A cornerstone of the submarine force's excellence has been its ability to critically and objectively examine and correct its failures. The tragic collision of the USS Greeneville (SSN772) with the Ehime Maru and several resulting deaths will challenge this ability.
Since the completion of the board of inquiry and subsequent admiral's mast, the former captain of the Greeneville has felt free to tell all in a number of nationally televised appearances. These appearances and the court of inquiry results have provided insights into the causes of the incident and the way ahead for the submarine force.
The sacred duty of a mariner is to avoid hazarding another vessel at sea. As a mariner, this captain was an egregious failure. In this regard, the court of inquiry's wording in its finding was kind to him.
Likewise, the highest duty of the captain of any naval vessel is to ensure the safety of his crew. As a ship's captain in peacetime, this captain again was an egregious failure. The collision endangered his crew, and in this regard the court of inquiry was again kind to him.
During successive television interviews with Commander Scott D. Waddle we were witness to a former leader in apparent anguish over his inability to protect his men in an inquiry after having failed to protect them at sea, when he was in his domain, with the highest priority being the safety of his ship and crew. From the first day of training on board a submarine, aspiring commanding officers are trained continually on the dangers involved in approaching the surface, and the need to comply closely with safety procedures is heavily emphasized.
Most troubling in retrospect were the former captain's statements concerning his "standing orders" regarding the ship's safe operation and his comments at sea that day. He maintained that he had the authority to circumvent standing orders in his rush to accomplish the day's events. (These orders required steps that are in place to reduce the risk of collision; these included adequate analysis of contacts and adequate periscope search for contacts.) In fact, Commander Waddle did not have this authority.
In the case of the Greeneville, the captain's failure to understand his priority in terms of crew safety and his failure to understand the most fundamental responsibility of a mariner at sea are issues that could easily cross-deck to other submarines.
Unfortunately, the outcome of the court of inquiry calls into question the credibility of that process as well. Among other unanswered questions is why these operations were not restricted to more appropriate waters. From another viewpoint, this raises the question of the responsibility of seniors in command to avoid putting commanding officers or subordinates in positions that may increase the probability of compromising the safety of both their men and others (in this case, other ships).
In the case of the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force these questions are all the more germane since it is a long-held tradition of submariners to back up or second check one's shipmate to ensure ship safety and security. It would appear that there was a breakdown in this proven practice on 9 February as the Greeneville went into inappropriate waters to perform an emergency main ballast tank blow.
Recently, the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force changed commanders in a previously scheduled normal rotation. The question this begs, of course, is where does the submarine force go from here as it decides how to deal with the lasting effects of the disaster and seeks to find and correct its causes?
The first step that must be taken is for the new submarine force commander to reject out of hand the dangerous notion that this was an isolated accident. The submarine force's greatness has been predicated on the exact opposite reaction to events such as these—i.e., presuming that the problem may be broader and aggressively acting on this basis.
The Greeneville captain's failure to understand that the commanding officer of a submarine does not have the authority to even consider compromising safety priorities except in wartime is instructive because the framework for this understanding is a major training issue established at the force commander level. In this sense, the force commander failed the Greeneville, the submarine force, and the fleet commander. Further, these events or missions requested of submarines and locations for performing them are determined by the force commander.
The challenge for the submarine force then is to determine the depth of the combined contaminations of poor judgment, compromise of tradition, and lack of training and understanding, and to right the force to its customary standards of operational excellence.
The challenge for the Navy is the same and to further reexamine its standards of performance and accountability before confidence in its leadership erodes.
Rear Admiral Frank W. Lacroix served on board seven submarines and commanded the USS Jacksonville (SSN-699) and the USS Dallas (SSN-700), as well as Submarine Development Squadron Twelve. He retired from the Navy in 1996, and is now a senior national security policy analyst at the RAND Corporation’s National Defense Research Institute.