The V-22 is a revolutionary joint common aircraft designed to meet validated requirements of the Marine Corps for 360 MV-22s, of Special Operations Command for 50 CV-22s, and of the Navy for 48 HV-22s. Its tilt-rotor technology offers great increases in the speed, responsiveness, and operational reach of military rotary-wing aircraft. The MV-22 Osprey completed operational evaluation (OpEval) in October 2000, and was found to be operationally effective and operationally suitable.
The program was on the verge of a full production decision when a production aircraft crashed in December 2000. Soon thereafter, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Jim Jones directed an independent V-22 review and requested a separate Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General investigation as well. Delay of the production decision and the two reviews have re-energized the debate between proponents of the Osprey and those in favor of other alternatives to helicopter medium-lift requirements.
The heart of the debate over the V-22 is not the aircraft's current technical or programming challenges, all of which have solutions. Rather, it is "capability bang for investment buck" and V-22 cost relative to other programs expected to be in the DoD budget in the years ahead. As always, there will be more requirements than resources, a problem that is not easily solved amid the many competing defense priorities of the nation. It is unlikely that there will be enough funds to meet the widespread modernization requirements of all services. The joint V-22 program—as currently structured with a total of only 458 aircraft—is an expensive program competing for limited resources.
The recent public controversy has stirred up long-standing criticism of the V-22 program and tilt-rotor technology, including the seemingly valid proposal of both opponents and some well-intentioned supporters—a mix of V-22s and helicopters to meet the Marine Corps' medium-lift replacement (MLR) requirement. This would consist of a small number of MV-22s as "silver bullets," with another type of helicopter filling the bulk of the MLR requirement. The mix argument is composed of the following elements:
- Acknowledgement of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)validated Marine Corps MLR requirement for a shipboard-compatible aircraft capable of carrying 24 troops at 240 knots in a 200 nm operational radius, a 2,100 nm self-deployment capability with one aerial refueling, and ability to survive 12.7 mm weapon damage.
- Acknowledgment that the MV-22 is the solution to those requirements and the most operationally effective and cost-effective alternative across the full range of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and assault support missions.
- Recognition that the Osprey also is more expensive relative to the unit recurring and unit program costs of some proposed helicopter technology alternatives on an airframe-to-airframe comparison for a fixed number of squadrons.
- The conclusion that a mix of an undetermined number of MV-22s and helicopters—such as an improved "navalized" version of the CH-47—would be an acceptable compromise. Mix advocates would call this the middle ground between the JROC-validated requirement and the compelling effectiveness of the V-22 on one hand, and the V-22's higher costs relative to potential helicopter alternatives within a fixed DoD budget on the other. Reintroduction of the V-22 mix concept offers nothing new. Since 1984, there have been more than seven cost and operational effectiveness analyses (COEAs) conducted on Marine Corps MLR requirements and the Osprey. Each COEA built on and improved the analyses of previous studies to answer new questions and look at new options. In fact, the V-22 is one of the most studied roeyrams in DoD history.
Mixed MLR fleet analyses specifically were addressed within the 1993 MLR Phase I COEA and the 1994 MLR Phase II COEA. Review of the various studies highlights the following points:
It is always less costly to purchase platforms that do not meet validated MLR requirements or to offer combinations that only partially meet the requirements. The "silver bullet" V-22 approach says that the requirements are validated and necessary for the emerging 21st-century operational environment; however, because of competing priorities and subjective judgments relative to rotary-wing replacement capabilities and cost, only a portion of the requirements will be satisfied. Total cost, capability improvement, and cost-effectiveness over the life of an aircraft are the key programmatic factors in requirements fulfillment. Actually, fielding only a few V-22s creates more operational and logistical problems for the Marine Corps and Navy than consolidating and reducing two aircraft types—the CH-46E and CH-53D—with the single MV-22. The mismatch in capabilities would limit the operational employment of Marine air-ground task force medium lift to the least capable platforms.
A mix would most likely increase the number of aircraft types the Marine Corps will operate, and this approach does not conform to DoD and joint efforts aimed at commonality. The long-term plan for the Marine Corps is to neck down its aircraft from ten to five or six. The mix proposal adds another type—and the training, logistics, and manning necessary to maintain it—without the justification of a corresponding increase in MAGTF operational capability. The mix moves the Marine Corps and DoD farther away from the joint common rotary-wing replacement aircraft that tilt-rotor technology offers. It misses the near-term opportunity for greater consolidation and commonality in naval aviation and the long-term cost benefits to be realized through expanded DoD use and foreign military sales.
The V-22 and other aircraft MLR mix would be more costly and less effective operationally than an all-MV-22 fleet. Although addressed in previous COEAs with similar results, the 1994 Phase II COEA concluded that "cost analysis clearly demonstrated that pure fleet alternatives are more affordable than mixed fleet alternatives." One of the primary drivers of higher mixed fleet costs relative to pure fleets is the resulting higher unit fly-away costs for each alternative resulting from smaller procurement numbers. The higher the overall procurement numbers, the lower the unit recurring fly-away costs and the more cost-effective technology investment becomes for meeting desired requirements. In acquisition costing, more units procured is always better because overall program and unit recurring costs are dependent on the total numbers procured. The fewer units procured, the more expensive each becomes—as does the total program.
The MV-22 "silver bullet" approach creates a disparity in land- and sea-based MAGTF operational range and capabilities for larger scale vertical assault. The mix makes sense only if proponents are viewing the MAGTF in terms of the forward-deployed and crisis response missions performed routinely by the smallest of its elements: Marine expeditionary units (special operations capable) MEUs(SOC). A MEU(SOC) with a 12aircraft MV-22 squadron could respond in a few hours to a crisis 900 miles away with 240 Marines (if 10 of 12 MV-22s were operational). The same MEU(SOC) with four MV-22 "silver bullets" in its aviation combat element could respond with 72 Marines (if three of four MV-22s were operational). More MV-22s means reduced risk on the ground as the naval task force moves to avert or stabilize a crisis.
As the size of the MAGTF increases, the utility of the mix decreases proportionally. In large-scale operations, the mix option does little to ease the Marine Corps' strategic airlift shortfall, while the all-MV-22 fleet reduces it measurably owing to the aircraft's self-deployment capabilities. Once in theater, the ability of the Marine expeditionary brigade or Marine expeditionary force to maneuver at the operational level through rapid large-scale vertical assault or assault support operations would be limited to enhancement of current helicopter capabilities. The mix option would not field a sufficient number of MV-22 squadrons to make an appreciable difference in time, operational reach, assault support, aircraft attrition, and casualties. An all-MV-22 fleet complemented by heavy-lift CH-53E aircraft provides the necessary mix of aircraft needed to recoup lost vertical assault lift, exploit battle-space gaps, and move up to regimental-sized units rapidly.
In equivalent lift analysis, the mix of the MV-22 and another helicopter would require greater numbers of aircraft, amphibious shipping, support infrastructure, and manpower thereby making it a more costly option than an all-V-22 fleet. Equivalent lift analysis is an apples-to-apples comparison of capabilities based on a variety of measures. In the 1994 COEA, the best of the helicopter alternatives required 50% more aircraft to match the combat power buildup and lower attrition rates of an all- MV-22 fleet when aircraft survivability was taken into account. Hence, more squadrons, ships, and manpower would be required to match the capabilities and effectiveness of the allMV-22 force.
In an equal cost analysis, pure fleet alternatives were found to be more affordable than mixed fleet alternatives—and a smaller all-V-22 fleet was equal in combat power build-up rates with less aircraft attrition and fewer casualties than the best of the helicopter alternatives using 45% more aircraft. Again, the implication for the MLR mixed fleet is that it would be only proportionally better relative to the total MV-22 squadrons procured.
The MV-22 and other helicopter MLR mix concept is a hopeful compromise between validated requirements and the cost of the joint V-22 program as currently structured. But it is a forlorn hope. The very factors that would seem to drive down costs—reduced numbers of V-22s—actually increase the unit recurring and total unit program costs. Moreover, total costs of the mix option actually increase because it would add another aircraft to the Marine Corps inventory. Defense leaders would be wise to designate tilt-rotor technology and the V-22 program as the DoD baseline for all future rotary-wing aircraft replacement. Looking ahead 30 to 40 years, a shift to all-tilt-rotor technology makes the most warfighting and economic sense for the services and the nation.
Colonel Hanifen, a CH-46 pilot, is assigned to the Joint Vision and Transformation Division of J-7 in the Joint Staff.