C4I. What a nice, handy way to make our jobs sound important. Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence—sounds impressive!
For years, the U.S. Navy led the world (including private industry) in communications technology. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, our technological edge began to disappear. By 1992, the importance of my job in satellite communications was dashed when someone asked, "Why should we spend $100,000 in immediate repair costs to fix a phone line when we can use a secure telephone unit and dial AT&T for pennies?" The commercial-- off-the-shelf buzz soon followed as we tried to regain some of the lost ground, but now we are finding that playing catch-up is futile.
In a nutshell, jobs no longer exist for a significant number of people who call themselves "communicators." Many of them are just clinging on, hoping they can justify their existence a little bit longer to enable another advancement to ensure they have a big retirement check coming for the rest of their lives.
One of the first hits to communications came in the form of a Navy radioman-turned-spy named John Walker. Within a few years, the Navy had recovered from this loss—not in information lost, but in newer, simpler-to-operate encryption equipment and the protection of this equipment and keys. In essence, 15% or more of the radioman workload disappeared. In the late 1980s, the Navy started eliminating mechanical Teletype machines. There was one less thing to repair and no one had to stand the watch over six or eight machines, ensuring traffic got processed correctly. Scratch another 20% of the radioman workload.
The automation of message processing has all but eliminated another 40% to 50% of the workload. The drafting/ releasing core competency has been delegated out to all hands, but for some reason, radioman manning on most ships remains at 1970s levels. Jokingly, many communicators and technicians started mispronouncing the rating, calling it "radi-yeoman," reflecting the shift (i.e., reduction) in the nature of the tasks, duties, jobs, and responsibilities of both the enlisted rating and related officer designators. Some saw the big changes coming and began learning computer basics. Others still are clinging to what became the largest rate in the Navy.
Somewhere along the line, the minimum standards for enlistment in the Navy became the standard for becoming a radioman. This has left us with a dilemma: how do we tell these people it is time for them to "go home"? Most cannot even cross-- rate into any other field within the Navy because of that minimum standard. Even the limited duty officer designator 619x is obsolete. Most are up to their necks in administrative instead of operational workload. A lot of this administrative work is repetitive gibberish, applied with a liberal amount of showmanship and designed to give the appearance of performing a job.
There is some valuable real estate on board ships reserved for personnel required to run overmanned and undertasked radio shacks. Most, if not all, of the communications plan configuration and testing have been relegated to the electronics technicians. Many commanding officers hold the electronics material officer accountable, even when 70% of communications problems can be attributed to operator error. Why is there not an increase in the manning of electronics technicians and a large decrease (or complete elimination) of the radioman (information technology) rating?
The other armed services have discovered that there is no need for a separate operator rating in their high-tech communications detachments. Most of the Navy's technical training requires that technicians be able to operate their equipment, so add a week on to these technical schools, present the administrative functions to the technicians, and allow for a true manning reduction. Let the real C41 experts (electronics technicians, operational specialists, fire controlmen, electronics warfare technicians, cryptologic technicians, and intelligence specialists) absorb the few radioman/operator-specific tasks that remain so the Navy can catch up. A simple test for the core competencies needed can be administered to all ex-radiomen—from seaman recruit to lieutenant commander—to determine if they are suitable for further service in one of these actual C4I rating specialties. Those who have taken the initiative to keep up with the technology should be rewarded with a redesignation suitable to their knowledge and abilities.
Commercial worldwide communications have caught up and surpassed the Navy's technology. The people responsible for the Navy's future communications need to be far more competent than the mainstream radioman, who still is getting evaluated and advanced at a highly inflated level. When the administrative workload exceeds the operational workload, is it any wonder that a large portion of the Navy communications establishment has been selected for outsourcing?
Senior Chief Stough is assigned to Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station Guam.