The terrorist attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) in Aden, Yemen, highlighted a problem that has been festering for years: the lack of internationally accepted port security standards. No international body has promulgated minimum port security standards to which commercial ports must adhere. Unless national authorities have implemented security procedures, these international trading portals are sieves through which contraband and people can pass with little or no risk of government intervention.
This has resulted in a high level of vulnerability to terrorism and other criminal activities, including cargo theft, smuggling, and the illegal import and export of controlled items. Poor port security also means that most nations do not have full control of their borders and the sovereignty of their territory.
To reduce the vulnerabilities of commercial ports, internationally accepted port security standards should be adopted that would leverage technology and intelligence to minimally hinder the flow of goods that fuel modern economies.
On the Waterfront
Commercial seaports generally have inadequate security systems and procedures in place. The Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports (the Seaport Commission) found that the 12 ports visited had only fair-to-poor security. These ports were selected for their size, geographic diversity, and types of trade and shipping. None of the ports had conducted a threat assessment, and only 17% had conducted a vulnerability assessment.
Just as surprising, statistical data regarding the amount of crime occurring in seaports are incomplete. In the U.S. case, neither the Uniform Crime Reporting Program nor the National Incident-Based Reporting System permits those entering or analyzing data to identify those crimes that occur at seaports. Various U.S. government and local law enforcement agencies keep statistics regarding seaport crimes, but that information is not consolidated. In addition, there is no international system of reporting criminal activity that is linked to seaports. Despite the lack of hard data, it is possible to make an educated assessment of the extent to which U.S. seaports are the focus of criminal activity. For example, internal criminal conspiracies were reported at 9 of the 12 ports surveyed by the Seaport Commission. Also, 69% (by weight) of the cocaine seized at U.S. borders was seized at the 12 seaports visited by the Seaport Commission, as opposed to 12% at the Southwest land border.
Outside the United States, the security of seaports is similarly dismal. Since 1991, the Coast Guard has carried out a series of vulnerability assessments of commercial seaports that host U.S. cruise ship passengers. These assessments are designed to determine the vulnerability of foreign ports to terrorism and offer insight into the global port-security posture. Like U.S. ports, security at the ports assessed by the Coast Guard generally ranged from fair to poor, with vulnerability assessments of medium and high. The foreign port assessment program has allowed assessors to identify a number of common security deficiencies, including:
- A badge/pass system that is nonexistent or not enforced
- Lack of coordinated/unified command, control, and communications
- Access control not enforced
- Perimeter security inadequate, obscured, or poorly maintained
- Lack of law enforcement firearms training by armed security forces
- No comprehensive operating procedures or security plan
- Corruption of port officials and security forces
The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that losses to cargo theft are $30-50 billion per year worldwide. This figure includes theft in non-maritime environments, but the volume of maritime-related trade indicates that much of this theft involves cargo traveling by sea. The CIA assesses that containerized cargo is particularly at risk.
Addressing seaport security on a global level is vital because seaports are catalysts for our economic engine and portals through our borders. An estimated 90-95% of all goods imported to the United States arrive by sea. Some may have been transhipped through other ports between the port of origin and the final U.S. destination, meaning that this cargo has passed through ports that probably have mediocre-to-poor security procedures. Coupled with lax U.S. requirements for reporting the contents of containers and a perpetual shortage of customs and immigration inspectors, it is reasonable to conclude that, in many cargo shipments, the U.S. government and its border control agencies have no idea what products are entering its territory and economy.
The adoption of international standards will make it easier to secure U.S. ports and make U.S. ships, passengers, and military personnel safer at ports outside the United States. If the United States were to institute stringent port security regulations unilaterally, trade would likely be impeded, which would have an adverse economic effect. International standards would create a level playing field with a minimal impact on trade.
Implementing Standards
All trading partners of the United States must maintain an acceptable degree of security in their maritime transportation systems. This is vital because any major variations would increase vulnerabilities throughout the system. If criminal groups or terrorists understand that it is easier to enter the maritime transportation system at a certain port where security is lax, they will do it. Therefore, international standards must be detailed enough to ensure security remains uniform.
A secure maritime transportation corridor must be developed that will not significantly impair trade. Goods shipped from a secure port would be granted expedited entry into the United States. This can be done using a certification model similar to that for airports. If a seaport meets international security standards as assessed by international or U.S. inspectors, cargo originating from that port would require less attention on its arrival than cargo from a port that does not meet these standards. This would be an incentive for ports to comply with international standards. Intelligence-cued inspections would be complementary to the international security standards, and the increased use of intelligence to identify and target shipments of interest also would reduce wholesale inspections of incoming cargo. Finally, the use of technologies such as container X-ray machines and carbon dioxide detectors would streamline the inspection process.
International port security standards could be pursued through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency of the United Nations. IMO already has developed voluntary guidelines for passenger vessel and terminal security and combating piracy. It is an appropriate venue for the development and implementation of port security standards.
Implementing port security standards will be most difficult for developing countries. It is in many of these countries, however, that security is most lacking and vulnerability is greatest. Therefore, training and technical assistance should be made available from more developed countries and industry to ensure the implementation of these standards is as smooth as possible.
There are several organizations that have done work in this area, including the International Association of Airport and Seaport Police, which has developed an accreditation program for law enforcement agencies with responsibilities in seaports. This program focuses on the agency procedures but does include an assessment of security at the seaport itself.9 Other potential contributors include the Maritime Security Council, representing private maritime security concerns; the International Chamber of Commerce, which has been active in antipiracy efforts; the National Cargo Security Council, which addresses cargo theft; and the Baltic and International Maritime Council, which has represented ship owner and operator concerns regarding maritime security.
The drive for international standards must be led by governments, as port security is in the interest of sovereign nations. Ensuring secure borders and creating an environment in which legitimate trade can thrive are the responsibilities of nations. A fair, well-developed, and judiciously implemented international port security regime will increase confidence among trading partners that their products will reach markets without interference. International port security standards will provide a baseline for vulnerability assessments that can reduce the risk of terrorism against ports and ships. That is the lesson of the Cole tragedy. It is the least we owe our dead.
Lieutenant Commander Edgerton is assigned to Group/Marine Safety Office Long Island Sound. He was a staffer on the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports and program manager for the Coast Guard’s foreign port assessment program.