The ability of naval expeditionary forces to accomplish their missions is dependent not only on strategy, concepts, and doctrine, but also on the equipment they have available.
Today's naval expeditionary forces provide a first-on-scene, scalable, rapid military response to a range of crises. Considered the world's premier response force, they are unique among even the most powerful navies of the world. A primary focus of the nation's military doctrine, articulated in a wide range of publications—from the National Security Strategy to "Joint Vision 2020"—is forward presence and fighting in and through the littorals. Crises from Bosnia to Somalia, to Liberia and others, have demonstrated that maintaining on-scene Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary forces capable of shaping the nation's strategic environment has never been more important.
Within the Department of the Navy an increasing percentage of the department's Total Obligational Authority is being channeled to make naval forces more expeditionary. Clearly, the emphasis on expeditionary warfare is more than rhetoric, and the goal of providing theater commanders-in-chief with a wide range of power projection and forcible entry options seems to be within reach.
However, in spite of this focused approach and the enormous investment in systems, sensors, platforms, and weapons needed to execute the Navy and Marine Corps strategy, there still are deficiencies in fielding combat-ready naval expeditionary forces capable of executing the array of missions they may be called on to conduct. Failure to fill these gaps may hinder these forces in the accomplishment of their missions in the near future and, left unattended, could marginalize their long-term contribution in supporting the National Military Strategy.
Proud Past, Focused Future
For many, "naval expeditionary warfare" conjures up visions of scores of ships, boats, and landing craft moving toward a beach at agonizingly slow speed, reminiscent of the World War II assaults brought to the screen so vividly in movies such as Saving Private Ryan. Until recently, this image was indeed representative. During the Cold War the Navy the Marine Corps organized, trained, and executed amphibious warfare doctrine in a manner that more resembled this mid-century experience than the way warfare was evolving at the end of the 20th century.
Desert Storm changed all that. While much of the lore of that conflict focuses on the high-profile action—the bombing campaign, the armored assault through the desert, and the payoff of the nation's high-tech weapons—the contributions of expeditionary warfare forces were equally important to the success of the coalition.
Naval expeditionary forces performed brilliantly in the Gulf War both in what they accomplished and in what they enabled other coalition forces to do. The heroics of the Marines in blunting the Iraqi attack on Khafji in January 1991 are well-known, as are the lightning, coordinated attacks through Kuwait in February of that year. Less heralded was the strategic advantage conferred by the amphibious task force whose presence tied up divisions of Iraqi troops along the western shoreline of the Arabian Gulf, aiding the success of our left hook through the desert. Documents captured from retreating Iraqi troops, as well as analysis conducted after the war, show the extent to which the very real and visible threat of amphibious invasion complicated Iraqi defensive strategy and tactics.
Desert Storm also focused attention on the capabilities of the amphibious ready group (ARG)/Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU[SOC]). These teams performed a wide range of actions from gas and oil platform takedowns, to amphibious raids and feints, to maritime interdiction and specialized demolition operations that were critical to the war effort.
These types of operations became the catalyst for expanding naval expeditionary warfare forces' capability. They provided the focus for the future, as articulated in the Naval Amphibious Warfare Plan:
The essence of the operational concept for . . . amphibious forces is forward presence ... and the ability to operate effectively across the full spectrum of conflict and a vast array of crises .... The basic elements of the operational concept are forward-deployed forces, augmentation by prepositioned and surge forces, seabasing, and the principle of operational maneuver from the sea.
Table 1 depicts ARG/MEU(SOC) conventional and special missions. The ability of the force to accomplish these missions is dependent not just on strategy, concepts, and doctrine, but also on the equipment it has available.
Equipped for the 21st Century
One result of the increased recognition of the importance of naval expeditionary assault forces—both Navy and Marine Corps—has been a renaissance of capabilities, making them some of the best-equipped, most versatile forces in the U.S. military arsenal.
Modernizing naval amphibious assault ships has been one of the Navy's top priorities. Gone are the single-screw amphibious assault ships (LPHs), the unstable tank landing ships (LSTs), the single-mission amphibious cargo ships (LKAs), and a plethora of older craft that provided capabilities often only marginally better than their World War II predecessors. For the Marines, outdated legacy platforms, such as the venerable CH-46 helicopter and its slow seagoing partner, the amphibious assault vehicle, are being replaced by new, more capable systems such as the MV-22 Osprey and the advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV). At the turn of the millennium, the Navy-Marine Corps team has focused its modernization efforts and resources toward meeting common objectives around two triads—strategic and tactical lift.
Strategic lift evolves from 12 amphibious ready groups built around the large-deck Tarawa (LHA-1) and Wasp (LHD-1)-class amphibious assault ships, and includes the new San Antonio (LPD- 17) class. The Whidbey Island (LSD-41) and Harper's Ferry (LSD-49) classes round out this formidable lift package. The ARGs of the 21st century will have enhanced lift, more speed, better agility, and the ability to handle more a diverse range of missions. They are designed to work together as a cohesive entity, but individual ships—particularly newer ships such as the LPD-17—also are capable of independent operations.
For the Marine Corps, tactical-lift capability comes from the air-cushion landing craft (LCAC), AAAV, and tilt-rotor MV-22. This triad, supplemented by legacy systems such as the MH-53E helicopter and escorted by platforms such as the AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter, provides the Navy-Marine Corps team with over-the-horizon force projection that exploits the sea as a maneuver space and provides increased capability to reach inland objectives well beyond the coastline.
Given the outstanding capabilities these extant and emerging systems and platforms offer, it would seem that the Navy-Marine Corps expeditionary assault team's ability to execute future missions is assured. It is not. Unless this team deals with significant operational capability issues soon, its chances of success will be proscribed.
Exposing the Gaps
Offensively, in addition to being an essential building block for follow on forces, the ARG/MEU(SOC) must be able to execute contingent operations, performing discrete and specialized missions ranging from in-extremis hostage rescue to noncombatant evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance. Defensively, when operating outside the protective umbrella of a carrier battle group (as was the case in most responses to crises during the past decade), these naval expeditionary forces must be able to defend against the full range of potential adversary threats. A review of the current and projected capabilities of the various Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) organizations by warfare area may help determine the team's true strengths and vulnerabilities.
The warfighting functions of the MAGTF can be categorized by its power projection capability in war, support requirements for operations other than war, and the defensive capabilities needed to counter air, surface, or subsurface units that threaten the force.
Strike Warfare (Opposed Operations). The ships, aircraft, and assault craft—available and programmed—of the MAGTF should enable it to conduct effective over-the-horizon operations to objective areas located as far as 200 nautical miles inland. LCACs and AAAVs will provide Marine Corps forces with the surface-lift capability needed to move combat power ashore rapidly.
By air, however, this capability is less assured. The Marine Corps is counting heavily on the MV-22 to replace its aging CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters and perhaps eventually the CH-53E heavy-lift fleet. As the Corps moves toward an Osprey-dominant force, the MAGTF's ability to execute opposed operations beyond the beach line must be reevaluated.
For the MAGTF to operate inland, the capabilities of its aviation element must be matched in a modernized force of offensive and logistics assets. Ospreys can quickly outfly and outrange the CH-53E heavy-lift helicopters and the AH-1W gunships that historically have provided the preponderance of escort support for Marine transport assets. In short, unless the Marine Corps moves to an all-Osprey air arm (a challenging scenario given the Osprey's cost), the air combat element will remain unbalanced and unable to fully capitalizing on the Osprey's capabilities to deliver support to inland objectives.
Special Missions. Missions such as in-extremis hostage rescue, noncombatant evacuation, and tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel may require Marine Corps air assets to penetrate an adversary's established defenses beyond the beachline. The team's ability to perform these missions must be reviewed from a total-force perspective.
Low-flying aircraft penetrating inland are vulnerable to various enemy antiair defense weapons. Other services have developed highly capable aircraft such as the Pave Low and Pave Hawk helicopters, as well as stealthy tactical aircraft, to support such challenging missions. However, the realities of forward expeditionary warfare and the short-fused nature of many special missions raises the possibility that the MAGTF will not have the ready support of nonorganic forces in time of crisis. The MV-22's speed and range make it far less vulnerable than the CH-46, but the Osprey alone is not the complete answer. The Marine Corps air combat element of the near future must retain an organic capability to support the expanded maneuver opportunities provided by the tilt-rotor aircraft.
Command-and-Control Warfare. The modern surface combatants that comprise the ARG have robust communications and command-and-control suites as well as modem electronic warfare sensors and systems. They also have the capability to reach back and access nonorganic intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and threat warning assets. Collectively, these capabilities enable the command-and-control warfare commander (C2WC) to provide an adequate degree of command and control as well as timely indications and warning of impending threats. However, the ARG/MAGTF C2WC lacks an organic airborne asset that can extend command and control of the battlespace and provide the linkage between the command ship and other assets in the ready group. An airborne warning and control or E-2C aircraft could provide such a capability, but these fixed-wing assets typically are not available to an ARG. An embarked helicopter such as the LAMPS Mk III SH-60B Seahawk with its radar and electronic warfare suites—as well as the capability to data-link to the parent ship—could provide immediate, off-the-shelf capability to the C2WC.
Air Defense Warfare. Organizationally and doctrinally, the MAGTF is well equipped to conduct rudimentary air defense. Ready group ships have good basic point-defense missile systems and guns, close-in weapon systems, chaff, and Stinger missiles that can present an impressive close-in gauntlet to incoming surface and air targets. There is no expectation, however, that outside the protective umbrella of a carrier battle group an ARG can deal effectively with a late-generation tactical air threat, or even saturation attacks by less-capable threats. However, there are steps that can be taken to enable the area air defense commander (AADC) to defend against low- and mid-altitude threats such as a single third world tactical jet fighter or a suicide aircraft.
The AADC needs early warning, a shared consolidated tactical picture, and multidimensional deconfliction to protect his own expanded battlespace and to use the defensive systems at his disposal more effectively. The AADC also could use a rudimentary air-to-air capability to deal with airborne threats before they come within weapons release range of future three-ship ARG formations. The former capability exists in LAMPS Mk III aircraft as well as in derivative models of the UH-60A Blackhawk helicopter equipped with various types of air warning radars. The latter capability could be adapted to enhance the air-to-air capability of the AV-813 Harrier currently embarked with the air combat element of the MAGTF.
Surface Warfare. The threat of small-boat attack has grown dramatically in size and capability during the threat of small-boat attack has decade; a number own dramatically in size and capability during the possess at least rudimentary decade; a number of nations possess and least-attack craft. ARG ships have little more than point-defense capabilities and fast-attack could use both ARG ships have little more face than point-defense capabilities and an effective both air-to-surface-ship face stand-off weapon and an effective international market has a variety of surface-ship weapon. The international market has a variety of surface weapons that could be adapted to ARG ships. In addition, all air combat, including element could be equipped with more robust air combat element could be equipped weapons than the Hellfire missile and 20air-to-surface weapons than they care missile today. mm. cannons they carry today.
Undersea Warfare. This is one of the toughest areas for the ARG to handle on its own because it has no undersea warfare (USW) capability. There are no effective sensors, systems, or weapons, no USW doctrine, and no procedures or tactics for USW organic to the ARG. Undersea warfare often is overlooked because it is assumed either that the ARG always will operate under the protection of a carrier battle group or that the threat is not there.
The challenge of undersea warfare is daunting, but there are ways to provide some capability to ARGs. Submarines, which often find it challenging to work with carrier battle groups because of the potential for blue-on-blue engagements, might be better suited to work with ARGs, where the chances of blue-on-blue are minimized. Alternatively, P-3C aircraft can range virtually worldwide—certainly into most littoral areas—to provide a basic USW capability for an ARG. These capabilities exist today; however, there are no procedures and practices to use them to conduct undersea warfare within the ARG.
Another option might be something along the lines of the Arapaho Program, in which H-3 Sea King helicopters with dipping sonar and packaged maintenance are deployed on board merchant ships. This same capability could be adapted to ARGs.
Discrete Needs for Naval Expeditionary Forces
The Navy-Marine Corps team's ability to conduct operational maneuver from the sea in the world's littoral regions would be enhanced by:
- An aircraft organic to the air combat element capable of escorting the MV-22 on long-range missions
- An airborne early warning, command-and-control and battle management aircraft to extend the MAGTF's command-and-control range
- Stand-off surface warfare weapons
- Rudimentary undersea warfare capability
- Rudimentary organic countermine capability
Funding these capabilities could prove daunting if we restrict our vision to familiar paradigms and attempt to solve each shortfall with a discrete system, sensor, platform, or weapon. Fortunately, imaginative and innovative planning can achieve needed improvements without budget-busting repercussions. As our leaders seek to man and equip naval expeditionary forces for the Navy-after-Next, the following low-cost, high-leverage enhancements should be placed at the top of any list of near-term requirements:
- Augment the MAGTF air combat element with a survivable and combat-capable aircraft to escort, support, and protect the MV-22 out to its extended range. This aircraft could be an Osprey derivative or another type of VSTOL aircraft embarked with the ARG.
- Continue to explore options such as integrating LAMPS Mk III aircraft into the ARG. The inclusion of two SH60B aircraft would: (1) provide airborne early warning using the airborne APS-124 radar, electronic countermeasures ALQ-142 ESM suite, and identification friend or foe capability; (2) assist battle management by linking command-and-control systems with a digital data link from well over the horizon; (3) provide a rudimentary surface warfare capability by employing Penguin and Hellfire missiles; (4) provide a robust multisensor and undersea warfare weapon-delivery capability.
- Provide the ARG with a fixed-wing tactical VSTOL aircraft that has improved air-to-air and air-to-surface ship attack capability, day and night, even in adverse weather conditions. An upgraded AV-8B Harrier, while less capable of taking on later-generation threats, would be effective against a wide range of surface and air threats.
- Deploy an Arapaho-type undersea warfare capability on board either amphibious assault ships or maritime prepositioning ships designated to provide sustainment to the ARG. Also explore the viability of emerging countermine systems that could be organic to the ARG.
One way to package a high percentage of these capabilities is to deploy a surface combatant with the amphibious ready group. An Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)class frigate—not typically a primary battle group player—with two embarked SH-60B Seahawk helicopters would be an ideal platform to support an amphibious ready group. The ship would provide air-defense capability, enhanced command and control and battle management, and excellent surface warfare and undersea warfare capabilities. This concept has been demonstrated successfully in carrier battle group and amphibious ready group workups but has yet to be formally implemented with forward deployed forces. The rationale for institutionalizing this investment is powerful.
A Compelling Need
The ability of our MAGTFs to operate autonomously outside the protective umbrella of a carrier battle group needs to be ensured. Any deficiencies that affect the force's ability to survive in the hotly contested littoral must be eliminated. The Navy and the Marine Corps must continue to take the lead in articulating these deficiencies and proposing effective solutions—and then make their case to the administration, Congress, and the American people.
Knowledgeable observers recognize and appreciate the critical role that naval expeditionary forces have played and will continue to play in supporting the National Security Strategy. Addressing the issues that inhibit these forces from accomplishing their missions must become a priority in our national defense debate.
Captain Goldorisi is a senior advisor for the Center for Security Strategies and Operations, the policy research and analysis arm of Anteon Corporation’s Systems Engineering Group. During his career as a naval aviator, he twice served on battle group staffs and served several tours in the amphibious assault forces, culminating in command of the USS Cleveland (LPD-7) and Amphibious Squadron Seven. He would like to thank Rick Laziksy and Bruce Byrum for their invaluable help and keen insights in completing this article.