In any mine countermeasure (MCM) operation, assessments must be made to determine the time required to complete the task and to estimate the risk involved. At assessment level "Risk Directive Charlie," the primary concern is timely completion of the task; risk to MCM assets is secondary. The mission of the U.S. Navy's Very Shallow Water Mine Countermeasures (VSW MCM) Detachment is to perform advanced force or pre-assault tasks—which by their very nature are high-risk operations. The men of this detachment know the dangers and accept them readily: going into underwater minefields at night, just outside the surf zone of enemy-held beaches, with little or no support. This article is as much about them as it is about the capabilities of the Navy's only VSW MCM unit.
In December 1995, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) authorized creation of a "proof-of-concept" VSW MCM detachment with the goal of evaluating the feasibility of a sustained capability. This action responded to lessons learned in numerous exercises, which demonstrated that ad hoc approaches to MCM operations in the VSW zone (10- to 40-foot depth) could compromise landing site locations and unnecessarily endanger divers. Previous exercises also had verified the need for specialized equipment to locate and counter ordnance and obstacles in that zone.
The VSW MCM Test Detachment was made up of Navy explosive ordnance demolition (EOD), Naval special warfare (NSW), and Marine force reconnaissance personnel. Test objectives were to: develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for low observable mine reconnaissance and obstacle neutralization; identify requirements for achieving and sustaining a permanent core contingency response capability to conduct VSW MCM; and evaluate prototype VSW MCM systems and equipment.
Because of the extremely high-risk nature of the mission, the concept of operations was written so as to substitute technology for man as a sensor and weapon system. The long-term goal is to get man out of the loop. Initial investment in diver and marine mammal systems (MMSs) is aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and survivability of current in-service systems until unmanned systems are available to the fleet. It will enable the Navy to buy equipment and develop the tactics necessary for an initial operational capability in advanced force mine reconnaissance in the VSW zone. The CNO initiative resulted in establishment of a sustained detachment to ease the critical shortfall that exists in MCM support of amphibious operations.
The EX 8—soon to be MK 8—Marine Mammal System combines the capabilities of marine mammals with a detection device to determine the location of bottom and tethered mines along specific boat lanes in the VSW zone. The system uses dolphins "on-the-go" in scanning continuously for mines to maximize the area searched. The operators use a work boat with command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) equipment for precise navigation and target location recording. On locating a mine-- like object, the system maps the potential mine for later reacquisition by divers. After working in its assigned area, the system returns to a drop-off point where the mapping data is collected for transmission back to the mine countermeasures commander and commander of the amphibious task force.
VSW MCM tactics, techniques, and procedures were developed over 18 months by the integrated Navy-Marine team. Everyone had basic skills in underwater search and reconnaissance operations, and brainstorming and the trialand-error approach were used extensively. The detachment conducted day and night training in San Diego test areas that were set up with mines representative of the VSW threat, including areas with difficult bottoms for mine searching. Techniques were adjusted to accommodate safety requirements and permit trial runs with prototype equipment. The detachment was able to refine its tactics and techniques from ship and shore through participation in four fleet exercises over the test period, including Dugong 96 in Australia and JTFEX 97-3 at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. These exercises offered different environmental and bottom conditions, assisted in determination of basic mobility and sustainability requirements, and began the process of gathering the key planning considerations for proper employment of the VSW MCM Detachment.
The detachment validated that combat divers and mammals—Atlantic Bottlenose Dolphins—could find mines and obstacles. The unit was established officially in October 1997 and currently is made up of fleet Navy technicians as well as EOD, NSW, and Marine force reconnaissance personnel. The three warfare specialties are a distinct force multiplier. All hands are experienced petty officers and noncommissioned officers with two or more operational deployments under their belts. As the detachment reaches full manning level, the numbers breakdown is 17 SEALs, 16 Marines, and 25 EOD men. This showcase of interoperability is truly a unique blend of talented, hard-working men and trained dolphins. The men are the best the United States has to offer. Machinist Mate 1st Class James Meagher, who was selected as Sailor of the Year for both EOD Group One and Naval Surface Force Pacific Fleet, is representative of all the outstanding sailors and Marines who accomplish the old Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) mission—but in a far more refined and unusual fashion.
The VSW MCM Detachment's job amounts to the SEAL platoon's combat hydrographic reconnaissance, except that it is done underwater and searches specifically for very shallow water mines. The task is to find mines for possible follow-on neutralization or find gaps in the mine lines. The task becomes "low visibility" rather than underwater when the marine mammal handlers escort dolphins into the VSW zone. (Ironically, things have come full circle-handlers ride a motorized surfboard, much as the team commander did in UDT's early days, when he rode down swimmer lines to observe progress.) Obviously, the detachment is not a conventional MCM unit. While its mission is combat oriented, it strives to strike a balance between warfighting laboratory and credible contingency capability.
The VSW MCM mission is conducted in darkness. Detachment forces and systems must be capable of handling difficult currents and fides, reduced visibility, complex seabeds, varying types of influence and contact mines, other man-made obstacles, and enemy forces ashore. Inside the ten-foot depth curve (surf zone), mine reconnaissance techniques lose effectiveness. The Navy has decided that overhead reconnaissance coupled with pre-assault breaching is the best way to conduct MCM operations.
The detachment's operating environment is anything but comfortable. The sea is unforgiving, especially near the surf zone—if something can go wrong, it will. Knots untie; gear secured improperly in boats and on swimmers is lost; rogue waves capsize the craft of the most experienced operators. The following factors illustrate the "typical" VSW zone:
- Size and proximity to the beach of the VSW zone is related to the beach gradient (slope). Along the Kuwaiti coastline, for example, a 1:27 gradient results in a 2,300-yard long VSW lane in the zone with the shallow end approximately 1,000 yards offshore.
- Visibility and bottom profiles in the VSW zone vary widely. Even within a single square mile, conditions can range from more than 50 feet of visibility and hard sand bottoms to zero visibility and rock, soft mud, and silt bottoms. Bottom profiles vary from a flat seabed to those marred by deep canyons, rolling mounds, and ridges. Plant life prevalent in much of the world's shallow water further complicates visibility and acoustics.
- Typically, VSW areas in many parts of the world are densely cluttered with an assortment of objects, such as sunken channel buoys, crab pots, sewer lines, sunken ships, and other man-made debris.
- Depth, waves, and tidal action complicate acoustic approaches to MCM operating areas. Waves and tidal currents, though often predictable, add to their complexity. Surface conditions can vary from flat standing water to heavy seas.
- The possible proximity of VSW to hostile forces makes overt MCM operations impractical in most cases. The vulnerability of divers operating in these environments and the need to preserve tactical surprise mandates development of low-visibility tactics to increase the probability of successful operations. Proliferation of night vision and infrared systems makes clandestine night operations increasingly difficult.
- Water and air temperatures affect systems in the water greatly. Diver endurance even in warm water is generally limited to a few hours; with the very best thermal protection, endurance decreases rapidly in cold water.
The complex environment of the VSW and surf zone renders most deep-water MCM systems ineffective. To date, there are no remotely controlled systems in service for detection and classification tasks. The effectiveness of various sonars begins to degrade at depths of less than 40 feet. Lack of classification capability in large-area detection systems results in a high false-alarm rate even in good environmental conditions.
The VSW MCM Detachment's many achievements since the stand-up ceremony in October 1997 are a tribute to the people of the different warfare specialties assigned to the detachment. In the words of John Paul Jones, "Men mean more than guns in the rating of a ship." A new, highly valuable mine countermeasures capability has come of age. It is up to the Navy and Marine Corps to maintain it—even in the face of defense downsizing.
Commander James, a naval special warfare officer and former enlisted SEAL, is the officer in charge of the Very Shallow Water Mine Countermeasures Detachment at the Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, California.