotary-wing support needed to support their littoral missions from the air.
The role of helicopters in littoral warfare is a priority for naval aviation, though the focus largely has been on developing multimission platforms and pilots rather than on a singular mission such as special warfare. As the Navy rotary-wing community transitions to new tactical aircraft, reassessing traditional Navy missions and tactics is appropriate. Given the significant technology-based, building block architecture of these new aircraft, their suitability to assume a greater role in Naval Special Warfare must be considered.
The Naval Special Warfare/Rotary-Wing Team
Although the helicopter was introduced at the end of World War II and saw significant action during the Korean War, Naval Special Warfare units did not begin working extensively with Navy rotary-wing assets until the Vietnam War. As patrol boats and SEAL platoons attempted to keep the vast waterway network of the Mekong Delta open and clear of communist insurgents, it became apparent that riverine operations would require close air support. By 1966, detachments from Helicopter Combat Support Unit-1 were in theater, and within a year, Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadron 3 (HA[L]-3) was established to meet this need. Although the Army supplied the UH-1 Huey aircraft, the Navy was tasked with providing pilots for these demanding missions.
Army air crews flying in support of naval operations from Navy ships caused difficulties which both services were quick to discover .... Army gunships were not equipped for and their pilots not skilled in all weather helicopter flying, particularly from a floating deck. .. It was believed that Navy helicopter pilots, skilled at antisubmarine warfare and search and rescue operations which required a similar all weather capability, would be better able to cope with this environment.
Over time, HA(L)-3's mission grew to include convoy protection, coastal surveillance, agent and sniper insertion, and SEAL support. By the end of the Vietnam War, the Seawolves of HA(L)-3 had flown more than 78,000 missions. The disestablishment of the squadron in 1972 not only signaled the end of an era in naval aviation, but also left the NSW community without a dedicated rotary-wing squadron to provide mission support.
Despite the lack of a naval special operations squadron, Navy SEALs have continued to rely on conventional U.S. naval helicopters for training and real-world missions. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, "Navy SEALs dropped from helicopters on 25 occasions into Gulf waters to detonate mines. In preparation for the ground war, SEALs flew 11 reconnaissance missions off Kuwaiti beaches, dropping swimmers who swam almost to shore on two-hour surveillance stints." Today, they work with combat support squadron (HC) detachments attached to amphibious ready groups, operate with antisubmarine squadrons (HS) attached to the carrier air wings both at sea and during combat search-and-rescue exercises at NAS Fallon, and perform maritime interdiction operations in the Arabian Gulf with the support of HS and HSL aircraft.
Criteria for Success
The failure of Operation Eagle Claw—the 24 April 1980 attempt to rescue 53 American hostages held in Iran—forced many to reexamine the need for specially equipped aircraft and well-trained pilots and aircrew to support special operations forces (SOF) missions. Analysis of the operation determined two causal factors: ground and air components did not train together as a unit, and there was no full dress rehearsal or evaluation for all participants. When the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom) was established in 1987, emphasis was placed on supporting SOF missions with SOF assets and on training SOF forces.
Success of any SOF mission involving air support is highly dependent on two criteria: the skills of all operators involved and the opportunity for joint rehearsal. In contrast to Eagle Claw,
during preparations for the raid on the Son Tay prisoner of war camp near Hanoi in 1970, absolutely nothing was left to chance. The plan called for nearly four weeks of training prior to deployment. During this period, the aircrews flew a total of 1,017 hours in 368 sorties to hone their skills. The three elements of the ground assault force practiced their attack no less than 175 times before the raid.... Even the pilot who had to crash-land his helicopter in the center of the prison compound practiced his mission at least 31 times. The team members knew each other and trained well together, and when the time came, the mission was executed flawlessly.
SOF pilots, in particular, must possess the skills, acumen, and flight hours to successfully fly SOF missions. The pilots of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), despite the failure of their missions in Somalia, exemplify this expertise:
They were expert at flying totally black. With night-vision devices, they could move around on a moonless night like it was midday. The unit's pilots had been involved in almost every U.S. ground combat operation since Vietnam. When they weren't fighting they were practicing, and their skills were simply amazing. These pilots were fearless, and could fly helicopters in and out of spaces where it would be hard to insert them with a crane.
Current SOF Rotary Support
Today, all SOF units, including Naval Special Warfare commands, request SOF aircraft for training missions and exercises at the monthly Joint Air Allocation Conference, held by USSOCom. Despite having a system in place to pair SOF ground with rotary-wing assets, interoperability is not optimum. The skill level of the pilots is without question, but limited training opportunities and the design limitations of SOF aircraft hinder effectiveness.
In a recent Air Force report, peacetime training was cited as a major limiting factor for SOF missions. As Major Kenneth Page notes, a significant issue is "the limited amount of joint training that can be accomplished due to the small numbers of SOF aircraft and their current locations." For Naval Special Warfare, this problem is all too real. The majority of rotary-wing SOF squadrons are located at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, Hurlburt Field, Florida, and Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Georgia—significant distances from the SEAL team locations in Coronado, California, and Little Creek, Virginia. As a result, SOF helicopter squadrons are tasked far more frequently in support of Army and Air Force SOF missions, as opposed to the maritime mission of Naval Special Warfare. From 1997 to 1999, 47-67% of East and West Coast NSW missions that requested aircraft through the Joint Air Allocation Conference were canceled or went unsupported.
In addition, there simply are not enough SOF aircraft to simultaneously support and sustain Army, Air Force, and Navy special operations forces for training, let alone for two major theater wars. From 1997 to 1999, only 58-67% of Joint Air Allocation Conference mission requests were tasked or supported. As a result, the ground and rotary-wing assets expected to perform SOF missions are unable to train together to the degree needed to maintain and improve their warfighting skills. Ultimately, this may place the success of future missions in jeopardy.
The second major obstacle to optimum interoperability is platform limitations. Most SOF aircraft today are capable of maritime operations off multispot vessels such as amphibious assault ships, but as more emphasis is placed on performance in the littoral environment, the ability of these aircraft to perform from smaller ships comes into question.
Cruisers, destroyers, and frigates can maneuver more easily in the littoral environment, but they are less suitable than a large-deck, deep-draft platform to host the majority of Special Operations Forces' rotary aircraft because of the helicopters' size, rotor arc, and tail wheel configuration. The Army and Air Force Special Operations H-60s, H-47s, and H-53s are limited to a Level I, Class 4 certification category on these ships, and only capable of "day and night IMC [Instrument Meteorological Conditions] VERTREP/hover facilities; hover height in excess of five feet." The only SOF aircraft capable of landing on these smaller naval vessels are the AH/MH-6 and the OH-58D. Both provide excellent command and control, sniper, and surveillance capabilities, but neither is suitable to perform the multiple insertion and recovery methods required by a SEAL platoon.
The Air Force is procuring the CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft to replace the MH-53, and it also is questionable whether it the CV-22 is right for clandestine maritime SOF operations. Its size and design, much like its predecessor's, will limit its operations to larger seaborne assets. As a result, replacement SOF aircraft may not be the ideal NSW mission platform in future conflicts.
Navy Rotary Support
The logical solution is to provide Naval Special Warfare forces with dedicated rotary-wing support from within the Navy. SEALs have relied on the support of conventional Navy helicopter squadrons and detachments for command and control, insertion/extraction, and resupply and sniper missions for both training exercises and actual operations. From September 1999 to April 2000, West Coast SEAL teams requested rotary-wing support from Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific, for 73 missions—more than half of all rotary-wing requests from the four armed forces. In turn, West Coast Navy squadrons provided assets for approximately 71% of the requests. Despite their tremendous support, the Navy rotary-wing community, as now organized and resourced, is unable to meet SOF standards to perform and practice littoral missions.
Mission priority and skill levels. In the current HC community, NSW is a secondary mission, and the HSL community considers it neither a primary nor a secondary mission area. Any only in recent years has the HS community upgraded NSW to primary mission status. As much as naval aviators who fly in support of NSW missions would like to be "crack pilots" like their SOF counterparts, the emphasis in their communities often is on simply maintaining currency for these missions. Unfortunately, these skills also are based on the currency of the pilot, and not on proficiency or the needs of the NSW operators.
With antisubmarine and antisurface warfare, command and control, logistics, and organic airborne mine countermeasures as primary missions, naval rotary-wing pilots have little time to focus on becoming tactically proficient in the NSW mission. In addition, pilots who support NSW training in the local area often are not the same pilots who deploy with that particular platoon.
There are two Navy squadrons that consider NSW a primary mission—HCS-4 and HCS-5—but they are reserve commands. As a result, they cannot be tasked directly to perform NSW missions, they determine their own training, and they often have other obligations. To the detriment of Naval Special Warfare, HCS pilots, like their active-duty counterparts, do not train to SOF aviation standards, and total reliance on a reserve command can cause readiness to be compromised.
Funding. Today, Navy squadrons cannot meet demands in support of primary missions, let alone a secondary mission such as NSW. Despite a shortage of aircraft, parts, fuel, and people, squadrons still are required to maintain a high level of readiness, and budget constraints continue to force reductions in flight hours.
Location. The West Coast NSW commands are able to work closely with squadrons based at NAS North Island, but the same cannot be said for their East Coast counterparts. The East Coast HC community and HCS-4 both are located at Norfolk, Virginia, in close proximity to Naval Air Base Little Creek; however, the closest HS and HSL commands are at NAS Jacksonville.
Standard operating procedures. Many Navy squadron standard operating procedures do not permit crews to fly the helicopters at the altitudes and airspeeds required for SOF missions. For example, many commands restrict their pilots from flying below 200 feet over the water at night, but SOF missions require lower altitudes, not only for stealth and concealment but also for insertion and extraction. A ten-foot, ten-knot profile at night may be standard for an Army MH-60 when deploying a SEAL platoon but the parameters are much stricter for the Navy H-60s. SOF standards require aviators to push the envelope and be comfortable under extreme flying conditions. The conventional Navy does not. As a result, training often is less than optimal.
Aircraft limitations. The SH-60R and MH-60S—the two airframes to which the Navy helicopter fleet will be transitioning—provide a multitude of benefits for the NSW mission. The SH-60R will be an excellent command-and-control and sniper platform, and will be equipped with a glass cockpit, radar, forward-looking infrared, Hellfire missiles, countermeasures dispensing system, laser detection set, advanced threat infrared countermeasure missile warning system, and side suppression system. The CH-60 baseline aircraft will hold up to 12 troops, be equipped with a glass cockpit, hover infrared suppression system, night-vision device heads-up display, wirestrike protection, and downed aviators location system. The armed helo kit for the MH-60S scheduled for initial operational capability in 2005 will include forward-looking infrared, Hellfire missiles, countermeasures dispensing system, laser detection set, advanced threat infrared countermeasure missile warning system, digital map system, radar warning receiver, and a fixed forward suppression system. The MH-60S will be capable of performing virtually all methods of insertion and extraction.
Despite the improvements and upgrades, neither aircraft is truly suitable for NSW support initially. The MH-60S in production lacks self-protection equipment and the countermeasures required for combat search and rescue, and door mounted guns. There are no plans to put armor plating on the SH-60R or the MH-60S.
The Naval Special Warfare Squadron
The answer is to reactivate HCS-4 and HCS-5. Maintaining the reserve components and reserve aircraft, the active-duty components should be established with the sole purpose of supporting NSW missions from land or at sea from a surface action group, amphibious ready group, or other sea-based platform. The squadron would be comprised of MH-60S and SH-60R aircraft specially configured for SOF missions. The anticipated move of HCS-5 from NAS Point Mugu to NAS North Island in 2001 also would provide the opportunity for greater interaction with the West Coast SEAL teams.
Both squadrons should be manned with second-tour or night-vision-device qualified Category II pilots with sufficient flight hours and experience at sea. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and USSOCom would share funding, and a training curriculum would be based on existing tactical manuals, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the special boat units, and the needs of the SEAL teams.
Dedicated active-duty rotary-wing squadrons would provide a real and consistent solution for NSW mission requirements in the littorals. The benefits to the NSW community are obvious, and it also might help solve a growing aviation retention problem. It would provide a focused mission for helicopter pilots, and would permit them to specialize in a singularly challenging mission area. In addition, it would offer two additional command opportunities for the rotary-wing community, as well as continued command opportunity within SOF.
Success in the littorals is dependent not only on SEALs with the requisite skills to work in those regions but also on the support platforms and their operators who must deliver them to their targets. Now is the time to ensure all of our assets are well trained and equipped to perform littoral missions.
Lieutenant Dunne, a 1992 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, is assigned to Naval Special Warfare Group One as fleet exercises officer.